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The Development and Use ofWritten Pleadings in Scots Civil
Procedure
An Introduction
(i) Three Primary Questions.
At the start of researching this thesis, the writer wanted to answer three questions.
First, what was and is meant by 'written pleadings' in Scots law? Secondly, how was
it that written pleadings and the rules of written pleadings arose? Thirdly, and
probably influenced by the Zeitgeist of the late 1990s, the writer wanted to explore
whether modern Scottish civil procedure was in need of reform, and whether the
system of written pleadings as traditionally practised would continue to play a part.
(ii) A General Definition of Written Pleadings.
At the outset, a very general definition of 'written pleadings' might be attempted viz.
the formulation in writing of litigants' positions in law and fact for determination by
a court. But for the present this is as far as the definition can go. The word
'pleadings' has changed in its meaning from the seventeenth century to the present
and this should be borne in mind when considering the literature of different
periods.
In the early period, from the time of Viscount Stair,1 to about the mid 1700s,
'pleading' was a term of art, meaning the oral presentation of a case to the court. This
pleading had as its goal verbal articulacy and fluency of expression and was
'syllogistic' or 'enthememic' in construction. Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, in
1 i.e. 1680s onwards.
1
'What Eloquence is fit for the Bar. An Essay,'2 gives us an early idea of what was
considered 'eloquent'. This pleading was said to be viva voce, i.e. oral.
'Written pleading' as a technical term is seen from about the 1820s onwards, and is
used to differentiate pleading in writing from 'pleading viva voce', following reforms
in the procedure of the Court of Session which aimed to limit the practice of the
former.
Confusingly, in the earlier period of the mid to late 1700s, the use of the word
'pleading' could have been understood in both senses. Boswell captured the idea
when he said,
'Ours is a court of papers. We are never seriously engaged but when we write.
We may be compared to the Highlanders in 1745. Our pleading3 is like their
firing their musketry, which did little execution. We do not fall heartily to
work till we take to our pens, as they do their broadswords.'4
When those lawyers did take to their pens, the pleading in writing was sometimes
termed 'written pleading.' The resulting documents incorporated not just the law
and the facts but also arguments to persuade the court. They were often voluminous,
hence Boswell's reference to a 'court of papers.'
(iii) What is Meant by 'Civil Procedure'?
The title of this thesis also refers to Scots 'Civil Procedure.' This is the modern term.
As the name suggests, it is the manner of proceeding in civil causes before the
2 contained in his: Pleadings in some remarkable Cases Before the Supreme Courts ofScotland Since
the Year 1661. To which, the Decisions are subjoyn'd (Edinburgh, 1673).
3 i.e. oral.
2
courts.5 When used generically, it encompasses the rules, directions, acts of sederunt6
and practice notes created by civil courts regulating the manner of civil proceedings
before them, and subsumes the case law and conventions which have developed
from the implementation of these regulations. If someone interrupted two
perambulating advocates on the floor of Parliament House and asked them 'Where
can I find out about Scottish civil procedure?', they might perhaps point to
specialised texts or Volume 2 of the Parliament House Book7 which contains the
Rules of the Court of Session 1994 as amended, interspersed with annotations.
From the seventeenth century there have been texts and treatises and annotated
prints of the 'manner of proceeding' in the courts. Stair appended to his Institutions
of the Law ofScotland8 his Modus Litigandi or Forms ofProcess Observed Before the Lords of
Council and Session in Scotland which became Book IV of the second edition of his
Institutions. From this example, there followed texts on what became known as 'The
Form of Process',9 and later 'The Practice of the Court of Session'10 or sometimes 'The
4 Boswell: the Ominous years 1774-1776, ed. C. Ryskamp and F.A. Pottle, (London, 1963) p. 228.
5 W.A. Wilson, in his Introductory Essays on Scots Law (2nd ed., Edinburgh, 1984) opens the
chapter on 'Civil Procedure' thus: 'This essay outlines the procedure in an ordinary action in
the Court of Session.' p. 63.
6 In the thesis this will be reduced to 'A.S.' In the plural 'acts of sederunt' will be employed.
7 Green's Annotated Rules of the Court of Session 1994 as amended, (2003) Parliament House
Book, Volume 2, Division C (Court of Session Practice).
8 (Edinburgh,1681).
9 John Spotiswood, The Form ofProcess, before the Lords ofCoimcil and Session, (etc.) (Edinburgh,
1711); (2nd ed., Edinburgh, 1718), J. Russell, The Form ofProcess in the Court of Session (etc.)
(Edinburgh, 1768), J. Watson, New Form ofProcess before the Court ofSession (etc.) (Edinburgh,
1791), Thomas Beveridge, A Practical Treatise on the Forms ofProcess before the Court ofSession
(etc.) (2 vols.), (Edinburgh, 1826).
10 J. J. Darling, The Practice of the Court ofSession, (2 vols.) (Edinburgh, 1833), C.F. Shand, The
Practice of the Court ofSession (2 vols.) (Edinburgh, 1848), JE. J. G. Mackay, The Practice of the
Court of Session, (2 vols.) (Edinburgh, 1877 - 79); D. Balfour, A Handbook ofCourt ofSession
Practice, (Edinburgh, 1891), JE. J. G Mackay, Maiiual ofPractice in the Court ofSession,
(Edinburgh, 1893); J.A. Maclaren, Court ofSession Practice, (Edinburgh, 1916)
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Procedure in the Court of Session.'11 In essence the terms have the same meaning and
in modern practice are encompassed in the words 'Civil Procedure.'12
(iv) Lessons From the History of the Development ofWritten Pleading.
The reason for positing the second question viz. how was it that written pleadings
and the associated rules arose is that, in the literature, the magna opera of /Eneas
Mackay and James Anderson Maclaren13 and the modern treatises and textbooks,
there is nowhere a detailed account of the development of written pleadings. There
are historical references to the main events and statutory changes are noted, but they
are glossed and do not actually tell us much about what caused changes in civil
procedure and why such changes were considered necessary. This thesis attempts to
do so, but not merely as historicism. Historical developments in civil procedure and
in the creation of the system of written pleadings can be instructive as suggesting
solutions to modern day problems. The recent Coulsfield Report observed:
'This Report is not an appropriate place to examine in detail the role of
written pleadings in court procedure in Scotland in the past. However,
some historical background may be useful, since it may indicate what are
the tendencies inherent in a system in which there is extensive reliance
on written pleadings, and how the resulting problems might possibly be
avoided.'14
11 J.P. Coldstream, Procedure in the Court ofSession, (Edinburgh, 1878).
12 The terms 'Procedural law' or 'Adjectival law' are sometimes seen in analyses of the
branches of Scots Law. The terms are merely classificatory meaning the law which has
developed under the form of process or practice.
13 op. cit. supra.
14 Report of the Working Party on Court of Session Procedure (Chairman: Lord Coulsfield,
2000) Ch. 6.
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In tracing the development, it will be seen that there is a continuity, and an evident
tradition. Some of the terminology and conventions still used in modern pleadings
will be explained. Most practitioners could explain why a summons was entitled a
summons, and a defence was called a defence, but what of condescendence, answer,
litiscontestation, proof before answer, and pleading devices such as 'quoad ultra',
'brevitatis causa', and 'believed and averred' to name but a few?
It is sometimes insinuated that modern written pleadings in Scots Law developed
from the starting point of the Court of Session Act 1825 (also known as the Judicature
Act).15 The Act dictated the form in which the pleadings were to be presented and
instigated the 'closed record' but as will be seen, much from previous practice was
incorporated or reformulated.
The Coulsfield Working Party appreciated that historical solutions to some of the
historical problems of a system which uses written pleadings can be useful. But all
the problems which may arise from changes cannot be anticipated. As one astute
early nineteenth century commentator appreciated,
'In regard to the forms, and regulations of judicial proceedings, it is obvious
that the minutiae cannot be anticipated in detail by a code of rules, but are to
be fixed by experience, and must be fixed by constant amendments as they are
liable to constant evasions'.16
15 For example, 'The current system of written pleadings was first set out in the Court of
Session Act 1825.', A. Murray, 'Fair Notice - The Role of Written Pleadings in the Scottish
Justice System' in H.L. MacQueen and B.G.M. Main (eds.), The Reform ofCivil Justice (1997) 5
Flume Papers on Public Policy 49 at 51.
16 James Glassford, Remarks on the Constitution and Procedure of the Scottish Courts ofLaw
(Edinburgh, 1812), p. 150.
5
The quotation highlights two important points. Firstly, courts have always attempted
to specify in the form of process, or in modern parlance, civil procedure, the rules
which the proceedings must follow. Secondly, changes to the rules must be
continually monitored and further altered, as their implementation is affected by
practice.
A grasp of the historical origins and the developments in civil procedure
demonstrates that often, ideas or innovations which may appear to be novel are often
actually 'second-hand.'
Let us consider three brief examples. First, as touched upon above, and as will be
discussed in more depth in chapter 1 of this thesis, pleading in the period leading up
to the start of the nineteenth century was in writing. The facts and the law were pled,
but in rhetorical and argumentative style. The procedural reforms thereafter forced
parties to state the 'material' or 'essential' facts and to state the law together with the
authorities relied upon in a separate note, which came to be attacheci to the main
pleadings. Written pleadings based in rhetoric and argument coupled with detailed
authority finally died out with the abolition of the 'written cases' procedure before
the Lord Ordinary in the 1850 Court of Session Act. Yet, in a Court of Session
commercial action at the present day, where a cause is appointed to debate, the
Commercial judge may order that 'written arguments on any question of law should
be submitted'17 or may direct the action to be determined on the basis of written
submissions...without any oral hearing.'18 Notes of Argument may also be ordered19
17 RCS 47.12 (2)(b).
18 RCS 47.12(2)( h).
19 RCS 22.4.
6
in 'ordinary actions' stating the grounds of law to be advanced by a party at the
debate.
Consider this second example. In the 1860s there were calls for the introduction of a
Note to Admit or Note of Admissions procedure akin to an English common law
rule. The Second Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Courts ofLaw
in Scotland recommended its adoption20 but the idea fell away. The same concept
recrudesced in the twentieth century, and Notices to Admit were introduced into
patent cases in 1991 and extended to ordinary actions in 1994.21
Thirdly, of actions before the Court in the mid-nineteenth century, those concluding
for payment of money were the most frequent. Lord Advocate Moncrieff's aborted
Bill of 1863 recommended a simplified and streamlined procedure for these common
types of cause, requiring in the initiating writ simply the amount claimed and very
briefly, the cause of the action.22 In the twentieth century, actions for damages for
personal injuries became the most common type of cause before the court. In making
provision for these types of cases, the Court introduced in 1985 a simplified Optional
Procedure23 which in 2003 has been superseded for all actions of damages for
'personal injuries' by a new 'personal injuries procedure'. This new procedure
commences with a 'statement of claim' consisting of numbered paragraphs relating
only to those facts necessary to establish the claim and without a condescendence or
pleas-in-law.24
20 (P.P., Edinburgh, 1868).
21 Now regulated by RCS Chapter 28A.
22 with no requirement for conclusions.
23 which was regulated by RCS Chapter 34.
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Thus, ideas in civil procedure do often have a historical pedigree. If proposals for
reforming civil procedure and the system of written pleadings in the modern era
have such a pedigree, knowledge of how previous rules were usurped or altered or
derogated from must be of interest in assessing the likely chances of successful
reform.
But equally, it should be appreciated that in the constant search for improvement, it
is unlikely that there is a Utopian ideal. Reminiscent of Glassford in 1812, Angus
Stewart, Q.C. has noted:
'There is no such thing as a system of procedure perfect for all time. As time
passes, all procedures tend to over-elaboration, all forms tend to ossification
and all rules tend to be displaced by their derogations. Every now and again
reform is imperative.'25
(v) National Sensitivities and the Reform of Written Pleadings.
This leads to the third question viz. whether the modern Scottish system of written
pleadings is in need of reform. Answering this is more difficult. Proposals for
changes to civil procedure in Scots Law frequently raise passionate debate and this is
particularly so with written pleadings. In earlier periods, schemes with an English
content offended national and cultural sensitivities as an attack on the integrity of the
system of Scots Law as a whole. England has never imposed changes to the Scots
system of pleading. There has never been a wholesale incorporation of an English
system of pleading nor assimilation of the two systems, even though this has been
24 See RCS new Chapter 43.
25 Angus Stewart, Q.C. : Book Review of 'The Reform of Civil Justice', [Hume Papers on
Public Policy (Edinburgh, 1997)] in (1999) 3 Edinburgh Law Review 265 at p. 266.
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periodically advocated. English procedure, though, has cast a long shadow over
Scots civil procedure.
Changes modelled on English practice have frequently been incorporated into the
Scottish system, sometimes with beneficial effect. The first proposals for the
incorporation of English civil jury trial caused great indignation among large
sections of Scottish society in the 1780s, yet jury trial was a competent method of
proof by 1815, and its incorporation was thereafter justified (erroneously) by
reference to prior practice of the Court of Session. Its success continued because
lawyers realised that this 'bulwark of English common law' was advantageous to
their clients. It became the lawyers' favoured method of proof up to the 1860s. The
beneficial effect was that it educated the profession that it was possible to make
averments of fact without admixing those averments with propositions in law.
Thereafter, the Court of Session made strenuous attempts to force parties to separate
law and fact in all actions, which attempts were reflected in the rules regulating
written pleadings.
It has always been the boast of the Scottish system that a cause might be disposed of
without the necessity of enquiry into the facts pertaining to the case, saving expense
for the litigant and conserving the resources of the court. Through the concept of
relevancy, a party's case may be examined to test if, taking the facts stated in the
hypothetical, the orders sought from the court are justified when the law is applied
to those facts.
The concept was an inheritance from the early Canon law and still forms a
cornerstone of Scottish civil procedure. As will be discussed in the thesis, it is
9
sometimes a difficult concept. It has not always been understood, nor its benefits
appreciated, in the House of Lords, which on occasion has raised the hackles of
practitioners north of the border. Scots lawyers have always been a little sensitive to
criticism of their national form of process or civil procedure.
Why is this? Across the course of reform of civil procedure, from changes to the
'form of process', from the time of Stair to the present, Scots lawyers have
demonstrated pride in their system of pleading. As Lord Gill told a conference in
1998,
'As for pleading, to the enthusiasts it has great strengths. Those who speak
of pleadings often do so with lyrical excitement and pleasure, but when the
system is exposed to outside review, there are comments such as those of
Lord Diplock in Gibson v. BICC.'26
The enthusiasts, defenders and even champions of the Scottish system of written
pleadings often see it as a system which is inherently Scottish and part of Scots law,
better than that in England and historically envied by those in other jurisdictions.
(vi) Written Pleadings and Scots Law
Moreover, it is often maintained that the Scottish system of written pleading is
instrumental in preserving Scots law as a system which 'founds on principle' and is
not 'precedent led' and that Scots Law is a 'rights based, remedy subordinated'
26 'Future Directions', Paper presented to Conference 'The Reform of Civil Justice'
DHI/Faculty of Advocates, 1 June 1998. The case is reported at 1973 S.C. (H.L.) 15 and for
further comment see infra.
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system of law27 as compared to England which places emphasis on the remedy. This
is perhaps now questionable. Historically, changes to Scottish civil procedure in the
nineteenth century had the practical effect of bringing to an end references to
classical texts and foreign works of learning which were cited as examples of
principle.
Still, some writers point to other strengths in the Scottish system of written pleadings
and for justification often refer to what outsiders have said about it. Here is one such
example.
(vii) Written Pleadings from an External Viewpoint
In 1911, in the United States, a Federal Committee under the chairmanship of Mr.
Justice Lurton, was involved in drafting procedural rules for use in equity cases in
the federal courts of the United States. In the vacation of that year, the chairman
visited England to study the modern procedure in actual operation there. In the
course of the visit, he submitted to Lord Chancellor Loreburn twelve questions
relating to equity procedure in England. His first was 'What is the practical benefit
resulting from the adoption of a single form of action in law and equity cases?'
Loreburn, struggling to discharge the functions of Speaker of the House of Lords,
Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and member of the Cabinet and shortly to fall seriously
ill from the pressures of these positions, still managed to write answers to all the
questions. In answer to this first, he explained the historical minefield of English civil
27 See N. Whitty, 'From Rules to Discretion: Changes in the Fabric of Scots Private Law' (2003)
7 Edinburgh Law Review 281 at 304 and 307-8.
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procedure up to the Judicature Act 1873 which fused equity and law in the High
Court and resulted in new rules for pleadings. He explained these new rules in brief:
'Each party must state in writing as shortly as he can what his claim is and
how it arises, or in the same way what his defence is and his reply. He must
not enter upon any evidence, and must not state his case in an embarrassing
way.28 What is required is clearness, brevity and simplicity, though in fact
these virtues are not always present in the pleadings. Either party may be
ordered to give further particulars in order to make things plain. (It may be
worth while for Mr. Justice Lurton and his coadjutors to consider the Scottish
method of pleading, which, in my opinion, is the best. Upon that I am quite
sure that the Lord President of the Court of Session would willingly give
information. He is at the head of the Scottish Judiciary, and speaks with the
highest authority.)'29
We do not know if Mr. Justice Lurton contacted the Lord President but the passage
was eminent praise indeed from the Woolsack.30 Scots lawyers have since used and
re-used the quotation, as in its essence there is something remarkable about the
highest judge in Britain considering that the Scottish system of written pleading was
the best example Mr. Justice Lurton could emulate and moreover, for the creation of
a system of pleading in equity, that bedrock of the English law. The passage seems to
have been originally quoted by another American, Wyness Millar in 1932,31 and was
28 i.e. by concealing facts which would lead to embarrassment at trial.
29 Printed in The New Federal Equity Rules Promulgated by The United States Supreme
Court at the October Term, 1912, as revised to July 1,1925: together with the cognate
statutory provisions and a reproduction with annotations, of all former Federal Equity Rules.
With an Introduction, Annotations and Forms by James Love Hopkins of the Bar of the
United States Supreme Court. (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1925) p. 28.
30 See also the reported comments on the Scottish system of pleadings of Lord Chancellor
Halsburgh in J. & G. Paton v. Clydesdale Bank, Ltd, and Anr. 1896 SLT 7 at 8.
31 R. Wyness Millar, 'Civil Pleading in Scotland' (1932) 30 Michigan Law Review, (2 Parts) No.
4, 545 - 581; No. 5 582 - 746 at 545.
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then used by Lord President Cooper in his Selected Papers as the basis for an assertion
that Scots lawyers are not unreasonably prejudiced in favour of their native
methods.32 It was used by Lord Kilbrandon in his obiter dicta apologia on the Scottish
system of written pleadings in Gibson v. BICC33 in counterpoint to Lord Diplock's
biting criticisms of Scottish practice.34 The quotation has had various outings since.35
But if one looks behind the above facts, one sees that Loreburn was a product of a
Scottish legal family, his grandfather36 and his father37 both being members of the
Scottish Bar. Perhaps some of that rubbed off on him. Moreover, although he was an
English lawyer by training, unlike his fellow members of the Appellate Committee,
Loreburn had a predilection for separating, and keeping separate, fact and law in
legal issues before the court,38 and he was no slave to stare decisis, viewing previous
cases as merely illustrative of principle.39 These were two traits which a Scottish
lawyer of the time would have been proud of. Even in his judicial writing he
appreciated the requirements of written pleading which permitted fact of 'sufficient
particularity' but not evidence to be pled.40
32 Cooper, T., (The Rt. Hon. Lord, of Culross), 'The Scottish Legal Tradition' in Selected Papers
1922-1954, (1st collected ed.) (Edinburgh, 1957) 172 at 193.
33 1973 S.C. (H.L.) 15 at 32.
34 ibid, at pp. 27-30.
35 R. Black, An Introduction to Written Pleading (Edinburgh, 1982) p. 1; S. Woolman, 'Pleadings',
in H.L. MacQueen (ed.) Scots Law into the 21st Century. Essays in Honour ofW.A. Wilson
(Edinburgh, 1996) 277 at 279; R. Aird and N. Jameson, The Scots Dimension to Cross-Border
Litigation. (Edinburgh, 1996) p. 106.
36 R.F.V. Heuston, Lives of the Lord Chancellors 1885 - 1940 (OUP, 1964) (Reissue 1987) p. 133
37 Obituary, 'The Right Hon. Lord Loreburn, Lord Chancellor', (1906) 14 SLT 1. His father was
later Chief Justice of the Ionian Islands, ibid.
38 Heuston, op. cit. p. 182, citing McCartan v. Belfast Harbour Commissioners [1911] 21.R. 143 and
Shrimpton v. Herts C.C. (1911) 104 L.T. 145.
39 Heuston, op. cit. Appendix, citing West Ham Union v. Edmonton Union [1908] A.C. 1, 4.
40 'I suppose that in the Scotch Law the object is to make people state clearly what it is that
they mean to prove, not to require them to state evidence, but so to aver that there is
sufficient particularity and that there will not be embarrassment or surprise to their
adversaries. I presume that is the general object' Caledonian Railway Company v. Symington
1912 S.C. (H.L.) 9 at p. 11. (The case was decided 16th November 1911).
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So, perhaps the English Lord Chancellor's admiration for Scottish pleading and his
recommendation to Mr. Justice Lurton should be seen in this light.
Another more recent example of English admiration, which has not often been
quoted, can be found in the Winn Report of the Committee on Personal Injuries
Litigation.41 There the committee considered that
'Scottish pleadings of which we cite an example below, merit study. Whilst
it can fairly be said that they tend to loquacity and that the highly significant
Latin terms employed would not trip easily for Temple pens or tape-
recorders, it must be respectfully recognised that they are so framed as
clearly to highlight, in isolation and in logical relevance and significance, the
issues to be determined. Their timber is sound. By contrast in English
pleadings there is far too often foliage serving no purpose other than that of
a screen.'42
These remarks were made towards the end of a period in which the House of Lords
had been called upon to decide a number of Scottish appeals on points of pleading,
which decisions moved practice away from strict interpretations of written pleading
and altered the notions of both bench and bar on the inter-relationship between
averment and proof. Pleadings of the time obscured rather than highlighted the
issues to be decided. These cases culminated in the decision of the House of Lords in
Gibson v. BICC*3 and the infamous dictn of Lord Diplock when he exclaimed,
41 Cmnd. 3691 (London, 1968) Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Winn.
42 ibid, at para. 244.
43 cit. snp.
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'My Lords, when I first became a member of your Lordships' House I was
unacquainted with the niceties of the Scots system of pleading. Since then
my acquaintance has grown; so has my disenchantment.'44
The decision is examined later in the thesis.45
Whilst there are some in Scotland who see only the strengths in the Scottish system
of written pleading and whilst Scottish lawyers have been traditionally sensitive to
comments from outsiders, perhaps comments such as those of Lord Diplock or
indeed any visiting outsider46 should occasionally jolt us from any complacency
regarding the need of our system periodically to be reviewed and reformed.
(viii) Scheme of the Thesis
Chapter One traces the development of written pleading from the time of Stair to the
end of the eighteenth century and examines the form of process immortalised by
Walter Scott in 'Redgauntlet'47 and caricatured by Maidment in his 'Court of Session
Garland.'48 In this, it is suggested that pleading in writing actually arose from an
unlikely source, but thereafter developed quickly. In Chapter Two, the continued
development of pleading in writing is followed through the turbulent times of
attempted governmental and parliamentary interference in Scotland's national legal
institutions, to the point of the ultimate adoption of the civil jury trial and the new
forms of procedure arising from the work of the 1824 Commissioners. Chapter Three
44 at 27.
45 see Chapter 5 infra.
46 See R. Wyness Millar, Civil Pleading in Scotland' 1932 (30) Michigan Law Review, (2 Parts)
(No. 4), 545- 581; (No. 5) 582 - 746, Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University of Dallas, Texas, 'The tyranny of fact pleadings' (2003) 48 JLSS 19 - 24.
47 W. Scott, Redgauntlet, (ed. G.A.M. Wood and D. Hewitt) Edinburgh Edition of the Waverley
Novels (Edinburgh UP, 1997).
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commences with an inspection of the terms of the important Court of Session Act
1825 and the struggle which followed in its implementation between the Court and
the profession. The chapter reviews and examines the ensuing procedural
developments, the Court of Session Act 1850, the aborted 1863 Bill and finally the
Court of Session Act 1868 which completed less than a century of radical change and
which had by then defined the operation of written pleadings in the Court of Session,
to which practice it has remained faithful up to the present day. Chapter Four
attempts an up-to-date statement of the modern rules of written pleading. Having
traced their development in the earlier chapters, it will be apparent that there is little
which is not based in previous practice. Most of the modern rules have a historical
pedigree and have arisen through the incremental changes scrutinised in the earlier
chapters. Chapter Five looks at the operation of written pleadings in the modern
adversarial context, drawing conclusions from some of the issues raised above.
Chapter Six concludes the thesis by speculating on the future for written pleadings
and attempting to answer the question whether traditional or conventional written
pleadings will or should have a continued role in Scots civil procedure, which
question, of course, concerned the writer at the very outset.
There are a number of appendices at the end of the thesis. Appendix 1 is an
examination of an actual case from the period covered in Chapter One. Appendix 2 is
a brief survey of actual written pleadings from the period 1843-73 taken from the
Session Papers of the Faculty of Advocates looking at how the advocates in the Court
employed written pleadings in the period. It may be read in conjunction with
Chapter Three. Appendices 3, 4 and 5 are the results of empirical research
undertaken by the writer at a formative stage in the research for this thesis. Some of
48 The Court ofSession Garland, (Edinburgh, 1839).
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the results are referred to in gremio of Chapter Five, but much has not been used.
Whilst only a portion of it has been used in this thesis, as I have no intention to
publish it separately I appreciate that others may wish to have recourse to it at a
future date. Thus I have included all of the material. Finally, Appendix 6 is a
reproduction of an article by the writer which was printed in a collection of essays
published by Edinburgh University Press in 1997. As the writer draws upon and uses
the article in the thesis, it is reproduced here in compliance with the terms of the
University of Edinburgh Higher Degree Regulations, and with the kind permission
of Edinburgh University Press.
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Chapter One
Procedure and Pleading in the 17th and 18th Centuries.
The Start and Development ofWritten Pleadings.
(i) Introduction
In 1714, William Forbes,1 reflecting upon the development of the form of process2
before the Supreme Court in Scotland commented,
'The State of our Form of Process hath, by the long Experience of near 200
Years, been from Time to Time improv'd and so refin'd from all Matter of
fancied Inconveniency as much as is possible; that it is at present more easy,
accurate, distinct, safe and desirable, than the Rules and Orders of any other
Supreme Court that hath fallen within the Compass of my Observation or
Reading.'3
Although we are not told which other Supreme Courts he had observed or read
about, his 'close Attendance every Session-day in the Inner-house, for the space of
1 At the time when he was writing, he was the newly installed incumbent of the first Chair of
Civil Law in the University of Glasgow. See further Cairns, 'The Origins of the Glasgow Law
School: The Professors of Civil Law, 1714-61', in P.B.FL Birks, (ed.), The Life of the Law:
Proceedings of the Tenth British Legal History Conference, Oxford, 1991, London, 1993,151, at pp.
177-9; Cairns, 'The Civil Law Tradition in Scottish Legal Thought', in D.L. Carey Miller and R.
Zimmermann, (eds.), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law. Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays
(Berlin, 1997), 191 at p. 217; and for his biography and, in particular, his life as an advocate
and collector of decisions, see D. Walker, The Scottish Jurists, (Edinburgh, 1985) at pp. 185-93.
2 What now might be termed Civil Procedure. What was meant by the phrase was literally the
manner of proceeding in the Court. Thus, there are a number of textbooks of the period
written by advocates and clerks entitled 'Forms of Process'. See Introduction and infra.
3 William Forbes, Advocate, Professor of Law in the University of Glasgow A Journal of the
Session. Containing the Decisions of the Lords of Council and Session, etc. (Edinburgh, 1714)
Preface, p.10.
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eight years immediately preceding June last' (1713), had convinced the Lords of
Council and Session of his 'exactness and accuracy' of observation.4
The improvement and refinement of the forms of process of the Court, up to this
time, had led to Scots lawyers beyond Forbes expressing pride in the Scottish manner
of proceeding before their Supreme Court. Craig5 and Stair6 before had expressed
similar sentiments. The two hundred years to the point of Forbes' observation at the
start of the eighteenth century had seen a system of pleading developed, modified
and refined to meet the needs of the people for whom it operated.
The utility of the procedure was crucial to these sixteenth, seventeenth and
eighteenth century commentators. A procedure before the Court which permitted of,
or at least aimed for, 'justice to all' was important. The old King's Council, with its
process on brieves, had been transformed into a central Court and with the new
Court came a changing view of Scots Law as well as new procedures and forms of
process, albeit that this change occurred against the matrix of the Jus commune
tradition. Implicit in these changes was that it was a central function of the King to
ensure the equitable administration of justice to all of his subjects and that justice
4 Act of Sederunt (A.S. hereafter) 7 July 1713 appended at p. 48 of the Preface.
5 'Our Scottish forms of legal process and judicial procedure are, no doubt, different from
those in use in England; but, with all respect to our neighbours, I make bold to say, and to say
advisedly, that the forms we use in Scotland are better than those used in any other country I
know of.' Epistle Dedicatory, p. 9, T. Craig, Jus feudale tribus libris comprehensum,( 3rd ed.),
(Edinburgh, 1732). [I have used Lord Clyde's translation, The Jus Feudale by Sir Thomas Craig of
Riccarton luith an Appendix containing the Books of the Feus, 2 vols. (Edinburgh and London,
1934), Vol. I at p. 9.] Craig's work was finished around 1605 although only first printed in
1655, see J. Cairns, Fergus and H. MacQueen, 'Legal Humanism in Renaissance Scotland'
(1990) 11 Jour. Leg. Hist. 40-69 at p. 49 and W.M. Gordon, 'Roman Law in Scotland' in: R.
Evans-Jones, (ed.), The Civilian Law Tradition, (Stair Society, Edinburgh, 1995). pp. 13-40 at p.
26. For a good explanation of Craig's motives in so writing see W.D.H. Sellar, 'English Law as
a Source' in: D.M. Walker (ed.), Stair Tercentenary Studies, (Edinburgh, 1981) p. 140 ff.
6 "[t]he law of Scotland in its nearness to equity, plainness and facility in its customs, tenors
and forms, and in its celerity and dispatch in the administration and execution of justice, may
well be paralleled with the best law in Christendom" I have used here the edition edited by
D. Walker, Stair's Institutions of the Law ofScotland (Edinburgh, 1981) at 1,1,16.
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should not favour one over the other by reason of their position in the hierarchy of
society.7
The language used by Forbes and Stair betrays this. For Forbes, the reason the Scots
form of process was better than anywhere else was because it was 'convenient',
'easy', 'accurate', 'known', 'distinct' and 'safe'. For Stair, the law of Scotland in its
'forms' was plain and easy, and the administration and execution of justice, swift in
dispatch. Even Craig, writing against a background of recommending a closer
working of English and Scots law,8 came to the conclusion that the Scottish forms of
legal process and judicial procedure were better.
In the development of the form of process, changes were initiated by the Lords
themselves, sometimes on the recommendation of the Faculty of Advocates, such as
to remedy what were considered abuses of the system. More often than not, the
'abuses' arose from litigants and their legal advisers attempting to circumvent the
rules of the Court or exploiting loopholes in the procedure to gain advantage over an
adversary; but such tactics were generally not employed with any preconceived
intention of eroding the procedure of the Court. A favourable new interpretation of
an old rule, the creation of delay or the imposition of extra expense upon an
adversary were tactics which could be, and were, used in the conduct of the
litigation.
7 One also notices the same imprimatur in the preamble to the acts of sederunt. Thus A.S. 24
May 1595 refers to "the great weill and ease of our Soverane Lords leiges" and A.S. 20
January 1643 commences, "considering the great prejudice of parteis and loss of mutche
tyme".
8 There is much in the literature on this. For an example, W.D.H. Sellar, 'English Law as a
Source' in: D. M. Walker, (ed.), Stair Tercentenary Studies (Stair Soc., Edinburgh, 1981) 140 and
by the same author, 'The Resilience of the Scottish Common Law' in D.L. Carey Miller
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There were principally two sources of rules under 'the form of process' - Acts of
Parliament, and declarations or ordinances by the Lords themselves, called 'Acts of
Sederunt.9
(ii) The Form of Process and Manner of Proceeding Before the Supreme
Court from the Time of its Institution
The Court of Session itself had been founded in 1532 and ratified by act 1541.10 By the
time of its institution, the old processes upon brieves had died out11 and the new
Court developed a form of process heavily influenced by the Romano-Canonical
procedure of the Church Courts of the time.12 In general, the procedure was oral,
although initiated by a written document and where the Lords thought it expedient,
parts of the procedure thereafter were in writing.13 There were marked similarities
between this procedure and that of the church courts,14 in particular, in the method
and R. Zimmerman, (eds.), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays
(Berlin, 1997) 149 at 160ff.
9 Forbes explains the difference between decisions of the Court and A.S. as 'Acts of Sederunt
differ from the decisions in this, that the former are only fixed rules of Form to be observed in
the Distribution of Justice made by the Lords in thesi; whereas the latter are their
determinations and Resolutions in hypothesi, upon particular points of Right or Form before
them in foro contensioso.'
10 Then entitled the 'College of Justice', which comprised its President and fourteen ordinary
Senatours. See R.K. Hannay, 'The College ofJustice: Essays on the Institution and Development of
the Court ofSession (1933), pp. 27-61.
11 There is a wealth of writing on the old process upon brieves. See J.W. Cairns Historical
Introduction, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 27; I.D. Willock The Origins and Development of the Jury in
Scotland, Stair Society, vol. 23 (1966); H.L. MacQueen 'Pleadable Brieves, Pleading and the
Development of Scots Law', (1986) 4 Law and History Review 403-22; H.L. MacQueen,
Common Law and Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland (1993).
12 John Finlay Professional Men ofLaw Before the Lords ofCouncil c.1500 - c.1550 (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1997) vol. I, p. 213 and see now the same author, Men
ofLaw in Pre-Reformation Scotland, Scottish Historical Review Monograph No. 9, Tuckwell
Press, (2000) at p. 122. There is also much in M. Godfrey, 'The Lords ofCouncil and Session and
the Foundation of the College ofJustice: A Study in Jurisdiction' (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis,
University of Edinburgh, 1998) at pp.192 -215.
13 J.W. Cairns, 'Historical Introduction', op. cit. p.63-4; Godfrey op. cit. p. 193.
14 S. Oliphant, The Court of the Official in Pre-Reformation Scotland: Based on the Surviving records
of the Officials ofSt. Andrews and Edinburgh, (Stair Society publication, vol. 34 (1982)) pp. 95 -
118; J.J. Robertson, 'The Development of the Law', in Brown (now Wormald) (ed.) The Acts of
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of formation and formulation of argument. The church courts had long used
Canonical procedure which had been influenced in the medieval period via the
rediscovery of the works of logicians and orators, and the disciplines of logic,
argumentation and topical reasoning, of the ancient period.
By the middle of the seventeenth century, the procedure of the Court of Session was
well defined. Before turning to the procedure, prescribed mode of reasoning and
pleading before the court in the early seventeenth to mid seventeenth century, one
should understand how the Court was composed, including its geographical
composition and how it operated in practice and to this we now turn.15
(iii) The Inner House and The Outer House.
The Court, at least from the time of its institution, sat as a unitary body, comprising
the President and fourteen Ordinary Lords, although not all these Lords always sat
together at one time. Nine Lords formed a quorum and causes coming before the
Court were decided by a majority vote.
the Lords of the Isles 1336-1493 Scot. Hist. Soc., (vol. 22 (1986)) at pp. 151-2. For some good
detective work in identifying Canonical influence in early law and in particular, steps in
process and procedure, see J.J. Robertson, 'The Canon Law Vehicle of Civilian Influence with
Particular Reference to Scotland', in D.L. Carey Miller and R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Civilian
Tradition and Scots Law Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays (Berlin, 1997), p.117 at pp. 121-5; and the
same author, 'Canon Law as a Source', in D. Walker (ed.), Stair Tercentenary Studies,
(Edinburgh, 1981).
15 What follows is based on the following sources: R.K. Hannay College ofJustice op. cit. pp. 95-
6; Royal Commission of the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland, Tolbooths and
Town-Houses: Civic Architecture in Scotland to 1833 (1996), 82-6; Our Journall into Scotland Anno
Domini 1629, 5"' November from Lowther (Edinburgh, 1894) 26-30; C.A. Malcolm, 'The
Parliament House and its Antecedents' in G.C.H. Paton (ed.) An Introduction to Scottish Legal
History, (Stair Society, vol. 20 (1958)) pp. 449-58; Lord Cullen, Parliament House A Short History
and Guide (1992); W. Forbes 'Journal of the Session' op. cit., Preface, pp. ii ff.
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The Court was composed of an Inner House and Outer House, separate from each
other, described16 initially as the 'invart tolbuyth' and the 'Outer Tolbuyth',17 and
thereafter as the 'inner-hous' and 'utir-hous' or 'over-hous'.
The reference to 'tolbooth' was an acknowledgement of the Court's predecessor, the
early sixteenth century Tolbooth, situated at the north west corner of the Kirk of St.
Giles, comprising an inner and outer part.
The original Tolbooth became unsuitable for the functioning of the Court, and
prompted the Lords of Session to complain to the town council of Edinburgh, which,
in 1554, undertook to effect repairs,18 eventually erecting at the south-west corner of
St. Giles a new Tolbooth with inner and outer houses for the purposes of Court. In
1632, King Charles I requested the town council to provide new accommodation for
Parliament, the Court of Session and the Privy Council, which request the Council
acceded to, and the foundation stone of a new building was laid on 3 August 1632.
The building works were finally completed in the summer of 1639.19 The design was
for a hall for Parliament and a jamb20 to the east with a great door positioned facing
the yard to the rear of St. Giles giving entry to the 'Parliament Hall'.
From at least 1555, whilst in the Tolbooth, the Court developed the practice of
individual members carrying out particular functions away from the main body of
16 in the early A.S.
17 Also 'outtir tolbuyth' or 'utir tolbuyth'.
18 Hannay, op. cit. p.95. See also H.P. [later Lord] Macmillan, 'The Court of Session in 1629',
1900 (xii) J. R. p. 137 (drawing on the historical manuscript - C. Lowther, R. Fallow, P.
Mauson, 'Our Joumall into Scotland ano dni. 1629, 5"' November, from Lowther' [= repr.
Edinburgh, 1894 as Onr jonrnale Into Scotland Anno Domini 1629, 5"' of November From Loivther.
C. Loivther Mr. R. Fallow Peter Mauson (Douglas Edition.)]
19 See further, M. Upton, 'The Platitude of Parliament Square' 1997 SLT (News) 273 at 274.
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the Court. Although obscure,21 it appears in the early practice that the Lords went
out to the Outer Tolbooth for the taking of depositions from witnesses. By 1564-5 an
ordinance of the Lords provides for 'thrie of thaim in the uttir tolbuyth' to hear on
two specified days 'all common privilegit materis'. Privileged matters22 were those
which required the supplication of the Lords upon a 'bill'23 and approval of the judge
by interlocutor was a prerequisite for the raising of a summons.24 These bills were
considered in the 'Bill Chamber', a throw back to the institution of the College of
Justice.25
20 i.e. wing.
21 The best explanation of the early development of the Lords going to the Outer Tolbooth
and later the Outer House is to be found in R.K. Hannay, op. cit. pp.91-101. The 'Over New
Tolbooth' in St. Giles' Kirk (prior to the 1640 building) comprised a connected outer and inner
house. It is discussed in P. Miller's appendix to Douglas's 1894 Edition of 'Lowther's Tour'
(Edinburgh, 1894) which also contains a plan at p. 27. The plan is reproduced in H.P.
Macmillan's 'The Court of Session in 1629' op. cit. at p. 140.
22 removings, suspensions and advocations also proceeded upon bills.
23 The Bill was in essence a draft of the summons. See further James A. Maclaren, Bill Chamber
Practice, (Edinburgh and Glasgow, 1915) p.3
24 On the Bill being passed by the Lord deputed for the consideration of the 'Billis', as
'appropriate' for progressing to the next stage as a summons ('summonds'), the bill would be
returned to the writer ('wryter' or sometimes 'writtar') to the signet who had drafted it and
he would draw the summons and forward it to the Keeper of the Signet, together with the Bill
passed by the Lords, who received the bill for warrant and signetted the summons. Of course
non-privileged summonses, of which the most common was a summons for payment of a
debt, could proceed without a bill. The procedure in respect of this, as well as the forms of
process generally, can be found in John Skene, Regiam Majestatem Scotiae &c. (Edinburgh
edition, 1609) to which is adjoined 'Twa Treatises, The ane, anent the order ofproces observed
before the lords ofConnsell, and Session' (1609). The works can be referred to under the title of
the Tract 'Ane Short Forme ofProcess presentlie used and observed before the Lords of Counsell and
Session'. See also the work of Skene's assistant Habbakuk Bisset and his amplified and revised
version Rolment ofCourtis (1622). I have used here the version edited by Hamilton Grierson,
Scottish Text Society (N.S.) Vols. 10,13 and 18.
25 C.A. Malcolm, op. cit. The Bill Chamber had originated as a vacation Court in the A.S. 31
July 1532. The Bill Chamber also performed another important function - that of a 'sift' for
matters coming to the Court from inferior jurisdictions. Bills of Advocation sought to review
the proceedings of an inferior court and Bills of Suspension (or Suspension and Reduction)
sought to stay the execution of the sentences passed by the inferior court (or to reduce them.)
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Sometimes parties would attempt to have a bill considered by the whole Lords26 but
from 1575 onwards all bills had to come before the Lord Ordinary in the Outer
House and only where there was dubiety in the content, was the bill to be read to the
'haill lordis'. So we may speculate that at least two of the functions performed in the
Outer House were the consideration of these bills and the taking of evidence from
witnesses.
Thereafter, frequent references to the Lords sitting for variations of 'billis, witnes and
utir tolbuyth'27 appear in the Sederunt books and by 1591, the practice has emerged
of a 'Lord Ordinar appointit weeklie to sit in the Outer Tulbuyth.'28 We may
therefore speculate that by 1591, there was a Lord of the Outer Tolbooth as well as
Lords in attendance for the taking of witnesses' depositions and for the Bills.29
By this time, the Lords were established in the 'New Tolbooth' or 'Tolbuith'30 which
was now sometimes referred to as 'Parliament House.'31 Although the records are
incomplete, it would appear that the Lord Ordinary appointed to sit in the Outer
House was also given the function of hearing cases coming into the Court upon
summons without a Bill, his function being to oversee the procedure of considering
26 presumably with the intention of persuading the Lords to grant a remedy immediately in
equity or alternatively, testing the 'haill lords' reaction to its content with neither the expense
nor risk of summoning the other party to the cause (on this see infra.).
27 Hannay, op cit., p.98.
28 A.S. 25 May 1591.
29 This is speculative. Even so, although Bisset records that 'ane of the Lordis sail pas to the
uttirhouse' and details how he is to proceed in calling actes and then the tables, citing A.S. 23
June 1579, he makes no mention of the bills or depositions of witnesses, albeit that the title
under which this is stated is 'Lordis of the uttirhouse' i.e. plural. Moreover, the following title
heading viz., 'The lordis of the uttirhouse suld nocht be called to voit in the Innerhouse' states that 'It
is statute that the lordis ane or ma ordourlie/ordinarlie appoynted for the uttirhouse (my
emphasis) (both words are used in the two original versions used by Hamilton-Grierson)
might suggest that more than one was appointed at and for any one time. Bisset's Rolment of
Courtis, Hamilton-Grierson edition, op. cit., Vol. I p. 146
30 A.S. 13 July 1596
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the pursuer's summons and libel and thereafter superintending the parties'
subsequent oral pleadings and then granting actes or decreets where appropriate or
if not, bringing the parties to a position whereby one side or the other was allowed
proof of their 'allegeances.' When such a position was reached the case would fall
within the remit of what became known as the 'Lord upon Oaths and Witnesses'.32
Where the Lord Ordinary considered any matters raised to be difficult, he could
'report' it to the whole Lords for their answer.33
The period was a turbulent one34 and the Court was often forced from Edinburgh
and the Tolbooth by the Scylla and Charybdis of plague and revolt. There is no
record of how the Lords proceeded when forced to do so, but by the middle of the
century, with the erection of the New Tolbooth35 (the old tolbooth remaining and
partially rebuilt for non-judicial purposes)36 and the restoration of Parliament Hall
after the ravages of Cromwell, the Court was back to the established pattern of
appointing Lords from among their number to carry out the tasks in the Outer
House, the remaining Lords sitting in the Inner House.
Forbes was not only a keen observer of the decisions of the Court. His is the best near
contemporaneous account of the lay-out of the Court and the two houses, their
31 quoted by C.A. Malcolm, 'The Parliament House and its Antecedents', op. cit., p.452
32 The two modes of proof. Lowther recorded in 1629 on his visit to the Courts that 'their trials
are wholly by oath and witnesses.' Lowther Our Journall Into Scotland Anno Domini 1629, 5"' of
November (Douglas Edition, 1894) 29
33 see infra.
34 For good coverage of the period see generally, J.W Cairns, Historical Introduction, op. cit.
35 to become Parliament Hall.
36 It was to become a gaol.
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interaction and the personnel of the College of Justice.37 The procedure was in part
affected by the geographical lay-out of the Court and the manner in which the judges
organised their functions. This in turn affected the way in which the advocates
pleaded before them. The Inner House was positioned in the jamb built to the side of
Parliament Hall. It was a large square room with a room to the north side of it where
the Lords put on their robes and the advocates and principal clerks their gowns.
When sitting in the Inner House the Lords sat at a semi-circular Bench positioned
towards the south end of the room and the bar at which the advocates pleaded
formed the diameter line. In front of the Bench sat the six principal clerks at a table38
At the east corner of the Inner House sat a Lord upon the Bills at a table attended by
the Clerk of Bills.39
On the west side of the House, two 'doors of communication' opened out into the
Outer House, described by Forbes as a 'stately hall.' One was used by the Lords
having business in the Outer House as well by as the clerks moving from one court
to the other distributing processes to either House. The other door was the 'common
door' at which was positioned a door-keeper who was discharged40 to allow in any
other than the advocates, writers to the Signet and 'persons of note'.
The Outer House (on the site of the present Parliament Hall) had a Fore Bar in the
middle of the south side at some distance from the wall up which advocates would
37 What follows is primarily based upon Forbes' account in the Preface to his Journal.
38 and sometimes the Lord Clerk Register when he thought 'fit to attend in his gown'. The clerks
were, as we would now say, 'legally qualified'. No person could be a clerk unless they had
served three years as an advocate or as a writer to the Signet. Forbes, op. cit., Preface p. ix.
39 C.A Malcolm gives a description that 'At each corner a Lord sat upon the bills' but does not
provide any authority for this. This may not be correct. Certainly, in the previous century it
had been the practice for the Lord upon the Bills to go out to the Outer House. See the
discussion infra.
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ascend by some steps to plead. Seated within the bar were six under-clerks41 called
Clerks of the Outer House and behind them there was a high Bench where the Lord
of the Outer House sat. Adjoining his Bench was a table where the Clerk or Keeper of
the Minute-Book sat and marked down the proceedings as they occurred.
On the east side of the Hall were the Side-Bars, wherein there were chairs for the
Lord Ordinary to hear and determine causes42.
40 viz. in modern language, 'charged not to'
41 Originally three serving in the Outer House. See A.S. 11 January 1604.
42 Although Forbes says that there was only one Lord Ordinary sitting at the Side Bar it is
probable that there were three judges sitting in this area by the time of his writing. Malcolm
op. cit p. 455, Cullen op. cit. p. 10. When the Court sat in the New Tolbooth, in 1610 (A.S. 11
January 1604) it is mentioned that no Lord except the 'Ordinar, sail cum to the Utter-hous,
without special license askit and gevin of the Chancellor and President' - any Lord
transgressing being punished, and again, in A.S. 29 January 1642, there is mention of 'the
Ordinar Lord in the Utter-hous'. A.S. 8 November 1649 also makes mention of the position,
such that by 1650, the A.S.2 January 1650 prescribes that the 'Lord who is Ordinar in the
Utter-house' must call actions according to the order that they are insert in a roll made up by
him. It continues to ordain the Lord who is 'Ordinar on the bills, to go furth [to the Outer
House] everie day at nyne houris, for calling of such acts and copies, for seing of pieces [of
process] and for calling of such acts as are past litiscontestatione, for satisfieing the desire
thereof, and for receiving of witnesses, and for productione of principalis, remitting of
protestationes, and granting of certificationes whan thair is no disputt'. The following Act of
Sederunt (A.S. 16 January 1650) regulating the closing of depositions of Witnesses, ordains all
depositions of witnesses, 'quhilks are heirafter to be received and examinat, to be closed and
stamped be the Lord Examinator of the saids witnesses', - these witnesses presumably
having been received by the Lords Ordinary on the Bills. A.S.6 November 1677 again notices
'Ordinaries upon the bills' and in 1686 (A.S. 4 November 1686) it is ordained that only two
Lords in one day (beside the Ordinary on the Billis) shall go to the side bar one at one time to
call processes (this ordinance being renewed by A.S. 16 January 1690). A.P.S. 1693 c. 30
innovates a new Ordinary appointing the Lords to 'nominate ane Auditor weekly for hearing
of parties upon Concluded Causes' and to make a report of the probation to be brought into
the Lords, i.e. from the Outer House. Lastly, but by no means least, there was passed A.S. 5
June 1711, entitled 'Act of Sederunt anent the Order of the Service of the Lords upon the Bills
in the Outter-house, for preparing Concluded Causes, and on the Oaths and Witnesses'
regulating the order of each of them going to the Outer House. This ordinance must have
been within Forbes very recent and direct observation. Indeed, at p. xi. of the Preface he notes
that 'Every Lord, except the President, takes his Turn of sitting in the Outer-house, upon the
Bills, at the Side-Bar, upon Oaths of Parties and Witnesses, and upon concluded Causes.
.. .Each Lord is called the Ordinary, with respect to Affairs that come in before him. In the
forenoon, there is always One Ordinary upon the Bills, Another in the Outer-house, a Third at
the Side-Bar for reconsidering Matters formerly debated before him when upon the Bills, or in
the Outer house And the rest of the Lords sit with the President at the same Time'. By the 18th
Century, Alexander Young, W.S. could note that the Side Bars in the Outer House 'were then
of a very singular construction, being merely an Arm Chair in a small recess, with a narrow
shelf in front, which brought the Judge, Counsel and Agents in such close connection that
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The large area of the hall was enclosed on the west side by rails through which those
with business with any advocate could pass and speak with them. The Faculty had a
Keeper who was charged with not admitting anyone to the area not having any
business with the advocates.43 On the North side of the House there were 'many
Rows of Benches' on which 'advocates or others admitted within their Bar may sit'. It
appears that the area in front of this was where the advocates would 'walk.'44 The
advocates would assemble on their benches or 'seats' and await instruction from the
Writers to the Signet and their agents, or would await the calling of the case in which
they were already instructed. There was a Keeper of the advocates' bar and seats and
it seems an officer for their fees.45 The advocates themselves had personal agents or
servants, who would carry out the more menial tasks for their principals and
masters.46
(iv) The Theory, Mechanics and Dynamics of Litigation before the Court:
The Bicameral Administration of Justice
they almost touched each other ... ' Alexander Young, Memoir ofRobert McQueen ofBraxfield,
EUL Laing MSS. Div., ii, 113.
43 This was modified such that no persons could actually access the area where the advocates
sat. The Minute Book of the Faculty ofAdvocates, 2 vols., vol. I., (1661-1712), J.M. Pinkerton, (ed.),
The Stair Society, No. 32, (Edinburgh, 1976,1980) at pp. 39-40. It is recorded that the Faculty's
Keeper in 1679, John Ballandine, could make 'ane compitent lyfelihood' taking 'casualties' from
'Noblemen, Gentlemen, wryters to the signet, Agents and uthers' permitting them to come within
the advocate's bar. This practice was barred by order of the Lords of Session. He petitioned
the Faculty for an increase in salary to reflect this prejudice, - unsuccessfully - a year later his
supplication is refused, p.46
44 Minutes for February 24,1673, Faculty of Advocates Minute Book, op. cit. vol. I, p. 25. The
walking up and down Parliament Hall is still practised by advocates together and advocates
with agents, the reputed raisoti d'etre being that other parties cannot be privy to the
discussion.
45 3 November 1665, Faculty Minute Book, op. cit., p.11
46 See Royal Commission 1927. The Faculty's Minute Book, op. cit., records, on 2 July 1664, a
decision of the Faculty that only advocates and not their servants could sit in the 'first seat'.
op. cit. vol. i, p. 8.
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It was as thus assembled that the Court undertook its work. The theory of litigation
was that parties would bring their dispute to the Court and once the preliminaries
were dealt with, the parties would 'enter into pley' in the preliminary setting down
of their respective positions, before being required to enter a judicial contract i.e.,
litiscontestate,47 agreeing to be bound by the ultimate decision of the Court. Probation
was not permitted other than that allowed by the Court and the best evidence was
written.48 If witnesses were required to prove an allegeance then, if the witnesses
could be in attendance in Edinburgh, their testimony was taken by the Ordinary on
Oaths and Witnesses behind closed doors, although the parties could provide lists of
questions or interrogatories, and once the depositions were taken and noted they were
sealed up to be prepared by the Lord Ordinary on Concluded Causes as part of a
'state' of the case to be brought before the whole Court as a collegiate body for its
determination. Witnesses who were unable to travel to Edinburgh had their evidence
taken by a Commissioner appointed by the Ordinary, which was thereafter reported
back to the Ordinary on Concluded Causes.
It was a particularly Civilian way of proceeding and was testament to the Romano -
Canonical methods adopted by the Court at institution.49 Any disputes which
contained weighty or intricate matters, would be decided by the whole Court whilst
the preparatory work was undertaken by individual members. As Forbes explained,
47 The A.S. 19lh January 1600 refers to the parties being 'put to a point' by litiscontestation.
48 This was of some antiquity. See further, Finlay Men ofLaw op. cit. The rationale was based in
the Romano-Canonical distrust of the spoken word on which, see D.A.O. Edward, 'Fact-
Finding: A British Perspective' in D.L. Carey Miller and P. Beaumont (eds.), The Option of
Litigating in Europe, United Kingdom Comparative Law Series, vol. 14, (Edinburgh, 1993)
p.43ff.
49 Jeroen M.J. Chorus 'Civilian Elements in European Civil Procedure' in D.L. Carey Miller
and R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law. Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays
(1997); Finlay Men ofLaw, op. cit., p.89.
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'Business is carried on before the Session in the best Order can (sic) be
thought of. That of greatest Moment, is calculated to be determined in
Presence, and what is less Material is committed to particular Ordinaries. ...
For in the Session, particular Ordinaries determine all common Business, and
mostly do so ripen & prepare weighty Matters, that the Senate in the Inner-
house have nothing to do, but to give them the finishing stroke. Whereas,
single Judges in separate Courts (tho' of Ordinary Knowledge and
Experience) cannot (unless resolved to decide at random) expedite Justice
with that Celerity, may (sic)50 be expected from particular Lords in the
Session in their respective single Capacities, who are supported and
forwarded in their Procedure, by the communicated Advice of the collegiate
Body. Facilius enim invenitur, quod a pluribus queeritur.'51
50 should probably read 'as may'
51 Forbes Journal p. xiv. Implicit in the Lord Ordinary ripening and preparing matters for the
whole Court is the concept that they were 'delegates' of the whole Court acting in particular
capacities to assist their brethren in the final judicial determination of the cases. Macmillan
quotes Lowther's dismissal of the Ordinaries in the Outer House 'which doth hut as it were
prepare things for the Inner House' (op. cit. p. 141 = Douglas' 1894 Edition at pp. 29-30) which
source may have informed Professor T.B. Smith, when he considered them Tittle more than
commissioners executing delegated functions and reporting back to the whole Court': T.B.
Smith: British Justice: the Scottish Contribution (London, 1961) p.55 (although this is refined a
year later to 'as delegates of the Court' - T.B. Smith: A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland
(Edinburgh, 1962), p. 90.) See also similar sentiments in modern writing - Stair Memorial
Encyclopaedia, (S.M.E.) vol. 6, para. 910 and Lord President Dunedin's propagation of the
idea in Purves v. Carswell (1905) 8 F. 351 at 354 and in The Clippens Oil Co. Ltd. v. The Edinburgh
and District Water Trustees (1906) 8 F. 731 at 750 which was in turn followed by Lord
Thankerton in Smith v. Education Authority ofGlasgow 1933 SC (HL) 51 at 53 and by Rt. Hon.
Lord Normand in 'Scottish Judicature and Legal Procedure' Presidential Address to the
Holdsworth Club, (1940-41) at p.6. However, N. Phillipson, in The Scottish Whigs and the
Reform of the Court ofSession, (The Stair Society, vol. 37) (Edinburgh, 1990), p. 44 (following J.
Glassford, Remarks on the Constitution and Procedure of the Scottish Courts of Law, (Edinburgh,
1812), at p.20) has pointed out that the Outer House was a court of first instance in its own
right. Both are right. As discussed infra, in the early part of the century, the manner and form
of the preliminaries was known and fairly straight forward - at least in the simpler non-
priviledged actions, such as for payment of a debt or spuilzie. Thus, the ordinance of the
Lords enjoining agents to adhere to the 'known forms'. The Ordinary in the Outer House
would perform a role which was mostly supervisory in nature, ensuring parties adhered to
what was at its most basic, a formulaic process, although his role would always permit of the
exercise of equitable jurisdiction to modify the process before him. Thus Stair, (I have used
his Modus Litigandi comments. See infra), records that, of old, ordinary Summonses were
drawn by a writer to the Signet without a Bill or warrant of the Lords because 'the Stile and
nature of them was current and known' Modus op. cit. at p.3. The writers to the Signet had stile
books which they were 'obliged and every session enjoyn'd punctually to observe', (p.4) As the law
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Whilst this was the theory, the practice developed differently. The wiles, ploys and
attempts to circumvent the procedure by litigants and their agents and advocates
would often leave the Court with much more to do than the giving of a finishing
stroke. More importantly, it was to be these attempts by litigants 'to steal a march' on
their opponents which indirectly resulted in the cievelopment of written pleading.
But even at this early stage, and in the teeth of such tactics, it was still appreciated
that the proper administration of justice required that parties to a litigation should be
permitted to answer the positions put forward by the other. Thus it was implicit that
a cause should be refined. It was appreciated that justice summarily dispatched was
not justice at all and some delay between the initiation of a cause and its final
determination would always arise. The idea was that the cause should be 'refined'
between parties. The word often used in the commentaries is 'ripening'.
But whilst parties were entitled to advance arguments beyond the initial arguments
by one in a summons and the response to it by the other, there were time limits to
allow them to do so, after which it was not in the interests of justice to permit the
Court's time to be expended. The cause would require ripening within a specified
time period, after which the 'celerity' of the whole system would be affected. After
the initial stage, the cause could be determined, but if it was complicated or novel,
there were mechanisms to allow it to go beyond this initial stage for consideration 'in
Presence' that is, before the whole Court. It was appreciated that in these
circumstances, justice required the Opinion of the whole Court.
developed and became more complex, and the creation of rights, and obligations between
parties came to be regulated by new legal concepts, the Court increasingly required to
superintend the process, carefully preparing the resulting new forms of demand. As a result,
the procedure of the Court developed and became more complicated. Thus, the role of
Ordinary in the Outer House became more important, his tasks developed a discretionary
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(v) The Initial Stages of a Litigation
There were two classes of case which came before the Lords - ordinary and extra¬
ordinary.52 Ordinary actions could pass the Signet with or without a Bill but extra¬
ordinary always required a Bill attached.53 In both cases the initiating document was
a Summons and it was common practice for these documents to be drafted or
'drawn' by Writers to the Signet, with or without the advice of an advocate. This
drawing was left to writers as in the usual course 'the stile and nature of them was
current and known.'54 In drafting the writer would consult his collection of practicks
or styles55 for the proper style to be used in the action he was to raise. The proper
nature, hence the remarks by Glassford that the Ordinaries' duties comprised a Court at first
instance in its own right.
52 What follows is based upon the following sources: (full titles) [Stair] Modus Litigandi or
Forms of Process Observed Before the Lords of Council and Session in Scotland appendixed to The
Institutions of the Law ofScotland Deduced from its Originals and Collated with the Civil, canon and
Feudal Laws; and with the Customs of Neighbouring Nations Part First and Second by Stair,
President of the Session (Edinburgh,1681); Q. Spotiswood,] The Form of Process, before the Lords of
Council and Session, etc. Written for the Use of the Students in Spotswood's College of Law, by Jolm
Spotiswood of That Ilk, Advocate (Edinburgh, 1711); J. Glassford, Remarks, op. cit.; [T. Hope,]
Minor Practicks, or A Treatise of the Scottish Law. Composed by that Eminent Lawyer Sir Thomas
Hope ofCraighall, Advocate to His Majesty King Charles I (Edinburgh, 1726) pp. 1-12; [G.J. Bell,]
Examination of the Objections Stated Against the Bill For Better Regulating the Forms of Process in
the Court of the Laiv in Scotla7id by George Joseph Bell, Esq. Professor of the Law ofScotland in the
University ofEdinburgh, (Edinburgh, 1825); and Report of the Commissioners, 29 July 1823, For
Inquiring into Forms ofProcess in the Courts ofLaw in Scotland, and the Course ofAppeals from the
Court ofSession to the House of Lords, P.P. Reports from Commissioners Vol. X of 1824.
53 Where a Bill was required, the Summons thereupon would bear the words 'E.r deliberatione
dominorum concilii' A privileged summons required to be preceded by a bill where the
pursuer sought to serve upon a shorter induciae . (See Lord President Inglis' explanation in
Walls' Trustees v. Drynan (1888) 4 R. 359 at 362.)
54 See infra.
55 As Stair notes, those passing without a bill had by his time become fixed and ordinary and
commonly known and observed by the Writers to the Signet and were contained in their Stile
Books and they were 'obliged and every session enjoyn'd punctually to observe' supra. Formerly,
the Practicks and Style Books were collected by the individual practitioner and copied by
others or even bequeathed onwards at death. This had occurred from a much earlier period.
See Finlay's examples in Men of Law op. cit. p. 88. Later they came to be printed. For example,
Practicks of the Laws ofScotland, Observed and Collected by Sir Robert Spottiswoode OfPentland,
(Edinburgh, 1706) and George Dallas of Saint-Martins' System ofStiles, As now Practicable
within the Kingdom ofScotland (Edinburgh, 1697) in which the portion on summonses had been
revised by Stair himself. [Rt. Hon. Lord Normand, Scottish Judicature and Legal Procedure,
Presidential Address to Holdsworth Club, (1940-1) at 31-2 ]
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style required the summons (or 'libell56') to contain the required constituent parts
and would state the ground of the pursuer's action, the refusal of the defender to
comply with the pursuer's demand and would conclude for the specific remedy
sought.57 The procedure thereafter was to cite the other party to appear. The practice
was originally to have two summonses, the first (or principal) summons summoning
on a day of compearance with a second summons thereafter containing certification
that if the defender did not compear decree in absence would be granted against
him. This was modified by A.S. 24 May 1595 so that all principal summonses called
judicially i.e. by formally calling of the parties' names, and this was inserted into the
common minute book by the Clerk, recording that fact. If the summons could be
proved by writ or needed no other probation than the summons itself, then it was
presumed in law to be 'true'. If it required to be proved by the Oath of the defender
or the testimony of witnesses then the Second Summons was peremptory and the
Clerk would record 'called and continued to such a day'. It was put under
'continuation of days' so that the defender's advocate could prepare for the second
calling of the summons, and the defender himself was not required to compear until
cited by the second summons. The days of compearance would be determined by the
nature of the action, but generally, it was 21days.58 By Act of Regulations 1672, cap. 6
this was altered again, removing Acts of Continuation and second Summonses, and
in cases where second Summonses would have been required, there was to be one
56 as with all the terminology of the period, there are various spellings: viz.'lybel', 'libel',
'lybell'
57 There were six parts: the name of the judge at whose hand the summons was raised, the
pursuer's and the defender's name, the matter for which the summons was raised, the day
and time at which the defender should appear and the place of the Court. In all of this, the
purpose of these strictures was to ensure that the Judges could be satisfied of the summons'
conformity to the law before the action was even entertained, for it was 'unjust to permit an
action to proceed which was ex facie groundless.' See G.J. Bell op. cit., p.9ff
58 recent spuilzie (the taking away of another's moveable property without lawful excuse)
proceeded upon 15 days. There was another small amendment made to the procedure by A.S.
30th November 1647.
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summons with two diets. Privileged or extra-ordinary cases could proceed upon six
days compearance and a practice developed of agents attempting to get the
summons raised as an extra-ordinary summons with the benefit of bringing the other
party to the court sooner rather than later.59 The Lords attempted to prevent the
practice by A.S. 29 June 1672, ordaining that all summonses had to proceed upon
21 days other than privileged summonses, specifying which types of action could
proceed by a privileged summons.60 The extra-ordinary summons was known as a
'libelled summons' and the ordinary summons was referred to simply as that - an
ordinary summons.
After the last day of compearance had passed, if the pursuer failed to show, the
defender's advocate could 'protest' that his client had been summoned to compear
and the pursuer not insisting, the defender was entitled to protestation which
relieved him from any part of the summons until there was a new citation. If the
defender failed to turn up or to be represented, the pursuer might get his decreet if
the summons could be proved instantly by writ or if it required to be proved by
witnesses he was assigned a Term to Prove. If both parties were in attendance, the
Clerk would record the parties present. There could be no further procedure until the
process had been 'seen' by the defender's advocate.
The process would be comprised of the 'peeces of process' which were the
documents founded on by the pursuer.61 The idea was that the defender's advocate
could take this away in readiness for when the case returned in two or three days. It
59 or even not at all. If the summons could be instantly verified by writ then the pursuer could
effect diligence against the other party immediately.
60 This doesn't appear to have been successful. Stair records the 'most part of summonses
proceeding upon bills'. Stair, Modus Litigandi, op. cit., p.l
61 Often going to the pursuer's title to raise the action.
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did not always work well in practice and A.S. 29 January 164262 records complaints
against the advocates for 'keeping of pieces'. The case could not call again until the
process was back with the Clerk and the Act restricted the period of keeping to forty
eight hours.
The keeping of pieces was still problematic in 1649. An A.S. of that year provided
those pursuers prejudiced with a remedy.63 Another problem arose where there was
more than one defender and thus there could be a delay whilst the advocates for all
the defenders perused the process. By the same Act, the advocate for the principal
defender was required to allow the other defenders' advocates sight of the pieces at
his house.64 Having seen the pieces the defender's advocate would return them and
write on the back that he had seen it. If the pursuer's advocate altered the summons
or he added to the pieces, the procedure would be gone through all over again. This
seeing of the pieces of process was superintended by the Lord Ordinary on the Bills.
If all parties had compeared and all the defenders' advocates had seen the pieces of
the process then the process was 'ready for dispute' and it was 'inrolled' according to
the dates of return marked on the back. There was then a 'roll' made up listing the
order of the ordinary actions which were due to be called by the Lord Ordinary in
the Outer House, although there seem to have been problems with this, in particular,
with cases being called out of order and litigants appearing when the case did not
62 'Anent keeping of Peices, (sic) and ordering the session-house'
63 A.S. 21 November 1649. The pursuer could get his advocate to subscribe a complaint or
'ticket' which would be sent to the President or the Lord upon the Bills and the offending
advocates holding the 'pieces', without just cause would be fined, until the pieces were
returned. A.S. 28 February 1662 reduced the period to 28 hours and ordained the returning
advocate to write his name upon the back with the date of return (with the words 'seen and
returned') and the pursuer's advocate was not obliged to see the same. By Stair's time,
advocates could be debarred for a second offence and agents and their servants could be
incarcerated until the pieces were returned.
36
call. A.S. 2 January 1650, 'to the effect that the Leidges may have knowledge when thair
actions shall he callit and not to he tyed to ane unnecessar attendance' ordained the
Ordinary in the Outer House to make a roll which he was to subscribe and affix on
the wall of the Outer House and to call the actions according to the order that they
were inserted. This was also for the benefit of the advocates representing the
parties.65
A.S. 28 February 1662 sought to further remedy the problems of the calling of the roll
by ordaining that the roll should be called in order and ordaining the Ordinary in the
Outer House for the week to call the roll in order.66
(vi) The 'Dispute' and the Role of the Concept of Relevancy
On the morning that the case was due to call, the parties' advocates would be in their
seats in the Outer blouse or perhaps walking in the hall or consulting with their
clients or discussing the pending cause between or among themselves. The Clerks
sitting in front of the Lord Ordinary in the Outer House, between the fore-bar and
the Bench, would then call the case and the macer in attendance at the fore-bar
would step out and shout67 the case name into the hall.
Parties' advocates would then come forward, up the steps anti to the bar, ready to
dispute. This part of the procedure was oral and progressed in a defined and
64 Problems with the processes continued. See A.S. 20 January 1643, 'Act anent upgiveing of
Processes', and A.S. 15 December 1643, 'Act anent those who take up Summondses and
Processes, after Parties have extracted their Acts, for taking their Oaths in the samen'.
65 Stair records that the roll was put up so that 'advocates may inform themselves and be
ready to dispute without surprisal or tergiversation', Modus Litigandi p.7
66 The subject vexed the Faculty. See the entries for this year and thereafter in the Minutes of
the Faculty in J.M. Pinkerton (ed.), The Minute Book of the Faculty ofAdvocates Vol. I. (1661-
1712) The Stair Society No. 32, (Edinburgh, 1976)
67 He had to shout over the bustle and confusion of the agents, advocates and clients milling
about in front of the Bar.
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formulaic manner. The pursuer's advocate would start. If the summons was an
ordinary summons, he would not need to relate the whole document, but only
mention the summons and crave decreet if no further probation was necessary, or if
it was, he would crave a 'Day to prove' or a 'Term to prove' depending upon how
long he thought would be necessary to adduce the evidence. On a libelled summons,
he would relate more fully the tenor of the summons anci also the merits of his cause
to 'inforce the justness and equity of the cause'. The Lord Ordinary might stop him
in mid-stream until it was established whether the defender was controverting the
relevancy of the summons.68 In answering, the defender's advocate would relate the
merits of the cause as he saw them and would then move to 'proponing'69 his
defences. These proceeded in an order.70 The term defences was used generically,
subsuming objections and exceptions. For our purposes, the most important of these
defences was that the Libel or some member of it was not 'relevant'. The concept of
relevancy and its related concept of sufficiency71 were very important in this
formalistic manner of oral pleading.
Stair explained the concept of relevancy as follows:
'Relevancy is a relevando, to relieve or help: and therefore a thing is said to be
relevant, when, if it be true and proven, it would relieve the pursuer or
68 For as Stair says '[I]t is an improfitable spending of time, for the Pursuer to inforce the
relevancy of the summons if the Defender controvert not the same' Modus Litigandi, op. cit., p.
7. For the doctrine of relevancy infra this Chapter.
69 Putting forward or setting forth.
70 viz.: 1. The days of compearance were not yet past; 2. Incorrect Days of Citation; 3. The
summons not having two Citations (conform to the Act of Parliament 1672 - see supra); 4.
Defense upon the tenor of the executions; 5. The Pursuer's title was not sufficient (e.g. that of
executor without production of his confirmation or assigny without his assignation); 6. All
parties not called (i.e. the interests of all the defenders not cited to the action); 7. the order of
discussing the defender incorrect, other parties being properly discussed before him. (e.g.
where a cautioner for a tutor convened the tutor would require to be discussed first); 8. that
the Libel or some part of it was not relevant; 9. that it be incompetent.
71 i.e. technical legal sufficiency
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Complainer/2 and give him the Remedy which he infers73 and concludes in
his Libel, and craves to be done as due by Justice.'74
For a Libel to be 'sufficient/ that is, sufficient in Law, it had to contain an argument
or 'ratiocination' which was sometimes in syllogistic form, whereby the point of law
was first deduced as the major proposition or premiss in the syllogism and then the
matter of fact proceeded as the minor or subsumptive proposition or premiss and
from this the conclusion (the remedy sought in the libel) would be inferred as the
consequent, the law being applied to the fact subsumed and remedy sought
concluding, and being necessarily consequent, in Justness.
The propositions of fact and law could be presented the other way round as an
'enthimeme."75 In this case, the matter of fact was deduced as the antecedent premiss
and from there it was to be inferred that in Justice the remedy should be adhibited.
To be relevant, the pursuer would require to refer to the Law either generally, or
'specially' - that is, that the fact related as done or omitted to be done by the defender
was contrary to law76 or was contrary to a specific point of law. Sometimes it was
72 The pursuer was narrated as the complainer in the libel of the summons - complaining that
he had had his rights infringed and seeking the help or remedy of the court to give him relief.
73 Inference is not used in the way we would understand it now, nor in the way it was used in
the later period. The idea was that the conclusion was necessarily inferred from the premises
that is, it necessarily followed in a logically deductive manner as opposed to an inductive one.
Something would be deduced from a larger number of things, so, for example, a point of law
would be deduced from all the points of law that could be known. This idea is shown in
Stair's title to his Institutions - 'The Law ofScotland Deduced from its Originals and Collated with
the Civil, Canon and Feudal Laws etc.' Thus, when Bell records, in his review of this period, that
the demand would have to be 'correctly deduced' this would have been misunderstood by
the lawyers of this period. (G.J. Bell, op. cit, p.11) The correct word would have been
'inferred'.
74 Modus Litigandi, op. cit., p.9
75 'or enthymeme' in modern logic. By Stair's time this was more frequent.
76 or 'Equity' or 'Reason' or 'Justice'
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subjoined to the conclusion, in a shorter form which would state that on the matter of
fact libelled it 'ought' to be declared or decerned by the Court as libelled according to
law or a particular point of law.77 Thus, the Relevancy of the Libel or Complaint, as
again Stair explains,
'is the Consequence of the Conclusion of the Libel, from the premisses
thereof. Or it is the Justice of the Libel, or the Sufficiency and Goodness of
the Plea. And the Probation is the Verity or Truth of the Libel. So that the
Remedies of Law proceed upon Justice and Truth.'78
(vii) Relevancy, Syllogistic Argument and Practice
The employment of syllogisms and enthymemes as a mode of reasoning had been
inherited from Aristotelian and Ciceronian logic and modes of reasoning and
arguing, passed through the Civil Law anci into the Romano-Canonical procedure of
the Church Courts79 and from there to the Court of Session. As Professor Cairns has
pointed out,80 John Cunninghame could tell his students at the start of the eighteenth
century that it was out of 'Civill Law that all our reasoning and Topicks are taken.'81
The syllogism and the enthymeme could be used by the advocate in argument before
the Bench depending on the argument being advanced. The syllogistic argument
77 or again 'Equity' or 'Reason' or 'Justice'
78 Modus, op. cit., p. 10
79 on this see R.C. van Caenegem, Plistory of European Civil Procedure in: International
Encyclopaedia ofComparative Law, vol. 16 (1973)
80 J.W. Cairns, 'The Civil Law Tradition in Scottish Legal Thought' in D.L. Carey Miller and R.
Zimmermann (eds.), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law. Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays, op.
cit., pp. 191-233 and by the same author, Historical Introduction op. cit., vol. I, p.139
81 (Following Cairns above) J. Cunninghame, Edinburgh University Library, MS. Gen. 1735, p.
5 and also National Library of Scotland, MS. 3413, p. 3 in respect of the 'Civil Law' 'in regard
we borrow all our Topicks from it, in pleading.'
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might be too restrictive and as Sir George Mackenzie explains,82 'neither possible nor
agreeable to the Nature of Rhetorick', because 'an Induction and Enthymemes were
infinitely more accommodated to it.'83 If, however, one of the arguments was
stronger then the rest, to render it more 'formal' it would be 'reduc'd into a
Syllogism'.84 Finally, the pleader could sum up by reducing his whole argument into
syllogistic form. The influence was the tradition of earlier logicians, in particular
Cicero and Aristotle.85 In an earlier work, Mackenzie acknowledges the influence of
82 writing at the same time as Stair.
83 Sir George Mackenzie, 'Idea Eloquentiae Forensis: una cum Actione Forensi ex Unaquaque Juris
Parte (1681) I have used Robert Hepburn's Translation of 1711, 'An Idea of the Modern
Eloquence of the Bar. Together with a Pleading out ofEvery Part of Law.' at p.55. See generally F.S.
Ferguson, 'A Bibliography of the Works of Sir George Mackenzie Lord Advocate Founder of
the Advocates' Library.' (1935 - 38) 1 Edinburgh Bibliographical Society pp.21-22. Rhetoric
was the art of persuasion and argumentation. For Aristotle the art (as a 'techne', that is,
capable of being learned) of rhetoric was finding, in each case, the available means of
persuasion and Cicero, through his Topics, formulated the conception of proof as argumentum
developed from rhetorical and dialectical (i.e. arguments from plausible premises) theories.
The topico-rhetorical tradition influenced the Romano-canonical procedure which heavily
influenced the procedure of the Court, as speculated upon here by Mackenzie. The Romano-
Canonical procedure was originally interested in the oath as a means of discovering truth, but
the oath could only turn on what was 'necessary', that is, what was relevant to the question in
dispute. It was this concern which, through the technique of disputation on hypothesis,
permitted the removal of all fallacious types of inquiry in the search for the probable truth.
On all of this, see A. Guiliani, 'The Influence of Rhetoric on the Law of Evidence and
Pleading' J.R. vii (1962) pp. 216 - 251 and I. Maclean, Interpretation and Meaning in the
Renaissance. The Case ofLaw (Cambridge University Press, 1992) pp.75-82. See also, H.L.
MacQueen, 'Pleadable Brieves, Pleading and the Development of Scots Law', Law and
History Review (4) 1986 No. 1, pp.403-422 at p.411. Finally, on this as a mode of arguing in a
historical European dimension, see R.C. van Caenegenr, History ofEuropean Civil Procedure in
International Encyclopaedia ofComparative Law, (1972) vol. 16, p.20, para. 2-17.
84 Mackenzie, An Idea of the Modern Eloquence, op. cit. p.56
85 Thus Mackenzie notes 'He who answers, uses with us, to repeat the Arguments which he is to
answer all with one breath; before he begin to make distinct answers to them, and this process I
conceive, from Aristotelick way ofarguing in the Schools, wherein he who maintains the Thesis
proposed, must repeat the argument before he answer it' 'What Eloquence is fit for the Bar', op. cit.
p. 12. This type of disputation was a common manner of instruction. It seems to have been
employed by John Spottiswood (for more on whom see infra) as a teaching mechanism for his
students - disputation exercittii gratia (see John W. Cairns, 'John Spotswood, Professor of Law'
in Miscellany Three, (ed. W.M. Gordon), (39 Stair Society, 1992) p. 131 at p. 147 and was
extended to intrants to the Scottish Bar at their 'Publick Examination'. They were required to
(latterly) write a Thesis which was impugned and had to be defended. See further by the
same author, 'Advocates' Hats, Roman Law and Admission to the Scots Bar, 1580 - 1812',
1999 (20), Journal of Legal History, pp. 24 at pp. 31-32
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Cicero as the 'greatest master of that art' of Pleading86 and in another essay, explains
the role of syllogistic reasoning at the first institution of the Court,' [a] t the first
institution of our Senat, It was appointed by an Act of Sederunt, That all Argunning
(which term was us'd in that Age for arguing) should be Sylogistice, and not
Rhetorice'87 conceiving that
'our Session having been at first constitute of an equal number of Church¬
men and Laicks88, and the President being an Ecclesiastick, these Church¬
men having the advantage of Learning and Authority89, did form that Act of
Sederunt according to their own breeding, by which they were tyed in their
Theology-schools to debate by Syllogismes; but after-ages having found this
upon experience to be very unfit and pedantick, they did not only suffer that
Act to run in desuetude, but allow'd this auguster, and more splendid
manner of debating'90
For Sir George, the 'more splendid manner' was to propone one's defence using not
the syllogism, but the enthymeme, as, in pleading, the 'matter of fact should come
first' although the 'Sylogisme' was proper for 'Lybells (which are but a Sylogisme)
yet it suits not with a Defence'. In his view, it would not suit because it would be
'ridiculous, and impossible, to wrap up a long story, many circumstances,
86 in the introductory 'The Authors Reflections Upon these Pleadings in Pleadings in some
remarkable Cases, Before the Supreme Courts ofScotland Since the Year, 1661 To which, the Decisions
are subjoyn'd (Edinburgh, 1672) I have used the second edition of a year later, (Edinburgh,
1673) although the copies are identical other than removal of Mackenzie's name from the title
page. See Ferguson, op cit., p.21
87 'What Eloquence is fit for the Bar. An Essay' in Pleadings in some remarkable Cases, op. cit., p.
3
88 i.e. lay men.
89 of the Civil Law and Romano-Canonical procedure.
90 p. 5. c.f. Hannay p.94, op. cit., citing ADC iii 405. See also Acts of the Lords of Council 1501 -
1503 (ed.) A.B. Calderwood (Edinburgh, 1993). Thus Balfour in his Practicks notices the case
of Oliphant v. Innes (1541) (at p.313 in the version edited by PGB McNeill, 1962-3) as authority
for the proposition that a 'relevant libel should have three parts, the major, the minor and the
conclusion'.
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presumptions and probabilities in a syllogisme; and oftimes there are many defences
propon'd and joyn'd together'. The most ordinary way, for him, of arguing in Law
was by 'similies, instances and parallels' and thus it was improper to 'drive' these
into syllogistic form.91
In all of this, of course, parties proceeded in the hypothetical as to fact. Proof of the
fact in the formulation was to be decided after the Court had decided the relevancy
of the forms of the parties' positions. As D.A.O. Edward has commented, where the
facts alleged, even if proved could not support the claim then the case could be
decided as a matter of law and proof of the fact was not merely unnecessary but
positively undesirable.92 The law followed the maxim 'frustra probatur quod probatum
11011 relevat.'93 That was not to say that proof could not be brought forward at this
stage. If the pursuer's Libel was 'instructed' by being 'instantly verified' by writ,
then, like in the case of compearance by a pursuer without a defender, the Court
could hold that the Law presumed it to be true and all the defender could do was to
controvert the relevancy of it, that is, to argue that the conclusion was not just or
there was not a sufficient ground for it in Law or Equity. Thus, explains Stair, the
pursuer must 'condescend upon what ground of law or Equity he foundeth,' unless
it be clear and evident to the judge.94 If the Lord Ordinary found the Libel relevant he
would sustain it then and there and would ciecern, with the power to correct any
91 Professor Cairns has pointed to these writings of Mackenzie as indicative of the
establishment of the "advocates' corporate sense of themselves as an independent liberal
profession" following their withdrawal in 1670 and the disbarring and banishment of a large
number of them in 1674. J.W. Cairns, Historical Introduction, op. cit. pp. 125-6
92 D.A.O. Edward, 'Fact-Finding: A British Perspective' in D.L. Carey Miller and P. Beaumont
(eds.), The Option ofLitignting in Europe, op. cit., p.43
93 'It is useless to prove that, which, when proved, is not relevant to the question at issue'
Trayner's Latin Maxims, 4th ed., (Edinburgh, 1993) pp. 232-3
94 Modus Litigandi, op. cit., p.10. Note the word 'condescend'. See infra.
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errors in favourable cases95 thereby granting it 'as it ought to have been demanded'
or granting it a libello ut libellatur96 in unfavourable cases. If the Libel could not be
instructed instantly, for example if the documents founded on by the pursuer had
not been brought to Court or were being searched for, the Pursuer would crave a
Term to Prove, the conclusion or remedy depending upon proof of the fact by writ,
whether as the major or minor premiss.
Relevancy as discussed above, was not solely debated with the summons and its
libel. The pursuer's advocate before the Bench had a right to 'Reply' to which the
defender's advocate had a right to answer by 'Duply', the pursuer's advocate
answering that by 'Triply' and so on until the process was naturally exhausted, but
always with the defender's advocate answering last.97 Each of these 'allegeances'
proponed was to be carefully recorded by the Clerk in the Minute Book and could be
sustained and admitted to probation, if relevant, whereupon the Lord Ordinary
would issue an Interlocutor to that effect.98
After the defender's advocate had exhausted his defences as objections to the 'defects
of the pursuit', he would move on to propone his 'exceptions' to the libel, that is, the
bases in law which, in the terminology of the time, would 'elide' what was relevantly
pleaded by the pursuer.99 Stair classified these into 'Dilators' and 'Peremptors', the
95 the Lord considering the overall impression of the case and the evidence produced,
whether he thought it favourable or not.
96 from the libel as laid.
97 Spottiswoode, Forms of Process, op. cit., p.45.
98 The procedure was oral. These 'allegeances' as 'duplys' 'triplys' etc. were not lodged, c.f. D.
Walker A Legal History ofScotland (Edinburgh, 1996) p.567 'The pursuer could lodge a reply ...
the defender a Duply".
99 These were sometimes colloquially referred to as the 'defences'.
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former not absolutely determining the cause, the latter doing so.100 They were
proponed to 'elide' the pursuer's action, either for a period of time 'to a certain day'
or permanently. The importance of these exceptions was that they founded upon
some positive right of the defender. Dilators had to come first and had to be proven
instantly. The Court would not grant a Term for proving them and they could not be
proponed after the Peremptors.101 The exceptions were as varied as the types of
action brought before the Court,102 but an example will suffice. To use Bisset's,103 if I
am obliged to pay 'T' £100 at next Whitsunday and 'T' calls and pursues me for the
said sum at any time before Whitsunday, then I could allege the dilatory exception
that I should be absolved from the pursuit because the term of payment that is
Whitsunday is not come. The debt is not taken away and I will still have to make
payment at Whitsunday notwithstanding the exception. This dilator exception
would have to be proved instantly, here, being obvious to the Lord Ordinary hearing
it whether Whitsunday had passed or not. If it had not, the judge would sustain the
Dilator and I would be entitled to extract a sentence thereon which was in effect an
absolvitor until the pursuer raised a new citation. If, on the same facts, I propone a
peremptor exception of payment, that the debt has been paid and satisfied already,
and if I am successful in proving, then in court, or later, that the payment was made,
then I would be entitled to be absolved simpliciter and never be craved thereafter for
the said sum. If called upon by the judge, the parties would discuss the competency
100 This was the classifying genius of Stair. In earlier times, one finds the words defence,
exception and objection used interchangeably, the terms peremptor and dilator being applied
to all. See for example Bisset and Balfour.
101 One could plead an Exception Declinator against the judge before either, but it would have
to be proponed first. Bisset Rolmentis op. cit. p. 173 quoting Quoniam Attachiamenta.
102 Stair gives examples of Satisfaction (of a Debt or obligation), Payment (of a Debt),
Discharge (of one's obligations), Prescription (as regulated by Acts of Parliament),
Renunciation(the pursuer having renounced his right upon which the case was proceeding),
Innovation (the substitution of a new right in full satisfaction of the old right being pursued),
Transactions (similar to innovation but taking away the former right in whole or in part) and
exception reijudicatae (the cause already judged and decerned).
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of the exception of payment as eliding the action for payment of a debt, then the
relevancy of the exception, leaving it to the Lord Ordinary to decide whether to
assign a term for proving the payment.
Although these are simple examples, implicit is the acceptance by the defender that
there was an obligation to make payment atWhitsunday. In the language of the time,
the exception would 'acknowledge', or 'import the verity of the libel'.
Tactics here were all important. The defender's advocate would propone the
exception and wait to see if it was contested by the other side as to its relevancy and
competency and whether it was met with a 'reply'.104 If the exception acknowledged
the libel and was relevant then the defender was permitted to prove it and the
pursuer did not need to prove the libel. If the exception denied the libel, or a part of
it, both parties would be ordained to prove. If Replys and Duplys etc. were proponed
by the parties then, if relevant and competent, depending upon whether they
acknowledged or not the preceding allegeance, the allocation of proof was
determined. Thus, using Stair's example, if the libel was for payment of a debt, the
defender might except upon compensation,105 the pursuer might reply that the debt
alleged as compensation had been dischargeci, to which the defender might Duply
that the debt compensed on was due to him as an assignee in an assignation, and if
there was a discharge, it was posterior to intimation to him as the assignee, therefore
the debt, in law, being still extant. Here the Libel, Exception, Reply and Duply would
all have to be proven. If the pursuer failed to prove the Libel, the defender would be
103 pp. 180 - 182. This would proceed as an ordinary summons.
104 As Sir George Mackenzie notes, 'the defender propones his defence, but urges it a little, till
he know if it be controverted by the Replyer, in a full Discourse', What Eloquence is fit for the
Bar, op. cit. p. 10. See also Stair, Modus Litigandi, op. cit., p. 14
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assoilzied, if he proved it and the defender failed in his exception then the pursuer
would succeed, and if he proved his Libel and Reply but the defender failed in the
defence (exception) and Duply then again the pursuer would succeed. The whole
purpose of the exercise was to determine who had to prove what.
Once the Lord Ordinary had heard the parties' advocates, he would sustain or repel
the respective allegeances and determine this allocation of proof. This determination
and assignation of Terms for Proving was called litiscontestation parte comparente.106
He would grant an interlocutor or interlocutors to this effect and this was the Act of
Litiscontestation,107 allowing and authorising (as warrant for citing witnesses) the
parties to lead proof of their articulate positions as noted in the Act. After this,
parties could not propone anything new except that it could be instantly verified or
emerged of new.108
(viii) The Advocates' Pleading at the Disputing
In the sketch of the procedure detailed above, it might be thought that the procedure
before the Ordinary could be dispatched with reasonable haste. Whilst in some
quarters rhetorical style was considered only fit for 'haranguing' and long reasoning
was to be discouraged,109 it seems that the advocates used this 'disputing' as a way of
demonstrating their skill and learning as well as their ability at pleading before the
105 i.e. one debt set off against another due
106 i.e. when the parties had appeared. There could also be litiscontestation parte non comparente
when one of the parties was not in attendance. See Spottiswoode p.56 ff., and Hope, Minor
Practicks p. 3
107 Litiscontestation was known to the Roman formulary system and was part of the Canon
Law although the term as used at this time connoted a different meaning whilst similar in
concept. See D. Walker, A Legal History ofScotland Vol. IV The Seventeenth Century
(Edinburgh, 1996) pp. 567 - 569
108 de novo emergens vel nuper veniens ad notiam.
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Court. 'Animated by gain, applause and custome'110 they might 'rail' against the
adverse client or the adverse advocate,111 expressing indignation at the 'odiousness'
of the position being adopted by the other party or their advocate opponent's
understanding of the law cautiously avoiding the use of what the Court might
consider unbecoming language or expression.112
They might stretch out their submissions, or plead long narrations of the law,
presumably for the benefit of the client and agent, which the other side would have,
in any event, no objection to, and would not require to reply to, the whole narration
therefore being unnecessary. Or, instead of succinctly stating the answer to the
preceding allegeance, they might develop, in great depth, the reasons why it was to
be enforced, mystifying the Clerks who were supposed to be noting in the minute
book the allegeances, and perplexing them as to what was meant to be the Reply,
Duply etc. to be noted.113 If one recalls Sir George Mackenzie's comments that the
Defence (or indeed the following allegeances) could be 'a long story', comprising
'many circumstances, presumptions and probabilities' and that argument before the
Court should be by 'similies, instances and parallels',114 it is perhaps not surprising
that such disputing would test the patience of the Ordinary. We are told that such
was the operation of the system, it would leave the Lord Ordinary, 'weary.'115
109 David Erskine of Dun (Lord Dun) 'Friendly and Familiar Advices' (1754) - 'Advice to the
Advocates' pp. 34-35
110 Mackenzie, What Eloquence op. cit. p. 8
111 ibid. p. 14
112 See the unfortunate outcome for Mr. Kenneth Gordon, Advocate, suspended from practice
for using unbecoming expression before the Court. A.S. 17th December 1708.
113 It seems that the Clerks developed a practice of trying to record everything, which was
checked by A.S. 3rd November 1677 ordaining them to 'set down distinctly the defences,
answers, replies and duplies etc. as they are prepared at the bar, without necessity to add
reasons for enforcing thereof.'
114 see supra.
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It is important to note that this was the Advocates' preferred way of stating a client's
case to the Court. It encapsulated what might now be termed the 'art of persuasion',
the advocate employing all and any reference to whatever purported authority,
which in the option of the advocate concerned, would assist or bolster his client's
position. This would include copious reference to Civilian authority. (Later, when the
pleading proceeded mostly in writing, the same approach would be adopted, but put
down on paper.) By this juncture, the operation of presumption and probability in
arguing had had a long history. The net result was that these similes, instances and
parallels advanced in argument were not in practice limited other than by the
learning of the individual advocate employed, or the patience of the Ordinary.
(ix) Tactics Employed by the Advocates.
There were three other tactics which could be employed to the perceived and actual
benefit of the parties. Firstly, the advocate might seek to persuade the judge that the
whole cause as presented, or in particular, points which had emerged in the course of
the dispute, were so complex or intricate or the applicable law was so doubtful that
he should 'make avizandum', i.e. consider the cause or the points privately, before
coming to a determination in litiscontestation. The idea seems to have been that a
considered determination rather than an immediate one would perhaps more likely
satisfy a party, without the necessity of bringing the matter back to him for review. If
this was concurred in by the Ordinary, the interlocutor would then record that it was
'Avizandum to the Lord himself.' Alternatively, on the same grounds, the Lord
Ordinary might be persuaded to 'advise' with the whole Lords in the Inner blouse, in
which case the party so requesting would 'have the Lords Answer'. In both cases it
was possible that the Lord Ordinary would follow this course of his own volition.
115 Mackenzie What Eloquence is Fit, op. cit. p. 10
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Also, in both cases, it could trigger the whole panoply of review procedures. So if,
after Avizandum, either party was not satisfied with the interlocutor pronounced
and the Act of Litiscontestation made, the practice had developed that the party
could crave to be further heard by the Ordinary (this time at the Side-Bar)116 and
either illustrate the arguments previously made, or propone new ones. The Lord
Ordinary would then, consistent with Civilian principle,117 review his own previous
interlocutor and either adhere to its terms or make alterations to it.118 If this was still
unsatisfactory the party could crave 'the Lords' Answer' and the cause might be
reported to the Inner House, either by the Lord 'voluntarly' or upon the defender
offering security (an 'Amand'). The Lord Ordinary in this situation could refuse to
Report.
The ultimate goal in these machinations was to attempt to obtain an Act of
Litiscontestation in the most general of terms, which would allow the party to lead
strictly non-relevant evidence, all of which would allow for a change of position in
law and fact when the evidence came out.
The third tactic used in seeking to postpone the determination of the relevancy, here
to a later stage, once the evidence had come out, was through seeking an Act Before
Answer, instead of the Act of Litiscontestation. This was tactical because in so
116 Debating at the Side-bar and the confusion arising therefrom seems to have greatly vexed
the Faculty of Advocates, appearing in its Minutes seven times between 1672 and 1691. See
Minute Book of the Faculty of Advocates, op. cit Vol. I. The difficulties seem to have been in
ascertaining when the Lord Ordinary who had been Ordinary in the Outer House was due to
sit at the side-bar as well as the practice of 'stopping' acts and decreets before they could be
extracted which took place at the small Side Bar. See below.
U7 see phillipson, Wliigs op. cit., generally in Ch. 2.
118 See further Spottiswoode, op cit., p. 58-59
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seeking it and being granted it, one was not thereby constrained to the articulated
points of an Act of Litiscontestation. It was still an interlocutor of the Ordinary, still
litiscontestating the cause, but instead of determining the relevancy of the mutual
allegeances of the parties, it sustained points and repelled points and allowed parties
to prove their allegeances before Answer to the relevancy. When extracted it was
called an Act before Answer. As Stair explains,
the Lords premit the Probation to the Discussing of the Relevancy: and
therefore, before Answer, ordain Witnesses ex officio to be adduced. And
where they see it dubious, who ought to be preferred in Probation, they use
before Answer to the Dispute, to ordain Witnesses to be examined hinc inde,
and such Writs and Evidents to be adciuced, as either Party will make use of.
And then they advise the Relevancy and Probation together and must not
admit new Probation, or new Alledgences in Fact, competent before the Act;
but the Act before Answer stands, as an Act of Litiscontestation, in all Points,
and hath the same Terms to prove, with Litiscontestation.'119
In his Modus Litigandi, Stair does not comment upon when these Acts became part
of procedure, although by the second edition120 he notes that 'by more recent custom,
the Lords have of a long time, ex nobili officio' allowed parties to lead proof of
witnesses before answer to the relevancy.121 The Court had always had an equitable
jurisdiction to grant equitable remedies and as the phrase 'ex nobili officio' implies, the
'remedy' of allowing Acts before Answer lay in the equitable jurisdiction of the court
to grant an equitable remedy where the law could not be determined without
ascertaining the facts upon which the case proceeded, as the need arose. Certainly,
119 pp.19-20 Modus Litigandi, op. cit.
120 published in 1693
121 Stair, Institutions IV.39.5
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the Act before Answer was known as a 'device' by 1674, in which year an Act of
Sederunt122 made provision for what had to be proponed before the Act was
extracted. It was appreciated by the Lords that 'questions do and may arise
concerning the import and effect of such acts'. As they explained
'[Considering That in severall cases they are in use, before discussing the
relevancy of the points debated ... whereupon acts are extracted which are
called acts before answere'
The Act of Sederunt ordained parties to propone all allegeances before the act was
extracted. Whilst this was the theory, as usual, the practice was different and as
Professor Bell was to remark one hundred and fifty years later, it left the issues to be
proved as a 'mass of law and fact.'123
At the end of all the probation, the Lord Ordinary upon Concluded Causes (from
1693 onwards), to whom the task fell, would often not be able to determine what had
been allowed and what had actually been proved, and was therefore hampered in
ranking the evidence and making up the 'State' of the case for advising to the whole
Lords for sentence.124 Thus, when parties came to the Inner House on the Concluded
Cause, the fact that it had proceeded before Answer as to the Relevancy allowed
them a greater latitude than if the relevancy had already been determined by Act of
Litiscontestation.125
122 A.S. 23 July 1674 ('Act concerneing Acts before Answere')
123 G.J. Bell, Examination of the Objections Stated Against the Bill For Better Regulating the Forms of
Process in the Court ofLaw in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1825) p. 32
124 Moreover, as discussed later, when the preferred and usual method of taking the proof
was by a Commissioner, not the Ordinary, the process became even more confused.
125 The Act of Litiscontestation was far more restrictive in terms of the evidence which could
be led. As Baron Hume could tell his students in the Scots Law class at Edinburgh University
about 1821, referring to the Act of Litiscontestation: 'it was settled ... to whom the privilege of
proving should be allowed; and to that party alone the choice of witnesses and the conduct of
the whole proceedings was given: for they had no notion in those days of allowing a conjunct
proof to both parties, of allegations, how relevant soever, which were opposite to each other, -
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In terms of the two other 'tactics', as Stair's example detailed above shows, the law
was becoming increasingly complicated and the rights and obligations of parties and
the legal devices and methods of protecting and enforcing them were constantly
being refined by the Court. It was therefore of material advantage to a litigant to
bring matters before the Lords - especially if it was unusual or novel, and certainly if
the Ordinary's reaction at the initial stage was unfavourable.126 The process of
allowing the party the Lords' Answer was through the procedure of 'Reporting' or
'taking to report' by the Lord Ordinary himself, and it was this procedure which was
to give rise to pleading in written form.
(x) The First Steps Towards Written Pleadings - The Report,
Solicitations and the Written Information.
Parties and their advocates knew that once the Lords' Answer was allowed, then the
cause was definitely going to go to the whole court, which, it should be remembered,
sat as a unitary body in private deciding matters on a majority vote. Rather than
relying upon the Ordinary's Report to the Lords, parties, agents and advocates
developed the practice of soliciting the Lords to impress upon them aspects of their
case and introducing new material for their consideration beyond what had been
allowed in relevancy at the superintendence of the Ordinary. In the first instance this
was done orally and it was only later that the 'information' was expressed in writing.
and still less a proof at large of facts and circumstances, whereof the virtue had not been
previously tried and considered.' 'Baron Hume's Lectures 1786 - 1822' (ed.) Paton, (Stair
Society, Edinburgh, 1957) p. 311
126 It was also desiderated as a party could bet that the Inner House would not all speak with
one mind other than in the most simple of cases. On this, see infra.
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The problem of solicitation vexed the Lords and their methods of dealing with the
problem are worth examining.
We may observe at the outset that the origin of this practice is difficult to trace and
that there have been theories placing it as a much later practice.127 The lodging of
'exceptionis and informationes gevin in write' had formed part of the procedure of
the Court in the earliest period128 but this was probably recognised procedure in the
Court differing from 'unsolicited' material. Yet, the practice of soliciting was not
unknown to Bisset in 1579.129 By 1596, parties, their advocates and agents had
commenced soliciting the Lords in their houses and in the 'high streets and in the
tolbooth' before the cause was to be reported.130 One party doing this would induce
the other to follow their example, in case the first persuaded the Lords of the
'goodness' of their case. The Lords considered the practice an 'intollerable abuse' and
in any event unnecessary, as the 'reporte from the Utter-hous' was 'sufficient
127 Robert Chambers in Traditions of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1868) = reprint (Edinburgh, 1967)
records that the judges were 'tampered by private solicitation' after the Restoration and hints
that the practice was derived from France, quoting a passage from Moliere's Misanthrope from
1666 (Qui voulez-vous done, qui pour vous sollicite? Aucun juge par vous ne sera visite?') pp. 121-2.
H.P.[Lord] Macmillan in 'The Court of Session in 1629/ ((1900) 12 J.R. p. 137), refers at pp.
141-2 to Lowther's 'Our Journale (sic) into Scotland ano dni. 1629, 5"' ofNovember', [which
recorded that parties and their advocates acquainted judges with their case before the hearing
(1894) Douglas Edition, p. 31] and what Lord Swinton called the 'disgracefid custom' of
solicitation, imported from France, in accordance with which parties, whose cases were in
dependence, were in the habit of paying personal visits to the houses of Judges for the
purpose of soliciting or giving them information.' Whilst a Dictionnaire de Droit et de Practique
(1749) carries explanations for the words and phrases 'Information', 'Information par Addition',
'Sollicitations aupre's des Juges, pour faire obtenir gain de cause a line des parties qui plaident' and
'Solliciteur', the practice, in Scotland at least, seems to have been known much earlier.
128 John Finlay, Men of Law, op. cit., p. 110.
129 Bisset records an A.S. 23 June 1579 that 'na actis nor lettres salbe ressavit over the bar, And that
na persone solist, the ordinar lordis ... that pass to the uttirhouse, to call ony act... under pane of
repruf and farther punishment at the lordis discretioun' p. 147 in vol. I of Hamilton-Grierson's
edition of 1920. It is likely that this ordinance was directed to removing temptations from the
Lords in an age when their integrity could be seriously open to question. See L. Macgregor,
'Pacta Illicta' in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds.), A History ofPrivate Law in Scotland (2
vols.) vol. 1,129 at 135-138 and also James Maidment, The Court ofSession Garland (London &
Glasgow, 1888) p. 13ff, in chapter 'Anecdotes of the Early Administration of Justice in
Scotland' for examples of judicial dishonesty and the institution of the judge's 'peat'.
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information to the Lordis of the estaites, merites and circumstances of thair causes'131
and in an attempt to remove the practice imposed a system of fines and
imprisonment.
Nevertheless, for better satisfaction of the parties whose actions were 'weichtie or
intricate' requiring 'better consideration', these parties were allowed, on a warrant,132
to deliver to the Lords themselves or their servants, at a particular hour, 'the
informatioun of the causis in wreitt', the Lords undertaking to read and consider
them, with advocates persisting in the practice without a warrant to be debarred 'fra
the tolbuthe'.
Thus, under their control, the Lords could now be informed in writing by the parties
before the Lord Ordinary was to Report.133 The Lords must have found that this
practice assisted their preparation for the case, as the practice of soliciting was
relaxed again by 1632 so that parties could go to the Lords' houses between 2 in the
afternoon and 7 at night to 'sollicite' or 'give informatioun' to them for the next days
calling, but doing so after 7pm the party would lose the opportunity of the case being
heard the following day.134 Again, it seems that these 'informations' were in writing,
being left for the Lords to peruse. In 1629, Lowther had noted that 'the parties with
their advocates will acquaint the Judges with their case before it comes to hearing,
which they say maketh quicker dispatch.'135
130 A.S. 13th July 1596.
131 ibid.
132 i.e. with the Lord Ordinary's permission.
133 Glassford, Remarks op. cit. p. 14 records 'At what time the use of written informations to
the court was first introduced does not appear'. It is certainly about this time.
134 A.S. 12'h June 1632.
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The Cromwellian conquest and occupation in 1651, the appointment of the
Commissioners for the Administration of Justice in 1652 and the requirement of the
'taking of the oath to be true and faithful to the Commonwealth'136 of those advocates
wishing to continue to practise caused many at the bar to refuse to recognise or plead
before the new judicial tribunal. This, it seems, resulted in another temporary137 form
of pleading in writing. As Forbes in his preface noted:
[The Commissioners] 'introduced the management of debates in writing, that
they might have the more time to deliberate on their decisions, and indirectly
have the assistance of the great lawyers; which written debates were drawn
by the non-conforming lawyers, and presented by men of less note at the
bar'.138
Whilst this may have been true, as noted above, written pleading was already firmly
established in the realm of informations and these were written in a 'debating' style.
When later, pleading in writing was to be considered voluminous, bloated, and
unfocussed, the idea persisted that this style of pleading was as a result of English
judges and cack-handed advocates in an earlier period.139 Consider this from the
Faculty of Advocates in 1824:
'The introduction, or at least the great increase of voluminous memorials in
the Court of Session, has been attributed to the appointment of the English
135 Lowther, Our Journall Into Scotland (repr. Edinburgh, 1894) at 31.
136 i.e. the 'Tender' (abjuring the Stewart cause)
137 For the period of the Usurpation.
138 Forbes, Journal of the Session Preface, p. 16. This cannot be vouched.
139 See Tait, M.S., s.v. 'Of the Court of Session', C.F. Shand, The Practice of the Court ofSession
etc. (Edinburgh, 1848), p. 339, f.n.l, and Anon., 'Scottish Law Under Cromwell' 1875 (19)
Journal of Jurisprudence 281 at 284.
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judges by Cromwell - men, ignorant of Scotch law, and deficient in judicial
habits, and who were at the same time deprived of the assistance of a learned
bar. To them the opportunity for repeated examination of written arguments,
and for reference to text-books and decided cases, might be necessary.'140
Pleading in writing by information, however, was certainly extant by the time of the
Usurpation. Even if the system of pleading altered in the Cromwellian period,
following the Restoration in 1660, the Court returned as did the former form of
process and on the recommendations of a Law Commission appointed 1669 and
reporting 1670, the Courts Act 1672 141 confirmed that the Ordinary whose
interlocutor the party sought to review had to be approached first for his
consideration of whether the matter should proceed to the Lords' review. It
prohibited any Bill presented to the Lords stopping or rectifying any Act or 'decreit'
passed in the Outer-house unless the party had firstly made an application to the
Ordinary who pronounced the same. If he refused to hear the party upon any new
matter 'condiscended on'142 or in the case of doubtfulness, upon consignation of 'ane
Amand', then in these circumstances the party could present the Bill to the whole
Lords.
The same Act also contains an interesting provision143 concerning how the advocates
were to be paid for this written pleading. Their 'allowance' was in time coming to be
regulated according to the 'quality of the persones who employes them'. The section
provides that
140 Remarks on the Report of the Committee of the Faculty of Advocates, appointed to
Consider the Provisions of the Bill for the Better Regulating of the Process of the Court of Law
in Scotland (London, 1825).
141 s. 15
142 to become a pleading in its own right. See below.
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'for every consultation, Pleading thereupon, and drawing Bills upon any
Interloquitor thereanent altogether, there be given at most to any Advocat,
by Noblemen Eightein pounds, by Knights and Barrons fiftein pounds by
Gentlemen and cheiff burgesis tuelve pounds, and by the rest of the people
nine pounds' ...'nothing be allowed for drawing Informations to be given to
the Lords aftir dispute, bot to one Advocat onlie and that the Allowance
therfor be onlie the halfe of what is allowed for the consultation'
From this itmight be inferred, firstly, that the informations after dispute were in
writing, hence the verb 'drawing'. Secondly, it seems clear that the Lords were
attempting to restrict economically the length of the bills and informations and limit
the numbers of advocates involved in drafting them. If the work involved before and
after the dispute was limited to a 'block' allowance, presumably it was not in the
financial interest of the advocate to draw long informations.
Yet, and perhaps because of this, by 1677, the practice of importunate solicitation had
re-emerged, and the Lords again found the practice of soliciting a great and real
inconvenience. Even the President would be solicited. Forbes noted that Stair 'could
not indure to be sollicited, or impertinently addressed to in Matters of Justice.'144
143 s. 27
144 Forbes, Journal p.38. This, however, might be treated with caution. Professor Hector
MacQueen has made a strong case for this passage having been copied directly from Stair's
writing itself. In 1689 he was subjected to air attack on his character in a pamphlet attributed
to Robert Ferguson 'The Late Proceedings and Votes of the Parliament ofScotlaiui contained in an
Address Delivered to the King, Signed by the Plurality thereof, Stated and Vindicated' His Reply and
defence the following year 'An Apology for Sir James Dalrymple ofStair, President of the Session,
by himself published 1690 contains a passage 'When my Sons came to the House, I did most
strictly Prohibite them to Solicite me in any Case, which they did exactly Observe' (at p. 3) on
which this passage from Forbes could be based. Further, as MacQueen points out, Sir John
Lauder of Fountainhall recorded that Stair had been solicited by his wife on an occasion. The
whole discussion can be found in H. MacQueen, Stair's Later Reputation as a Jurist' in
Miscellany Three, (ed. W.M. Gordon) (39 Stair Society, Edinburgh, 1992) p. 173 and
particularly at pp. 181; 187 and 190
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Parties at this time were soliciting the Lords at 'their houses scattered through the
severall places of the city', paying respects to the Lords and attempting to elaborate
upon the written information by 'verbal information' 'upon pretence of giving
information.'145 It is noted in this 1677 A.S. that written informations had by then
'become ordinary' and that all that ought to be represented to the Lords in any cause
may easily and without trouble be done by written informations sent to them. The
Lords, 'finding it infeasible to hinder sollicitations' by previous methods, declared
that no solicitation or verbal information could be made to them whilst the cause was
depending and if it was, this would be a reason for the (exception of) declinature of
those Lords hearing the cause. Written informations, judicially allowed, could
continue to be presented between the hours of five and eight at night. Thus, by this
time, written informations and therefore what might be termed written pleading, at
least in relation to reporting, was part and parcel of the Court's procedure.146
This ordinance did not seem to work in the event, or at least adversaries would
entertain suspicions as to whether the other had had the opportunity of speaking
with any of the Lords before the whole court was to decide their cause. As a result,
two years later, the Lords issued a further A.S.147 ordaining not only that it would be
grounds for declinature, but that at advising, if either party sought it, they would
'purge themselves' as to whether they had received verbal informations or
solicitations in the cause being decided by them.
145 A.S. 6th November 1677
146 They are sometimes confused with what were to become 'condescendences'. For incorrect
use see for example J.W. Brodie-Innes, Comparative Principles of the Laws of England and
Scotland Courts and Procedure (Edinburgh & London, 1903) Also Wyness Miller, Civil Pleading
in Scotland' (1932) 30 Michigan Law Review, p.556 fn 46.
147 A.S. 24th December 1679
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A different problem then arose, whereby parties began printing their informations,
the Lords prohibiting this by A.S. 2nd January 1685. By A.S. 11th November 1690, the
Lords ordered the previous Acts of Sederunt 1677 and 1679 to be printed and affixed
to the walls of the Outer-house and to be observed and later the same month issued
yet another ordinance148 in relation to the 'Manner of delyvering Informations to the
Lords'. They noted that the chief occasion of the parties' solicitation was that the
'leidges' thought that the informations would not be securely delivered unless they
did so with their own hands, and in doing so would then take the opportunity of
verbally informing them for good measure. To remedy this, the Lords devised a
system of boxes for every one of them, each box with a slit in the top of it and locked,
each judge holding his own key. The boxes were to stand in the Session house from
three to seven at night so that 'informationes ... may be lett in and cannot be drawen
out' until the box was opened by the individual Lord when he sent for his box at
seven. Informations149 were not to be delivered in any other way, except in the case
of the Lord Reporter, who it seems could now also be informed. So established then
was the practice of informing, that the Lords would be uncertain if a cause was to be
reported if there was no information in their box the previous night. The reason that
there might not be an information for a party put in the boxes was sometimes due to
negligence on the part of those charged with drawing them but at other times this
was tactical - waiting to see what was in the other party's information. To remedy
this, the Lord Reporter was to put a note advising of the causes to be reported the
next day into the Lords' boxes.
148 29th November 1690 confirmed by A.S. 2nd June 1691.
149 and bills and answers. Bills were here not those for extra-ordinary summons which went
before the Lord Ordinary on the Bills, but Reclamatory Bills against a Lord Ordinary's refusal
to Report. Answers were those ordered by the Inner House 'answering' these bills. See below
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An indication of the time-consuming nature of the reading of the parties'
informations is given in the Act of Sederunt of the following year150 which shortened
the period that the boxes stood, by an hour 'that the Lords may have competent time
to peruse their informationes.'
(xi) The Ordinary's Report and the New Role for Informations.
In all of this, the purpose of the Report by the Ordinary should not be lost sight of,
viz., that the cause itself, or particular points therein, being complex or intricate or the
applicable law being doubtful, or the Ordinary being mistaken, it was for the better
determination of the case that the whole Lords should pronounce upon it. On the
Ordinary intimating that he was to Report and the day that he was going to do so, he
would peruse the Process a day or two before the day of the Report, looking over the
writs which related to the points in dispute, all as (hopefully) carefully noted by the
Clerk at the time the parties had made their submissions, so that he would be able to
narrate distinctly and 'deduce the cause and pleading thereupon' for the benefit of
the Lords. On the day, the Lord Reporter would go to the Inner House and report.
The whole Lords would consider the Report and pronounce an interlocutor, unless
the facts or law were intricate, profound, new or required serious consideration, in
which case they would summon the parties to be heard in praesentin. With the advent
of the judicial sanction (or tolerance) of written informations, both parties were to
have their written informations ready for the Lords the night before the Report and
put in the boxes of the Lords. If the Ordinary spotted anything new in fact in the
Informations, which was not proponed before him at the bar, he would either hear
the parties again on it, or point it out to the Lords, who, if they considered that it was
'weighty,' would desire him to hear the parties again. The Ordinary would then
150 2nd june 1691.
61
leave the Inner House and return to the Outer House to advise the parties of the
Lords' determination and what they had sustained or repelled.
Reporting continued to be a problematic procedure. Because of 'the mistakes that fall
out in reporting of Causes', the 1693 Act anent Advocats their Subscribing of the
Minutes of Debate c. 33, provided that the Minutes as noted by the Clerk at the
dispute would require to be signed by the procurator for 'ilk party' and by the Lord
Reporter, which Minutes would also be added to the multiplicity of papers to be read
by the Lords prior to the Report.
(xii) Reclaiming Petitions.
The parties' advocates could also engineer a hearing in presence by presenting a
reclamatory bill by a 'Petition' addressed to the Lords in the circumstances noted
above, when the Ordinary refused to report for the Lords' Answer, even upon an
amand, and supplicating that the Lords should alter the interlocutor or fix a hearing
in their own presence. These bills 'were for the most part ordained to be seen'151 and
answered (in a similar manner to libels) and the day for hearing in praesentia was
fixed. On the day of the hearing in presence, whether as a result of the Lords calling
the hearing or as a result of the presentation of a reclamatory bill, the parties and
their advocates would go to the Inner House and make their submissions. If the
parties were appealing against the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor to refuse to report,
the Lords could adhere to it, alter it, recommend to the Ordinary to hear the parties
again, or appoint another hearing in praesentia in relation to the dispute. If the
hearing was as called by the Lords themselves, they could advise it instantly, or
ordain parties to give in informations again, whereupon the President would advise
62
the cause for the interlocutor of the Lords, which itself could be the subject of a
reclaiming bill, which might be ordered to be seen and answered and thereafter
heard again in praesentia, the Lords either adhering or altering their former
interlocutor.
(xiii) The Developing Practice of Pleading by Written Documents.
Thus, by the start of the eighteenth century, students in John Spotiswood's College152
would be alive to the role which written pleading had come to play in the procedure
before the Scottish Courts. Other than the initial addresses by parties' advocates, the
pleading was written and increasingly printed, the by-product of the Lords' attempts
to remove verbal informing or soliciting. The trend towards writing was set to
continue as were the Lords' attempts to control it. Yet, as we shall see below, the
number of documents relating to different parts of the procedure was also to
increase. What might be noted, at this key point in the development of the
procedure, is that invariably, the parties' advocates, freed from the shackles of
relevancy at the dispute, would, as a result, relish the opportunity given by the
allowance of informations to display their learning and to extrapolate nd longum all
that had been said in the oral submissions before the Ordinary as well as introducing
new facts, new law and new legal reasoning and argument.153 Even the wording
used by the Court in permitting the parties to follow this course gives this away - the
parties were 'allowed to enlarge in informations.'154
151 Spotiswood, op. cit.
152 see John W. Cairns, John Spotswood, Professor of Law' Miscellany Three (ed. W.M. Gordon)
(39 Stair Society, 1992) p. 131
153 For an interesting excursus through some of the early eighteenth century Session papers
held in the Advocates' Library (and now also the Faculty's Mackenzie Building) see John A.
Inglis Eighteenth Century Pleading (1907-8) 19 Juridical Review 42 - 57
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In consequence, the approach which had developed at the Bar in the 'dispute' under
the supposed superintendence of the Ordinary had found a new vehicle through the
written word, that is de facto written pleading. The constructions which had been
deployed in the art of persuasion before the Ordinary could now be expressed in
writing, without wearying the Judge (at least in his presence). Moreover, in their
drafting, more time could be used by increasingly educated155 advocates, allowing
them to ruminate over the client's cause and search the ever expanding Advocates'
Library for whatever favourable source could usefully be deployed in the client's
cause. Obviously, the Inner House in its composition, comprising fifteen individuals
of differing outlooks and views, mores and abilities presented a broad platform to
address. Some of the judges were undoubtedly learned jurists and scholars. Others
however, were eccentric, or adopted unusual approaches to ascertaining what the
law was and indeed how it should be applied. It should also be recalled that some
were political appointee Extra-ordinary Lords and they were thus susceptible to
submissions coloured by shared political leanings. Finally there were those who
found the work taxing.
Thus, a Bill, Petition or Information, drawn with the aim of persuading the Lords to
alter an Ordinary's interlocutor, would try to contain something for all: rhetorical
devices would be employed; appeals ad populum and ad hominem would be included;
and most commonly apologies would preface the pleading - apologising for having
so to detain their Lordships but with the explanation that it was due to the
unreasonableness or recalcitrance of an adversary. As a result such papers were far
154 My emphasis
155 There is a wealth of writing in respect of this. See for example Cairns, Historical
Introduction, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 125-130 and the works cited therein.
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from the brocard '11011 rhetorick, sed logick' which had guided the procedure in the
early period.
Part of the problem was that there was no prescribed content and, for the most part,
the bills and informations from the period up to the start of the nineteenth century
are long, rambling and tedious. Typically, they start with an explanation of the
previous procedure156 and then why the party is seeking the review. Thereafter, they
often continue for page after page and it is often hard to avoici the conclusion that, in
most cases, the drafter had had a stream of thoughts as to what might prove
persuasive. The points made often appear random and contain a mixture of fact and
authority, not necessarily at the same part of the page. Thus, Spotiswood records that
there were, 'many Inconveniencies arising from the large and unnecessary
Congestion of Narratives and Matters of Fact in Informations'157 At their best, with
'citationes' from the Civil and Feudal Laws and the texts thereon, they could be
works of learning. At worst they were tedious collections of decisions.158
But these written pleadings all had to be read, and as noted, the informations were to
be ready for reading by the Lords the night before the reporting of the cause or the
hearing in presence. It was not so much the content, but the length of these
informations which irked the Lords. Stair, in preparing his Decisions of the Lords of
Council and Session159 notes in the Epistle Dedicatory the Targe Pleadings, or the
156 The collections held by the Faculty do not include the Summons. The triggering of one of
the review procedures meant that a copy of the original summons was included in the
process. See below.
157 Spotiswood, op. cit. p.60 following the wording useci in the A.S. 6th February 1692
158 Walker A Legal History ofScotland Vol. V (Edinburgh, 1998) p.595
159 Stair, The Decisions of the Lords ofCouncil and Session In the most Important Cases Debate before
them, With the Acts ofSederunt. As also, An Alphabetical Compend of the Decisions; With an Index of
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Written Informations of Parties' and Forbes, somewhat dramatically records the
effect of having to read them upon the Lords' health, as
'of late, since Informations and Bills were allowed to be printed, become an
incredible Fatigue to the Lords: Who after toiling all Day in hearing Causes,
are obliged to shut themselves up to peruse and consider a Multiplicity of
Papers at Night; and thereby often to want the necessary Relaxation due to
Nature, which visibly shortens their Days.'160
(xiv) More Pleading in Writing
From at least the 1690s, the 'Multiplicity of Papers' which the Lords had to read
included new documents called 'condescendences.'161 The etymology of the word is
uncertain but it will be recalled that the Courts Act 1672 had referred to matters
'condiscended on' and Stair had referred to the situation in which a party had to
'condescend upon what ground of law or Equity he foundeth'.162 In any event, at this
time, a 'condescendence' had taken on a very particular meaning.
If the Lord Ordinary in the Outer-house had granted an act, sentence or decreet, the
party who took issue with it had to make a 'stop' to it within six days of its
pronouncement, before it was extracted and diligence executed thereon. By A.S. 7th
the Acts ofSederunt, and the Pursuers and Defenders Names. From June 1661. to 1681 In two Parts
Observed by Sir James Dalrymple ofStair, Knight and Baronet, &c. (Edinburgh, 1683)
160 Forbes Journal op. cit. p. 10. It is possible that what Forbes meant was that it shortened the
judges' leisure time. However, given MacQueen's thesis above and in particular the esteemed
audience to whom his works were directed, a little spin and drama to emphasis how hard the
judges worked would have been well received.
161 Wyness Millar had trouble tracing the origin of this word and seems to have failed to
notice its emergence at this time. See R. Wyness Millar, Civil Pleading in Scotland, Part I, p.
556. He continues that 'these statements were, however, usually called 'informations' until 1850'
This is misleading. The term 'condescendence' was used in the sense here. The term
'Memorial' was used in relation to the comments of the parties upon the evidence adduced
before the Ordinary on Oaths and Witnesses or Commissioner, and latterly, was also used to
denote the document containing the parties' comments on the Minutes of Debate, although
finally the terms became pretty much interchangeable.
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November 1690, the said party had to insert in a 'condescendence' the points upon
which he wished to be heard. If it contained a 'relevant ground' for a 'stop', the
Ordinary would do so and ordain the condescendence to be 'seen' by the other party.
The other party would be allowed to 'answer' this (in a document of the same name)
and the whole matter would be reviewed again at the 'Side-bar' before going to the
Lords, if one party or both wished to take it there.163
Following proof, it was the duty of the Ordinary on Concluded Causes to write a
'State' of the evidence which would come to be printed and it became the practice for
counsel to write 'Memorials' on the import of evidence. This practice was not
properly regulated until 1752!64
(xv) The Court's Difficulties with Informations, Bills and Pleadings in
Writing.
By this time, the Lords were irritated by the problem of the long informations and
bills (petitions) being drawn by the parties' advocates. It is clear that their previous
efforts to correct this had failed or at least, were noticed more in the breach than the
observance. The A.S. 6th February 1692 records The Lords of Council and Session
spending 'a great part of the leidges time unprofitably in reading' the bills and
informations of the parties. Because they frequently made no mention of what was to
be instructed and proven, from here forward, the Act ordered that no notice would
be taken of, nor answer given, by the Lords to any matter of fact contained in a bill or
information. These matters of fact were to be distinctly proposed and instructed by
162 Stair, Modus Litigandi, op. cit. p. 10. See supra.
153 This whole procedure was not without difficulty and some degree of confusion. The A.S.
10th June 1691 and A.S. 7th July 1691 attempted to regulate it - unsuccessfully.
164 A.S. 18lh June 1752. C.f. Phillipson, op. cit. pp.43-4, 56 and Cairns, The Civil Jury op. cit. p. 5
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writs produced - which writs were to be marked at the points in the margin
corresponding to the text upon which the party intended to rely.
The parties' allegeances were to follow the order of the minutes of debate and every
alleageance was to bear the point for or against which it was proposed. Thus the act
attempted to prevent the tactical with-holding of facts by a party and was an early
attempt to force the parties to narrate their case specifically, with the production and
marking of the relevant parts of the writs which instructed the facts, obviously all
with the intention of addressing the problem of the long written pleading. Following
a Commission appointed by the King to examine the procedure of the Session, the
Articles of Regulation165 two years later went further. The Side-Bar was abolished
and the passing and refusing of Bills was now to be conducted by Ordinary on the
concluding Saturday of his week. The 'abuse of the multiplying of bills and their
superfluous length' was to be checked by imposing a fine on the advocate subscriber
if the bill was found to be 'groundless, or in its length superfluous or litigious.'166
Further, the Lords declared that in the final determination of the cause, the party
prevailing could put in an 'accompt' of the expenses and damage that he had been put
to in the process by reason of the content of the bill or information, which they would
then either decern for or tax and modify, if found to be extravagant. The same
Articles again attempted to restrict the payments to be allowed to advocates for the
drawing of the information after dispute.
165 Articles of Regulation concerning the Session, dated 29lh April 1695 and recorded in the
Sederunt Book 2nd November 1695.
166 c. 23
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This attempt to prevent the confusion prevalent at the Side-Bar and in particular the
practice of getting causes called at it for 'stops', appears not to have worked.167
Moreover, the petitions, answers and informations which were being placed in the
Lords' boxes were still causing the Lords problems - although this time it was the
language used in them. As we have noticed above, originally it was considered good
oral pleading to use every device and every argument which one could marshal, in
seeking to persuade the Ordinary of a client's case and in time this practice had been
incorporated into the written pleading which took its place. A.S. 9th July 1709 records
'of late, indecent and disrespectful expressions are so frequent in informations,
petitions and answers that it is necessary ane effectual remedy be provided against
the same' ordaining
'all advocates to be careful all petitions, answers, informations and other
papers to be put in the boxes, be formed and drawn with all decent and
respectful! expressions towards the Judges and parties.'
with the threat of advocates being disbarred in the non-observance of the same. But it
was not just the advocates' unbecoming language. It seems disgruntled parties were
not averse to letting the Court know what they thought of it at the conclusion of the
proceedings before the Ordinary in the Outer House. A.S. 20th June 1710 prohibits
'cursing, swearing, reproaching and mocking of religion and piety' noting that
'abuses of that kind were sometimes committed in the Outer House'. Certainly,
before the Lords in the Inner House, the observation of judges bickering and
arguing168 cannot have been an edifying sight. At the supposed conclusion of a cause,
167 A.S. 11th November 1708 imposed an obligation on the Ordinary to make up a 'Side-Roll'
and to call according to it at the Side-Bar and dictates the times and days that he was to be
permitted to do so. See also Russell's explanation of it in The Form ofProcess in the Court of
Session and Court ofTeinds To which is preficed, A General Account of the College of Justice by John
Russell, Clerk to the Signet, (Edinburgh, 1768) at p. 59
168 See AE.J.G. Mackay, A Sketch of the History ofScots Law. An address (in part) Delivered at the
Request of the Members of the Society ofScots Law in the University of Edinburgh (1882) 26 Journal
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especially in those causes in which there had been allowed an Act before Answer,
there would be a morass of law and fact before their Lordships, clouded with various
memorials, condescendences, informations and bills, all in process, and out of which
the Judges would have to vote on the outcome.
Twenty years earlier, an Act of Parliament had ordered that the doors of the Court
should be open to the public so that the public for the first time could see their
Lordships' deliberations upon their causes coming before them.169 As Bell could
remark,
'the observations of parties at the final decision of the cause, extending both
to the relevancy and fact; the frequent imperfections of the averment and
hypothesis, on which the relevancy had been decided, as appearing by the
actual depositions of the witnesses; together with the open deliberations of
the judges on the whole matter of the cause; exposed the final determination,
which had formerly been a simple and conclusive sentence on fact, almost in
the nature of a verdict, to argument and remonstrance. ... [and] of a
discussion, rhetorically maintained, on the whole mass of law and fact
involved in the case.'
Of course, an angry and disgruntled client might be soothed and placated with the
advice that all was not lost and that he could reclaim. As we have seen, the
reclaiming bill would be the appropriate vehicle to bring matters before the whole
Court and could be so brought more than once. The number of times was restricted
of Jurisprudence (in 2 parts) March 1882 pp.113-129; May 1882 225-240 at part 2, p. 233.
Phillipson op. cit. pp. 53-54. See also Henry Cockburn, Memorials of his Time, (Edinburgh, 1856)
at p. 245. 'A bench of fifteen judges can only be a 'learned crowd.' Their number produced
confusion, unseemly contention, prominence in the coarse and shrinking by the gentle'.
169 1693, c. 42 Acta Pari. vol. ix, p.305
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to two in 171V70 and further restricted in 1718171 so that the second reclaiming
petition could relate only to new matters of fact which had recently come to parties'
knowledge. But all of this might be obviated by the Ordinary who took a flexible
approach to the rules of procedure and the Acts of Sederunt.
'Flexible rules of procedure meant that few steps in a cause were irrevocable.
A cause was as long or as short as the litigants wanted it to be. If it
progressed quickly, it was because the parties were prepared to accept the
various interlocutors passed upon it by the Ordinary. Machinery existed
which allowed parties to litigate for as long as their inclinations or their
purses allowed them. The rules of procedure were not so much binding
forms as mere premises, which could be softened by the equitable powers of
the Court.'172
(xvi) Pressures on the Court: The Development of Rules of Pleading in
Writing.
This machinery, by reclaiming, and the invocation of the other methods of review,
coupled with the tactics used by the advocates, (and the length of their pleadings)
began to take its toll on the Court. Throughout the remainder of the first half of the
eighteenth century, we see in the Acts of Sederunt the Lords engaged in a battle to
force the parties to state distinctly the law and the facts upon which they were
content to litiscontestate. It was a battle which they never won.
170 A.S. 20th November 1711.
171 A.S. 26th November 1718.
172 Phillipson, op. cit. pp. 58-59.
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In addition, to add to its woes, the amount of business coming before the Court was
yearly increasing. As Phillipson has shown,173 by the end of the century, the Court
was unable to deal with a third of the business brought before it.174 The answer, it
was thought, was to get back to the proper superintendence of the 'dispute' before
the Ordinary, even though the Court was not yet, at this stage, able to permit the
abandonment of the panoply of review procedures consistent with equity and the
Civilian principles which had informed the procedure from the outset. Adherence to
strict form was considered to cause injustice but the 'form' could be softened by
'Equity',175 and if the parties could be forced to state clearly their positions in early
course, then, consistent with that equity, the procedure could be brought to a swifter
conclusion.
The ordinance of 6th February 1692 relating to the content of written pleading was
reinforced in A.S. 19th December 1710176 and in 1715177 it was provided for the first
time, that where
'any party against whom any matter of fact shall be alleged which might be
admitted to probation, the said party or his advocate shall be obliged to
173 somewhat speculatively, J. Cairns, '"The Dearest Birth Right of the People of England":
The Civil Jury in Modern Scottish Legal History' in (eds.) J. W. Cairns and G. McLeod, '"The
Dearest Birth Right of the People of England" The Jury in the History of the Common Law (Oxford,
2002)
174 Phillipson op. cit. p. 46
175 Karnes, author of the principal work on equity in Scotland, thought 'himself superior to
rules which he considered either as nugatory and cumbersome or else hurtful to the interests
of justice.' Quoted by J. Ramsay of Ochtertyre, Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century,
i, pp.189-90.
176 see above, adding that the advocate subscriber of any written pleading would be looked
upon as the drawer of it and answerable for its content. This was the subject of another A.S.
20th November 1711.
177 A.S. Is1 February 1715. See also Robert Wyness Millar, Civil Pleading in Scotland (1932) 30
Michigan Law Review, (2 Parts) No. 4, 545- 581; No. 5 582 - 746 at page 572, and at fn 126 for
his discussion of the Scottish system of pleading following ficta confessio as well as his citation
from Balfour's Practicks quoting the case of Hay contra Diksone 6 Dec. 1542 2 t. c. 128. It is of
interest because Lord President Clyde (primus) corrected and added to the article. The case is
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confess or deny that fact before pronouncing of the interlocutor ... which
confession or denial shall be expressly marked in the minutes. And if he
refuse so to confess or deny, his refusing in like manner shall be marked on
the minutes, whereupon he shall be held as confessed.'
In other words, the old practice of acknowledging the libel had to be followed in
writing. The Court reinforced this in 1723,178 whereby it was ordained that written
defences, (both dilator and peremptor) answering a summons, required to be signed
by a party or his procurator and had to 'comprehend an acknowledgement or denial
of the facts libelled, otherwise the said facts shall be held as acknowledged.' Itwill be
recalled that the dispute before the Ordinary of old had proceeded orally and in the
employment of the reply and duply etc. the party's advocate would tactically
consider whether the 'verity' of the alleageance of the opponent should be
acknowledged. By this time, it seems, the 'dispute' or 'debate' itself no longer
resembled the oral proceedings of old. The defences now had to be in writing, and
the summons always had been. Whilst before, it could always be inferred from a
speaker's allegeance whether he acknowledged the libel or denied it, as stated to the
Lord Ordinary under the old procedure, by this time the Court was expressly
ordaining parties to do so in writing.
The importance of this now was the sanction to be exercised by the Court to coerce
parties to do. If it was not denied, it was to be held as acknowledged. So, from his
silence in answering an adversary's case, a litigant would be deemed to have tacitly
admitted that which he remained silent upon.
actually an 'authority' in the loose sense of the word for proponing a peremptory exception
and acknowledging a libel.
178 A.S. 15th February 1723.
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This provision was tried and may have been moderately successful as the latter A.S.
was continued179 to January 1728. In addition the Lords were to be given additional
powers as there is included a provision permitting the Ordinary to award 'expences'
against a party found 'shifting or delaying.' This A.S. in itself must have had effect
upon parties as it was continued again180 to 1st July 1729.181
However, the strident march of acts of sederunt imposing increasing penalties upon
litigants and their pleadings slowed. Equity was once again invoked. It became
permissible once more for a defender to give in their dilatory defences apart and they
could delay the giving in of the peremptor defences until the dilators were discussed.
The reason for this could have been that a party's title was doubtful or that there had
been irregular steps of process prior to the giving in of the peremptors and it was
deemed unfair (i.e. contrary to equity) to the defender to peril his case until the
dilators had been discussed. Whilst there was supposed to be consignation of 20
shillings Sterling by the defender to the pursuer at the point of over-ruling the
dilatory defences, in practice it came not to be observed, and became another cause
for delay.182
The 'ingiveing of Informations' continued to dog the Lords and the issue raised itself
once more in 1738.183 Whereas before, parties might delay the preparation and giving
in of informations to elicit the adversary's position, and attempts were made to
179 by A.S. 1st January 1726.
180 by A.S. 11th June 1728.
181 finally being made perpetual by A.S. 19th February 1742.
182 In respect of this aspect, see the dismay of Russell writing in 1768 (obviously informed by
his capacity as a Clerk to the Signet) in The Form ofProcess, op. cit., p. 38.
183 A.S. 29,h June 1738. A.S. 13 July 1739 repeated its terms and reinforced it.
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prohibit this, in any event, the practice continued. To prevent it, a party ready with
an information on the appointed day could then be authorised to print the Minutes
of Debate following the 'dispute' anci the cost of printing was then to be recoverable
from the other party and a new day was set. A dilatory party was not to be allowed
to give in an information unless he paid an amand.
(xvii) Ongoing Reforms
Regulation of the Court's procedure continued apace for the remainder of the
century. Acts of sederunt were passed regulating what papers could be put in their
Lordships' boxes and when they should be put there,184 papers were to be printed for
the 'conveniency of the Judges',185 Memorials on the import of prepared States of
evidence were regulated,186 petitions now had to be signed by an advocate187 and the
Minute Book was now to be printed by the Keeper and copies circulated to the
Writers, as were the Outer House Rolls.188
However, this was the very period which required strong measures from the Court
to marshal its procedure. The written pleadings and abuse in bringing cases
repeatedly back before both the Ordinaries and the whole Court were pressing
concerns. A.S. 27th June 1776, prevented prorogation of reclaiming days by consent of
both parties.
184 A.S. 6th November 1740; 10th November 1741; 23rd November 1752; 16th December 1760; 14th
June 1788
185 A.S. 15th July 1768. Agents were now to be fined for 'imperfect quotations and
typographical errors. See Watson, op. cit. p. 91.
186 A.S. 18th June 1752
187 A.S. 5th March 1789
188 A.S. 11th March 1789
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The A.S. 11th August 1787 attempted to remedy inter alia the 'manifold delays and
obstructions to the course of justice in the Outer-house' which arose from the
amending of libels, and parties not being prepared on the day of calling for the
discussion before the Ordinary. The tactic appears to have developed among
advocates who found themselves in a position of unpreparedness, of allowing
interlocutors or decreets to be pronounced against interest and thereafter to
represent to the Ordinary. The net effect of this was that the Ordinary was deprived
of examining the merits of the cause at the first stage of proceedings.189 This was
made the subject of further control, by attempting to force parties to join issue on the
facts of the case which were actually in dispute190 in their written pleadings, and
reverting to the old system of requiring defenders to state their whole defences, both
dilatory and peremptory, together. Again a system of fines was introduced.191
(xviii) The Changing Nature of the Advocates' Function and the Effect of
Written Pleading
Still, there was little oral debate as once there had been, and the movement towards
pleadings being required in writing had resulted in the loss of the superintendence
of the separation of fact and law so important in Stair's time. These written pleadings
might indeed furnish the Court with all the facts and all the law pertaining or which
might pertain to the case being decided, but the approach used by many drafting
advocates of including all possible fact and law as opposed to all relevant fact and
law left the Court with the function of selecting all that was relevant and as a result
189 Watson, New Form of Process before the Court of Session, op. cit., p. 57
190 This was to remain a dead letter.
191 Lord Craig attempted to enforce these but was of the view that they were of little effect.
Notes ofopinions on proposed form ofprocess, 14"' March 1809, MSS - Proc. Scot. Jud. Com 1808
Advocates' Library.
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of the increased demand for judicial time, it was a function which it could no longer
efficiently perform.
The nature of the advocates' work was also changing. The conversion of counsel
from verbal practitioners at the bar little involved in the practical drafting of the
simple initiating court documents, to primarily drafters of pleadings with a
decreased function in oral pleading before the Court, seems to have led to the loss of
the skill of oratory so valued in the earlier period. In 1748, this change had not been
lost on Lord President Dundas192 in his reply (as noted by the Faculty) to the
Advocates, on his taking office, when he reflected upon the manner of proceeding
adopted by this time in the Court:
'That in order to promote and continue at this Bar the exercise of that rational
and manly eloquence that was only becoming their profession to give the
senior gentlemen opportunities to exert it and the juniors to acquire it, he
was resolved to endeavour to give more frequent occasions for pleading
causes in the Court of Session, instead of deciding them so often as of late
years had been practised, singly upon written or printed papers.'193
His endeavours (which were not great194) would prove to be unsuccessful and the
greatest part of proceeding before the Court, from start to finish, was by written
pleading. Not surprisingly, three quarters of the way through the century, Boswell
could write that
192 He was previously Lord Arniston and was judicially known, upon taking office, as Lord
President Dundas.
193 Minutes of the Faculty of Advocates op. cit. Vol. II p. 225 (3rd November 1748).
194 see below concerning the quantity of acts of sederunt regulating proceciure over the
period. Of course, it was not just the Lord President's responsibility, but that of the whole
Lords. The Acts of Sederunt of this period are signed in the name of the President but with
I.P.D. post fixed, that is in praesentia dominomm, - in the presence of the Lords.
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'Ours is a Court of papers. We are never seriously engaged but when we
write.'195
As had always been the case, the drawer of the respective parts of the pleading had
in mind the persuasion of the Court. The pleadings were always drafted with this
focus. Thus, in eighteenth century pleading, if one party was concerned that the
other was not being frank in their pleading, it would plead that the other was
seeking to 'amuse' the Court - i.e. to deceive it. If one party considered himself
prejudiced by the pleading of another it was to the Court that an appeal was made
and the Court could insist that full disclosure be made in the pleadings for the
benefit of the other party. The rules were such that there was no requirement to give
what, in modern practice, would be called 'fair notice'. It had always been the case
that the defender to a suit had a period 'to see the pieces', but the concept of giving
fair notice of one's position in the pleading for the benefit of an adversary (without
being so ordered by the Court) was to develop later.
(xix) Further Pressures on the Court.
The problems faced by the Court until the end of the century, have been well
documented by Phillipson.196 These included the taking of evidence on Commission,
once the preserve of the Ordinary on Oaths and Witnesses, which was now
frequently passed to a Commissioner who was allowed to call which ever witnesses
he pleased to give evidence and it was thereafter left to the Ordinary on Concluded
Causes, hindered rather than helped by the Memorials of the parties, to rank the
195 Boswell: the Ominous years 1774 -1776 (eds.) C. Ryskamp and F.A. Pottle, (London, 1963), p.
228
196 Phillipson op. cit. Chapter 2 'Litigation in the Eighteenth Century' pp. 42-61
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evidence and prepare a 'state' for the Lords' decision.197 There was even the
development of another step in proceeding which could be reduced to writing.
Memorials, which it should be recalled could be ordered by the Court at the point of
the concluded cause, allowing the parties to comment upon the import of evidence
adduced, now were also drawn by parties commenting upon the import of the
debate before the Ordinary, after the printing of the Minutes of Debate and before
the very frequent Informations.
In the end, a number of factors combined to make the bringing of a suit before the
Court slow, inefficient and thereby expensive - contrary to the benefits of the
Scottish form of process examined at the start of this chapter. These factors included
in a lengthy list, the keeping of pieces of process by defender's advocates198, the
mistranscription of the Minutes of Debate, the ordering of cases in their stead; the
unlimited representation to the Ordinary, and the increasing incidence of Reporting;
the prevalence of Acts before Answer granted by the Lord Ordinary, the frequent
exercise of the two opportunities to reclaim, and the confusion of the side-bar199; the
protestations and stops; the unfocussed memorials, informations, representations,
petitions, bills and condescendences all of 'superfluous' length and dubious content;
the applications of equitable reason excusing failures on the part of litigants and
their advisers to obtemper the strict rules of form; and the ever increasing business of
the Court. These all conspired to bring the Court to its knees.
197 Phillipson ibid. pp. 56-57
198 Considered by Russell, an 'evil practice'. J. Russell Forms of Process op. cit. p. 43
199 Glassford considered the rotation of Judges a 'disease inherent in the system'. J. Glassford,
Remarks, op. cit., p. 24
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While these constituted internal problems for the Court, there were also external
forces which would come to apply additional pressure for change. Since the Union,
there had been a right of appeal to the House of Lords in civil matters, which appeal
'stopped' the execution of the Court's sentence (or even interlocutors) pending final
determination by a judicial body which failed to appreciate the nuances of the
inferior court's procedure. A litigant who had managed successfully to steer a course
through the tides and eddies of the procedure of the Court of Session could still be
thwarted within sight of land by a deep pocketed adversary200 and dragged to
London where his cause might be determined by a very different approach.
By the turn of the century, there had been abortive attempts to change the
constitution of the Court of Session,201 various pamphlets had been published by
concerned individuals on topics relating to the business of the Court and the
problems it was encountering, and eyes were increasingly looking over the border
for a panacea, or at the very least some kind of palliative. It was appreciated by those
with influence, as well as by informed members of the population at large, that
'something had to be done' - only what? The Scottish political elite as well as the
judiciary, on reflection, had to accept that the old method of Lords' ordinances and
exhortations through Acts of Sederunt had not been successful and that in the final
analysis, intervention of the British Parliament would probably be required.
200 It was thought that litigants would be reluctant to appeal to the House of Lords as a result
of the distances to be travelled, and the costs involved, making it more likely that litigants
would acquiesce in the decision of the Court. See A. J. MacLean, 'The 1707 Union: Scots Law
and the House of Lords' 1983 4 Journal of Legal History, 50-75 at p. 69. But it was a tactic to
appeal with no intention of proceeding - the sentence of the Court being 'stopped'.
201 Henry Dundas' abortive 'Judges Bill' of 1785. See next Chapter.
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More dramatic change was just around the corner, as we shall see in the next chapter,
but before we leave this era, there is produced in Appendix One to the thesis an
analysis of a practical example of a cause proceeding through the Court in this
period, the written pleadings presented to it and the Court's interlocutors and
sentence which all highlight some of the issues raised in this chapter.
(xx) Conclusion.
At the end of the 18th century, the 'form of process' was on the threshold of change.
The Zeitgeist was characterised by the general opinion that there was nothing
particularly wrong with the forms of process and the undoubted problems faced by
the Court, in an age of increasing prosperity, were as a result of the failure of
enforcement.202 But what was to be enforced had developed into a discrete,
sophisticated and complicated body of rules regulating the bringing, pursuing and
determining of actions before the Supreme Court. The attempts to prevent the oral
informing of judges by litigants had given rise to the Court's first acceptance that the
pleading of causes before could proceed in the written form. The written Information
had originateci in the concept of 'justice to the lieges' and was the next step from the
Lords' attempts to prohibit oral informations or any oral contact with them outwith
the curtilage of the Court. Once it was acknowledged as a part of process through the
Acts of Sederunt, it began the slide away from the preparation of parties' positions in
a litigation under the strict superintendence of a Lord Ordinary. Thereafter followed
the written petitions and answers, the Memorials and the condescendences and
answers. Written pleading before the Court had commenced.
202 As we shall see later, such thinking has periodically surfaced with those concerned with
reform of procedure in the Court of Session.
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The function of the advocates thereby also changed, and it was through these
documents that they now sought to display their learning and ability, although
rarely succinctly. The net result was that these long documents required to be read
by the judges before the matter was called in Court, which documents appear to
have frequently contained matters which the Court thereafter considered 'groundless
and superfluous'. Away from the superintendence of the Ordinary, the Court could
no longer control what was inserted into these documents and whether it was (in the
opinion of the Court) strictly relevant. Moreover, the old manner of isolating the
particular points in fact and law and pronouncing interlocutors thereon, permitting
probation in respect thereof could not be imposed if the parties were left to their own
devices in putting forward what they themselves considered germane to their case,
whether relevant or not. In allowing written pleading without regulation as to what
it should or should not contain, the Court discovered that its work increased as the
advocates so pleading would not naturally separate fact from law. In addition, fact
and law advanced by one party was often not acknowledged as either true or false
by the other, the ficta confessio operating badly in practice and again the work of the
judges was increased.
The rules of court as acts of sederunt often prohibited particular conduct and
behaviour and yet, their repeated continuation or reformulation perhaps suggests
that these ordinances were not regularly followed and continuing enforcement was
required. The reason that this was so also arose from the equitable considerations
which had always informed the Court. There was a tension between these equitable
considerations and the strict adherence to and enforcement of form. In allowing
more and more complicated procedure beyond the initial dispute, through written
pleading and justified in equity, the Court realised that it was permitting a form of
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process which was far from the safe, easy and celerious forms so praised before. The
case examined in Appendix one, by no means unusual in its machinations and its
length, typified the problems of litigation before the Court. Hence the clamour for
the more rigorous enforcement of the acts of sederunt and the form of process by
some and the insistence on the preservation of equity in the manner of proceeding
before the Court by others. To say that there was deadlock is to go too far, but it was
appreciated that changes would be required to the Court's procedure.
Whilst the winds of change were blowing, the cause of that change at the start of the




An Era of Change: Re-defining the Theory ofWritten
Pleadings and the Development of Civil Procedure, 1800 -
1825
(i) Introduction
At the start of the nineteenth century the state of the form of process in Scotland was
in need of a strong medicine to cure its ills. The coming quarter of a century was to
prove to be an era of change, which was ultimately to see the constitution of the
Court altered for the first time in its history, individual Courts with their own
jurisdictions abolished and assimilated into the Court of Session but, most
importantly, for our purposes, was to provide the groundwork for the establishment
of a code of procedure which in its embryonic state, was to form the basis for all later
procedure in the Court of Session - even to the present day. The changes to the
Court's procedure, however, did not proceed in a dramatic or revolutionary way,
although there were frequent outcries by the profession as new proposals followed
new proposals. Frequently ideas would lie dormant and be resurrected at a later
stage.
Throughout the period 'written pleading' was to become a term of art in
contradistinction to oral pleading - or in the terminology of the period 'viva voce'
pleading.1 The written documents lodged by the parties in the previous era, not
always with the sanction of the Court, in the form of Condescendences and Answers,
Mutual Condescendences or Memorials, (in proper practice, containing 'articles' of
pleading separated in fact and law and stating pleas-in-law), were to become
recognised and formal steps in procedure, whilst others such as Minutes and the
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Petitions and Answers, would be put initially to one side, re-emerging later under
other steps of procedure. This was the period which created the 'closed record'
which would operate as foreclosing parties from adding anything new to their
pleadings, either in fact or law. The old Debate or 'Disputing' under the
superintendence of the Ordinary, became bedevilled with difficulties of restricting
parties' pleaded matters of fact, and whilst it would remain a step of process, it was
to become formally relegated in import, no longer being used as the mode of
defining the parties' respective positions in law and fact.
The debate would follow condescendences and answers as revised and at this
hearing the future procedure of a cause was to be decided. By the early 1800s the
preparation of the parties' pleadings had significantly departed, through practice,
custom and usage, from the old defining and superintendence of parties' positions in
fact and law previously undertaken by the Court. It was still accepted practice for the
judges to decide cases on probability taken in the round and based on the averments
of the parties in the multitude of pleadings, although this would change. As the
period developed, increasingly the system and rules of written pleading were
defined.
In this Chapter, we concentrate on the developing role which was to be played by
written and viva voce or oral pleadings and the manner in which the Court and the
legislature developed mechanisms for addressing the age old problem of pinning
parties down to definite and concise statements of their cases, separated in law and
in fact.
1 or sometimes, pleading 'ore tenus'
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The impetus for change of the procedure in general was to come from the usual
complaints about the delays of the old procedure but also from hitherto silent
quarters, namely, the House of Lords and the respective governments of the day. But
the internal pressure for change originated in the Whigs' admiration for the English
practice of sending disputed matters of fact for decision by a civil jury and this
produced ideologies which competed for the attentions of those charged with
reforming the form of process, which were to cast a long shadow over the changing
form of process in the early years until the establishment of the Jury Court in 1815
and even beyond that. Moreover, in what was to be a highly politicised age, it was
the first time that the procedure of the Court was to become a political issue, such
were the feelings roused among the (albeit restricted land owning) electorate in
relation to its reform.
At first blush, it may appear that the examination of the introduction of the civil jury
into Scotland has no direct relevance to the consideration of written pleading before
the Court. It was, however, to be the catalyst for the bold, but ultimately
unimplemented, thinking of the Commissioners of 1808 - 18102 and was to lead to the
creation of a procedure which would go some way towards untying the Gordian
knot - separating parties' admixture of law and facts in their pleadings, at least in the
first instance. Any system which required a jury to determine disputed matters of
fact in civil litigation would necessarily require the splitting of the functions of the
judge and the jury and the pleadings of parties would have to be modified to meet it.
The whole issue of civil jury trial as an 'English' mechanism for the determination of
fact and the question of whether it should be introduced into Scottish procedure
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engendered strong opinions - opinions informed, at least initially, by nationalistic
sensibilities and by the fact that there was a want of recognition by many south of
the border that Scotland was an equal partner in the Union. Paradoxically, even the
strongest of such views were tempered by the realisation that the two countries were
growing increasingly together in outlook, language and, most importantly, in
commerce, and, in the final analysis, it was thought that some assimilation (even in
the manner of proceeding before each country's Supreme Courts) would probably be
beneficial for both.
Parts of the country and members of the judiciary and Bar stood on the watch for
'anglicisation' of the Court as a national institution, as well as of its procedures
although, at the conclusion of the era of change, the anglicisation argument would be
appreciated for what it was - a red herring. Further, and in any event, the pressures
for 'anglicisation' would come from within the country and not from the south.
As to the role of written pleadings, the period is marked by the attempts of the
Court, government ministers and the profession to devise a system which, at an early
stage of proceedings, produced a definitive account of the parties' positions in fact
and law which would then permit a judicial determination. It had to be a system
which called for some adherence to form, in the interests of speedy resolution (but
also the expending of judicial time) but simultaneously not penalising parties too
severely for failures to obtemper strict form and permitting, in the interests of equity,
some mechanism for review of such judicial determinations.
2 Novel ideas were advanced by Ilay Campbell and Charles Hope especially.
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The old system was certainly civilian based and 'equity infused.' It was to be
acknowledged that the interests of justice should not be determined by the resources
of a litigant but by the balance of the competing interests of the litigants and the
Court.
(ii) Early Attempts at Change
By the end of the eighteenth century, the notoriously conservative Scottish legal
system was infused with the ideologies of the Scottish Enlightenment,3 and French
Revolutionary notions of Justice and Liberty. Justice, it was realised, required the
Court's procedure to be efficient and fairly cheap, which could be used by one and
by all and which would provide a final determination in a reasonable time. In truth
this was hardly novel and was in essence merely a reformulation of the rationale of
the Court of Session, existing as it always had 'for the administration of justice' and
'the convenience of the lieges'.
It is fair to say, however, that the system of written pleading and the form of process
had handicapped the Court in attaining these ideals and by the later eighteenth
century, the Court of Session was labouring to get through the number of causes
each year enrolled.4 The Court could only dispose of a third of these annually, and
the remaining two thirds were being carried over into the new session for the
following year. Unsurprisingly, criticisms of the Court focussed on this inability to
get through the business and the inability was blamed on its anachronistic structure,
3 What might be now termed conservative with a small 'c'. Although the profession, and
indeed the Bench, was by nature cautious in outlook and wary of change, there were
elements, particularly those of Whiggish disposition, who embraced the new concepts.
4 As Dr. Phillipson has shown, between 1761 and 1791 the number of causes enrolled had
increased 119 per cent. N. Phillipson, op. cit., p. 46. See also Parliamentary Papers (hereafter
P.P.) 1843, xlix, 121-6, Return showing abstract of the extent of business down in the Court ofSession
since 1780. C.f. the figures compiled by Darling in James Johnston Darling, The Practice of The
Court ofSession 2 Vols., (Edinburgh, 1833) Vol. I, p. 3.
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practice and procedure.5 Prior to the Union, it had previously been the practice of
governments of the day to leave matters of practice and procedure to be regulated by
the Court itself through its power to make Acts of Sederunt dictating the procedure
to be followed before the Court. But the creation of temporary and then permanent
Acts of Sederunt and the periodic re-incorporation of parts of previous Acts of
Sederunt bore witness to the fact that these were often little followed in practice.6
Frequently, their operation in practice would be dictated, not by the Court, as
intended, but by the profession. In the end, invariably, the Court would capitulate
and acquiesce in deviations, alterations and failures to obtemper the prescribed form.
Why was this? In the first place, it seems that practitioners would strain against the
application of any new Act of Sederunt on the basis that a continuation of the old
known way of doing things was infinitely more appealing than jeopardising a
client's cause upon some new alteration of procedure if, and this was the point, the
Court could be pressed into the continuation in that case on the grounds of equity or
justice or any other such concept. Secondly, this was made easier by the Court
inadvertently failing to ensure that previous provisions were explicitly superseded
or were to be held as having fallen into disuse. As a result, a new Act of Sederunt
might, after diligent research, be found to conflict with a previous one, but neither
profession nor Bench knew whether the previous was even extant.7 Many acts of
5 J. Cairns, 'Historical Introduction', in A History ofPrivate Laiv in Scotland (2vols.) (Oxford UP,
2000) vol. 1, p. 150.
6 Glassford considered that the rules throughout the history of the Court had 'generally been
calculated well' but that 'practical evils have chiefly arisen from a relaxation in their enforcement' and
that in later times (up to 1812) 'there is less strictness in the form and a lesser degree ofprecision in
the pleading'. Glassford, Remarks, op. cit. p. 134.
7 In July 1808 the House of Lords ordered the Court of Session to prepare and send to them all
the acts of sederunt then in force, separating those affecting the form of process from those
altering, strictly, the law. It took the Court a year and a half and by February 1810, it
transmitted a report admitting that to carry out the request was difficult beyond being
actually possible and apologising for it. See Alexander Abridgement of the Acts ofSederunt p. ix.
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sederunt were not even initially published, and were followed only half-heartedly
thereafter, by which time, the practice or abuse the A.S. 'discharged' had continued.
As Lorci Cringletie could still much later remark, in his submission to the
Commissioners appointed in 1823 to examine the forms of process of the Court of
Session:8
'I have often remarked, and every person acquainted with our forms must
have observed, that salutary Regulations have, at different periods, been
introduced by Acts of Sederunt of the Court. But every one must also have
remarked, that most of these which are adverse to indolence and carelessness
in the practitioners, and require outlay of money, always meet with a
continued resistance, till at last they are gradually relaxed, and ultimately
neglected. Indeed, many of the practitioners are unacquainted with these
Acts, as they are not printed and sold by the Booksellers, till a considerable
time after they are enacted.'9
(iii) Governmental Intervention and Scottish Sensibilities
Because the Court had not controlled its procedure other than by incremental
alteration, (with varying degrees of success,) it was realised by the innocent (and not
so innocent) observers in the hierarchy of the Executive that reorganisation of the
8 This is detailed below. The passage is taken from the Commissioners' Report 1824, p.105
9 Evidence of Lord Cringletie Report of the Commissioners for inquiring into the forms ofprocess in
the courts oflnw in Scotland and the course ofappeals from the Court of Session to the House ofLords,
P.P., x) Appendix [Hereinafter Commissioners' Report, 1824\ See also the evidence of Daniel
Fisher, SSC, to the Commissioners: 'The great complaint which I think lies against the present
Form of Process, is, that the Forms are no where to be found in one connected body. They
stand upon Acts of Parliament, but chiefly upon Acts of Sederunt, which alone extend now to
a large folio volume. These Acts of Sederunt are framed to alter, amend or repeal a previous
Act; and in this way it requires very considerable study and attention, by collating those Acts
of Sederunt, to ascertain what is the precise form of procedure in particular actions. The Acts
of Sederunt fixing the Forms of Process, are indeed so numerous, that extensive and
continued practice is necessary, before a person can acquire a thorough knowledge of them.
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Court and the streamlining of the form of process before it, would require
governmental intervention. Things came to a head in 1785, but the first skirmish was
not to relate to the form of process at all.
The number of judges was a more pressing concern. The Scottish governmental
representative Henry Dundas10 grasped the thistle on the death of one of the Judges,
Lord Kennet.11 The Inner House, it will be recollected, sat as the 'Haill Fifteen', as a
unitary Court, in praesentia, with the Lords Ordinary performing the preparatory
functions in the Outer House. Dundas proposed12 to leave the vacancy unfilled and
by a policy of not filling dead men's shoes, reduce the numbers of the Bench to about
ten. The logic was that a smaller bench would operate more efficiently, unlike its
previous operation adverted to in the previous chapter.13 In addition, whilst in the
previous era of judicial and political patronage 'gowns' could be bestowed as
political rewards, it was now hoped that a smaller bench would be comprised of
individuals of natural legal ability. Dundas figured that the decreasing numbers of
Lords would increase the Treasury limited reserves, out of which the remainder
To the want of this knowledge I ascribe part of the litigation, and of the loose pleadings
which occasionally occur in Court.' Commissioners Report, 1824 p. 117.
10 in concert with his half brother Lord President Dundas (the younger) and the Lord
Advocate Ilay Campbell.
11 What follows up to the introduction of Jury Trial into the Court of Session is based upon
the following sources, viz., N. Phillipson, Scottish Whigs and the Reform of the Court ofSession,
op. cit.,. Chapters III - VI, pp. 62-164; David M. Walker, A Legal History ofScotland, Volume V,
The Eighteenth Century, (Edinburgh, 1998) pp.458 - 65; Volume VI, The Nineteenth Century
(Edinburgh, 2002), pp. 320-4; J.W. Cairns, Historical Introduction, op. cit. pp. 150 ff. I.D. Willock,
The Origins and Development of the Jury in Scotland, (vol. 23) (Stair Society, Edinburgh, 1966).
Whilst Professor Walker's contribution is synthetic in composition and Professor Cairns'
work is necessarily introductory, Dr. Phillipson's contribution to the period, whilst
historiographical, is as yet unsurpassed. I do not attempt to better it. This Chapter focuses on
the continued development of written and oral pleading in the Court of Session and where
Phillipson's material is relevant to this it will be referred to as appropriate.
12 He prepared a Bill, commonly referred to as The Diminishing Bill, or The Judges Bill of
1785 for presentation to the House of Commons and thereafter for passing into legislation.
The Bill can be found in the Scots Magazine, vol. 47 (1785) pp. 475-6. See Phillipson, op. cit. p.
63.
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would be salaried. What Dundas did not calculate was the ensuing outcry, voiced
through the newspaper columns of the Edinburgh press14 and fuelled by the quill
pen of James Boswell,15 praying in aid Article XIX of the Articles of Union. Moreover,
the content of the Bill (and its method of introduction) had raised the hackles of the
county freeholders, a powerful collective voice of the franchise, whose meetings
dictated to, and they were thus listened to by, members of parliament.16 None of the
counties supported it. It was no surprise that the Bill was withdrawn by Dundas.
But, 'the issue', as Phillipson notes, 'clearly flicked the national prejudices of many
Scotsmen on the raw.'
What was difficult for the freeholders to swallow was the loss of the five seats on the
Bench. But at the same time, five of the nine freeholder counties wished a closer
assimilation with the courts in England and attached to this, crucially, the adoption
of the civil jury trial.
Boswell's pamphlet was marked with the imprimatur of that past master of the Law
of Equity, Henry Home, [Lord Karnes] and in particular his opinion that matters of
proof were safest in the hands of a plurality and that the function was performed by
the 'Haill Fifteen' as a 'grand jury of the nation in civilibus.'17 This was part of the
13 Glassford considered, with some merit, that the composition of the Court at its institution
was devised such as to provide the necessary authority in 'rude and lawless times'. Glassford,
Remarks p. 12.
14 Notably the Caledonian Mercury (of 7lh May 1785) and the Edinburgh Evening Courant (of
May 9lh 1785) See Phillipson ibid, at p. 65-6 and Walker, ibid. Vol. V at p. 485 f.n. 139.
15 A Letter to the People ofScotland on the most alarming attempt to infringe the Articles of the Union
and introduce a most pernicious innovation bp diminishing the number of the Lords ofSession (1785).
16 As Phillipson points out, their additional gripe was that, through the tactless and clumsy
introduction of the Bill by Dundas, they had not been consulted in its drafting, and given that
it affected a Scottish institution and some argued the Scottish constitution, the net effect was
always going to be its lack of support and subsequent withdrawal.
17 [H. Home] Lord Karnes, Historical Law Tracts (Edinburgh, 1758) p.411 Karnes goes on to
conclude that it is a good thing in litigation that the weighing of evidence is done in Scotland
by professional men rather than amateurs. This was conveniently ignored by Boswell. See
Phillipson, op. cit. p. 73.
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growing belief among many that the jury was a part of the 'antient law'18 and in
some quarters it was explicitly advocated that English civil jury trial introduced into
Scottish practice would prove to be the panacea for the Session's deficiencies.19 The
Lord Advocate attempted to explain the thinking behind the Bill,20 but to no avail.
The momentum against it had gathered and whilst the reasoning against it was
deeply flawed, the Bill was dead in the water. In the debate over the Bill, Scotsmen
had shown extreme sensitivity to unsolicited meddling in their national institutions21
whilst paradoxically, in a time of increasing prosperity, accepting the need for
assimilation with England, not just within the realms of the legal system and the
law.22 We noted the problems faced by the Court in the last chapter, but importantly,
the whole episode of the Judges Bill crystallised the realisation that the machinery
and procedure of the Court, and in particular the problems it faced in compelling
parties to focus their respective positions in fact and law as soon as possible after
18 Dispelled by Ilay Campbell. See below.
19 Walker has also drawn attention to the publication of Blackstone's Commentaries in 1765-
69 in England which incorporated the ideology of the trial by peers of every Englishman and
that this was the 'grand bulwark of his liberties'. (Blackstone, Comm., IV, 342) The work was
cited with frequency in the Scottish Courts. C.f however, Ivory's criticism of Blackstone's
'fulsome and blindly indiscriminate praise' bestowed on jury trial, 'as almost to engender
disgust' Ivory, Form ofProcess, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 286. Sir William was also critical of the
Scottish system of pleading in writing, and had denigrated the Session's determination of the
case of Napier v. Macfarlane 1749 - 'No pique or spirit of party could have made such a cause
in the Court of the King's Bench or Common Pleas have lasted a tenth of the time, or have
cost the twentieth part of the expenses.' Commentaries, III, c.24
20 Ilay Campbell, An Explanation of the Bill proposed in the House of Commons 1785, respecting the
Judges in Scotland (1785)
21 Phillipson, op. cit. p. 77
22 As well as manners, prose style and spoken accent. Phillipson ibid. See the development of
'polite speech', the establishment of 'The Society for Promoting the Reading and Speaking of
the English Language in Scotland' by the Select Society (Scots Magazine, August 1761); the well
attended lectures of Thomas Sheriden, 'orthoepist' (Scots Magazine, July 1761), and the
movement to raise funds to bring 'persons from England, duly qualified to instruct
gentlemen in the knowledge of the English Tongue' (Scots Magazine, August 1761) It was said
by Lord Monboddo that David Hume (the philosopher) died not repenting his sins, but his
'Scottiscisms'. See also J. Adam Smith, Eighteenth-Century Ideas ofScotland in (eds.) Phillipson
and Mitchison, Scotland in the Age of Improvement (Edinburgh, 1996) p. 107 at pp. 110-111 and
J. Clive, The Social Background ibid. p. 225 at p. 238.
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commencement of an action, were inadequate. The importance of the whole saga was
'the debate it provoked rather than the remedy it proposed'.23
The Court itself, however, had been alive to the 'fact and law' problem and had
passed the A.S. 1787 attempting to coerce parties to 'join issue' and requiring a
defender to lodge both dilatory and peremptory defences.24
The Court made further attempts to remove argument from written pleadings. In
1800 the Lords again reverted to the old tried and trusted manner of regulating
procedure by the passing of an Act of Sederunt - once more attempting to force
litigants to state distinctly their positions in fact and law. Parties were to be
prevented from being allowed proof until the pleadings were in a suitable state. At
this juncture, the pleadings in practice contained papers called 'Condescendences'25
and 'Answers' or alternatively 'Mutual Condescendences',26 but now the Act
provided that these should be peremptory. Section 1 of A.S. 11th March 1800 'Act
concerning Proofs' stated
'That no act, or other warrant for proving, shall henceforth go out in any
cause, till a distinct statement of the disputed facts and allegations shall have
been previously made, in the form of a condescendence and answers, or
mutual condescendences; which papers shall be so framed, as to contain no
23 Phillipson, op. cit. 77
24 Campbell was to concede in 1808, that, in fact, this regulation was very seldom strictly
observed. Ilay Campbell: Sketch ofa Report, (MSS Proceedings ofScotch Judicature Commission,
1808, S.R.O.), p. 15 [See also Phillipson op. cit. p. 58] There is a copy of this held in the
Advocates' Library entitled Sketch ofa Report Concerning The Forms ofProcess in the Court of
Sssion (sic) bound (but not indexed) in A Compilation of the Forms ofProcess in the Court of
Session During the Earlier Periods After its Establishment; ivith the Variations which they have since
undergone. And Likewise Some Antient Tracts concerning the Manner of Proceeding in Baron Courts,
&c. (Edinburgh, 1809) Author not printed but interlineated 'Thomas Thomson' (who was
Lord Clerk Register)
25 It will be recollected from the previous chapter that condescendences were latterly written
in respect of the printed Minutes of Debate.
26 Source: General Collection of Session Papers, Law Room, Advocates' Library [ALSP]
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argument or discussion of any kind, nor even any recital of the proceedings;
but, taking it for granted, that the nature of the cause is already understood
from the libelled summons, defences, and pleadings, shall only state, under
distinct heads, or articles, the special facts and circumstances pertinent to the
cause, which are alleged, and offered to be proved on either side, in order
that the same may, as nearly as possible, be brought to a precise issue, and
may (so far as thought material) be admitted to proof in that form, either
before answer to the relevancy, or after determining upon it, as the case may
require'.27
Attempts to implement the Canonical doctrine of fictn confessio, through the Acts of
Sederunt 1715,1723, and 172328 i.e. holding a party as confessed in the circumstance
that he did not admit or deny an adversary's allegation, had been unsuccessful and
the above emphasised parts of the act perhaps betray the Lords' pessimism that such
precise issues could be realised.29 The 'materiality' was to remain within the province
and discretion of the Ordinary in allowance of proof. But this attempt was always on
a sticky wicket. Whilst argument, discussion and the recital of details of previous
procedure could be prohibited and whilst it was not difficult for practitioners to
27 Underlined parts are my emphasis. The A.S. also authorised the granting of commissions
for a Commissioner to take evidence and to report to the Court in all actions, which in the
previous period had been restricted to the cases of witnesses in the hinterlands and those
infirm, or elderly or sometimes abroad, unable to travel to Edinburgh. With the concurrence
of the Court this was to become the pre-eminent form of taking evidence in non-jury court
cases.
28 referred to in the previous Chapter. These replaced the old oaths ofcalumny and verity which
fell into disuse. See Watson, Form ofProcess, op. cit. pp.60-1. The concept of ficta confessio in
the previous period arose from a defender failing to turn up to answer a summons, as he
dared not, on oath, deny the libel (Stair, IV, 39, 27-28) which concept was extrapolateci to the
written pleading of the parties, oath removed.
29 As Murray noted (at his time of writing in 1831), 'If the party does not deny the essential
facts, judgment ought to be pronounced against him; but, holding a party as confessed,
provided he does not deny the unessential circumstances averred, is no longer necessary.
Even, under the former system, it was very rarely put in force by any explicit interlocutor' J.
Murray, Introduction to Volume 5 of his Reports ofCases Tried in the Jury Court (etc) (5 vols.)
(Edinburgh, 1818- 31) p. 15
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plead by way of 'articles',30 the AS did not define the pertinence of the special facts
and circumstances (nor could it) and thus it remained within the province of the
parties to elect what was to be inserted, so that the Lord Ordinary, in his
determination of the 'materiality' still had to wade through those 'special' facts and
circumstances which the parties considered had (at least) some bearing upon their
cases.
Whilst it was flawed, the A.S. was again an inch in the right direction. Phillipson31
has criticised the whole A.S. as having little to commend it. With regard to its
provisions prescribing procedure for the problematic commissions for evidence,
merely exhorting the Commissioners to follow the rules of evidence, it was
disappointing.32 Yet, from the standpoint of examining the imminent development
of the form of process the AS must be considered crucially important. It not only
provided for the first time that Condescendences and Answers should form a step of
process, but also, in requiring 'Articles of Condescendence' of the facts of the case
offered to be proved by a party, it laid the groundwork for the composition of such
Condescendences and Answers in the procedure to be determined twenty five years
later. Phillipson is correct, however, to assess the A.S. as an ultimate failure. Hay
Campbell considered that it laid down 'some very salutary and useful regulations
concerning the mode of adjusting facts' but even he had to concede that the
procedure could 'still admit of considerable improvement, particularly in the form of
30 The practice had developed in any event.
31 Phillipson, op. cit. p. 78
32 Until the 1860s proof taken by a Commissioner was the most common form of proof, even
in Edinburgh, as the Ordinaries assigned this method rather than taking the proof
themselves.
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preparing issues in fact before going to proof.'33 As we will shortly explore, it was
this issue which was the greatest stumbling block to revising the Court's procedures.
(iv) A Different Approach: Swinton's Pamphlet and Reorganisation of the
Court. Tackling the Problems from Within.
By this time there was a school of thought that the way for the Lords to get through
the business was to alter the very constitution of the Court and revamp the 'Haill
Fifteen' itself. Proposals to do just that had been voiced by one of the Senators, John
Swinton, in 1787.34 Flis proposal was, inter alia that the Court could, in its discretion,
direct jury trials for the taking of evidence. Jury trials would force the parties to focus
their respective allegations of fact. Nothing, however, came of it.35
All of the debate about libertarian and egalitarian reforms in the Court of Session's
procedure did not diminish the business coming to the doors of the Court and
leaving from there to the table of the Flouse of Lords. There were stirrings of
complaint in London, both on the Bench of the Flouse of Lords and within the
English ministers' corridors of power about the frequency of 'Scotch Appeals'.
The Lords' work load was increasing in part as a result of litigants in the Court of
Session tactically appealing. The litigant was not concerned with the law that was
applied to his case- only that, when he had lost the earlier round, the decision
against him was overturned. A deep-pocketed litigant, having exhausted the
remedies available in Edinburgh, could roll the judicial dice in the House of Lords
33 Campbell, Sketch op. cit. p.11
34 John Swinton, Considerations Concerning a Proposal for Dividing the Court ofSession into Two
Classes or Chambers; and for limiting Litigation in Small Causes; and for the Revisal ofJury Trial in
Certain Civil Actions (1789) See Phillipson, pp. 79-84. Lord Ivory considered it 'a very elaborate
and valuable pamphlet'. Ivory, Form of Process, op. cit. Vol. II, 279
35 Part of the problem was that Swinton's pamphlet was deeply flawed in the technicalities
and application of the principles of civil jury practice. A draft bill combining the A.S. of 1789
and 1800 and the proposals was brought forward thereafter. Swinton was the probable
author.
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and take a chance on the Lords finding against the Court of Session for reasons little
associated with the reasoning and even less understood.36 It should be noted that at
this time the composition of the House of Lords Bench was purely English. 'Scotch
law' was, for their Lordships, often a difficult concept, such that it was commonly
easiest if the laws of the two countries were treated as the same and English law
could then be applied.37 Hence, a different result using a different law.
If procrastination was also a desired goal of an party appealing, the dice were loaded
in his favour. By 1807, the House of Lords was three or four years in arrears with its
workload, a disproportionate part of it emanating from north of the border.38
Theoretically an appeal to London by a defender against a decree for payment
granted in Edinburgh could be ignored for a couple of years whilst the 'successful'
pursuer headed towards civil imprisonment for debt.
Also, litigants themselves had difficulty understanding why the Lords of Session had
found against them.39 The constitution of the Inner House - Cockburn's 'mob of
fifteen judges'40 and the manner of its decision-making hardly inspired confidence
that the cause had been carefully examined, the full facts made known and the law
exactly ascertained and applied. Whilst there had been a mystique surrounding the
Court in the days of 'Closed Doors', now the litigant himself could witness the
spectacle of Inner House decision-making in action; and whilst the decisions of the
36 This was the opinion of Campbell himself later expressed in 1811. See I. Campbell, The Acts
ofSederunt of the Lords ofCouncil and Session from the Institution of the College ofJustice in May,
1532 to January 1553 (Edinburgh, 1811) pp. xxxv - xliv.
37 See Chapters 3&4 below.
38 Phillipson, p. 85.
39 This was also the view of Campbell, see Phillipson, p. 86
40 Henry Cockburn, Memorials ofHis Time, op. cit., p. 128 A more delicate description in less
earthy language is provided by Glassford '[in the former constitution of the Court] it is plain that
the mere circumstances of its numbers bore the seeds ofmanifold contrariness in opinion, and
multiplied the chances offluctuation in judgments from natural and accidental causes' Glassford,
Remarks, op. cit., p. 17
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Court continued to proceed by vote, the final determination was exposed to what
Bell labelled 'argument and remonstrance' and a 'discussion, rhetorically
maintained, on the whole mass of law and fact involved in the case'.41 In all the
commotion, dissenting voices from some of those on the Bench could encourage a
losing litigant to appeal.42
And yet, whilst there remained complaints regarding the manner of the decision
making, the length of time it took to make decisions continued to be a real problem.
How could the Court dispose of the business more expeditiously? Treasury funds
would not permit the appointment of further Lords of Session and this wasn't even
canvassed as a possibility, although it had historical precedent.43
The government returned to the thorny issue of leaving a seat on the Bench unfilled
as a potential way of squaring the circle in the need for increased salaries for the
judges whilst implicitly requiring them to work harder for their money. The
41 Bell, Examination, op. cit., p. 30. See the parody and 'jeu d'espirit' purportedly written by
George Cranstoun as an Inner House Advising in a fictitious case involving the respondent
'defaming' the petitioner's 'Diamond Beetle' as an 'Egyptian Louse'. 'Notes Taken at Advising
the Action ofDefamation and Damages, Alexander Cunningham, Jeweller, Edinburgh, Against Mr.
James Russell, Surgeon There' in Maidment, Court of Session Garland, (Edinburgh, 1839) at pp.
70-78.
42 Bell Examination, op. cit., p. 34 notes 'The facts, in this course of discussion (i.e. by the Lords
on the State of the case after proof) and of the decision, were as unsettled as the law - the
equity, perhaps, more unsettled than either. There was no record to ascertain precise limits of
a judgment into which the opinions of fifteen judges entered: And not only were the parties
encouraged to dissatisfaction by the sentiments of the minority, and the occasional
misapprehension of facts, to which it was easy to ascribe those of the majority, but few cases
could be considered as decided for the public, while it was possible to contend that the facts
were mistaken ... and both in general law and in particular cases, everything was so loose,
that, as a matter of mere hope in a game of hazard, no man who could afford to appeal,
would easily be persuaded to abstain from that chance' Bell, Examination, op. cit., p. 34 See
infra.
43 The books of sederunt contain a letter from Queen Mary augmenting the number of judges,
'quereas it is desyrit of our saids Lords and College of Justice, for better expeditioun of the
multitude of actionis that presentlie cumes befoir you and thaim to haife the said College
eiked the noumer of six, and in the meyn tyme the guages to be eiked and augmentit, to the
99
opportunity to do so came in 1805 on the death of Lord Ankerville. Lord
Hawkesbury, the Home Secretary, attempted to revert to the Dundas scheme of 1785
and was met again with protestation. But the nature of the protest differed. It was no
longer principally on the basis of English interference in a Scottish institution, but on
the basis that the volume of work in the Courts had reached a point that it would be
inexpedient to leave it to fourteen men rather than fifteen. Beneath the surface there
were darker political motives.44
But whilst reduction in the number of judges was struck from the agenda,
reorganisation of the Court was back on it. The Lord President, Lord Justice-Clerk,
Lord Advocate45 and Dundas resolved to do just that in a series of discussions among
them resulting in a memorandum to Hawkesbury proposing the splitting of the
Inner House into two divisions, each with concurrent jurisdictions.46 The Outer
House would continue as it had done with each division providing one or two
Ordinaries to carry out the functions. To preserve uniformity in the decision making
of the Divisions, the President would sit in both. The rationale was the same as had
been proposed by Swinton. Twice the work in half the time. The form of process,
they considered, was not lacking in design. Rather the problem lay in its use by
agents to procure delay or a re-consideration of a case already determined upon by
the Ordinary, as well as the constant invocation of the Court's equitable powers
through representation and reclaiming petitions. Although the memorandum did not
effect the said Lords may better wait upon the administration of justice: the ane and the uther
we think maist raisonnabill ...' A.S. 2,ui March 1562.
44 Phillipson, op. cit. p. 87. By this time, Henry Dundas (as Lord Melville) had been
impeached. The government was politically unstable and both Dundas and Campbell,
mindful of the events of 1785, did not wish to provoke a similar reaction, thereby toppling the
government.
45 i.e. LP Campbell, the newly appointed LJ- CCharles Hope, and Montgomery respectively.
46 See Phillipson op. cit at p. 87 and references detailed therein.
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explicitly address how the ongoing issue of separation of fact and law could be
achieved, lurking in the background was still the introduction of civil jury trial to
effect such a separation.
The scheme, however, fell with the government on the death of Pitt. A new political
alliance took office with Lord Grenville at the helm and with Thomas Erskine as
Lord Chancellor and his brother Henry Erskine, the former Dean whose personal
litigation is examined in Appendix the new Lord Advocate. The new Solicitor
General was John Clerk. All of them, with the assistance of William Adam, an
English barrister but former Scottish advocate, set about reform of the Court of
Session and preparing a Bill for Parliament in 1807. As Whigs, it was to be expected
that their model of reform should follow the English common law courts.
It was proposed that the Court of Session should be divided into three chambers
with concurrent jurisdiction and litigants would be able to elect to have their causes
decided upon the old form of procedure or to go to the jury. Emulation of English
form and the assumption that the English model should be the basis for
reconstruction, had returned.47 The old arguments about the assimilation of the two
countries and the need for the progressive march of Scottish society from 'barbarism
to refined civilisation' were dusted down and re-presented.48 In England, a litigant
could nominate into which of the courts he wished to bring his case. In Scotland, this
was obviously not possible, and whilst Grenville and Adam considered that a litigant
should not control the progress of his case,49 it was fair comment that his choice and
47 It was to return again in recent times. See later.
48 See for example J.P. Grant, Some observations on the forms ofproceedings in the Court ofSession
(London, 1807)
49 Phillipson, op. cit p.92
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options of the fora in which it could be raised were non-existent. On 'joining of
issue'50 by summons and defences, if the parties resolved to go to the jury, it would
require the separation of fact and law in their pleadings and would remove, in one
fell swoop, their opportunities to represent to the Lord Ordinary or reclaim to the
Inner House. The Bench were sceptical. In the first place, the Lords had no
experience of such alien procedure and were, by habit, well versed in the old system.
Secondly, to where would the parties appeal from jury trial? It was resolved to create
a Court of Appeal presided over by a 'Lord Chancellor' of Scotland51 and containing
the presidents of the three divisions and the Chief Baron. But it will be observed that
the whole plan revolved around the parties 'joining of issue' through their summons
and defences. Where, in the practice of the Court at the initial stages, positions were
'urged just a little' until the adversary's position could be ascertained, it was going to
be unlikely that the summons and defences could perform the function being asked
of them. The existing system was geared to edging parties to a position whereby the
factual issues and the respective positions in law could be defined and proof (if
required) assigned accordingly. It was never disputed that a cause needed 'ripening'.
How could parties go to a jury on defined issues of fact where the initial stages of the
process were used to ascertain the grounds upon which the litigation was to be
fought, and nothing was to be given away until later in the pleadings, the parties and
judge engaging in a quadrille until the pleading was terminated and the cause was
dispatched to proof, most commonly upon an Act before Answer? As Glassford
remarked five years later,
50 significantly, an English expression. It had been used by Stair in his discussion of
Litiscontestation and the analogous English method - 'Instead of this term, the English use
the term of joining issue; that is, of settling the points, whereupon the issue of the process will
follow.'Stair, IV, 39, 2
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'It is obvious that in the conduct of the pleadings the great difficulty is to
obtain a confrontment of the true and whole allegations of the parties; since
it is always the interest of one of them to elude.'52
All of this had been appreciated by the Court in 1800 in its ordinance requiring the
parties to prepare Condescendences and Answers or Mutual Condescendences as a
second step of process, detailing 'articles' containing the facts alleged and offered to
be proved. Moreover, the scheme failed to recognise the fact that once the 'basis' of
the litigation had been established, it was the Judge who would determine what was
relevant and what was to be proved and the attempts to narrow the factual issues
were for his benefit, and not the parties'. With the advent of the popularity of the act
before answer, the judge was left to determine the initial stages upon a 'probability
of the whole' and thus, parties would aver not only the facts which they undertook
to prove as necessary to support their action or defence, but all extraneous matter
which might make their case seem probable and their opponent's case improbable
with the purpose of satisfying the Ordinary that their case was 'true' or 'just' and
judgment should be pronounced in their favour without recourse to proof.53
The 'special facts and circumstances pertinent to the cause' could have a very wide
meaning. Hence, the repeated attempts by the Court to force parties to state only the
material facts - not argument, rhetoric or facts relating to probability.
51 and Henry Erskine's name was pencilled in.
52 Glassford, Remarks, op. cit. p. 142
53 There is a good discussion of this by Joseph Murray, Advocate, in the Introduction to
Volume V of Reports ofCases Tried in the Jury Court at Edinburgh &c. (Edinburgh, 1831)
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Obviously the 1800 A.S. already mentioned attempted to remove rhetoric, narrations
of the previous process and the 'extraneous matter' all with the purpose of getting
the cause to proof whereas in the English procedure of the common law courts the
facts were elicited upon a general issue during the trial by the famous (or infamous)
doctrines of 'special pleading'.
As Lord Chancellor Eldon remarked in a case brought to the blouse of Lords on
appeal from the Court of Session in 1807,
[The Condescendence] 'is not accurately expressed. I should wish that those
who entertain the opinion that the trial by jury would be easily introduced
into Scotland, to prove this condescendence. In upwards of fifty pages, they
will see very little of what could be laid before a jury without immense
difficulty. Before trial by Jury could be of advantage in Scotland, they must
first alter their mode of pleading in that country:'54
In what way could the parties be forced into precise articles of fact such as could go
to the jury? It was always going to be unlikely that the system of the time could
accommodate early disclosure of a party's position in fact for such a purpose. We
may profitably pause, here, to consider the mode of pleading of this time and in
particular, the problems the Court faced in getting parties to state precisely and most
importantly, definitively, the facts upon which they were content to go to proof.55
54 Wilson & Ors. v. Alexander & Ors. (12lh August 1807) 5 Pat. 187-90
55 The problems of the Court of this period were not covered by Phillipson in Scottish Whigs,
op. cit. In his first chapter he paints with a broad brush, covering a period from the mid to late
eighteenth century and up to and incorporating submissions made to the 1825 Royai
Commission (see below). Professor Walker follows closely the treatment in his History, Vol. V
and VI. It is a period worth examining, for therein lie the seeds of later procedure. Moreover,
this treatment will show that whilst the discussions about changes to the procedure
continued at the highest levels and in radical terms, the actual changes effected, were
incremental and in their treatment of the problems in the form of process, were less dramatic
or revolutionary than has been previously considered.
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(v) The Early Nineteenth Century Form of Process and the Role Therein
of Written Pleading
Much of the process remained unchanged from the previous era,56 and almost all the
'pleading' was in writing. However, the maimer in which the rules of process were
used by litigants, agents and advocates had become part of (or remained) the
problem. There were still Lords Ordinary on the Bills, Oaths and Witnesses and on
Concluded Causes all operating by rotation in the manner of before. The cause was
still initiated by a printed or written summons, comprising the syllogistic
formulations and narrating the pursuer's claim or ground of action, stating that the
defender was required but refused to do justice in respect thereto, concluding for
decree and attaching a 'will' for warrant for messengers-at-arms to cite the defenders
to appear. The summons passed the Signet and was served on the defender calling
him to answer the claim or to show cause why ciecree should not pass against him
with certification that if he failed to appear decree would pass against him57. The
statement of the claim was still the 'libel' although the words summons, libel and
libelled summons were used interchangeably.58 After the 'induciae legales'59 had
elapsed, the summons was tabled, then lodged with the Clerk and on an appointed
day was carried to the Outer House 'before the ordinaries came out' when the
partibus60 was called out whereupon the clerks of the advocates instructed by the
agents and parties to appear would attend with the Clerk and mark the names of
56 The following has been drawn from Watson, New Form of Process, 2nd ed. 1799
57 There could be special certification that if the defender was referred to his oath in the
summons and failed to appear and depone he would be held as confessed.
58 Campbell, Sketch op. cit. p. 4
59 the period between citation and appearance allowed for the defender to answer the claim.
Ordinarily 21 days but there could be shorter periods of 15 and 6 days for privileged
summonses. The pre-1672 distinction in respect of actions requiring two summonses was
preserved in relation to this.
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their masters.61 The Clerk would then enrol the cause,62 formulate a roll of causes
with the names of the parties and their respective advocates and would affix this to
the walls of the Outer House.63 The cause would then call for a hearing before the
Ordinary at an appointed day. The parties were expected to be ready for this calling
- the 'debate' - and prior to it the defender was to have put in, in writing his 'whole'
defences64 both dilatory and peremptory - in terms of the A.S., stating the facts
which he was insisting upon and explicitly admitting or denying the several facts set
forth in the pursuer's libel. He was also obliged to lodge an inventory of writs
founded upon by him. All of this was required of the defender within six days of the
summons and writs being given out for his seeing. The defender's counsel was
required to return the summons subscribed by him on the back with the words 'seen
and returned with defences apart.'65 It appears that this was a source of delay. The
1672 Regulations had provided a six day period for seeing, but looking back in 1815,
Ivory noted that the Regulations in respect of the mode of these 'seeings' were 'not
very rigidly attended to in practice' as the defender's advocate would frequently
keep them and not return them.66 Agents might also utilise the procedure for seeking
to engineer a delay.
60 names of parties and the action.
61 The advocates' clerks filled in the 'partibus' with the Clerk. Ivory, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 175-6.
62 By 1815, the Court had established a Fee Fund, and there was a fee for so enrolling which
had to be paid to the Fee Fund Collector. Previously the Clerks would apportion the dues of
enrolment amongst themselves. The Fee Fund was a more formal and organised, although
similar, method whereby the Clerks would collect a fixed fee for each type of document
enrolled and were collectively entitled to one third of the fees ingathered.
63 The cause, depending upon its nature would go to the Suspension Roll or the Ordinary
Action Roll, the latter incorporating the Regulation Roll. If there was appearance for the
defender, the cause was transferred to the Ordinary Action Roll, if not, it was sent to the
Regulation Roll (for disposal under the Regulations) or the Suspension/Advocation Roll if it
had entered the Court in that form.
64 The word 'pleas' starts to be used at this time rather than defences.
65 This was without prejudice to his right to protestation against a dilatory pursuer for non-
insistence. viz. 'judicial protestation'.
66 Ivory, Form ofProcess, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 181-2. This had been a problem in the previous
century.
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'Such are the proceedings, where appearance has been properly entered for
the defender. But it sometimes occurs in the hurry and confusion of business
(this does not always arise from mistake. It is sometimes an expedient fallen
upon to procure delay) that appearance is entered, and the summons taken
out by a counsel who is not retained.'67
Even the defences and the writs instructing them were often given in late.68
Frequently, defenders wished to amend their positions after the six day period.
Pursuers also were prone to seek to do so. If the party could show that there had
been a new discovery which required the alteration, then he could amend on a
supposed payment of an amand of 30 shillings. It seems that defenders were the
worse culprits and by 1799 payment of the amand was no longer enforced, which
permitted defenders to delay the hearing by lodging69 defences in part. As Watson
regretted, 'the defenders have often nothing in view but to protract the course, by
giving in their defences piecemeal.'70 Seeking amendment proceeded by giving in a
note in writing at the calling of the cause. The Ordinary would allow the other party
to see it until the next calling which permitted the other party to propone objections
to it. At the next calling the Lord Ordinary would either refuse to admit the
amendment or would 'allow it to be received' all as he saw fit.71
The situation developed such that by 1815, when the cause appeared for its first
calling before the Ordinary (i.e. when the debate was expected to proceed) he almost
67 Ivory, Form ofProcess, op. cit., vol. I, p. 183 and fn 'v'.
68 The defences and the writs, and also the other parts of the written pleading to be given in
within a time limit, required to be lodged i.e. 'boxed'.
69 what was termed 'lodging into the clerk's hands.'
70 Watson, New Form of Process, 2nd ed., (1799) p. 58
71 Note the discretionary function of the Ordinary in this.
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always would make General Avizandum72 or make an order for debate at the next
calling. From this developed the re-incorporation of an older practice which allowed
then the pursuer, in all cases, to put in written answers admitting or controverting
the defences or making contrary pleas or statements.73
When the cause finally called for the debate, if the pursuer was still not ready, the
process was deleted out of the roll to be again re-enrolled and the cause was
continued to a more 'convenient period.'74 Sometimes the pursuer and his agent
would not appear deliberately such that if the defender was present thereat, he could
insist in judicial protestation and obtain decree - a pursuer's thinking being that to
continue with a bungled summons to the extent of determinations by the court in fact
and law thereon would give rise to the plea of res judicata if another summons on the
same grounds was thereafter lodged, whereas payment of the costs of the defence to
the debate would allow a new action to be raised on a proper footing.75 If there was
no appearance entered for the defender, the pursuer could obtain decree in absence.
72 unrelated to Avizandum to himself or the Great Avizandum. This was a legal fiction and
required no advising.
73 The received wisdom, in pleading before the Court, was that defences should give as little
information to the other party as possible and thus in most cases the Summons and the
Defences did not provide the information necessary to enable Counsel to debate the cause. It
was then the duty of the agent to prepare full statements for Counsel prior to the debate
giving all the information which at that time they possessed. On receipt of this information,
Counsel would sometimes seek to amend the libel or the defences. If they did not, at the
debate they would make use of such of the information which they considered it prudent to
use and thus it was only at this time that the legal advisers came to know the likely grounds
upon which the action was to be pursued/defended by the other side. See Evidence of David
Cleghorn to the 1824 Commissioners, Commissioners Report, (See below) pp. 59-60. and see
later in the Chapter.
74 Ivory, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 209
75 That this advice was given to litigants by advocates was admitted by Robert Forsyth,
Advocate in his evidence to the 1823 Commissioners and is printed in the 1824
Commissioners Report (See below) at p. 137: 'If a party come into Court and cannot get his
case perfectly tried in point of law or fact, the misfortune is fatal. The plea of res judicata puts
him to silence forever. To be sure, when a Summons has been raised in a blundering way, I
have sometimes directed the pursuer to let it fall by protestation, which costs him only 17s.
6d. to the opposite party, and he can raise a new action'. See also Lord Reed's comments in
Beattie v. The Royal Bank ofScotland pic 2003 SLT 564.
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If the defender or his representative appeared thereafter, he could be 'reponed'
within a certain time on payment of 10 shillings amand and with any consequences
in the pursuer's 'expences.'76 If the parties were ready to debate, the pursuer would
narrate the ground of action and pleas upon which it was supported and the
defender stated his defences in proper order - dilatory before peremptory. The reply
and duply etc. continued as of old until the Ordinary considered the parties were
close enough in fact and law, and the cases were properly relevant and ready.
That was supposed to be the conclusion of the 'written pleading' and the Act of
Litiscontestation could be pronounced warranting the adducing of evidence by the
parties in proof or, if applicable, judgment pronounced. If the cause was one of
difficulty, the Lord Ordinary could still make 'Avizandum to himself'. Most
importantly, the peremptory defence of 'relevancy' was supposed to be disposed of
in the 'debate'.77 In Watson's time, he could write
'But if the process be not ripe for a decision because the facts not being
ascertained, all that the Lord Ordinary can do, is to determine the relevancy;
... he determines how far it would infer the conclusions which the parties
respectively draw; in which case the judge is said to find the libel or defences
relevant, and in so finding he admits them to probation. The parties then
must condescend upon the manner in which they will undertake to prove
their averments.'78
76 The role of expenses in litigation and the finding of 'expences' one against the other was
becoming increasingly important and a more efficacious deterrent to delaying than the
Court's fines and amands. See Chapter 3.
77 One still sees the word 'discussion' as used in the previous period, but 'Debate' had become
the usual term for the oral reasoning upon the written pleading before the Ordinary before
Proof or decree etc.
78 Watson, New Form of Process 2nd ed. (1799) p. 74
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Thereafter the cause would be directed to the side-bar at which the Ordinary would
hear parties upon their Condescendences and Answers or Memorials.79 The old
manner of the Ordinary ordering or the parties requesting Memorials on the
'minutes of debate' had gone following the A.S. 180080 which made peremptory the
lodging of Condescendences and Answers or Mutual Condescendences prior to any
allowance of proof. That the Libel and Defences concluded matters before judgment
or proof, was very rarely, in practice, observed, as the parties would invariably wish
further alteration to their respective cases or the Ordinary considered that the
pleadings did not 'join issue' on the relevant facts and law.81 In the language of the
times, the cause was deemed 'not ripe for decision', the Ordinary's decision in
relation to relevancy proceeding upon the litigants' positions which were not
finalised in fact.
It was possible to amend one's position in the course of the debate or any
continuation of it. If an advocate wished to make alterations, he was allowed,
(originally within the discretion of the Ordinary) to amend, by written
Condescendence and written Answer, again respectively.82
In all of these parts of subsequent procedure the Ordinary would 'advise' at a later
calling. These later callings proceeded before the Lord Ordinary at the Side-Bar. It
79 It seems that such documents were similar but different. A Condescendence and Answer
was to be strictly limited to the matters of fact which had arisen in the debate (i.e. the
pertinent facts in the consideration of the respective parties). A Memorial (or Mutual
Memorials) also detailed the facts but in addition contained the arguments about the law
arising from them. See Evidence of David Cleghorn to the 1824 Commissioners,
Commissioners Report, 1824 (See below) p. 60.
80 Ivory, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 218.
81 Watson noted that there were few cases determined at the first hearing and that causes
were more fully heard at the side-bar 'where by far the greatest part of the business of the
Court is conducted.', Watson op. cit. p. 77-8.
82 becoming mandatory by A.S. 1800. See above.
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will be recalled that the Ordinaries were in rotation and by the continuance of the
procedure in the manner above, there would arise all manner of timetabling
difficulties in getting the same Lord Ordinary (who had heard the debate) out of the
Inner House (he not being in the Outer House for that week) to hear the cause at the
Side-Bar. Moreover, it appears that there were not always continuations to a
particular date, it being left to the parties to enrol a note in the Ordinary's hand-roll83
to 'force in a condescendence or answers to condescendence.'84
The summons as amended by condescendence, the defences amended by answer,
actual Condescendences and Answers85 (or Mutual Condescendences86) became the
'record of the cause' and were 'intended as the ground-work of the whole after
proceedings.'87 At a final hearing before the Ordinary, advising upon the
Condescendence and Answers, no further written pleadings were allowed.
(vi) The Continued Prevalence of the Act before Answer
Argument and rhetoric in all of these pleadings was supposedly bad practice and
had been forbidden by the A.S. of 1800.88 The idea was that the argument or
83 the method by which the cause could be brought back to him.
84 Watson op. cit. p.82.
85 sometimes 'replies'.
86 sometimes called mutual Memorials following the old terminology. In time
Condescendences would pertain to fact and Memorials to law.
87 Ilay Campbell, Sketch, op. cit., p. 6.
88 Implicit in this is the idea that bad practice could be corrected and the aims of the Court
achieved by the advocates being 'shamed' or 'embarrassed' into changing their methods of
drawing their pleadings. If it was 'bad practice' to insert rhetoric, by implication the
professional skills of the drawer would be questioned. Murray notes that the 'usual mode of
expressing disapprobation was by a note in an interlocutor; but though the disapprobation
was expressed, the erroneous statement remained in process, and was frequently the means
of leading the opposite party into a similar error, and probably to a greater degree' (Murray,
op. cit. p. 16) C.f. Stair IV, 40,10 (on bills) 'But which is yet worse, bills are oft-times drawn by
unskilful agents, mendicating the hands of advocates thereto, wherein such undigested stuff
is multiplied, as none would have impudence to offer at the bar, wherein fact and law is
jumbled together, without distinct proposal of points of fact instructed, or to be proven, as
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'reasonings of the counsel ought not to enter into the record of the cause,
being much more fit for hearing at the bar, when the formal pleadings are
closed'.89
The Ordinaries, however, found it difficult, after the allowance of all of the above
procedure, to issue an interlocutor granting an Act of Litiscontestation defining the
issues between the parties in fact and law and allowing proof or otherwise in respect
of each. Even the disposal of the defences was awkward. Whilst A.S. 11 August 1787
ordained the 'whole defences' to be pleaded, by this time, it was 'very seldom that this
regulation [was] strictly observed'90 and a defender could drip out his defences or
pleas, mixing peremptory with dilatory - reserving some of them for later in the
pleading or until called upon either by the judge or the pursuer to state them more
particularly.91 The lack of enforcement of paying amands encouraged them to do so.
Even with the full defences disclosed, peremptory defences in fact could still prevent
the determination of the relevancy of the cause at the debate. From the time of Stair,
where the facts and circumstances were disputed in relevancy and truth and where
the eliciting of the facts was prerequisite to determining whether they were sufficient
in law to 'infer the conclusion' (i.e. the relevancy) then the facts had to be brought
out first. Hence the development of the equitable 'remedy' of the Act before
they behoved to propone at the bar: so that the Lords are necessitated to gather the matter out
of that mass, wherewith there are mixed long narrations and allegeances, neither true nor
competent to be proved.'
89 Ilay Campbell, Sketch, op. cit. p. 6. Record here is probably used a similar manner to what
was written down by the Clerks of the Outer House in the previous century following the
'discussion' But another meaning might be ascribed to it. There was at the time a feeling that
the documents of the Court should stand as a record for its work, and the pleadings of the
parties should be retained as historical documents to be kept in the Books of Council and
Session. There was an A.S. passed for the purpose. Perhaps it was felt that the old manner of
pleading rhetoric and argument would not reflect well upon the Court in these pleadings
being recorded for posterity.
90 Campbell ibid. p. 8.
91 Glassford Remarks, op. cit. p. 154.
112
Answer.92 But in granting an Act before Answer, what facts should the Ordinary
allow to be adduced for such a determination? Strictly it should have been those
stated in the pleadings not just for proof, in terms of the 'sufficiency' of the party's
case but also those required to be proven as examined in the light of relevancy.
Closely related but crucially different. As we have seen, what was stated in the
pleadings was not only infused with argument and law, but the facts they were
supposed to contain were constantly altered to refute a counter allegation inserted
into an adversary's case. Thus, the libel was in practice amended, even after the
pronouncement of an Act (being mostly an Act before Answer)93 and the
Condescendences and Answers were revised, amended and revised and re-revised.94
Indeed, following the clear terms of the A.S. 1800, it seems that there was even a
practice of putting in two writs under the name of Condescendence - one entitled
'Condescendence of the Grounds of the Action', and the other entitled
'Condescendence of Facts Without Argument' or 'Condescendence in Terms of the
Act of Sederunt'.95
It was certainly difficult for the Court to legislate for the circumscription of relevant
individual facts in individual causes which should be allowed to be proved and this
was exploited by the parties and their advisers. As already noted, it was a definite
tactic to coerce the Ordinary to 'play safe' and grant an Act Before Answer which
92 For discussion of the Act, see MacKay, Practice of the Court, Vol. 1, p. 15; J. M'Glashan
Practical Notes on the Jurisdiction and Forms of Process in Civil Causes (etc) (Edinburgh, 1842) pp.
174-5; D. M. Walker, 'Equity in Scots Law', (1954) 66 Juridical Review, 103 at p. 145.
93 The old practice was that a Libel could be amended before Litiscontestation but not after it.
Ochterlony v. Mackenzie (1738) Mor. 11985.
94 Murray, Introduction to Vol. V Jury Cases op. cit. p. 24. Each alteration spawned another
individual writ of pleading. So, the record for the pursuer's pleadings might contain the libel
(summons), libel as amended, the Condescendence, the Revised Condescendence, the
Amended Revised Condescendence, and the Re-revised Condescendence. Of course, this
progression would be replied to by the defender.
95 Murray, op. cit. p. 16.
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would allow the parties to lead evidence beyond the bounds of relevancy of an Act
of Litiscontestation.96 Increasingly, the Ordinary would allow proof 'at large'.97
As Ivory98 explains,
[the forms prescribed in previous Acts of Sederunt] 'were attended in
practice with much litigation and delay; and the consequence, of course, was,
that their enforcement was, at first, gradually relaxed, and, in the end, they
were in some manner altogether departed from. The practice next crept in, of
allowing "the proof to be stated at large99"And by this means, as was early
made a subject of complaint, "the preparing of causes had become entirely
an operation of the clerk's servant, who made up a state of the process and
proof as it stood, without observing any order with respect to the points
litigated'".
So in practice, the Court had permitted the parties to elaborate on the pleadings (and
their adversary's position) by Memorial.100 These (under the title 'Informations'101)
had previously become a scourge by reason of their length and the Lords had tried to
96 As Bell observes, 'The art of the advocate was now to lay his ground broad, and make his
averments vague and comprehensive, that when evidence came to be taken, he might be as
little circumscribed as possible , and the widest field allowed for argument to the court/ (Bell,
Examination, p.32) He continues, 'The ingenuity of counsel was perpetually directed to
enlarge the field of evidence and discussion, and avoid every thing that might compromise or
circumscribe the party, (ibid, p. 33.)
97 Russell The Form ofProcess in the Court ofSession', op. cit. p. 89.
98 Ivory, Form of Process before the Court ofSession, the Jury Court, Commission ofTeinds. Two
Volumes (Edinburgh, 1815,1818) Vol. II, p. 133.
99 The parts in parenthesis are quoted from Russell above.
100 Mutual Memorials or Memorials and Answers (and after 1800 Condescendences and
Answers or Mutual Condescendences) could be ordered by the Ordinary following the
debate.
101 See the previous Chapter for the development.
114
prohibit them by A.S. 18th June 1752, which ordinance was never enforced and fell
into disuse.102
By 1808, the Lord Ordinary, having heard Counsel in respect of the written
pleadings, would frequently have to take the most equitable course (and safest
against representation and report) and pronounce an Act Before Answer, allow proof
at large and to the parties grant warrant to prove the facts as contained in their
pleadings and 'all facts and circumstances relative thereto.'103
Of course, the Act before Answer was meant to be used in the circumstances which
required it as a necessity or expediency (i.e. in equity) but the above practice caused,
'almost every cause where facts are controverted, to go, in a very loose and
unprepared shape, to proofs before answer'.104
The Lord President considered this an 'evil' and whilst acknowledging that acts
before answer could not be avoided in all cases, he laid the blame for the practice
squarely, if not fairly, on the shoulders of the Ordinaries who, he considered, were
failing to sift the pleadings in relevancy to remove argumentative material and facts
in the pleadings which were 'not material.'105 For him, all superfluous and irrelevant
matter should be 'thrown out' by the judge. If it was not, the consequences were
obvious.
102 They even appointed a Committee by A.S. 15th June 1774 to produce proposals to remedy
this and report. It appears that it never did so. Ivory, Form ofProcess op. cit. Vol. II, p. 134.
i°3 Murray Introduction op. cit. p. 25 This would then be inserted into the warrant for
Commission to take the evidence, leaving the Commissioner with the unenviable task of
ascertaining what ought to be allowed in proof. See Campbell, Sketch, p. 11.
104 Campbell, Sketch ibid.
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Causes now proceeded to proof on irrelevant and immaterial fact, very commonly
before a Commissioner appointed by the Court,106 although it was still possible for
witnesses to be examined by the Lord Ordinary in the cause. The old Lord Ordinary
on Oaths and Witnesses had disappeared as an independent office as interlocutory
business had increased in the Court,107 parole evidence was usually taken by
Commissioners on a warrant from the judge, Commissioners being appointed in
'many cases'108; and habit had led to causes following the individual judges who had
pronounced the previous interlocutors109 (although this was not always the case).
The Lord Ordinary, (or the Commissioner who had heard the evidence) was then
supposed to rank the evidence in a 'State', as had been done in bygone times and if
the proof was to be reported to the whole Court it had to be printed. The proof could
also be reported to the Lord Ordinary in the cause.110 If it was reported to him, he
could order memorials upon it before reporting it to the Court. If it was to be
reported directly to the whole Court, he could adjust it with memorials ordered from
the parties.111
The office of Lord Ordinary on Concluded Causes had also in practice been
dissolved and increasingly, the preparation of the state was left to the Clerk, as
adverted to above by Ivory, to be signed by the Ordinary of the Week (assuming the
105 Campbell, Sketch op. cit. p. 11. He also considered that the actings of agents and counsel in
drawing such to be regrettable. See also Glassford, Remarks p. 136.
106 This procedure had been tightened by the A.S. 1800 above.
107 His role was to be assumed by the Lord Ordinary for the Week. See below.
108 C.f. Campbell's claim that in 1808 that there were 'seldom more that 160 to 180 proofs
taken by commission in a year, to be reported either to the Ordinary, or to the whole Court,
while the number of causes before the Court are generally upwards of 2800 in a year' Ilay
Campbell, Sketch, op. cit., p. 15.
109 This seems to have arisen as a result of the confusion of where a cause was to appear in the
Lord Ordinary's 'hand-rolls' and when he was to sit at the Side bar.
110 By 1815, this was the more common method. See Ivory, Form ofProcess, Vol. II p.135
111 A.S. 11th March 1800, ss. 8&9
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role of the Ordinary on Concluded Causes) which was then inrolled in the relevant
roll and determined by the whole Court.
The Memorials upon the 'state' of the case, if permitted, were another pernicious
irritant. When the proof had been conducted upon an admixture of fact and law and
any other matter relating thereto, especially by a Commissioner appointed by the
Court, not surprisingly, drafting the Memorials for either party was far from simple.
In practice, they were long and tedious112 and subject to the very type of alterations
prevalent in the course of the revisals to the summons, defences, condescendences
and answers. Even by the time the state and associated papers got to the Inner
House, there could be informations and answers ordered upon it. These papers were
'often drawn to a great length, and calculated to perplex, rather than throw light
upon the cause.'113 Glassford could remark of this period that 'now, much if not most
of the pleading may be posterior to the proof.'114
In all of this, other than disapprobation and admonishment in an interlocutor or
payment of a fine, amerciation, amand115 or 'expences'116, there was little by way of
sanction for the defaulting party.
112 and had been in any event prohibited by A.S. 18th June 1752, 'short cases' being ordered in
their place. The practice returned to boxing Memorials.
113 Campbell, Sketch, op. cit., p. 24. (Discussing proceedings in the Bill Chamber but the same
could be applied to these papers for the Inner House). C.f Ivory, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 114 [Whilst
a cause was depending before the Inner House] 'At one time nothing seems to have been more
common, than to perplex the Court in almost every stage with additional petitions, answers,
informations etc.' (A.S. 10th November 1741 had prohibited any further papers after eight
running days from the inrolment of the cause in the Inner House Roll, other than by
appointment of the Court.)
114 Glassford, Remarks, op. cit. p. 153. It is surprising that the advocates for the introduction of
jury trial failed to make anything of this point. If the procedure now was such that much of
pleading on acts before answer was conducted after the proof, it would have been a small
step to argue for it in the course of a jury trial. See above.
115 in the Inner House at any rate. In practice they were not enforced in the Outer House.
Ivory, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 101 f.n. 'n'.
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Throughout the pleadings the 'dishonest litigant' could deny facts which he knew to
be true or could aver false facts,117 or could put in 'a long and intricate statement'
especially if he knew that his case was bad.118 'Agents of an inferior class' could still
exploit their own interest, lengthening papers.119 The obstructionist, the dilatory and
the obdurate were still well catered for, particularly those who came to a litigation
without concerns about cost.120
A party could still represent to the Ordinary and could still do so without limit.
Upon unsuccessful representation to the Ordinary a party could reclaim if the
petition was given in within the reclaiming days permitted.121 Answers had to be put
in timeously under pain of amand,122 which amand was, in practice, never collected
in the Outer House. If the Petition and Answers were not fully stated, the Court
could order a hearing in presence or the in-giving of 'replies' and 'duplies', or
Memorials and Informations. New matters of fact would admit of a second and final
reclaiming petition. Ultimately, in all of this, there lay a right of appeal to the House
116 See the more detailed discussion of this below.
117 Murray, op. cit. p. 11.
118 Murray, op. cit. p. 15.
119 ibid. p. 15.
120 See below. The period is notable for the introduction at all stages of procedure of the
awarding of 'expences' against a dilatory party, or a litigant who had missed a peremptory
time limit. 'Amands' could still be awarded although in the Outer House this was rare.
Agents could be fined or amerciated for default. Tracts of procedure rendered otiose by a late
amendment or piece of written pleading could render the defaulter liable in the expense of
the wasted parts of the procedure. It was left to the discretion of the Ordinary to allocate the
expenses of the procedure by interlocutor and an interlocutor 'condemning in, or assoilzieing
from expences, if pronounced by an Ordinary' could not be reclaimed against for a second
time (A.S. 1 February 1715, s. 4) See Ivory, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 99-101 and p. 113. See chapter 3.
121 A practice had previously developed of 'prorogating by consent of the parties the days
fixed for reclaiming.' The Court considered the practice irregular and ordained that it could
have no effect in preventing the lapse of the reclaiming days. A.S. 27 June 1776. There was
confusion about the proper period of reclaiming days i.e. whether they were natural days or
sederunt days (i.e. the days the Court was sitting). It was to be resolved by A.S. 7 February
1810 - 20 natural days.
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of Lords, both in the final sentence, as well as the interlocutory pronouncements by
the Ordinary and the Court. This,123 the procedure of taking evidence on
Commission and the lack of understanding on the part of litigants as to how their
case had been decided continued to inform the pressure for change.
(vii) The Three R's: Representation, Reports and Reclaiming Petitions.
One should not forget, against all of the above, that the old equitable remedies of
bringing the intermediate or final determination of a judge back before himself or his
peers was always possible.
By 1812 a case was being made for the abolition of the power of representation, and
although it would take until 1825 until it was finally removed,124 in this period, at
any of the stages, from the first hearing to the extended period at the side-bar, any
interlocutor of the Ordinary could be represented against. A note would be enrolled
in the Ordinary's hand-roll and the cause was brought out at the side-bar where the
merits of the representation were debated. The Ordinary could decide it then and
there or could order answers from the other party. In the latter case, the cause would
be continued to a date at the side-bar or parties would bring it back to him there by
note, and the Lord Ordinary would then decide to adhere or depart from the
interlocutor complained of. A party could even seek another representation on the
same interlocutor within ten sederunt days of the last.125 There were no limits on the
number of times that a party could represent. It was possible for the Lord Ordinary
to prohibit further representations :
122 A.S. 12 June 1782, A.S. 26 March 1794, A.S. 24 June 1806
123 the whole vexed topic of Scotch appeals, see Bell, Examination, op. cit., p. 35
124 to the chagrin of the Faculty of Advocates who argued strongly against its removal in
Report of the Committee of the Faculty of Advocates 1824. See infra.
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'in order to save trouble and expence to the parties' but'[I]n practice...such
declaration is too often disregarded, more representations being given in,
notwithstanding the prohibition; by which means the salutary ends which
the judge has in view are often disappointed'.126
But as Watson noted,
'It is to be regretted that there is no general rule of court limiting
representations in point of number as a party who conceives himself hurt by
the Ordinary's judgment, frequently brings an intolerable load of expence on
his opponent and trouble on all concerned.'127
A party could also still seek that the Ordinary report the cause to the Inner House.
The underlying rationale for a report was that the cause involved much difficulty or
was of such importance as to call for a solemn decision of the Inner House. If the
Ordinary agreed to take the cause to Report, he would order written (later printed)
memorials or informations from the parties128 and would appoint a day for the
parties to prepare and print their informations or for minutes of debate to be in the
hands of the Ordinary through his clerk, grant warrant for the cause to be enrolled in
the Inner House Roll and ordain the informations to be boxed.129 As of old, the Lord
Ordinary would then, on the appointed day, go to the Inner House and stand at the
125 Watson, op. cit. p. 88
126 Watson, op. cit. p. 90.
127 Watson, op. cit. p. 90.
128 sometimes the report could proceed upon printed Minutes as opposed to the more formal
Memorials or Informations. Watson, op. cit. p. 136; Ivory, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 125.
129 The old practice of boxing Informations to avoid solicitation of the Judges had become the
method by which papers were communicated to the Court. (See previous Chapter and Stair,
IV, 39.14) The boxes were kept in the lobby of Parliament House (See previous Chapter and
Watson op. cit. p. 91, Ivory, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 93-94, Thomas Beveridge, A Practical Treatise on
the Forms ofProcess; containing The New Regulations before the Court ofSession, Inner-House,
Outer-House and Bill-Chamber; The Court ofTeinds, and the Jury Court, 2 vols., (Edinburgh, 1826),
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foot of the Clerk's table and report the pleas of the parties as stated before him in the
Outer House and in the printed informations. The Inner House then delivered their
opinions and pronounced judgment in the cause. If attended with difficulty, as of
old, they would appoint a hearing in presence or give such other interlocutor as the
circumstances required130. Against this the parties could reclaim.
Although the Act of Regulations 1672 required parties to have first represented to the
Lord Ordinary before presenting reclaiming petitions, and the number of petitions
was limited to two,131 reclaiming was another drain on the Court's time (even after
the division of the Inner House.)132 Once enrolled133 they were formally 'single bills'
as they had not yet been answered. The Court would then order answers within a
number of days under sanction of a fine (which could be prorogated on cause
shown) which answers were boxed and the Court then determined whether the
petition and answers should be heard in presence, or whether replies and duplies or
memorials or informations should be ordered, or whether it should be remitted back
to the Ordinary.
(viii) The New Tory Government, the Court of Session Act 1808 and the
Reorganisation of the Court of Session.
It was against this back drop that the Whigs' bill, examined earlier, had emerged and
then failed. Again, though, history repeated itself and through a lack of consultation
Vol. I, p. 256) but were to be moved to Room 9 of the Register House by A.S. If March 1814,
ss. 4&5. (Ivory, ibid) It seems that by 1818, papers could be 'boxed' and 'lodged'. Ivory, ibid.
130 Ivory notices that by his time of writing, almost all cases reported are 'remitted back to the
Outer House for the purpose of being there matured and are not discussed in the Inner
House.' Ivory, op. cit. p. 80.
131 A.S. 26 November 1718
132 see below
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with those interested in the protection from alteration of the Court and its procedure,
and in the face of similar nationalist sensibilities to those expressed in 1785, the Bill
now presented disappeared with the fall of Grenville's ministry in 1807.134 Would
the bill have become law without the fall of the government? It is difficult to
determine but, whilst emulation of English form continued to stick in the craw of
many Scotsmen, the real problem was that the form of process was geared towards
an end which did not fit well with the isolation of matters of fact required for a jury
trial on the English model. If there was to be any hope for those pressing for the
introduction of civil juries, the forms of process would need to be altered first. But
reorganisation of the Court was to be the first task for the reforming incoming
ministry.
The new Tory government, on taking office, had appointed Lord Eldon as Lord
Chancellor. Legislation followed quickly. In the year of taking office, an Act was
passed whereby judges could now be pensioned off.135 Written copies of papers
(petitions, answers, informations or other papers) 'lodged'136 in processes before the
Inner House were to be printed and signed by the advocates by whom they were
respectively drawn.137 The A.S. 15 July 1768 in respect of fines for imperfect
quotations or typographical errors was to be enforced with the 'utmost vigour.'138
133 It seems that often a party would reclaim merely on the prayer of a petition. See Watson op.
cit. 123.
134 Phillipson, op. cit. pp. 86 -95.
133 48 Geo. III. c. 145.
136 This is the word used in the A.S.
137 A.S. 11th March 1808.
138 ibid. The size of type had to be at least the size of the type 'called English' A.S. 21 February
1806.
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In July 1808 a more important measure, carefully canvassed with the judges, the Bar
and the county freeholders, passed into law, geared to 'facilitate the dispatch of
business' of the Court of Session.139 By section 1 of the (colloquially known) Court of
Session (or Judicature) Act 1808,140 the judges were to sit in Two Divisions, the Lord
President and seven ordinary Lords of Session forming one Division and the Lord
Justice-Clerk and six of the ordinary Lords of Session the second Division. The
Ordinary judges of each Division were to officiate in the Outer House and Bill
Chamber 'in the manner which has hitherto been practised by the Ordinary Judges of
the whole Court', providing that two of the judges (one from each Division) should
sit in the Outer House for hearing the Outer House business and 'two should sit in
the Bill Chamber.'141 Parties could elect their Division by bringing their cause before
the Ordinaries of that Division and once there, the cause could not be removed to the
other.142 No appeals from interlocutory judgments to the House of Lords were to be
allowed, except with leave of the Division. Only appeals from judgments or decrees
on the whole merits of the cause were to be taken to the House of Lords,143 with the
proviso that the Division would have the power to regulate all matters relative to
interim possession, execution and payments of costs and expenses already incurred
139 48 Geo. Ill, cap. 151 The preamble to the Act betrays the driving force, informed also by the
mood of the time, that Scotland was a team player in the Union - 'Whereas the great
extension of agriculture, commerce, manufactures, and population, and the consequent
multiplication of transactions in Scotland, have greatly increased the number of law suits
brought into the Court of Session
140 The actual title was 'An Act concerning the Administration ofJustice in Scotland, and concerning
Appeals to the House of Lords - 4th July 1808'.
141 s. 5. Melville had wanted to make five of these Ordinaries sit in the Outer House for the
whole time which would thereby prevent the dislocation of the Outer House when they were
summoned to the Inner House. Eldon, however, consulted the judges, who fearing a
permanent separation of the Inner and Outer Houses, persuaded him to provide the




as may be affected by the affirmance or reversal of the judgment or decree appealed
from.144
Section 22 made provision for the appointment of Commissioners with powers to
enquire into the administration of justice in Scotland relating to matters of a civil
nature, and particularly into the forms of process in the Court of Session. We will
return to the evidence they received and their Report shortly.
By the end of the same month, Ilay Campbell had been prevailed upon to retire145 to
be replaced by the arch conservative Robert Blair, former Dean of Faculty.146
Straight away, the re-organisation of the Court led to practical changes in the
operation of the form of process. Formerly, the Lord Reporter reporting a cause,147
would go to the Inner House and stand at the foot of the Clerk's table and report,
144 s. 17.
145 Although he was a legal reformer and had some innovative ideas on the reform of the
Court's procedure, as evidenced in the quotations above from his 'Sketch', he was
considered not to be the right individual for the times ahead. He could be domineering
(Phillipson, op. cit p. 114). Cockburn remarked 'that he was ambitious of having a prevailing
influence over his brethren was true of him' (Memorials op. cit. p. 128) His forensic writing in
pleading was admirable and he had been trained and grounded in the system of pleading by
writing. He was of the opinion that there was nothing wrong with the form of process, the
only defect lay in the enforcement. For him there was little to resort to in the forms of
pleading in England, the improvements and the acts of Sederunts and regulations of the
Court being sufficient although 'too much neglected by practitioners.' For him, the
preliminary pleadings of the libel and the defences correctly framed made further
condescendences unnecessary (Sketch p. 12) and the blame for the state of the form of process
was to be attributed to agents. (Sketch, p. 27-8) He was 'hated by the agents whom he rightly
blamed for the present difficulties of the court and with whom he waged a constant and
unrelenting war' (Phillipson, op. cit .p. 114) His views on the Presidency of the Divisions, at
the planning stage, were clear whereby he would continue to preside over both. Twice the
work in half the time would be left to the President's availability and would hamper the new
Act's efficiency. In the end, the package put together by Melville and the Dundas' persuaded
him that his time as President was over.
146 As Cockburn remarked of him, 'Too solid for ingenuity, and too plain for fancy, soundness
of understanding was his peculiar intellectual ability' Cockburn, Memorials, op. cit. pp. 150 at
151.
147 Avizandum to the Lords or Great Avizandum.
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stating the pleas of the parties to the Court. Under the Act, the Lords Ordinary were
no longer permitted to participate in the vote before the Court and the practice of
physically going to report to the Court died out.148
(ix) The Work of the 1808 Commission Appointed to inquire into the
Forms of Process in the Court of Session.
The Commission authorised by section 22 gave the Commissioners a wide brief.149
31 Scottish and English Commissioners150 were appointed by Royal Warrant and
Lord Eldon was the Chairman. Most of the work was to be executed by the Scottish
Commissioners under Ilay Campbell.
As noted above, the Condescendence and Answer had become an integral part of
pleading at initial stages and had indeed been made mandatory by the A.S. 1800. The
A.S. simply applied the practice that had arisen up to that point, although there was
no historical precedent for it and it was not part of the earlier procedure. This gave
rise to a tension between Campbell and Hope over whether Condescendences and
148 Ivory Vol. II124-5.
149 The Commissioners 'after chusing a preses and clerk, to make full inquiries into the forms
of process in the Court of Session, and to report in what cases, and in what manner and form
it appears to them that jury trial could be most usefully established in that Court; and further,
to report in what manner the present form of process in that Court might be improved by
conducting more of the pleadings viva voce, by limiting the power vested in single Judges of
frequently reviewing their own interlocutory judgments, by obviating inconveniences arising
from the mode now practised, in taking proofs by commission, and by regulations relative to
the proceedings in the Bill Chamber 'as well as the expediency of Ordinaries officiating in the
Outer House and Bill Chamber, the form of procedure in the Admiralty and Commissary
Courts, and the general topics of the inferior Courts, extracting decrees and letters of
diligence, and the fees, perquisites and emoluments paid to clerks and officers of the Courts,
all to report before 12 November 1809.'
15° por qie Commissioners, see Phillipson, op. cit. p. 117. The Scottish Commissioners included
Lord President Robert Blair, Lord Justice-Clerk Charles Hope, Lord Chief Baron Dundas,
Lord Advocate Archibald Colquhoun, Solicitor General David Boyle and Dean of Faculty
Matthew Ross. Lord Melville and Henry Erskine were included as past Deans of Faculty.
Most of the work on the form of process was carried out by a sub-committee of Campbell,
Blair, Hope, Ross and a writer to the Signet, Robert Sym.
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Answers were really required in all cases.151 Campbell thought not. He maintained
his thesis that the real problems of the form of process lay in the failure of foreclosing
parties' allegations in the summons and defences. Hope differed in opinion,
pragmatically appreciating that once the basis of the action was ascertained, it was at
the point of the ordering of Condescendences and Answers that frank disclosure of
the parties' position could reasonably be expected, and thus condescendences and
answers should form part of the procedure in every case. Thereby, parties could be
forced, at that point, to admit or deny the facts stated by the other - the very purpose
of the Acts of Sederunt of 1787 and 1800. When the condescendence and answer had
been given in, he considered that
'it would be highly desirable to order a meeting of the two Agents to go thro'
the Condescendences & Answers together to try if they cannot agree on
certain of the facts. If they do these to be selected and the facts to be classed
into three heads. Primo. Facts admitted on both sides. Secundo. Facts averred
by the Pursuer and denied by or unknown to the Defender. Tertio. Facts
averred by the Defr. and denied or unknown to the Pursuer.'152
The work of the Commission was prodigious. The Scottish sub-committee of the
Commission had been set up on 30th November 1808 and by January of the following
year Campbell had formulated a sketch of procedure revolving around the central
theme that 'parties in a cause ought to be foreclosed as to their assertions at some
period of a cause' albeit that in his mind, this was best pursued after the libel and
defences had been lodged by the bringing of the respective counsel before the
Ordinary and forcing them to state whether they intended to 'rest upon' their
151 On all of this, see Phillipson, op. cit. pp. 118 -121
152 Hints for some improvements in our form ofprocess, (28"' Aug. 1809) MSS Proc. Scot. ]ud. Com
Box 1, Quoted by Phillipson, op. cit. p. 119
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pleadings as the ground of action or defence. Whilst this initiative was not to
succeed, the key aspect in it was that parties should be foreclosed. Hope, in
advancing his thesis that the point of foreclosure shoulci follow the lodging of
Condescendences and Answers153 still accepted and joined with Campbell that there
had to be a point that the parties would be foreclosed upon their respective
pleadings beyond which they were not entitled as of right to expand. This was a
significant departure from previous practice whereby the parties had always had the
opportunities of seeking a report, unlimited representation and had the two chances
to reclaim. Irrespective of where the parties were to be foreclosed in their pleading,
the importance was that they could, and should be.154
By February 1810, the Commission was ready to publish its First Report.155 Five days
later, the Court passed A.S. 7 February 1810 'anent the Form of Process in the Inner
and Outer House', drawing in part upon the work of the Commissioners, but using
the A.S. as an opportunity to assert some judicial control over the proposals for
reform of process and court re-organisation being proposed.156 Through this vehicle
the Lords recorded their recognition that various aspects of procedure were being
misused and although the remedies were not to be efficacious, the problems
specified were examined further by the Commissioners and incorporated into their
Second Report. But even although the bold steps discussed by the Commissioners
153 In August 1809.
154 this would become the genesis of the device of the 'Closed Record' advanced and
implemented in 1825. Moreover, it was to follow Hope's line that it should close after the
Condescendence and Answers.
155 Report of the Commissioners etc. P.P. x pp. 1-19. Dated 2nd February 1810. There is
nothing in it relating directly to the Commission's brief to Report on the form of process and
written pleadings.
156 The judges (through Lord President Blair) were opposed to the Commissioners' notions of
creating permanent Lord Ordinary - i.e. sitting permanently in the Outer House. Also, on the
form of process the Judges themselves were averse to preventing the amendment of libels
and defences.
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prior to the First Report were known to the Lords, the A.S. did not do anything other
than attempt to tidy up aspects of the form of process - all in accordance with the old
jurisprudence.
(x) Act of Sederunt 7 February 1810 - More of the Same.
The A.S. attempted inter nlin to prevent the passing of decreets in absence for the
purposes of delay. It noted that amendments of libels were sometimes given in and
received at a very late stage of the cause which the Lords considered encouraged
rash and ill-advised actions, and led to slovenliness in drawing libels in all actions.
From May 1811, there was to be no amendment after proof was allowed. An
amendment was not to be allowed unless produced with or before the second
representation against the Lord Ordinary's first interlocutor on the merits of the
cause.157 The Lords recognised that there was delay occasioned by the number of
representations given in to the Ordinaries against the same interlocutor and that they
often contained no statement of the cause at all but were given in merely for the
purpose of delay, or procuring more time to prepare a petition for the Inner House,
which they considered arose because the period allowed for reclaiming was too
short. From May 1811, the reclaiming days were to be extended to 20 natural days.
Moreover, it prohibited any more than two representations against an interlocutor of
a Lord Ordinary without prejudice to the Ordinary prohibiting a second
representation upon advising the first.158
Regarding the forcing of parties to define their positions in fact and law, there was
little new:
157 C.f. Phillipson op. cit. 120.
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'And whereas it is highly expedient that the real nature of the action, and the
facts and pleas in law set forth by both parties, should be contained in certain
known and fixed papers, forming an abridged record of the cause, so that the
Ordinary, the Inner House and (in the event of appeal) the House of Lords,
may be able to see clearly and within short compass the real nature of the
action; the Lords do hereby Enact and Declare, That they will rigidly enforce
existing regulations as to the returning of defences; and they do Order and
Enact, That the said defences shall not contain argument, but only a concise
statement of the facts on which the defender founds, and a summary of the
pleas in law which he is to maintain as applicable to those facts.'159
With regard to the problems of Condescendences and Answers, again there was little
novel:
'Considering how necessary it is that the averments of the parties should be
fully and distinctly brought before the Lord Ordinary and the Court, and the
parties compelled to bring out their averments in due time',
in addition to the regulations contained in A.S. 11 March 1800, now - where a fact
was averred by one party, and not explicitly denied by the other, he was to be held as
confessed, (in similar terms to the 1715 A.S.) and that fact would be held to be
definitively proved against him.160
158 Although third representations do not appear to have been unknown See Knox & Ors. v.
Murdoch & Ors. 3 Shaw 40 (1st Div). Practice did vary - c.f. Arbouin v. Sime ibid. p. 148.
159 Although there was nothing novel in this, and it merely adopted the approach tried on
previous occasions through other A.S., one might note the terminology used - in particular
'record' and 'pleas in law'. The A.S. would form one of the corner stones of the Report of the
Commissioners in 1824.
160 This developed in practice to become facts which 'necessarily fell within the party's own
knowledge.' Report of the Committee of the Faculty ofAdvocates, Appointed to Consider a Bill,
Entituled, 'An Act for the Better Regulating of the Forms ofProcess in the Courts ofLaw in Scotland
(Edinburgh, 1824).
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And if the Answers to Condescendences, besides explicitly admitting or denying the
facts stated in the Condescendence, contained counter averments, the direction to the
Lord Ordinary was clear - 'he shall ordain parties to revise both, so that the parties
may explicitly meet each other on the facts mutually set forth and such a
Condescendence and Answer (so revised if necessary)' would 'absolutely foreclose'
both parties, as to 'every averment, in point of fact.'161
(xi) The Commissioners' Second Report.
This A.S. seemed to galvanise the Commissioners (particularly Hope and Campbell)
and the Commission published its Second Report, dealing with Form of Process in
the Court of Session as per the brief, on 9 March 1810. But the result was
disappointing concerning the form of process and inconclusive in its
recommendations - generally aping the A.S. passed the month before.162
(xii) Outstanding Business - The Introduction of Civil Jury Trial.
Still the jury question remained unresolved.163 The business of the House of Lords
still was still increasing with appeals from the Court of Session, largely on questions
161 The AS was to be fixed for 3 years and was signed Robert Blair.
162 It did, however, provide the arguments for the appointment of permanent Lords Ordinary
in the Outer House which was to be introduced by statute three years later. Court of Session
Act 1810, 50 Geo III (c. 112); Court of Session Act 1813. 53 Geo III (c.64); AS 11 June 1813. See
further Ivory, op. cit. p. 70 ff. By 1813, there were was a sufficiency of new appointments to
the Bench such that the consent of existing Lords as at 1810, to sit in the Outer House
(encapsulated in the 1810 Act) was not required and the new Lords were required so to sit,
whether consenting or not.
163 The introduction of Trial By Jury in Civil Causes was complex. Here I attempt a gloss and
cietail the introduction and working of the Jury Court against the background of the effect it
had on written pleadings. There is a wealth of writing on the Civil Jury Trial. See for example
I.D Willock, The Origins and Development of the Jury in Scotland, (vol. 23) (Stair Society,
Edinburgh, 1966); Phillipson op. cit.', Cairns, Introduction, op. cit.; Walker Legal History op. cit.,
vol. VI, pp 324 ff, William Adam A Practical Treatise and Observations on Trial by Jury in Civil
Causes, As now Incorporated with the Jurisdiction of the Court ofSession (1816) Appx., 92-104 See
also above.
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of fact.164 The House of Lords protested165 and themselves considered that the
introduction of civil jury trial in Scotland would stem the flow of cases going south.
It will be recollected that the Commissioners had been charged with considering the
introduction of jury trial166 yet, in their Third and final Report167 could only conclude
that the topic had 'been the subject of much deliberation and discussion among the
Commissioners.'168 They themselves could not come to a conclusion. Their jury was
hung. As they noted in the Report -
' there exists among the Commissioners, upon the most important points,
much difference of opinion. Some of the Commissioners are decidedly of the
opinion that the introduction of Jury Trial into the proceedings of the Court
of Session, in any case, would be injurious, and indeed impracticable. Some
few are of a very different opinion, and conceive that in many cases the Trial
by Jury might be introduced, with little difficulty and great advantage.'169
164 Adam, as the new Chief Commissioner could remark on 22 January 1816 in his Speech at
the opening of the Jury Court 'many cases had occurred in the House of Lords, resting
entirely on matter of fact, accompanied by long printed proofs, calling upon the Supreme
Court of Appeal, which should only be required to decide matter of law, to perform a duty
not properly belonging to it, by deciding cases resting upon intricate, difficult, and ill proved
facts.' Introduction to Murray's Jury Court Reports op. cit. Vol. I. pp. xv - xxviii at page xvi.
There was a decrease in the business coming before the House of Lorcis from Scotland
between 1811 anci 1815 (193 Scottish appeals lodged compared with 225 in the preceding four
year period) but as this business comprised 80% of the House's business, the decrease was
academic. See Phillipson, op. cit., p.127 It should be remembered that from the date of the
Union, the House of Lords as Supreme Court had been a refuge for those not content to
accept a decision of the Inner House - even if that meant delaying the inevitable. See
generally A.J. Maclean The 1707 Union: Scots Law and. the House of Lords (1983) 4 Journal of
Legal History pp. 50 - 75.
165 See for example Smith v. Macneil (1814) 2 Dow 538; Hall v. Ross (1813) 1 Dow 201; Earl of
Seaforth v. Hume (1814) 2 Dow 338. Phillipson, op. cit. p. 128. A case could even have two trips
to London. See Tovey v. Lindsay 1 Dow 141; Wight v. Dicksons ibid 147; Hall v. Ross ibid. 211;
Tennant v. Herderson ibid. 336.
166 'Whether it would be for the utility of the Subjects within Scotland, That Jury Trial should
be introduced into the proceedings before the Court of Session, and in what proceedings; and
in what manner and form the same can be most usefully established' Third Report P.P. 1810
p. 59 ff.
167 dated 1 May 1810.
168 P.P. x 1810, p. 59.
169 Third Report P.P. 1810, x p. 59.
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In the end, as a result of the difference of opinion among the Commissioners, they
felt unable to report.170
On the death of Robert Blair in 1811, Charles Hope, the ingenious thinker whose
views we have already touched upon, became the new Lord President. The pressure
for jury trial was to be stepped up in the next three years. At the end of the House of
Lords Session of 1814, Eldon and Sir William Grant MR consulted with the heads of
Court and the leading Scottish Whigs and agreed upon principles for the
introduction of civil jury trial. A Bill introduced by Eldon171 providing for the Court
of Session to decide whether a cause should go to jury trial was opposed by a
Whiggish element in Scotland on the basis that jury trial should be compulsory in
certain classes of action. The bill was withdrawn and another was introduced by
Eldon, this time attracting the wrath of conservatives as being too akin to English
common law practice. With some degree of amendment, the bill became law as the
Jury Trials (Scotland) Act 1815.172 It was for the Court of Session to decide whether or
not a cause should be sent to the jury and whether the jury was to return a general
verdict or not. The types of cause to be sent were not enumerated, it being in the
discretion of the Court to decide whether it should be remitted. The experiment was
to lead to establishment of a Jury Court, headed by William Adam173 as Lord Chief
Commissioner with the second Lord Meadowbank and Lord Pitmilly as the two
Commissioners. By 1819 the experiment was judged to be a success and the Jury
170 'Considering the great difference of opinion amongst the Commissioners, on this
important subject, they are unable to report, with more decision, - Whether it would be or
would not be expedient at p [resent to introduce Trial by Jury into the proceedings of the
Court of Session.' Third Report P.P. 1810 x p.60
1711st December 1814.
172 55 Geo. III. (c. 42).
132
Court was made permanent by the Jury Trials (Scotland) Act 1819,174 now
enumerating particular causes which were to be remitted to the Jury Court; and in
1830 the Jury Court was assimilated into the Court of Session.
(xiii) The Effect of Jury Court on Written Pleading in the Court of
Session.
The new manner of determining matters of fact before a jury required new
procedural rules and these were introduced by A.S. 11th July 1815. They were
devised by Adam in consultation with the Lord President and the Lord Justice-Clerk
together with his new Commissioners Pitmilly and Meadowbank. The whole form of
process would now require a vehicle for determining 'issues' to be decided by the
jury in the event that the Court considered that the cause should go before it (and
after 1819 in the enumerated causes). Once a Division of the Inner House had
determined that the cause should go to civil jury trial it issued an interlocutor to the
Ordinary who sent it to the Clerk of the Jury Court. His role was to consult with the
appropriate Clerk of Session and the agents and counsel and to reduce the cause to
specific issues. These issues in draft were then to be returned to the Ordinary for his
approval before they were then passed by him back to the Inner House for final
approval by a second interlocutor. In all of this, the rules were designed so that the
judges could retain control over issues although the long and cumbersome process
became the subject of universal and constant complaint.175 The issues were to be
drafted from the record of the cause as a whole and not solely from the
173 Adam had had a hand in the creation of the Court from the time of Eldon's first approach
prior to the introduction of the first Bill. He was a member of the English and Scottish bars
(although had not practised in Scotland for twenty four years).
174 59 Geo III (c.35).
175 Phillipson, op. cit., p. 136 ff. Professor Walker follows Phillipson's treatment closely. See
Walker History op. cit. Vol. VI, pp. 323 ff.
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Condescendences and Answers176 and were to be presented to the jury in a series of
questions which could be answered yes or no.177
But a side benefit of drawing issues was that it at least demonstrated to agents and
advocates that it could be done, that is, the whole pleadings, at least in relation to
matters of fact, could be distilled into a series of simple questions and that the parties
were not precluded from advancing the matters of fact which they themselves
considered 'pertinent' to their cause. As Murray in the Introduction to the inaugural
Volume of his Jury Court Reports178 remarked
'The issues, extracted from the great mass of matter detailed in the pleadings
before the Court of Session, show the questions between the parties reduced
to a very small compass; while at the same time admit the proof of all the
facts and circumstances which either party may think necessary to sustain
their cause'.
The parties no longer required to address the mind of the judge in their pleadings: If
the issues of fact were to go before a jury in simple questions then there could be no
room for arguments about the probabilities of facts advanced by a party or his
aciversary nor whether all the facts having a bearing upon the case had been brought
forward in the pleadings. In any event, whilst pleadings in the form of
Condescendences and Answers addressed to a judge had this content, the rationale
for such arguments was removed as juries would never see the Condescendences
and Answers, nor any other parts of the pleading beyond the written issues.
Moreover, arguments about how the facts were to be proved were removed and
176 The approach favoured by Lord Meadowbank.
177 The questions were to be formulated as 'Whether
178 Introduction, Murray's Jury Court Reports, (Edinburgh, 1818) p. 10.
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evidence was not for the pleadings but now lay in the province of the jury. The issue
would determine what it was that was to be decided and all parties would know that
it was to be decided by the jury.
All of this was to effect a sea-change in the way jury case pleadings were to be
drawn, at least in those cases initially sent to the Jury Court, and later in the pleading
of enumerated causes. Parties would come to appreciate that in these circumstances
these parts of the pleading would be best served by intimating to an adversary what
the nature of the cause to be proved against him and thereby preventing
'embarrassment' and 'surprise.'179
Adam even devised a method of seeing the parties in chambers to discuss issues of
relevancy, 'bringing cases to a point' for the purposes of agreeing between them the
issues for the trial.180
The whole Jury Court experiment was, on the whole, a success. Between 22nd January
1816 and 24th February 1818, the Inner House had sent 115 causes for trial, of which
51 had been tried, 37 awaited trial and the remainder compromised or abandoned.181
The Lord President and the Lord Justice-Clerk were pleased with the result and the
Jury Court became a permanent feature a year later.
179 These were the conclusions of Joseph Murray, the editor of the Jury Court Reports and a
Jury Court clerk, in 1831 in his Introduction to Vol. V of his Jury Court Reports. Vol. v, p. x -
xii.
180 Evidence of Robert Forsyth to the Commissioners 1823, Commissioners Report 1824 (see
below), p.137. This approach he considered avoided 'the irritation of contradictory debate
about unascertained facts'.
181 Reports on the Jury Court, 1818 (P.P. 1818 x,) See Phillipson, op. cit. p. 139.
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However, the impetus for its creation, the House of Lords, was less pleased. The
Lords were still inundated with Scottish Appeals, albeit that there was a reduction in
the appeals on fact alone. By 1823 a Select Committee of the House of Lords
confirmed what the House already knew - that Scottish appeals were still forming a
disproportionate amount of their workload.182 If the House of Lords was to be
retained as the ultimate appellate court then the form of process would require to be
modified such that the House could dispose of Scottish appeals quickly.183 If this was
not implemented the Scottish legal profession would face a stark choice. Either the
jurisdiction would go or the Court would face the prospect of a forcible separation of
Scots Law into the English concepts of law and equity.184 Facing such a prospect, it
was resolved to appoint once again a Commission charged with inquiring into the
Form of Process in Scotland and the course of appeals to the House of Lords. The
Commission was appointed by 4 Geo. IV. (c.85)185 and on 29th July 1823 the
Commissioners were appointed.186 Its work would lead to the creation of the
structure of written pleading in the important 1825 Court of Session Act.
(xiv) The Work of the 1823 Commission.
'What! Put an end to written pleadings! Rob us of our business! Knock up
our profession! Substitute Turkish to Scots and English justice! Whence
182 Lords Journal vol. lv, pp. 644-5; 788-92: The House was 225 appeals in arrears and 151 of
them came from the Court of Session. Phillipson op. cit. p. 142.
183 see the statistics quoted by Rt. Hon. The Lord Hope of Craighead, 'Taking the Case to
London - Is it All Over?' The James Wood Lecture, given at the University of Glasgow,
February 1998. (Reproduced in (1998) 43 J.R. 135) at p. 138.
184 Phillipson op. cit. p. 143.
185 An Act for empowering Commissioners to be appointed bp His Majesty, to inquire into the Forms of
Process in the Courts of Law in Scotland, and the Court ofAppeals from the Court ofSession to the
House of Lords.
186 Headed by the Lord President, Lord Justice-Clerk and Chief Commissioner, the Lord
Advocate and the Deputy Keeper of the Signet.
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comes this man? From the Jacobin Club, or from St. Luke's?'
Jeremy Bentham187
The Commissioners had commenced their work by the autumn of the same year and
took as their starting point ascertaining the views of the certain members of the
Bench as weli as eminent members of tire profession. These views were expressed in
correspondence as Answers to Questions which had been posed by the
Commission.188
With regard to the 'Forms of Process and of Pleading in the Court of Session', the
Commissioners were given a detailed but difficult brief: -
'What alterations may be made in the forms of process and of pleadings in
the court of Session, with a view to secure, that in future, at the
commencement of a cause, there should be given to the court a more
accurate and distinct statement of the facts founded on by the pursuer, as
well as those alleged in defence? Whether a more frequent resort should be
had in that court to viva voce hearings, and whether a diminution of written
and printed pleadings may not be effected, as well as an abridgement of the
extent of each? And, what regulations may be enforced by legal enactment or
otherwise, tending to simplify and shorten the forms of proceedings, either
generally or in particular cases, in the Court of Session?'
187 Quoted by Peter Campbell, Objections to the Proposed Bill (etc.) (Edinburgh, 1825). See J.
Bentham, Scotch Reform, in J. Bowring, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (10 vols.), (1843). The
quote was Bentham's parody on the profession's all consuming concern for written
pleadings. Bentham himself thought that they were a 'licence for mendacity' and little better
than 'a labyrinth for harpies to burrow and fatten in upon the blood of the suitors' (J.
Bowring, The Works cit sup. vol. 5, p.24.)
188 Report of the Commissioners for inquiring into the Forms ofProcess, and Course ofAppeals,
Scotland. (P.P. 1824 x ) The Commissioners 'sent their Requisition to such of the Judges,
Members of the Faculty of Advocates, Writers to the Signet, and other persons, as they
thought best qualified to give information'. (Report of the Commissioners for inquiring into the
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(xv) The Written Evidence to the Commission.
The written evidence received by the Commission covered many of the problems in
the form of process and the methods used in drafting written pleadings examined
earlier in this chapter.
Much of the evidence reflected the profession's views that there was nothing much
wrong with the forms of process.189 The submission of Roger Aytoun W.S. was
typical:
But, in general I cannot conceive any system better aciapted for sifting of a
cause to the bottom, and preventing hasty pleadings and averments on the
part of the Bar, and rash decisions on the part of the Bench, than the forms of
process observed in the Court of Session These forms ... ought not to be
touched, but with a sparing hand, and under the most obvious dictates of
expediency and necessity.'190
The problems of delay arose because of the lack of enforcement of the rules by the
Court. But in reality, the conduct of litigation by this time had rendered summonses
and defences as mere opening gambits. It was only as the pleading ran its course that
the real issues between the parties would arise. Corrections or amendments to the
pleadings could, in practice, be made at any stage of the litigation and it was possible
forms ofprocess in the courts of law in Scotland and the course ofappeals from the Court ofSession to
the House of Lords, P.P., x) [Hereinafter Commissioners' Report, 1824] p.3
189 Reflecting the thesis previously expounded by Ilay Campbell during his tenure as Lord
President.
190 Answers by Roger Aytoun, Writer to the Signet, Commissioners' Report, 1824 p.41
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to introduce new facts into the papers right to the end of the litigation.191 The
procedure of the Court operated as a
'system, under which it was never too late, either to commit, or to correct, a
blunder.'192
anci this facility for correction and amendment permitted initial caution such
that one party would gingerly state his initial position, reserving his strong
points and concealing his weak points, simultaneously attempting to tease
out the position of his adversary. As the author of a text on the Form of
Process before the Court of Session explained:
'Both parties are aware, that, at almost every stage of a long litigation, the
ciefects, whether of their previous statements in point of fact, or of their
previous pleadings in point of law, may be corrected and supplied. Relying
on this, there is not unfrequently in the outset an inclination on either side
rather to withhold and keep in the back-ground many of the facts, in the
view of trying the adversary's strength, and of bringing out as far as possible
the important points on which his pleas are to be rested. ...Many actions are
brought, without either the pursuer or his advisers having formed any very
distinct idea how they are to be supported; and many defences, on the other
hand, are set up for no other reason than to procure delay, and because the
party does not find it convenient, at the moment, to give that consideration
to the matter in dispute, which is essential towards maturing it for judicial
decision. The important facts are afterwards dropt in as circumstances may
seem to require; former statements are at the same time retracted or
explained away; and thus, while the complexion of the case varies at every
turn, new questions in point of law are started, and sometimes a fresh source
191 Evidence of Daniel Fisher, SSC, Commissioners' Report, 1824 p. 116
192 Answers of Henry Cockburn, Commissioners' Report, 1824 p. 81 See also his Memorials
cit. 408 - 410
of litigation is opened up in the very last stage, and just when everything
seemed to have been brought to a conclusion. [In doing so] a party, before
finally committing himself, endeavours to fish out not only the case of his
adversary, but the leaning also of the Judge. 193
The summons and defences from the start were often incomprehensible, even to the
advocates194 instructed in the cause for each party.
'The Summons is generally framed in order to omit no possible medium
concludendi, so vaguely, and the Defences are so short and cautious, that even
Counsel for the parties themselves, cannot understand the case from these
papers, until a full Memorial or Brieve is laid before them by the Agent; and
even then the same caution is observed by the Counsel on both sides, and
unless the one party commits himself to the other, the first pleading does by
no means exhaust the cause. Hence the Lord Ordinary, in place of
pronouncing judgment, generally finds himself obliged to order mutual
Memorials in writing from the parties, or written Condescendences anci
Answers, so as to enable him rightly to understand the cause.195
Why were the initial pleadings of the parties so vague? It should be remembered that
the summons was drafted by agents, and was often hastily put together in order to
193 Answers of James Ivory, Advocate, Commissioners' Report, 1824 p. 148. He was particularly
interested in the form of process having produced his Form ofProcess before the Court ofSession
etc. in the previous decade. These views in his Answer here, were shared by the agents as
well. See the Report and Additional Report of The Society ofWriters to the Signet (etc.) (Edinburgh,
1824): 'Each party tells only a little which he must tell, in order to give a fair and plausible
appearance to his plea, and carefully conceals what may bear in favour of his adversary. Nor
is any censure imputable to the parties for adopting such a line of conduct, so long as the
forms of process are so constructed that to act otherwise would often be folly, rather than
candour; for such it would be voluntarily to open up the weak points of the cause to the
adversary, from whom a similar disclosure cannot, at that stage at least, be exacted.' pp.24-5.
194 It should be remembered that counsel did not draw the Summons and rarely the defences
and was brought in after the cause was up and running. Robert Forsyth, estimated that in 99
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beat the expiry of a prescriptive period or to found diligence.196 Thus, admissions in
defences would not be proffered in early course until the pursuer's position was
established, as there would be little point in full disclosure of the defender's position
until the pursuer had formulated his in greater detail. So it was only at the point of
the debate before the Ordinary that further information would be provided to
Counsel and thus to the Court.
The Defence, in most cases, is very general, giving as little information to the
other party as possible. In most cases, therefore, the Summons and Defences
do not give the information necessary to enable the Counsel to debate the
cause. It is accordingly the duty of the Agents to prepare full statements for
Counsel previous to the debate, and, in these statements, to give all the
information of which they are then possessed. At the debate which takes
place, the Counsel state the case according to the information they have
respectively received, and then, for the first time, the legal advisers of the
parties come to know, generally, the grounds on which the action is likely to
be maintained and defended.197
It was also important to keep in mind which particular Ordinary the case would
come before in its early passage through the Outer House as some would be more
disposed to pursuers than defenders, or some more lenient than others.
'It became often a matter of calculation, under the old arrangement, who the
Twelve or Thirteen Judges on the Bench might be, when a Petition was
cases in 100, the summons was drawn by the agent. Evidence of Robert Forsyth, Advocate
Commissioners' Report, 1824 p. 135.
195 Answers by Roger Aytoun, Writer to the Signet, Commissioners' Report, 1824, p.42.
196 Answers by Daniel Fisher, SSC: 'the great anxiety is to get the Summons speedily executed,
in order that it may come as early as possible into Court. If Letters of Inhibition and
Arrestment are to be used on the dependence, which is often the case, this is an additional
reason for the Summons being hurriedly issued.' (p.117) See also Answers by Robert Forsyth,
Advocate Commissioners' Report, 1824 pp. 136-7.
197 Answers by David Cleghorn, Esq., W.S. Commissioners' Report, 1824 p.60.
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moved, and who [were] the Two or Three necessarily absent in the Outer
House, discharging their duty there as Ordinary...'198
Another reason for the careful selection of the Ordinary to decide the case was that
cases were very frequently decided upon their whole probability without any
enquiry into fact. A pursuer could speculate that one judge over another would be
more disposed to this at an early stage. Perhaps other judges would permit greater
latitude to the defenders in resisting a pursuer's claims, or be more likely to permit
condescendences and answers with revisals, or be more amenable to the correction
of mistakes and blunders in the pleadings, or open to the introduction of new
material to the point of the debate and beyond.
'Many of the cases contain statements of facts, made by the opposite parties,
and not acquiesced in, the decisions are pronounced on what the Judges
conclude to be the real circumstances of the case, and the law applicable to
these circumstances. But as, in general there has been no distinct admission
by the parties of their opposite averments, they mutually deny statements
made by the other, and their Counsel are entitled to point out those
differences, even in the last stages of the proceedings, before the Judges
decide on the last printed papers that have been submitted to them. From the
nature of these proceedings, great delay must necessarily take place before a
final decision is obtained ... The parties frequently create obstacles, merely
for the purposes of obtaining delay. These forms hold out a very great
temptation to persons unable, or unwilling, to perform their obligations, or
pay their just debts.'199
198 Answers of Thomas Beveridge, Commissioners' Report, 1824 p. 54. Beveridge was one of the
Assistants of the Depute Clerks of Session and would be the first to write a text on the Act
passed in 1825 viz. A Practical Treatise on the Forms ofProcess; containing The New Regulations
before the Court of Session, Inner-House, Outer-House etc., (2 vols.), (Edinburgh, 1826).
199 Evidence of David Cleghorn, Commissioners' Report, 1824 p. 60
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The most common types of action in the Court were actions for payment of debts.
Lord Cringletie, in a somewhat world weary fashion, gave the Commission an
account of his experience of these types of cases. It is worth quoting at length as it
provides in itself, an example, from the judicial perspective, of the types of problems
in the procedure already examined.
'In almost all cases, (for there are some exceptions) the pursuer comes
forward with a Summons, setting forth that the defender is in his debt,
conform to an account referred to, or a bill or bond, the substance of which is
referred to; and in some instances, the pursuer sets forth that the defender
owes him a definite sum, without specifying how the debt arose; the
conclusion is for a decree for payment of the sum libelled, with interest from
a specified period; and very often the conclusion is for a decree for the sum
libelled "deducting such partial payments as the defender can instruct."
This Summons is called in Court; and if the defender appear by his Agent, it
is given out to him to be seen, and sometimes all the writings on which the
pursuer means to found, are given out with the Summons. But this rarely
happens, as either from carelessness or design, documents are withheld, and
afterwards produced and pleaded on at the bar, without the defender having
an opportunity of seeing them The defender, after having a week to see the
Summons and Writings produced, if any be produced, generally returns a
Defence, which is an evasion, such as saying he denies the debt, or that he is
owing nothing to the pursuer, and rarely produces any writings with his
Defence ... The case is then called before the Lord Ordinary in the Outer
House. ... [In far more numerous classes200] the parties come before the Lord
200 i.e. in modern language 'more commonly'.
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Ordinary to plead their cause; papers not produced before, are brought
forward and founded on, and the defender or pursuer obtains leave to see
these. Thus time is lost by the pursuer, and gained by the defender, and lost
to the Judge and the whole expense of that pleading is uselessly lavished.
When the case is again heard parties differ in their statement of facts ; and all
that is obtained is an order by the Judge, that one or other of the parties, or
perhaps each, shall put in a Condescendence in terms of the Act of
Sederunt,201 which is a statement of the facts, without any sort of argument,
which he offers to prove. If one of the parties only puts in such a paper, the
other answers it, after which the cause is called before the Judge, when an
order is given to revise these pleadings mutually, which often requires
repeated orders to procure obedience. The same takes place where mutual
Condescendences are put in; and then either on hearing the cause, or
advising it at home, the Lord Ordinary either decides it on the facts stated
and admitted, or remits it to the Jury Court.'202
Even after the relative success of the Jury Court and its requirements for detailed
separate averments of fact, not rhetoric nor evidence, litigants still generally
preferred to persuade a judge of the probability of their positions in the pleadings by
incorporating averments of why their averments of facts should be preferred and the
evidence which could be led to support them, even in the face of the provisions of
the A.S. 1800 and 1810. The pleadings were
generally composed of a statement of facts, blended with a rhetorical
exposition of the motives and conduct of the parties, and misplaced
201 i.e. 1810.
202 Answers of Lord Cringletie, Commissioners' Repoi't, 1824 pp. 101-2.
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arguments upon their import, insomuch that it is often difficult not to lose
sight of the facts of a case, buried in this mass of pleading'.203
The reasons why this was so are examined below and in the next Chapter.
(xvi) The 1824 Commissioners' Report: A New Scheme for Written
Pleadings.
Following the evidence submitted to them, the Commissioners by 1824 had made
their proposals relative to the preparation of causes in the Court of Session.204
Ignoring the prodigious evidence in relation to the preparation of Summons and
Defences, and concentrating upon their brief, the commissioners started with the first
hearing before the Ordinary. Full disclosure of the respective averments in point of
fact and of the pleas to be deduced from them was to be the rule, and the rule, they
proposed should be enforced imperatively. All documents to be founded upon now
had to be produced along with the summons and the defences.205 After the hearing
on the summons and defences the Lord Ordinary required both parties to state
explicitly whether they held the summons and defences as containing their 'full and
final statement of the facts' and if so, the record was to be minuted to that effect,
signed by Counsel for both sides and would foreclose any new averment in point of
fact at any later stage. If the parties did not so agree, or if the Ordinary did not
consider the statements sufficiently distinct and explicit he was to order the pursuer
or defender as was the case, to give in, the one a condescendence and the other an
answer, or mutual condescendences from both, of the facts which they 'averred and
203 Answers of John Hay Forbes, Sheriff Depute Commissioners' Report, 1824 p. 128
204 We here concentrate solely on the form of process and the role of written pleadings within
the Report. As per their instruction the commissioners also reported on jury trial although
with inconclusive results.
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offered to prove' in support of the summons or defences. The form of
condescendence was to be as regulated by A.S. 7 February 1810 with the Lords
discharged to pay the 'strictest attention' to the enforcement of its terms. In addition,
each fact averred had to be reduced into the form of a 'positive and substantive
proposition' beginning with a 'set form of words such as The Pursuer, or Defender,
avers and offers to prove' instead of the more usual 'loose narrative style' - with the
same applying to answers.
Where Condescendences and Answers were ordered, revisal was to be allowed in all
cases 'in order finally to adjust' averments, delete averments or to make admissions,
as appropriate. The time allowed to lodge the condescendence and answers was to
be fixed 'on due consideration of the of the circumstances' and not extended or
prorogated unless 'special cause was shewn'.
Once the averments in point of fact had been thus settled, the pleas on which the
parties meant to rely, were then to be set forth. Following a similar procedure as with
averments of facts the parties would be called upon to state whether their respective
statements likewise contained for the one the pleas and grounds of action and for the
other the defence in point of law; and where the parties did not so agree, the Court
would then order them to give in short and concise notes, signed by their Counsel
'stating in the shape of distinct and separate propositions, the pleas or matter of law'
which they were respectively to maintain, 'unaccompanied by any argument; but
with a brief citation (by mere reference to the names, pages, chapters, sections &c.) of
the authorities relied upon.' The orders for giving in such notes was to be strictly
enforced. On completion of the above stages, the cause was then to be enrolled
205 with the power to order diligence for recovery of documents on 'cause shewn'.
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before the Lord Ordinary for the purpose of the record being finally made up, and
the cause was to be disposed of by such order or judgment as the Lord Ordinary
thought the shape and nature of the case would require, but before doing so the Lord
Ordinary would finally close the record by authenticating with his signature the
adjusted condescendences, or condescendences and answers and relative note of
pleas.
The Commissioners proposed that the decision of the Ordinary on the merits would
be final, (i.e. no representations) and no reclaiming petition would be competent
against the interlocutors of the Ordinary in the preparation of the cause. But on a
note within a certain short time, desiring review of any such interlocutor or order,
reclaiming was possible but with power to the Ordinary to supersede making such a
report till the preparation of the cause was 'farther proceeded in or completed'.
The Orciinary was to be expressly provided with powers to suggest to the parties any
improvements in the pleadings or new pleas in law which occurred to him to be
relevant to the cause.
When the record was completed and closeci by judge's signature, the revised
condescendence and answer was to be held as the final record, foreclosing the parties
as to averments in point of fact; and no further amendment of the libel would be
allowed, after authentication by the Judge. The one and only exception to this was if
a matter of fact had emerged noviter veniens ad notiam but only with the permission of
the Ordinary or the Court, by means of a special application for leave to state such
facts, which could be allowed subject to expenses.
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The Note of pleas authenticated as before was to be held as the record of the grounds
in law to which the future arguments of the parties were to be restrained.
The commissioners proposed that the first or preliminary stage of the proceedings
would terminate at this point. The averments of the parties in matter of fact and their
pleas in matter of law, being fully disclosed and adjusted, the cause would be ready
for further discussion and the Ordinary would then either decide the cause upon the
admissions of the parties, or order the facts to be ascertained by jury trial, or do
otherwise as to him seemed most just and expedient. Discretion would be left to the
Ordinary to (i) take time to consider the record and thereafter pronounce his
judgment or (ii) order a further hearing, or (iii) order (if expedient) Cases in writing
to be prepared and lodged by the parties, and to be seen, interchanged and finally
adjusted between them, so that arguments in point of law met each other. When
cases were lodged, the Ordinary could still call the parties again to the bar and give
them an opportunity of being further heard before pronouncing sentence. Every
judgment of the Ordinary on the merits of the cause was to be accompanied by a
special finding with respect to the matter of expenses, giving or refusing them in
whole or in part.206
(xvii) The 1824 Bill.
The Commissioners' Report formed the basis for the 1824 Bill. Drafting the Bill was
entrusted to one of the Commissioners, G.J. Bell, but it was not to have an easy
passage. It was presented in 1824 and attracted criticism from all quarters.207
206 p. 9.
207 The WS Society, (Report and Additional Report to The Society ofWriters to the Signet, by a
Committee appointed to consider (etc.) approved and adopted as the Resolutions of the Society ... on
15"' and 22"d November 1824' (Edinburgh, 1824), the SSC Society, the noblemen, freeholders,
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Cockburn, with his usual drama, wrote that the air was darkened with 'all the flights
of pamphlets'208 and as well as the professional bodies, there were many pamphlets
from individuals, often published anonymously.209
The Faculty in particular were vehement in their criticism of the Bill. They appointed
a Committee under the Convenorship of John Hay Forbes210 which reported on 17th
August 1824 and which was approved in whole by the Faculty. The Report211 was a
root and branch attack on the Bill which had been drafted under Bell's supervision.
They attacked the language of the Bill which they considered departed from
'technical accuracy, leaving room for much doubt and discussion as to what ought to
be the form of procedure in Court.'212 For the Faculty, litigation was best left in hands
of the parties and their advisers.
'Let parties conduct their cause in the manner they think best. It is no part of
the business of the Judge to do more than to decide the case which the
parties present to him ... Your Committee cannot help thinking that it may
be doubted whether the Lord Ordinary can know what is the proper
statement of facts so well as the parties, and that it will be more expedient to
leave the conduct of a cause in these respects with the parties themselves.'213
JPs and Commissioners of Supply of the County of Edinburgh all presented petitions to the
House of Lords (House of Lords Journals, Vol. 56, (1824), pp. 396, 405, 428); and along with the
magistrates, Town Council of the Royal Burgh of Irvine, the Dean of the Faculty of Advocates
and the Clerks of HM Signet, they presented petitions to the House of Commons (House of
Commons Journals, Vol. 79 (1824), p. 507).
208 Memorials, op. cit. pp. 409-10.
209 See for example, (Peter Campbell) [The Author]: Objections to the Proposed Bill (etc.) and
Suggestions for Remodelling the Bill or Framing Another (Edinburgh, 1825).
210 who, it will be recalled had given evidence to the Commission and was, following the
passing of the Act, to be elevated to the Bench with the collective judicial responsibility for
enforcing the new provisions. See Phillipson, op. cit. 156-7.
211 Report of The Committee of the Faculty ofAdvocates Appointed to Consider a Bill, Entituled, 'An
Act for the Better Regulating of the Forms ofProcess in the Courts ofLaw in Scotland, (Edinburgh,
1824).
212 Faculty Report, p. 3.
213 Faculty Report, p. 6.
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Being forced to state pleas 'in initio litis' would occasion delay, expense and
embarrassment.214 For it to be competent for the Judge to add pleas to Notes of pleas,
was, for them, anathema.215
The Lord Ordinary's judgment in the Outer House as final also discomforted the
Faculty.216 Without a power of review, in their opinion, it could
'induce an indolent Judge (si fas sit dicere) not to study the cases beforehand,
trusting to the discussion by counsel which he must listen to; while a Judge
who reads and studies the cases will probably make up his mind on the
cause before hearing the counsel.' 217
Written pleading, they argued, was the better method of proceeding in the course of
litigation.218 It was of grave concern to them that a cause could be decided without
any written pleadings at all.
'For if no cases have been ordered in the Outer House, it is not imperative in
the Inner House to order cases, power only being given to that effect: so that
a cause may go to the House of Lords without having ever been discussed in
a written argument. Now this appears by far too great and too sudden a
214 Faculty Report, p.7
215 In previous practice the Ordinary was empowered to suggest pleas which if inserted
would be considered relevant, but by this time, the content of the pleading was firmly in the
control of the advocates and the power was rarely exercised.
216 pointing to the power of review being competent in the Roman Code, being part of the
judicial code in France, the Netherlands, in Savoy and Piedmont and 'probably every country
of Continental Europe adopting the Roman Code' including the Parliament of Paris. (Faculty
Report, pp. 13-15) See Bell's criticism and refutation of this in Examination, (cit. below) at pp.
105,108.
217 ibid. This concern was to exercise the Faculty for the next fifty years.
218 'an argument is never so thoroughly and surely sifted as in writing ... besides affording
the utmost certainty to the parties that their cause has been well and anxiously pleaded, is
often most valuable in maturing the doctrines of the law, or in bringing it back to its true
principles ...' Faculty Report, p. 18.
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departure from the system which the Country, the Judges, and the Bar have
been so long accustomed'.219
Under fire, Bell wrote his excellent 'Examination of the Objections Stated Against the
Bill/220 answering every point made against the Bill by the Faculty.221 He stingingly
concluded that the Committee of the Faculty, in framing the Report, had been
motivated, 'if possible, to defeat the reformation proposed, in the most prominent
and useful points.'
Although Bell in his Examination was technically correct in all his assertions anci
particularly strong in his refutations of the Faculty's arguments against the Bill, and
whilst the piece was so good it deserved a higher prominence than it received,
nevertheless his writing so provoked the Faculty and the profession in general that a
sacrifice was called for anci it was Bell himself who was put upon the altar. Further
drafting and refining of the Bill was removed from him. The task of drawing up the
second and final bill was entrusted to the Lord Advocate,222 although it followed
closely the Commissioners' recommendations. The Bill was passed and the 1825 'Act
for better regulating of the Forms of Process in the Courts of Law in Scotland'
(colloquially known as the Judicature Act and later as the Court of Session Act 1825)
became law on 5th July 1825.
219 Faculty Report, p. 19.
220 (Edinburgh, 1825).
221 as well as the WS. C.f. Faculty's Riposte - Remarks on the Report of the Committee of the
Faculty ofAdvocates, appointed to consider the Provisions of the Bill for the Better Regulation of the
Process of the Courts of Law in Scotland (London, 1825).
222 For the sad story of Bell's fall from grace, see Phillipson, op. cit. pp. 156-7.
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(xviii) Conclusion.
At the end of the eighteenth century, whilst Edinburgh was enjoying what was to be
its Golden Years of the Enlightenment, the sorry state of its supreme court with its
antiquated civilian based procedure, the increasing backlog of business and the
numerous appeals to the House of Lords had been the catalyst which had prompted
the early attempts to implement jury trial, which in turn had so touched the
sensitivities of the Scots lawyers. The old civilian concepts of lengthy presentation of
parties' pleadings in writing and the facility for repeatedly bringing matters before
the judges for review and rehearing (and thus it was never to late to commit and
correct mistakes) were ill suited for a court compelled to change. The separation of
fact and law and restriction in pleading in writing had been the goals and much of
the thinking which would inform subsequent changes to the procedure and manifest
itself in the Court of Session Act 1825 had already been completed twenty years
before. The Act introduced Scots civil procedure to the institution of the 'closed
record' which has continued to be a part of procedure ever since. The work of the
1824 Commissioners was translated into many of the provisions of the Act, but
whilst the Act was in parts novel and innovative, the reaction of the profession at its
implementation was to push Scot law away from the intended direction.
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Chapter Three
The Development of the 'Form of Process', and the Role and
Rules of Written Pleadings.
(i) Introduction
In continuing to chart and analyse the modern development of written pleadings in
Scottish civil procedure we might again ask the second question posed in the
Introduction - how was it that written pleadings and the rules of written pleadings
arose? Very simplistically, the answers lie in the development of procedure in the
Court of Session in the nineteenth century following the 1825 and the 1850 Court of
Session Acts. There has been no recent assessment of this development1, although
the practice books and modernwriting on written pleading all contain the 'rules'
and cite cases from this period as authority for propositions therein stated. It is
generally accepted that written pleadings as a system originated in the Court of
Session Act 1825 and whilst this is true, it does not present the whole picture.
It is submitted that it is not generally understood why the rules of written pleading
developed as they did nor the reasons for what was to be an erosion of the 1825
statutory scheme. The following is excerpted from the recent Report by the Working
Party on Court ofSession Procedure (Chaired by Rt. Hon. Lord Coulsfield) (Edinburgh,
2000).
1 Lord Cullen and the Working Party under Lord Coulsfield both touched on the topic. See
The (then) Lion. Lord Cullen, Review of the Business of the Outer House of the Court ofSession.
(Scottish Courts Administration, Edinburgh, 1996) Chapter 4, pp. 25ff., and Report by Working
Party on Court ofSession Procedure (Chaired by Rt. Hon. Lord Coulsfield) (Edinburgh, 2000),
Chapter 6. MacKenzie, 'Written Pleadings' (2003) Chapter 2 contains what is described as a
'Historical Background' but the treatment there is rather light, and does not attempt an
analysis of how the rules of written pleading developed in the period.
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'In its early stages,2 the reformed procedure was very much under the
control of the court... what was being done seems to have been very close to
what is now called case management, of a detailed kind... There are a
number of matters in relation to the development of the pleadings from 1850
onwards which are not entirely clear. It is not clear precisely why the case
management system ... was departed from... It is also not clear how far the
injunctions that the pleadings should be brief, and confined to the necessary
minimum matters of fact, were observed in practice...A third point which is
not entirely clear is why the pleadings began to be elaborated...'
We will examine the modern rules of written pleading in the next chapter. Whilst
many of the rules, practices and conventions of modern practice have their genesis
and origin in the period 1825 onwards, in what follows, an attempt is made to trace
the development of written pleadings from 1825 onwards to the end of the century
and, in doing so, to clarify some of the points raised above in the Coulsfield report.
In the period, it is important to appreciate that the development of what became the
'rules' of written pleadings was incremental. During this time, the body of rules
regulating written pleadings arose from two sources: first, the terms of the statutory
provisions augmented by acts of sederunt made by the Court and secondly, their
practical operation through decided cases. At the time, whilst Cockburn described
the Act as 'invaluable',3 for many, the changes were almost revolutionary, despite
the fact that in some places the changes merely incorporated previous rules which
had fallen into desuetude or, at least, perennial non-observance. The 1825 Act and
the ensuing acts of sederunt all contained ideas which had been floating around
2 viz. after 1825
3 H. Cockburn, Memorials ofHis Time, (Edinburgh, 1856) p. 409.
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since the start of the century.4 In particular, the manner of coercing parties to join
issue on disputed fact and the Court's attempt to keep separate fact and law, had
had their genesis in the previous period.
With the reforms, the old manner of presenting written pleadings was supposed to
be consigned to history. What actually happened was that the new system was
modified by practice and slowly some of the former practices crept back in. That is
not to say, however, that the new system was abandoned or transmogrified into the
system of old.
It is important to stress that it was attempts by practitioners to avoid the peremptory
requirements of the provisions, in the best interests of their clients as opposed to any
pre-conceived notion of overturning the new order (albeit such a recourse was often
considered to be in those best interests) as well as the Court's acquiescence in this,
which resulted in the incremental development of the procedure of the Court from
which emerged what we would now term 'rules' of written pleading. A reading of
any of the works on practice of the initial period 1825 - 1849 might suggest that the
new system worked well and that a cause could proceed efficaciously through the
Court, but any such suggestion would be far off the mark. The profession, for
reasons explored below, made repeated and concerted efforts to revert to the style
and practice of the earlier period.
The century was to see another two statutes directly affecting written pleadings,5
and two occasions when radical and far-reaching proposals for written pleadings got
4 JE. J. G. Mackay, 'A Sketch of the History ofScots Laiv' 1882 (26) Journal of Jurisprudence (in 2
parts) 113; 225 at p. 233
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as far as Bills but were ultimately abandoned.6 There were also various statutes
passed affecting the Court,7 as well as copious acts of sederunt. The century was to
see another two Royal Commissions8 directed inter alia to examine written pleading.
In both cases, whilst the Reports9 produced were disappointing,10 the evidence
received by both Commissions provides a fertile source for assessing what was
happening in practice regarding the form of process and the use of written pleadings
at these times.
In later chapters, we consider the modern rules of written pleading and thereafter
evaluate their continuing role, examining how they operate in the modern era. From
this we may draw conclusions as to how changes to civil procedure are
implemented, why these changes often produce unexpected results, and how, in
time, they become altered by practice. For the present, it may be suggested that
changes to civil procedure and the methods of pleading before the Court of Session
have always been corrupted by their practical operation. Thus, for example, the acts
of sederunt of the previous period were initially obtempered, and thereafter
irregularly followed until they were not actually followed in practice at all.
5 Court of Session Act 1850, Court of Session Act 1868.
6 In 1848 and 1863.
7 Notably Court of Session Act 1830 abolishing the Jury Court and fusing its jurisdiction with
the Court of Session.
8 First Report Front His Majesty's Law Commissioners, Scotland. (Pursuant to Address 9"' May
1834) 12"' May 1834 (P.P. xxvi 1834) (PLC. 295) (London, 1834) Second Report From His
Majesty's Law Commissioners, Scotland. Presented to both Houses ofParliament by His Majesty's
Command (P.P. 1835) (London, 1835) First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Reports of the
Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Courts ofLaw in Scotland (P.P., Edinburgh, 1868-71)
viz. 1868-9JC.4125]; [C.4188] xxv 29 & 423; 1870 [C.36]; [C.175 & 175-1] xviii, 455 and 511; 1871
[C.260] xx 257.
9 First Report of the Commission op. cit. (1834) and Report of the Commission (1871).
10 Lord Gill has commented that 'throughout all of the evidence tendered to these
Commissioners, there was no radical proposal which in any way challenged the basic
preconceptions of the system', 'The Case for a Civil Justice Review.' 1995 40 J.L.S.S. 129 at p.
132.
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Provisions of the Court of Session Act 1825 and its satellite acts of sederunt suffered
the same fate.
The following consideration of the development of written pleadings and the 'form
of process' will spotlight three themes which will be explored later. The first is the
importance of the reception given to changes to the 'form of process' and written
pleadings by the users - litigants, and their solicitors and counsel. It is a basic truth
that changes in civil procedure affect litigants and following such changes, their
cases must be handled in a new way. But the handling is done by specialised legal
advisers and if they deem the changes to be detrimental or prejudicial to their
client's interests, at least compared to the prior practice, then it is human nature to
attempt to revert to that prior practice. If the changes are welcomed, then they are
more likely to continue to be applied. It is suggested that it all depends upon
whether the changes are generally adhered to. Related to this, the second theme
explores how those charged with the judicial responsibility for enforcing such
changes react to attempts to revert to prior practice. Again historically, the
provisions of acts of sederunt were clearly not enforced by the judges as time passed.
Courts can provide solutions or remedies or alternative anci innovative procedures
but it is the users and those charged with enforcement who ultimately determine
their future course. In the period under consideration, parties increasingly used the
developing rules of pleading against their opponents to their own advantage and the
judges generally did not exercise statutory powers vested in them to act in a manner
which might now be termed 'pro-active' or 'interventionist'. Thirdly, changes to the
permitted methods of leading evidence anci the development of the law of evidence,
led to changes in litigants' preferred choice for the final disposal of actions. Proof by
commission was removed, jury trial became unpopular and proof before the
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Ordinary became, following the 1850 Act, the Conjugal Rights (Scotland)
Amendment Act 186111 and the Evidence (Scotland) Act 186612 the preferred choice
for taking proof. These changes to the methods available for proving averments led
to changes in how pleadings were presented.
Before examining the development of the form of process in this period and the role
and rules of written pleading, there are two further points which should be noted.
First, the threat of wholesale incorporation of the styles and terminology of English
civil procedure was never far away,13 particularly around the late 1850s and early
1860s when the common law procedure ofWestminster Hall was frequently cited as
a viable alternative to traditional Scottish methods. In the event, English concepts in
pleading were borrowed and succeeded more often than might be appreciated. Even
in the literature, English pleading terms crept into usage.14 'Confession and
avoidance' could be equated with the Scots pleading of an exception, and
'traversing' associated with a denial and explanation by statement of facts. The plea
to the relevancy was frequently associated with the English common law plea of
demurrer, or demurrer on a declaration,15 which association caused problems for,
and some dubious decisions in Scottish appeals to, the House of Lords.16 Jury trial
practice continued to innovate on the traditional forms of process and it was not




13 e.g. see M'GIashan's reproduction of long passages from Stephen on Pleading. M'Glashan,
Practical Notes, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, 1842) pp. 273-4.
14 M'Glashan considered that comparison of the English and Scottish system of pleadings was
'not without advantage'. M'Glashan Practical Notes op. cit. p. 273.
15 the English equivalent of a libel.
16 See Chapter 5 infra and discussion below.
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Secondly, the revisions to the method of pleading in writing and the new emphasis
on viva voce pleading resulted in a decrease in the use, citation and quotation of the
old Civilian texts and authorities.17 This was apparent in the years following the 1825
Act, but their citation had lived on in the 'written cases' or 'minutes of debate'
procedure. Section 14 of the Court of Session Act 1850 sounded the death knell for
this kind of pleading in writing before the Ordinary: It provided
'that it shall not be competent to the Lord Ordinary to direct cases or
minutes of debate,18 or other written argument, to be prepared by the parties
whether for the use of himself or the inner house.'
Seven years later the Council of the SSC Society reminisced about the old written
minutes or cases concluding that they had formed 'a permanent source of legal
knowledge of the greatest value'19 and a year later, an editorial in the Journal of
Jurisprudence concluded that Taw learning' in Scotland had suffered as a result:
'[There is a] total disappearance of anything like general learning in the
mode in which cases are handled. Pothier, and Voet, and Vinnius, and the
Corpus Juris and all the familiar works of ancient days, occur no more.
Listen to the best speeches in the court, and you hear nothing in the shape of
17 T.B. Smith remarked in his 1963 Hamlyn Lecture that, 'one interesting indirect consequence
[of oral pleading was] ... the virtual disappearance of citation from the Corpus Juris of
Justinian or of the learned Civilians such as Voet and Heineccius' T.B. Smith, British Justice :
The Scottish Contribution, Hamlyn Lectures, 1963 p.76.
18 As explored in Chapter 2, in pre-1825 practice, the Ordinary could order 'Minutes of
Debate' after the discussion or debate on the summons and defences and latterly the
condescendence and answers. They tended to be rhetorical, argumentative and florid
expositions of each party's case on the merits and sought to persuade the Ordinary to decide
in the client's favour without proof, i.e. on the probability of the truth of the pleadings. This
writ was retained in the 1825 Act (s.l6) under the appellation 'written case.' By the 1840s both
terms were used indiscriminately, although strictly, in 'shorter or less important questions'
they were called minutes of debate. Shand, op. cit. p. 339.
19 Report of the Council of the Society ofSolicitors before the Supreme Courts ofScotland (1857) [repr.
in part, in:] Business of the Court of Session (1857) 1 Journal of Jurisprudence 274 at 275.
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reference to authority, but quotation of a speech yesterday delivered, in all
probability by the judge to whom the address is made. The speeches are
admirable ad captandum20 addresses upon the special case without any
reference to those general principles of jurisprudence...Open the Corpus
Juris at the present day, before any of the Supreme Courts of Scotland, and
you are immediately met with the sneer, that your case must be bad indeed,
when it requires such authority. Even the sound sense of Pothier, and the
practical sagacity of Voet can no longer command the respectful attention
with which they were listened to of yore. Craig is worse than an old
almanac; Stair even is antiquated.'21
And the editor admonished his readers that the final abolition of traditional pleading
in writing
'must necessarily end in rendering our law narrow, contracted, technical,
and provincial. It will take away from it its great characteristic of being a
code the least encrusted with technicalities, which has existed among the
European nations since the fall of the Roman Empire.22
It is not the place here to discuss the 'de-civilisation' of Scots Law and its drift23
towards English law in the mid to late nineteenth century24 but it seems apparent
20 tr. 'for the purposes of
21 Anon., 'The Abolition ofWritten Pleading. Decline of Law Learning in Scotland', Journal of
Jurisprudence (2) 1858 p. 49 at pp. 49-50. This article seems to have been the source for Crabb
Watt's descriptions of the period in his John Inglis... A Memoir, op. cit. p. 55. In fact the Journal
of Jurisprudence seems to have offered him rich pickings for his biography, to the point that
it is in places plagiaristic. Paradoxically, it is Crabb Watt's work rather than the original
articles which has come to be cited in the literature. See for an example A. Stewart, 'The
Session Papers in the Advocates Library' in H.L. MacQueen (ed.), 'Miscellany Four' (Stair Soc.,
Edinburgh, 2002) 199 at 216.
22 ibid. p. 52.
23 See R. Evans-Jones, 'Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth of the Genius
of Scots Private Law', 114 (1998) L.Q.R. 228.
24 This whole area is complicated and distinctions can be drawn between what was an
ongoing reception of the civil law and its use thereafter as authority in the Courts. However,
simply put, the following elements had a bearing on the decreasing use of civil law: fewer
Scottish advocates were being educated on the Continent, the increase of case law as
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that the neglect of the old Civilian texts had largely occurred by the early to mid
nineteenth century25 and this was in part caused by the alterations in pleading
required by the 1825 and 1850 Acts. Theoretically, it might have been supposed that
counsel could have continued to make use of such authority in oral submission, but
it seems that they were reluctant to do so as the 'Latin and French were orally
different'26 to citations in minutes of debate.
All of this would fit with Lord Rodger's thesis, based on the observations of Lord
Watson between 1851 to 1883, that it was about 1858 that the Court of Session, under
Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis, started to welcome the citation of English authorities.27
There is another, perhaps more mundane explanation for this decrease in oral
citation of civilian authority. As we shall observe, the time permitted by the Court to
counsel, to expound their positions on record, was very frequently circumscribed.
(ii) The Scheme of the 1825 Act and the New Judicial Duties.
The Court of Session Act 1825 received Royal Assent on 5 July 1825 and a number of
acts of sederunt followed, the most important being A.S. 29 November 1825 and A.S.
11 July 1828. The Act and the A.S. 29 November 1825 followed closely the
Commissioners' recommendations. Fact and law were now to be separated and kept
precedent, contemporary interest in English law from the Union onwards, and the
assimilation of laws regulating matters of commerce as well as here discussed, the changes in
written and oral pleading.
25 It was certainly about this time. Alan [Lord] Rodger, has placed it in this period ('Thinking
About Scots Law' 1996 Edinburgh Law Review p. 3 at p. 14), T.B. Smith, A Short Commentary
on the Law ofScotland, (Edinburgh, 1962) 'in the nineteenth century' at 23-4, and Professor
Cairns, 'by 1832', (History ofPrivate Law, op. cit.) vol. I, p. 177. Robin Evans-Jones has
suggested that it was exposure of the 'weak' legal Scottish system to the 'strong' English one
which effected reception. R. Evans-Jones, 'Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the
Myth of the Genius of Scots Private Law' (1998) LQR 228.
26 The Abolition ofWritten Pleading, op. cit., p. 51.
27 Alan [Lord] Rodger, 'Thinking About Scots Law' cit sup. p. 16.
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apart to the point of disposal of the cause. The Judges were provided with statutory
powers to force practitioners to do so. It was now actually illegal to hear debates
until the precise issues of law and fact had been determined and pleaded,28 and a
cause could theoretically proceed to a conclusion on viva voce pleading alone.
Written pleading was to be used sparingly and, where it was permitted, it had to be
in conformity with the provisions, spirit and intention of the new Act.
There were few carrots and many sticks to enforce the profession to 'play ball'. The
new form of process was peppered with sanctions for default and conferred on the
Ordinaries considerable powers to force compliance.29
Briefly, the scheme was as follows.30 The summons continued in its usual form and
there was little change in the preliminaries of signeting, citation, service and calling.
28 Phillipson, op. cit. p. 147.
29 The main sanction was that of expenses, a topic which had figured prominently in the
submissions made to the commissioners in 1824. Arguments about expenses were to cause a
flood of satellite litigation. Historically, expenses as a sanction had operated in the Court of
Session on a more informal basis. The 23rd Article of the Regulations 1695 had provided that
'where a bill was groundless, or in its length superfluous and litigious', the Court was to 'fine
the Advocate subscriber and party in such a pecuniary mulct, to be instantly paid, as they
shall judge reasonable' and at the conclusion of causes, where a party's conduct in his
prosecution of the cause had resulted in 'expences and damage' to the other party, that party
could apply to the Lords, whereupon the Court could 'decern for' these expenses, or where
they were considered extravagant, 'tax and modify' them. A.S. 6 February 1806 had formally
regulated the amounts of expenses of judicial proceedings in the Court of Session and by
1809 President Campbell (Sketch ofa Report (1809) op. cit.) could note that 'allowance of
further parts of procedure '[werej'seldom allowed without a previous payment into the
clerk's hands of so much money to account of the other party's expences, as the delay of
giving timeous and sufficient information, must generally arise from the negligence or undue
conduct either of the party himself, or of those who conduct his case'. A year later, the
Second Report of the Commissioners 1810 reported 'that is it the province of the Judges to
settle Accompts of Expences, or to give Costs of Suit in such cases and in such manner as they
shall think proper, either by fixing the amount in the special case before them, or by laying
down general rules for taxing Accompts.' In the first three years of Shaw's Reports, 26 cases
dealing solely with expenses are reported and by 1833, it was 'usual to conclude for expenses
in the summons' (Darling, Practice op. cit. pp.139-40).
301 have restricted this to the parts of the Act relating to the preparation of the parties'
pleadings to the point of the record being closed. I have included the provisions of A.S. 11
July 1828 although it should be stressed that the A.S. was issued to correct practices which
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Where defences were lodgeci containing dilatory defences, the Lord Ordinary's first
duty was to dispose of them, by sustaining or repelling those dilatory defences,31
thereafter examining the accuracy of the summons and defences upon the merits.
In the summons, the pursuer was required to set forth, in 'explicit'32 terms, 'the
nature, extent, and grounds of the complaint or cause of action and the conclusions
which, according to the form of the particular action, the said pursuer or pursuers
shall, by the law and practice of Scotland be entitled to deduce therefrom'33 and in
like manner the defenders in their defences were required to state, in explicit terms,
'every defence, both dilatory and peremptory, on which he or they means to rely' in
particular, meeting the 'statement of facts and the conclusions deduced from them in
the pursuer's summons either by denying the facts therein stated, or by admitting
the same, and in answer setting forth in explicit terms, the facts on which the said
defender or defenders found', subjoining a summary of the pleas in law which were
to be maintained by the defender(s).34
had emerged from the practical operation of the new form of process. Revisal of the
pleadings is dealt with below.
31 subject to reclaiming. Beveridge, op. cit., p. 295-7.
32 In the bill, it had been 'positive'. The Act significantly tightened the language in this
regard. The Bill had narrated that the pursuer would 'set forth, in positive terms, the nature,
extent, and grounds of the demand therein made, and the conclusions which, according to
the form of the particular action/ he 'shall, by the law and practice of Scotland, be entitled to
deduce,' and in like manner, 'the defender and defenders shall, in the defences, state every
defence, both dilatory and peremptory, on which he means to rely; and shall, in particular,
meet the statements of facts, and the conclusions deduced from them, in the pursuer's
summons, either by denying the facts therein stated, or by admitting the same; and, in
answer, setting forth, in positive terms, the facts on which the said defender or defenders
mean to rely, subjoining a summary of the exceptions or defences, in point of law, which are
to be maintained.' (emphasised passages were altered) See James Fergusson, Advocate,
Observations Upon the Provisions of the Bill Presented to Parliament Relative to the Trial in a
Separate Tribunal of Issues ofFact arising in Actions Instituted Before the Supreme Civil Court of
Scotland (Edinburgh, 1824) p. 28.
33 s. 2 1825 Act.
34 ibid. s. 9 of the 1828 A.S. required the pleas to be 'short and concise' and 'without
argument.'
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The pursuer's 'explicit' terms in his summons were to be met by admission or denial
although the defender could also provide a separate statement of the facts founded
upon by him in his defence.
By section 3, the parties were required to produce the deeds or writing on which
they respectively founded.
The record was to be the focal document for the determination of any further
procedure. Now, neither the Lord Ordinary, nor the Court, could proceed to give
judgment until the 'respective averments of the parties in fact, and their pleas in
matter of law' had been set forth on the record, the record made up and
authenticated. Most importantly, parties would now be barred from advancing any
further averment of fact at the point that the record was closed. Initially the import
of this was not fully appreciated. If the record contained all the matters of fact upon
which parties could adduce evicience, where proof of fact proceeded as a jury trial,35
there could be discussion at the point of framing issues as to the scope of proof. But
later, when the common methods of adducing evidence came to be in proof or proof
before answer before the Ordinary, the inter-relationship between pleadings and
proof required development of new rules.
It was the statutory duty of the Lord Ordinary to 'examine into the accuracy of the
summons and defences, and to mention to the parties', at a calling of the cause, if
anything 'occurred to him'. At this calling the parties were expected to be prepared
to state whether a condescendence and answers, in their opinion, would be later
required.
35 the alternative was proof by Commission.
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Having repelled all dilatory defences, and having satisfied himself that the summons
and defences were 'in point of fact sufficiently explicit, and correctly deduced in
point of law, and that no further disclosure of the facts or of pleas' was necessary for
the due preparation of the cause for trial,36 the Lord Ordinary then required the
parties to state whether they held the summons and defences as containing their full
and final statement of facts and pleas in law. That being so, the record was made up.
Where the summons was imperfect, (in the opinion of the Ordinary), he could
dismiss the action or order an amendment of the libel.37 Likewise, where the
defences were imperfect, he could order defences 'more satisfactory and correct to be
given in', awarding expences against the defender for 'imperfect or evasive
defences', or he could order new or additional defences.
Where additional papers were ordered, a strict time period was fixed for this
purpose.38 Amendment of the libel or the allowance of new or additional defences
was permitted, when the originals were insufficiently clear and positive in point of
fact or correct in point of law, in both cases to be lodged within a strict period of
time.39 Once amended, if the Ordinary was satisfied that they were 'in point of fact
sufficiently explicit, and correctly deduced in point of law, and that no further
disclosure of facts or of pleas' was 'necessary for the due preparation of the cause for
trial' he required the parties to state that they held the summons and defences as
36 The most common disposal was by jury trial.
37 s. 6.
38 s. 44 AS. 1825.
39 ibid.
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containing their full and final statement of facts and pleas in law in the manner
before noticed.
In the event that the parties40 did not agree so to hold the summons and defences, or
where the Lord Ordinary considered fit, he could order the parties to give in, the one
a condescendence and the other an answer or mutual condescendence,41 setting
forth, 'without argument', the facts which they 'averred and offered to prove' and in
these, the parties were required 'in substantive propositions, and under distinct
heads or articles' to set forth 'all facts and circumstances pertinent to the cause of
action, or to the defence', which they respectively 'alleged and offered to prove.' A
definite period was fixed for the lodging of these pleadings,42 attracting sanctions for
failure to do so.43
Once the condescendences or condescendence and answers were lodged, the parties
were permitted respectively to 'revise' them 'in order fully to meet the opposite
averments.'44 From there, the revised condescendence and answers were lodged and
held as a 'complete paper'45 containing the whole averments in point of fact,
40
my emphasis.
41 simultaneously producing all documents or writings on which they were founding, c.f. Ch.
6, p.2 of the Report by Working Party on Court ofSession Procedure (Chaired by Rt. Hon. Lord
Couslfield) (Edinburgh, 2000) 'Darling explains that after a summons had been served and
defences lodged the pursuer was allowed to lodge replies' This seems incorrect. Darling's
treatment is as here defined, following the Act and A.S. See Darling, Practice op. cit. 196 - 206.
In the Sheriff Court, the reply was part of the procedure. See e.g. J. M'GIashan, Practical Notes
on Jurisdiction and Forms of Process in Civil Causes of the Sheriff Courts of Scotland (2nd ed.),
(Edinburgh, 1842) pp. 199 and 208.
42 s. 12.
43 s. 50 of the Act of Sederunt
44 s. 9.
45 What this meant was that the condescendence and answer (or mutual condescendence) had
to contain the whole averments in point of fact, admissions or denials without referring to the
previous papers (summons and defences or any amendments thereto) as it was deemed that
the parties had passed from any allegations in the former papers, unless these were
specifically and distinctly stated in the condescendence and answers. These allegations could
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admissions or denials respectively and accompanied with a note of the pleas in law,
stating the matter of law in distinct and separate propositions, without argument,
but accompanied by a reference to the authorities relied upon.46 Importantly, where
'a statement in point of fact within the opposite party's knowledge' was averred on
one side and not denied on the other, he was 'held as confessed'.47
A cause was then ordered to the motion roll.48 At the hearing thereon, the parties
were required to be prepared to 'attend to any suggestion of the Lord Ordinary, as to
any new plea' which appeared to him 'necessary to exhaust the disputable matter in
law or in fact in the cause.'49 The pleadings were finally adjusted before the Ordinary
and he was directed to hear parties' explanations, again to examine the statement of
facts and of the pleas, again suggesting any new plea which to him appeared
necessary to exhaust the whole disputable matter in law or fact. Then the revised
condescendence and answers and the relative notes of the pleas were to be signed by
counsel, and 'the record50 of the pleadings' as adjusted was authenticated by the
Lord Ordinary.
not even be incorporated into the condescendence or answers by reference. Ross v. Hnll 15lh
June 1820. Thus, admissions in summons and defences could be retracted. But any new
allegation in a condescendence, contradictory to the summons required amendment of the
libel. Dickie v. Gutzmer (1828) 6 Shaw 637, Eiving's Trs. Farquharson (1829) 7 Shaw 464.
46 s. 9.
47 s. 48 AS. Note the re-incorporation of the ficta confessio and the translation of the content of
the earlier AS. (see Ch. 2)
48 in practice parties enrolled the cause on the roll. Shand, op. cit. p. 334.
49 The Ordinary furnishing the parties with a note of the new plea, in order that, before
calling, they had time to consider it. It still had to be adopted by the parties though.
Beveridge, op. cit. p. 318.
50 i.e. as comprised of these adjusted condescendences and answers and notes of pleas. This
was held to be the record of the pleadings. In modern usage 'record' is pronounced 'record'
with the accent on the second syllable. From the context of the use of the word in section 10
of the act here, i.e. 'the record of the pleadings' it is suggested that this pronunciation must
have arisen later.
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How the record was to be made up was a matter for the Lord Ordinary and he could
competently put the cause into any shape he thought 'most conducive to the ends of
justice.'51 His discretion was significant and he could order papers lodged and
revised by parties to be removed. Finally the Ordinary authenticated the record52
and the parties were thereafter 'foreclosed' from stating any new averments in fact
nor permitted any further amendment unless res noviter veniens ad notiam,53 The
whole facts to be proved had to be set forth in the revised condescendence and
answers.54
Section 13 of the Act gave the Ordinary a discretion to decide the cause without
proof at jury trial, i.e. on the pleadings themselves, when it appeared 'that the Parties
have respectively admitted on the Record all the Facts requisite to the Decision of the
Cause.'55 Section 16 provided similar powers. When the Ordinary considered that
the cause, by virtue of 'Admissions, or from the Nature of the Cause' was fit to be
discussed in the Court of Session without recourse to jury trial or in other
circumstances56 he could proceed to decide the cause (i.e. without any proof) or take
it to report as he considered expedient and in this he could order the parties to argue
the whole or any part of the cause before him, as often as he considered necessary or
he could direct the parties to prepare 'Cases in writing'.57
51 Shand, op. cit. p. 337.
52 s. 10.
53 Beveridge, op. cit. p.319-26.
54 Mackay v. Macleods (1827) 4 Mur. 281, Cleland v. Weir (1835) 13 S. 1143, Neilson v. Househill
Coal and Iron Co (1842) 4 D.
55 or he could report the cause to the Inner House, s. 13.
56 when parties concurred in seeking to have a question of law or relevancy determined
before jury trial, when this was ordered by the Ordinary or Inner House or when the cause
returned to the Court of Session on a special verdict.
57 s. 16 (s. 22 and s.12 A.S. 1828 regulating the procedure).
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It was clearly intended that the Lords Ordinary would act positively (what might
today be termed 'pro-actively') to remove irrelevant material from the pleadings.
Section 4 prohibited the Lord Ordinary from giving any judgment on the merits of a
cause until parties' fact and law had been set forth on record, and examined by him,
with the power given to him to 'mention to the parties, at a calling of the cause, if
anything occur to him'58 and under the Act, it was the first duh/ of the Lord
Ordinary, as a matter of law, to dispose of the dilatory defences and thereafter
examine into the accuracy of the summons and defences upon the merits.59
Any deviation from the regulations was supposed to sound in expenses against the
guilty party. This in itself was to produce copious satellite litigation.60
(iii) Strictness and Discipline Under the Judicature Act 1825 - Charles
Hope's New Broom.
The Lord President introduced the new form of process and the accompanying
regulating acts of Sederunt with a powerful speech to the Court on 12 November
1825.61 Proclaiming, 'we are now to enter a new era in the administration of justice'62
he continued, explaining the whole ethos of the new system and the evils to be
eradicated:
58 Beveridge, A Practical Treatise on the Forms ofProcess; containing the New Regulations before the
Court ofSession (etc) (Edinburgh, 1826) 2 Vols., Vol. 1 p. 302. A similar approach was adopted
in the sheriff court, the sheriff ordering amendment of the libel or defences. John M'Glashan,
Practical Notes on Act ofSederunt... and the Forms of Process in Civil Causes before the Sheriff
Courts ofScotland etc. (Edinburgh, 1831) p. 82.
59 Beveridge, op. cit. p. 295.
60 See evidence of Elugh Macqueen, W.S. to the 1834 Commissioners 'Questions of expenses
are themselves a source of much expense... and are avoided except in extreme situations'.,
Ans. 16, p. 37.
61 The Speech of the Right Honourable Charles Hope, Lord President of the Court ofSession on moving
the Court to pass Acts ofSederunt for the better regulating of the Forms of Process in the Courts of
Lniu in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1825).
62 Speech, ibid. p. 5.
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'The great improvement here is, (and a great one it certainly is,) the
provision made to foreclose the parties as to their averments in point of fact,
at an early stage of the cause, by closing and authenticating the record, and
thus preventing the production of new averments to the very last stage of
the cause, which, at present, often makes it quite a different one from what it
was before the Lord Ordinary.'63
Appreciating that the new system would have to be bedded in, and acknowledging
the Faculty's grave concerns, and the rest of the profession's unease, he explained
that their Lordships were
'aware, ... that many alterations and amendments would probably be
required in the course of the first two or three years' practice under the new
system, we thought it greatly preferable that they should arise out of actual
practice and experience which would both point out the evil to be remedied,
and the remedy to be applied.'64
To operate, the system would require to be implemented by judge, advocate, agent
(and litigant) alike, all working in co-operation. The Court's attempts in the previous
period to marshal the procedure had failed because the profession had pressed for, -
and the Court (or at least individual judges) had acquiesced in, - erosions of acts of
sederunt anci the return to olci forms, each of which formed a precedent for further
erosion. Knowing full well the Faculty's abilities to corrupt and modify a change in a
form of process to their own ends, he implored:
'But, my Lords, it is obvious, that neither this, nor any other form of process
which can be devised, however perfect in itself, can possibly succeed,
63 Speech, ibid. p. 6.
64 Speech, ibid. p. 4.
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without a cordial co-operation and determination by all persons concerned
in the administration of justice, to give it a full and fair trial. On the one
hand, the Bar must not start, nor must we listen to captious and frivolous
objections, calculated merely to throw discredit on the New System. All such
must be discountenanced to the utmost. On the other hand, where a real and
unforeseen difficulty occurs, we must meet it fairly, and under the powers
vested in us by the Act, endeavour to provide the remedy most consonant
with the spirit of it.'65
The crisis for the Bar was that the system was designed to limit the written
discussion of the cause. The old manner of pleading in copious papers was to be
removed and pleading in writing drastically restricted. Many must have speculated
on how, after initial written pleadings a cause could be argued orally to a conclusion
thereafter. More tragically for the Faculty in general, there was to be no place in
these new papers for the expressions of learning, the quotations from the Civil Law
and the institutional writers, the employment of the arguments drawn from wide
and diverse sources which had so encapsulated previous notions of the Bar as a
fellowship of learning and wisdom. Even a 'written case' under the new procedure
was no substitute for a well drawn (and lengthy) Memorial or Minute of Debate.
Flow could a cause progress through the Court at such a pace and with little or no
opportunity for reflection on the arguments advanced? The Faculty had been
groomed in the ancient system of 'ripening and maturing a cause' either by
representing to the Ordinary or by reclaiming to the Inner House, originally without
limit, with the express purpose of stating all and any reference in law and classical
65 Speech ibid. p. 7.
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learning which could be brought and applied to the facts before the Court.66 The
Faculty Committee's closely argued Report of 1824,67 eulogising this method of
proceeding and highlighting the Bar's dissatisfaction with the Bill, which Bill was
now on the Statute Book in similar terms, had been brushed aside by the judicature
and to boot, mockingly discredited by one of the 1824 Commissioners, Professor
Bell.68 The disaffection and disillusion felt by the Faculty was almost palpable. Yet
the Lord President continued, rubbing salt into the sore,
'We must adhere most rigidly to the regulations prescribed to us by the act.69
.. .This rigid adherence to form may, and probably will, especially at first, be
productive of hardship in particular cases, where, from ignorance or
inattention in practitioners, the necessary forms have not been complied
with. ... Where deviations take place in the Outer House, the Lords
Ordinary must instantly check them, and if any have escaped the Lord
Ordinary, and are detected in the Inner House, we must, without hesitation
or remorse, remit the cause back to the Lord Ordinary to retrace his steps.70
Conscious that the new measures did not commend themselves even to Ordinaries
on the Bench71 and that it was likely that there lurked willing judicial conspirators72
66 As Robert Forsyth, Advocate had advised the commissioners in 1824, written pleadings
had 'made a learned and accomplished bar' and they enabled 'Judges to meditate in solitude
upon cases'. Answers of Robert Forsyth, Advocate, Report op. cit p. 138.
67 Report of The Committee of the Faculty ofAdvocates, Appointed to Consider a Bill, Entitled, "An
Act for the Better Regulating of the Forms ofProcess in the Courts of Law in Scotland'" (Edinburgh,
1824).
68 G.J Bell, Examination of the Objections Stated Against the Bill For Better Regulating the Forms of
Process in the Court of the Law in Scotland by George Joseph Bell, Esq. Professor of the Law of
Scotland in the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1825).
69 Speech, ibid. p. 7.
70 Speech, ibid. p. 8.
71 In particular, much now depended on the interlocutors having finality and not being open
to review in the old way. The President warned the judges that they would have to be careful
in 'deliberating upon final opinions and interlocutors as now final' (Speech, p.9).
72 Lord Meadowbank in 1824 had written to the Commissioners that he doubted that there
would be any benefit to administration of justice were pleading viva voce increased. For him,
pleading in writing was to be preferred as it allowed judges to 'reflect' and it was 'good for
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should the Faculty attempt to evade or relax the strictures of the new scheme, he
spelled out their Lordships' statutory duties, admonishing them not to rush into the
new written cases procedure:
'I have to say in reference to our own duty, ... much of the success of the
new system will depend on the discretion with which the Lords Ordinary
exercise the power given them by the act, of ordering cases before
pronouncing their judgments. On the one hand, to do so in all, or in a great
proportion of causes, would counteract the obvious intention of the
Legislature, by continuing, in too great a degree, the system of written
pleadings. On the other hand, not to order cases in causes of great moment,
and great difficulty, would, I am persuaded, be neither satisfactory to the
parties, nor conducive to the administration of justice (Where a great variety
of authorities, apparently contradictory, or not easily reconciled, have been
quoted to the Lord Ordinary in the course of the oral pleadings before him, it
is highly desirable that Cases should be ordered.)73
A heavy burden was placed on the Bar, with a dire threat:
If we are, to any extent, to do the business of this Court by oral pleadings, it
is absolutely necessary that counsel should adopt a more condensed and
logical style of pleading than has hitherto been generally practised. For if the
pleadings, which we are now to have so much more frequently, are to bear
any proportion, in point of length, to the hearings in presence to which we
have been accustomed, we must either shut the doors of this Court
altogether, or we must render our sittings permanent'.74
the counsel to research.' Evidence of Lord Meadowbank to the 1824 Commission,
Commissioner's Report 1824, op. cit. p. 192.
73 Speech, ibid. pp.10-11.
74 Speech, op. cit. p.16.
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The Bar, never a body openly to welcome innovation in the form of process, and still
smarting from the removal of their treasured ancient methods of drawing pleadings,
seem to have failed to adhere to the spirit and intention of the Act from the outset,
and it was perhaps only to be expected that the Faculty attempted to continue in the
manner which they knew best. But in addition, it was not just the novelty which was
a disincentive. The new form would hit advocates where it hurt most - in the pocket.
Although there had been previous attempts to introduce 'block fees'75 for the
drawing of pleadings for parts of the process, the Bar was still remunerated per
paper76 - the more pleading in the form of process, the more remuneration. The new
system intended drastically to reduce the papers of pleading thus, in theory,
reducing the Bar's source of income.77 Moreover, it had been customary to instruct a
leading and a junior counsel for any Inner House appearance, particularly where the
pleadings were voluminous, but the new procedure of discussion on the revised
condescendences and answers was supposed to bring the issues to the fore more
quickly. In July 1826 the Court checked the oral submissions at the discussion by
limiting the number of counsel appearing before them, Charles Hope considering
that the new procedure was bringing parties to issue such as 'hardly to require
Counsel at all, much less two on each side.'78
75 see Chapter 1.
76 See Appendix to Report of The Committee of the Faculty ofAdvocates, Appointed to Consider a
Bill (1824) where Daniel Fisher, a member of the Committee, had drafted an account of
expenses based on the proposals contained in the Bill arguing that the new measures would
increase the costs to litigants. The account includes the expenses for the individual pleadings
drafted. This was dismissed as 'purely imaginary, and ... according to the fancy or the
prejudice of the person engaged in making it up' and dismantled root and branch by Bell in
the Memorandum of the Appendix of his superb 'Examination of the Objections' op. cit. 15-30.
77 and saving the wretched litigant expenses in the process. See immediately above.
78 Notes by the Lord President on the Subject ofHearing Counsel in the Inner House, (Edinburgh,
1826) [Ordered by the Faculty to be printed 11 July 1826] p. 6.
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Taking the opportunity to reflect on the Faculty's general approach to the new
procedure, he continued,
'The President also stated,79 that in the previous conversation on the subject
which the Judges had held among themselves, it was the unanimous opinion
of the whole of them, that great fault lay with the Faculty in carrying
through the New Form of Process; that very few condescendences and
answers were properly drawn, as mere substantive averments of facts; that
the notes of Pleas in Law were often arguments in Law; and that very few of
the cases were drawn in terms of the act of Parliament, but were fully as long
and diffuse as the old memorials and informations.' 80
The bugbear for the Judges was 'that while they were obliged to hear longer viva
voce pleadings in Court,81 their reading at home remained fully as laborious as
ever.'82
Later in the year, the Lord President attempted to induce the Faculty to enter into the
spirit of the new system, but darkly threatening greater coercion:
'The President therefore, in the name and at the desire of the Court,
requested the Dean to impress on the Faculty the absolute necessity of their
entering more thoroughly into the spirit of the new Form of Process,
otherwise the Court would be under the necessity of adopting strong
measures, directed against Counsel and agents transgressing.'83
79 The actual speech was not recorded verbatim, thus the print by the Faculty is in the third
person.
80 Notes by the Lord President, op. cit. p.6.
81 thus the attempt to limit the number of counsel appearing.
82 Notes by the Lord President, op. cit. p. 6. The communication was printed in Shaw's Reports,
by order of the Faculty. See (1825) 4 Shaw 839.
83 ibid. p. 6.
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and concluding, no doubt conscious of the ever growing number of appeals lying on
the table of the House of Lords,
'there has hardly been one Record made up yet, that is fit to be presented to
the House of Lords, if the cause go there'.84
The Faculty were so concerned about this that they appointed a Committee85 to
produce a Report detailing its concerns and grievances with the new form of process
and the manner of its implementation which reported the following year.86
Yet by the end of the same year, the President still fulminated on the drawing of
causes under the new procedure. If he had hoped for a 'carrot and stick' approach to
the introduction of the new rules, the carrots had not worked. It was now time for
the stick.
'[The pleadings] are generally as bad as the papers under the old forms, or
worse; and as to the closed records, which have been sent us from the Outer
House, they are, with scarcely any exceptions, most improperly framed,
being stuffed with long quotations from documents which are founded on as
evidence, with inferences, and I don't know all what, instead of being
substantive propositions.'87
He put agents and counsel on notice that if the situation continued, he would order
his clerk to write to the injured client directly 'intimating that his case has been
84 ibid. p. 7.
85 The Committee were directed to inquire, 'Whether the provisions of the statute in regard to
the preparation of condescendences and answers have been generally observed or not; and if
it shall be found that they have not been observed, to what extent such failure to comply with
them has prevailed'.
86 Report ofa Committee of the Faculty ofAdvocates, approved and adopted at a meeting ofFaculty
held February 10"', 1827 (Edinburgh, 1827).
87 Scotsman, x, (719) 29th November 1826 cited by Phillipson, op. cit. p.158.
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bungled by his agent and counsel, and that he ought not to pay the account of
expenses' concluding in exasperation that 'Something must be done to correct this
evil.'88
Six months into the new regime, pleadings presented to the Court were falling far
short of the bench mark. Proper implementation now required some of the 'hardship
in particular cases' which had been adverted to in the President's November speech.
In two particular cases, Sprout and Roy & Ors., with the concurrence of the First
Division, he refused even to consider the record,89 remarking in Sprout:
'This is one of those records to which I alluded in the early part of the
Session; and if we pass it over, the new forms may be thrown aside as utterly
useless. The Condescendence is not even in terms of the old Act of
Sederunt.90 The facts and law are mixed together, and there are long
argumentative passages. I observe also that the parties here, as in many
other cases, do not state that they 'aver and offer to prove'91 that which they
condescend on, and which is expressly required by the statutes. After
reading these papers, I resolved that I would not judge on such a record, but
leave your Lordships to do what you thought fit.'
In Roy & Ors.,92 again refusing to advise on a record which was not in conformity
with the new rules, he complained:
'this record is worse that that of Sproat's, which I formerly objected to; and I
have resolved that I will not judge in such cases. The condescendence and
88 ibid.
89 Sprout v. Mure & Ors lsl December 1826, (1826) 5 Shaw 66 (N.E. 61).
90 i.e. A.S. 11th March 1800.
91 This was the requirement of the A.S. 1800 and had been the recommendation of the
Commissioners in their Report. Averments were supposed to start: The pursuer [or defender]
avers and offers to prove' See supra.
92 Roy & Ors. v. Wright & Ors. 9lh December 1826 5 Shaw 107 (N.E. 98).
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answers are filled with quotations of interlocutors, excerpts from proof93 and
with allegations in point of law ... The statute must be obeyed ... the proof
should not be quoted, - the object of condescendences being, not to aver
what is proved, but what is offered to be proved. It is no answer to say that
the Lord Ordinary did not object. We must enforce the statute. Indeed, the
real truth is, that both the Ordinary and the counsel are to blame, - the
counsel for giving in such papers, and the Lord Ordinary for receiving them.
We cannot advise the case on such a record. It must be prepared of new.'
It was clear where the President laid the blame. The Bar was pressing for and the
Ordinaries were acquiescing in, relaxations of the stricture of the new rules such as
to accommodate old bad habits, all as had been foreseen by him. The eradication of
argument, rhetoric and evidence from the pleadings was of paramount importance
and law was to be stated only in the pleas.
The Faculty's Committee reported in February 1827 following the Lord President's
Notes the year before. With much deferential pointing out of what were, in their
view, teething problems, re-iterating the same old arguments about lengthy pleading
being a safe-guard against hasty decision-making in causes, and confirming their
collective view that two counsel presentation in the Inner House gave a more
'deliberate discussion'94, the Report bitterly complained of the number of acts of
sederunt passed ('without communication with the Bar'95) since the inception of the
Act96 and the problems of compliance. It enclosed the results of a forensic
93 The case originated as an advocation.
94 ibid. p. 9.
95 ibid. p. 20.
9615 between 12th November 1825 and 14th November 1826, ibid.p. 20.
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examination of causes decided in the Court from the passing of the Act, which, it
was claimed, demonstrated these problems.
However, their most serious difficulties related to 'differences of opinion which are
known to have prevailed among the Lords Ordinary, and in the Courts, and in the
minds of the Judges at different times, regarding the import' [of the Act and act of
sederunt]. In particular, they conceded that they [the Bar] were unsure about
quotation of documents in condescendences and answers, the introduction into
condescendences and answers of 'remarks and minute details, not forming proper
and substantive matter of averment', the construction of pleas in law and the 'proper
form of preparing Cases.'
How could the Faculty obtemper the provisions of the statute and the new code if
the judges were all singing verses from different hymn sheets and the desired form
was a moving target? Attack being the best form of defence, the Report acerbically
pointed out,
'Upon all these matters a diversity of view prevails among Counsel, which is
the less remarkable, as they have been warranted by the Judges in adopting
almost any given opinion. In short, the form of preparing a cause, in so far as
committed to Counsel, has hitherto necessarily varied according to the
known views of the particular Judge before whom the case has depended.
The opinions of their Lordships in the Outer House have been in general
very unequivocably intimated from the bench, and they have been so
opposite and discordant, as fully to warrant what has now been stated.'97
97 ibid. pp. 22-3.
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The Report concluded, more in hope, than expectation, that
'[the] Judges will do what in them lies to facilitate this end,98 by exercising
great patience and forbearance towards practitioners, during the infancy of
the system, - and by coming to some common understanding, and adhering
to it, with respect to the mode in which pleadings are to be drawn.'99
(iv) The New Strictness and the Development of 'Rules of Written
Pleading'
The Faculty's professed position regarding the conduct of proceedings in the Court,
was that parties should
'conduct their cause in the manner they think best. It is no part of the
business of the Judge to do more than to decide the case which the parties
present to him.'100
But, at least in this early period, that was 'old hat'. True, the basic principles upon
which the pleadings proceeded remained the same and were those espoused from
the time of Stair. As G.J. Bell explained in the 2nd and 3rd editions of his Principles of
the Law of Scotland,
'The pursuer's case is truly syllogistical, stated commonly by enthymenre;
but, when fully expressed, proceeding on the rule of law as the major
proposition, the fact as the minor, and the conclusion as the result. The
defender's case is either a simple case; a denial of the major as correct in law;
or a denial of the conclusion: Or it is a case more complex, depending on a
new and opposite right averred by the defender, and forming an opposite
syllogism; admitting hypothetically, or really, the premises and conclusion
98 sc. uniform and consistent application of the principles of the new system.
99 Report, op. cit. p. 24-5.
100 Report of the Committee of the Faculty of Advocates (Edinburgh, 1824) op. cit. p. 6.
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of the previous summons, but avoiding or eluding it by what is technically
called air Exception. And this again is subject to denial, or to exception, till
the matter is finally exhausted, and the parties come to issue on one or other
of the questions thus raised.'101
However, the content of these pleadings was now regulated by the sections of the
Act and the act of sederunt and the procedure to be followed was clear. In
conformity with the President's edicts, the provisions of the Act and the act of
sederunt were, at least initially, stringently applied by the Lords Ordinary (albeit
sometimes as variations on a theme). The Court heeded the message that a close
supervision of the preparation of the pleadings fell within its domain and that the
loose and argumentative pleadings of the previous period were redundant. The
collective view of the establishment had been enunciated by Professor Bell when he
stated that the pleadings should 'proceed under the special superintendence and
guidance of a judge'102 and it was, to paraphrase the Faculty's own Report, now 'part
of the business of the Judge' carefully to superintend the preparation of the
pleadings up to the closure of the record, strictly interpreting and implementing the
statutory provisions.
The summons and defences, the amendments and additional papers, the
condescendences and answers (and any revisals thereof) and the written cases all
had to comply with the statutory directions. Moreover, following ss. 13 and 16 of the
1825 Act which permitted a judge to decide the cause on the pleadings without the
101 G.J. Bell, Principles of the Law ofScotland (2nd ed.), (Edinburgh, 1830) para. 2273; (3rd ed.),
(Edinburgh, 1833) para. 2270.
102 G.J. Bell, Examination of the Objections, op. cit. p.87.
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allowance of proof on commission or jury trial, it was possible to decide cases on
questions of law or relevancy without any inquiry into the facts.
Whilst compliance was for the Court, parties quickly realised that if the Ordinaries
were amenable to ciisposing of a cause without the need for expensive inquiry,
tactical capital could be made where an opponent's pleadings had not been correctly
presented in form. Such failures in 'correctness' could provide a basis for an
argument directed to the relevancy and a submission seeking decree or dismissal,103
or at the least, the ordering of new papers on the grounds that the summons or the
defences were not in the proper form, or did not comply with the provisions against
argument, or that the averments did not support conclusions or such like. Once the
Court had signalled its intention to enforce the provisions strictly, and together with
the court's willingness to decide a cause on questions of law or relevancy, parties
knew that it would be of advantage to press the Court for that strict enforcement as
against an opponent. Thus, increasingly the Court was engaged in determining the
correctness of the pleadings as a matter of mere form, and Shaw's reports, under the
heading 'process' for the years 1824 to 1833, contain a number of cases dealing with
questions of absolute form which, it was said, 'were greater in number than the
preceding three centuries'.104
103 Following the 1825 Act, the term 'dismissal' became a term of art and came to be used in
the situation where the defender was successful without determination on the merits, as
where the pursuer abandoned or the defender's preliminary plea was sustained. The pursuer
could bring a new action. Caledonian Iron and Foundry Co. v. Clyne (1831) 10 S. 133, Shirreffv.
Brodie (1836) 14 S. 825. A defence on the merits, if sustained, entitled the defender to
absolvitor and formed res judicata. However, the distinction was not always strictly observed.
Mackay, Practice, vol. I, p. 434.
104 Evidence of Hugh Macqueen to 1834 Commissioners, Preamble to Answers, pp.35-6.
182
(v) Summonses
Summonses in particular were subjected to detailed textual analysis and criticism of
the facts averred, the remedies concluded for and the maimer in which the
conclusions and the averments of fact had been composed. In his treatise on the
practice of the Court, published in 1833, Darling could bring home to his readers this
idea in two sub-titles in his discussion of the summons: 'Much Accuracy Now
Required in Libelling'105 and 'Form of Summons - Cases Illustrating Strictness Now
Required'106 The latter extended to five pages citing twenty nine decisions decided
from the implementation of the Act and the act of sederunt and the decisions do
demonstrate the rigour of the Court's approach to the summons. Indeed, as he
remarked,
'The act ... has introduced a stricter form of pleading, and objections, which
it would formerly have been held ridiculous to state, will now prove fatal.'107
The object of libelling the summons was,
'to make the summons pointed and precise in point of fact, and correct and
logical in point of conclusion. Prolixity in argument is quite out of place in a
summons. All superfluous matter, quotation of documents, ... flights of
imagination, ... ought to be avoided. Nothing can be more contrary to the
spirit and intention of the ...act, than unnecessary amplitude. And in such
cases, the Lord Ordinary may either throw out the summons altogether, or
order it to be amended, by striking out the irrelevant matter'108
105 Darling, op. cit. p.129. He considered the decisions of the Court were the best commentary
on the Act. Note: In the following, it is not intended to refer specifically to the cases cited by
him. They can be found at the pages referred to.
106 ibid. p. 130.
107 Darling, op. cit. 129-30.
i°8 Darling op. cit. p. 137, Shand, p. 222-3.
183
But there was an inherent tension in the requirement of sufficiency and what
constituted 'unnecessary amplitude.' The problem for the drafters of summonses
was that hasty summonses were often brought to obtemper the requirements of the
law of prescription or to secure hasty diligence on sums sued for,109 but at the same
time, the summons had to be broad enough in its terms to permit further averments
if ordered by amendment or in a condescendence, without prejudicing the claim at a
later stage of the action. The Ordinary on his own initiative- but probably in practice
armed with the submissions of the defender - would examine the pursuer's
averments checking whether they were 'in point of fact sufficiently explicit, and
correctly deduced in point of law.' There had to be a sufficiency of factual averment
as a matter of relevancy110 and these averments had to be married to what was
concluded for. Thus the use of the phrase 'pointed and precise in fact and correctly
and logically deduced in law' by Darling111 and Shand.112 An insufficiency in
averment of fact meant that the conclusions would not necessarily follow, the action
was thus irrelevant and was dismissed113 or, if it survived to the point of being
ordered to be amended, the expenses were lost to the other side. Subjecting the
summons to analysis of this kind was, to some extent, in the interests of the Court by
ensuring that the disputed matters in fact and law between the parties were properly
prepared and ventilated before allowing a cause to proceed to proof.114 But it was
also in the interests of the defender as the action could be disposed of at an early
stage, on a technical point of relevancy or, if not, he would get his expenses to the
109 The Dean of Faculty gave his personal opinion to the 1834 Commissioners 'that
summonses as now framed are oftener raised for the purpose either of embarrassment, or
oppression, or concussion, in order to be made the foundation of diligence, and cause greater
inconvenience in that way' ibid. p.83, Ans. 1 (Note, many adhered to this view).
110 not in these early stages as a matter of fair notice. This developed later. See below.
111 Darling, op. cit. p. 137.
112 Shand, op. cit. p. 222.
113 see above.
114 in the general sense. At this time, proof on commission or translation to the jury court for
the preparation of issues by the jury clerks.
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point that the summons was ordered to be amended. This was an incentive to
defenders to present technical arguments on the precision, import and conclusions of
the averments in a summons at this early stage.
Where a pursuer sought jury trial, averments had to be sufficiently distinct and
specific to admit of the requisite issues being deduced from them for trial, and where
there was a defect in this respect, the action was dismissed.115 But the jury never saw
the pleadings, the purpose of which was to provide ultimately the issue, and thus it
was thought that closing upon a summons and defences in enumerated causes
would normally suffice. If it was likely that the action was to be decided without
jury trial (i.e. that the cause was not an enumerated cause within the meaning of the
Act) a greater degree of minuteness was advisable. The existence of the modes of
proof by commission and jury trial was reflected in two styles of pleading:
'A great deal of expense is, in many cases, most needlessly incurred, by
proceeding to make up a record by condescendence and answers, where the
summons and defences would be quite sufficient of themselves. In ordinary
cases which come before the Court, for determination on the statements and
productions of parties, without farther probation, it may be advisable to
detail with some minuteness the essential facts and circumstances on either
side: but in cases which must be determined by a jury, to whom the
pleadings are never read, the more condensed the averments are kept, the
better; all that is required is, that the grounds of action and defence are
brought out with sufficient precision and distinctness to suggest the proper
issue or issues, and enable the parties, at the trial, to lead their proof, free
115 Robert Macfarlane, The Practice of the Court ofSession in Jury Causes (Edinburgh, 1837) p. 33
citing Rose v, M'Leod 1821 1 Shaw 112, M'lnnes v. Dickie 1822 1 Shaw 427 Jackson & Ward v.
Cassels 1833 11 Shaw 908.
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from any objection of not having given due notice, of the grounds of fact or
law, on which they respectively rely.'116
But this obsession with the minuteness of detail could be dangerous to a case:
'parties not unfrequently indulge in a much more minute detail and
specification of facts and circumstances that what are necessary. By doing so
they occasion expense, run the risk of errors, and needlessly expose their
case. It is quite enough in the general case, that the averments be broad and
distinct, leaving the minute facts and circumstances, and the manner and
means of proof, to be made out and brought forward at the trial.'117
Any 'unnecessary amplitude' in the summons and the Ordinary was supposed to
order the irrelevant averments to be deleted, although this was applied neither
uniformly nor as had been intended by the Act.118 The result was that there was
much discussion of the summons on the matter of its 'form' and the requirements of
sufficiency and, once more, the Ordinaries did not approach this with any great
consistency. Darling's long discussion of 'the premises ... sufficient to support the
conclusions'119 and his advice that 'care ought to be taken that no averments, except
those necessary to support the conclusions, be made'120 was helpful only insofar as it
was appreciated that these were general propositions to be applied, and that there
could be variations from judge to judge.
116 Macfarlane, Practice op. cit. p. 32.
117 Macfarlane, op. cit. p. 33, Wilson v. Beveridge (1831) 10 Shaw 110.
118 See below. It did sometimes happen. See the evidence of the Dean of Faculty, John Hope
(Charles' son) to the 1834 Commission in First Report From His Majesty's Law Commissioners,
Scotland. 12"' May 1834 (P.P. xxvi 1834) (London, 1834)'Some instances certainly have occurred of
summonses being too detailed, and part of them ordered to be expunged'. Appendix, p. 83, Ans. 7.
119
p. 132. c.f. Shand, following the same lay-out as Darling and under the same heading,
could, by 1848 give 52 cases under this head extending to 8 pages of his Practice of The Court of
Session, on the basis of The Late Mr. Darling's Work of 1833. op. cit. (Edinburgh, 1848).
120 Darling, op. cit. p. 137.
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For reasons of space, it is not possible here to provide a long exposition of the cases
demonstrating the strictness of approach adopted by the Court; but as a flavour, the
following examples may suffice. Thus, where the title of the pursuer was incorrectly
set forth121 or the defender's title was incorrectly set forth122 then the rest of the
averments were considered insufficient to support the conclusions. A summons
founded exclusively on statute could not support a conclusion for damages at
common law.123 If a defence admitted the whole averments and yet denied the
conclusion, it was irrelevant and decree granted.124 If a material averment was
omitted in a summons, even if the other averments were admitted by the defender
and the conclusion denied, the summons would be dismissed.125 Non-production of
a document founded upon at the same time as the signeting of the summons was
penalised.126
Averments required to support the conclusions of the summons (or condescendence)
and if they did not, the action was irrelevant even when the defender had fully
averred his version of events. This could lead to conflicts between the FFouse of
Lords and the Court of Session127 as to what in Scots Law was a discussion on the
121 Darling op. cit. p. 133, Shand op. cit. p. 217. Gillies v. Hunter (1831) 9 Shaw 257 Pursuers as
office bearers had to set forth distinctly their title as office bearers.
122 M'Neill (1829) 7 Shaw 696; Rose v. McLeay and Home (1827) 5 Shaw 883.
123 Millar v. Mills and Vary (1831) 9 Shaw 625.
124 Darling, op. cit. p. 132.
125 Shand, op. cit. p. 215.
126 Peter v. Mitchell 23rd Dec. 1826.
127 See e.g. M'Donald v. Mackie & Co. 8 S.&D. 686. The defenders were assoilzied by the Court
of Session (Lords Cringletie, Pitmilly and the Lord Justice-Clerk) because the pursuer had
failed to aver particular facts to support his conclusions. The decision was reversed by the
House of Lords [reported (1831) 5 W. & S. 462] on the basis that the defenders had admitted
the relevancy of the case against them by making a separate statement of the facts of the case
and the time for demurrer having passed, 'it was too late to deny their [scil. the plaintiff's
(sic) averments] relevancy', per Lord Chancellor Brougham at p. 466. The decision is odd as
Brougham had been an advocate for three years before becoming a barrister in London.
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relevancy which the House of Lords would sometimes equate with a plea of
'demurrer' with confusing results.128
(vi) Defences
It will be recollected that section 2 of the Act required the defender to state in explicit
terms all the defences together and the defences had to meet the statement of the
facts averred by the pursuer by denying or admitting them and in answer setting
forth, again in explicit terms, the facts on which the defender founded, subjoining
thereto a note or summary of the pleas in law to be maintained. A.S. 8 February 1810
augmented this, requiring that the defences should not contain argument. If they
did, the Ordinary could grant decree or order the defender to lodge correct defences.
Defences were subjected by pursuers, and the Court, to a rigorous examination in a
similar manner to summonses.129 Pleas in incorrect form, argument therein or
argument in any part of the defences would all be attacked by a pursuer moving the
Ordinary to grant decree or order new defences to be lodged. As the Faculty had
conceded in its 1827 Report, pleas in law were a vexed topic and how they were
128 In English Law, prior to the great procedural reforms instituted by the Judicature Act 1873,
there were special technical rules of procedure for each division of the Court and for every
form of action. 'Demurrer' was a plea whereby one party 'confessed' the facts, as stated by
his opponent, to be true, thus confining himself to a denial that, in law, the facts warranted
the inference against him. Similar to the plea of relevancy but crucially, once there was this
election, there could be no inquiry into the fact thereafter. There had to be an initial choice -
admit the facts or the law. Admitted facts permitted demurrer discussion of the law.
Admitted law permitted the civil jury trial exploration of the facts from which there could
then be discussion on the law. With the jury trial taking centre stage as the bulwark of the
common law, demurrer came to be considered repugnant - hence the often disparaging
remarks by members of the House of Lords in Scottish appeals when considering the
doctrine and pleas of relevancy in Scottish pleadings. (See also infra. Chapter 5) Uncritical
equation of the two can be found even in eminent writings e.g. Mackay, The Practice of the
Court ofSession (2vols) (Edinburgh, 1877) Vol. 1, p. 437 'The dilatory defence that the action is
irrelevant... is equivalent, therefore, to the demurrer of English pleadings.' At best, the two
are 'similar' (Bankton IV. 26. 6-7) or 'comparable'. Cf T.B. Smith, Short Commentary, op. cit., p.
92. See supra chapter 5.
129 at least initially.
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composed and what they were to contain was not wholly understood. They were a
fruitful source for a pursuer's attack on the defences. The statutory provisions130
required that them to be short and concise notes of the legal propositions on which
the action or defence was to be maintained, set forth in distinct and separate
propositions without argument. This had been confirmed by the Court.131 Sections 49
and 58 of A.S. 11 July 1828 had required there to be reference to the authorities relied
upon.132 Maclaurin explained,
'The correct form of stating the pleas in law is by no means generally
understood or practised. They frequently consist of lengthy statements of
facts, generally a repetition of the narrative part of the defence and they also
not unfrequently contain an argumentative discussion of the case. Instead of
this ... they ought to consist of concise legal propositions, free from
argument, or quotation of any kind, and referring to the authorities founded
on simply by the volume, book and page, or title.'133
For a long period there were many in the profession who considered that pleas in
law were not useful134 or, worse, were actually injurious.135
An admission in defences, once made, could not be easily retracted,136 but firstly, the
admission had to be taken with any explanation accompanying it137 and secondly
130 s. 9,1825 Act.
131 Fraser v. M'Kenzie (1826) 4 S. 706.
132 By 1848 this was seldom done. Shand, op. cit. p.325, Mackay, op. cit. Vol. I p. 391.
133 citing Fraser v. M'Kenzie 1826 4 Shaw 699; (N.E.) 1826 4 S. 706. J. Maclaurin, Form ofProcess
in Civil Causes (Edinburgh, 1836), pp. 117-8.
134 Evidence of Dean of Faculty to 1834 Commission, p. 86, Ans. 31.
135 Evidence of Patrick Robertson, ibid. Ans. 29 & 30, p. 17.
136 Darling, op. cit. p. 181, M'Leod (1822) 1 Shaw 333.
137 Darling, op. cit. p. 181, Carnegy v. Carnegy (1825) 3 Shaw 566 (N.E. 389), Grierson v. Thomson
(1831) 8 Shaw 317.
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that explanation could be 'redargued' by contrary evidence.138 It was competent,
however, simply to deny the averment of the pursuer.
(vii) The Condescendence and Answers
Where parties did not hold the summons and defences as a 'full and final statement'
of their respective positions, the Lord Ordinary would order a condescendence and
answers. As Darling explained in 1833,
'It seldom happens that the parties are willing to close the record upon the
summons and defences; for in general the summons does not set forth with
sufficient minuteness anci precision the ground of action, and the statement
in the defences generally renders some counter-statement from the pursuer
necessary.'139
There were strict rules as to what did and did not fall to be properly included in
these. A fact averred in a summons but not replicated in the condescendence could
not form part of the pleadings as the party was deemed to have abandoned or
departed from it by dropping it.140
It was required that the condescendence and answers should meet each other by
admission and denial and counter-statement, in a manner similar to the defences and
the older provisions of the A.S.141 1 February 1715,14211 March 1800,143 and 7
February 1810144 were held still to apply.145
138 Darling, op. cit. p. 181, Anderson v. Rintoul (1825) 3 Shaw 496 (aff. 1827 5 Shaw 744), Gall v.
Fordyce andMiddleton (1828) 6 Shaw 943.
139 Darling, op. cit. p. 201.
140 Luke v. Magistrates ofEdinburgh (1832-3) 6 W. & S. 241 per L.C. Brougham at p. 259.
141 See the previous chapter.
142 Shortly, where any fact was alleged by one party, the other had to confess or deny it. If he
refuseci to do so, he was held to have confessed and if he denied what was shown afterwards
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In practice this did not operate well and A.S. 11 July 1828 introduced a convoluted
procedure for condescendences and answers. It repeated the rule that the
condescendence was to be without argument, consisting of separate and distinct
articles containing the whole facts which the party averred and offered to prove in
support of his case and the rule that the answer required to reply to each article of
condescendence in order, distinctly admitting or denying, in whole or in part the
statements therein, without argument or introducing into that answer any counter
statement or counter averment. But if the 'respondent' sought to counter aver, then
he was bound to 'annexe' to his answers a 'respondent's Statement of Facts' wherein
he was required to 'aver and offer to prove' the whole facts pertinent to his side of
the case. The original 'condescender' was then entitled to revise his paper and
subjoin to that, under a heading 'Answers to the Respondent's Statement of Facts'
his answer to such statements, in order, by admitting or denying them, in whole or
in part. If he wished to include a counter statement following the respondent's
averments he added it at the end of his answers whereupon the respondent was
entitled to revise his answer and statement of facts in the same manner. The
resulting 'revised condescendence' and 'revised answers' had to form a 'complete
in probation to have been known to him, he was required to pay all the expenses whatever
the event. If he did not expressly deny it, it was, in the older language, held 'to be
acknowledged.'
143 Again, shortly, condescendences and answers were to contain no argument, discussion, or
recital of the proceedings and only state under 'distinct heads, or articles, the special facts
and circumstances pertinent to the cause' which were 'alleged and offered to be proved' on
either side such as to bring forward a 'precise issue'.
144 Which re-enforced A.S. 1715 - Where a fact was averred by one party and not explicitly
denied by the other, he was held as confessed. ('Aver' and 'averment' had the same meaning
as the older 'allege' and 'allegation'.)
145 although in previous practice they had been rendered to all intents and purposes
redundant. The 1824 Commissioners had recommended that each fact should be reduced to a
'positive and substantive proposition', beginning with the words 'The [pursuer or defender]
avers and offers to prove' and that the 'strictest attention' should be paid to the provisions of
A.S. 1810. Report op. cit. p. 6, sec. 3.
191
paper' containing no reference to the preceding condescendence and answers.146 As
before with condescendences and answers under the 1825 Act, a statement in point
of fact averred by one party and within the opposite party's knowledge, which was
not denied by that opposite party, was held to be admitted.147
The proper use of a condescendence was to state more clearly and specifically the
grounds of action set forth in the summons,148 supporting the summons and
restricting these if too general.149 But new grounds of action beyond, or statements
inconsistent with, the summons were not received150 and a summons irrelevant nb
initio could not be cured by a condescendence.151
No judgment could be pronounced on the merits of a cause without closing of the
record,152 and the record could not be closed other than as prescribed by the
statute.153
On the whole it might be assumed from the above that the old manner of pleading
had evaporated in the years following the implementation of the 1825 Act. Dr.
Phillipson has remarked of the process that' [I]t seemed as though the battle for
146 See supra for 'complete paper' The prohibition against 'reference' is explained by the prior
practice of making 'reference to' another document or another part of the process as a
shorthand. Thus pleading phrases such as 'reference is made to the condescendence' were
prohibited as it was envisaged that the 'revised condescendence and answers' would stand
by themselves.
147 The actual wording was 'he shall be held as confessed', again echoing the older
terminology.
148 Scott v. Napier & Ors. (1829) 7 Shaw 338.
149 Alison & Ors. v. Watt (1829) 7 Shaw 786.
150 Dickie v. Gutzmer (1828) 6 Shaw 637, Ewing's Trs. Farquharson (1829) 7 Shaw 464, Fraser v.
Dunbar (1835) 13 Shaw 950.
151 Kerr v. Kerr (1830) 9 Shaw 204.
152 s. 4 1825 Act, Falconer etc. v. Sheills & Co., (1826) 4 Shaw 829 (N.E. 836), Doig v. Fenton (1827)
5 Shaw 533 (N.E. 836).
153 Pattison v. Campbell (1827) 5 Shaw 208 (N.E. 193).
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stricter and more accurate pleadings had, at last, been fought and won'154 Can this be
taken as a fair assessment? Perhaps so, as an observation upon the changes in the
'form' of process. But, in practice, matters were very different.
(viii) The 'Practice and Experience' of the Judicature Act 1825 (and the
Deviations).
By 1835, the new form of process and the provisions regulating the drawing of
pleadings had been in operation for ten years and this is perhaps a suitable point at
which to review the operation of pleadings in the Court of Session in the period,
drawing on contemporary sources,155 noting the problems which arose in practice
and the developments which followed.
The procedure under the Act had envisaged that parties could close the record on
their summons and defences, but itwill be recollected that where parties refused to
do so, the Ordinary would order a condescendence and answers. This was exploited
by defenders who would refuse to close for the express purpose of creating more
154 Phillipson, op. cit. p. 158.
1551 have used the Evidence presented to the 1834 Commissioners Chaired by Bell First Report
From His Majesty's Law Commissioners, Scotland. (Pursuant to Address 9"' May 1834) 12"' May
1834 (P.P. xxvi 1834) (H.C. 295) (London, 1834), (The Answers to the Commission's Questions
were recorded and appear in the Appendix, [Hereinafter Commissioner's Report, 1834], and the
contemporary books on practice: Darling's The Practice of the Court ofSession, (2 vols.)
(Edinburgh, 1833); Macfarlane's Practice of the Court ofSession in Jury Court Civil Causes,
(Edinburgh, 1837); M'Glashan's Practical Notes (etc.) on Forms ofProcess in Civil Causes
(Edinburgh, 1831) and his Practical Notes on the Jurisdiction and Forms of Process in Civil Causes
(Edinburgh, 1831) (and 2nd ed. Edinburgh, 1842); Maclaurin's Form ofProcess in Civil Causes
(Edinburgh, 1836); Shand's The Practice of the Court ofSession on the basis of the late Mr.
Darling's work of 1833, (2 vols.) (Edinburgh, 1848); Shaw's Forms of Process in the House of Lords,
Court ofSession, (etc.) (2 vols.), (Edinburgh, 1843) and the introduction to Volume V (1831) of
Murray's Reports ofCases Tried in the Jury Court at Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1818 - 1831) by
Murray himself.
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delay.156 But it was rare that the summons itself was sufficiently explicit to permit
closing of the record. As Murray noted in 1831:
'it is found by experience that it is not in one case in a hundred, or perhaps
in a smaller proportion, that the Summons is held to be the statement of facts
on which the Record is closed, there seems little doubt whether a long or
short Summons ... is to be preferred. Indeed, as a Condescendence is in
almost all cases required, it is difficult to discover the use of the detail in the
Summons, especially as it may be omitted by the party in the very cases in
which the Court wish it to be inserted.'157
A summons, it will be recalled, was often drafted with inter alia, two objectives in
mind, namely as the foundation for quick diligence and secondly, to allow scope for
fuller averment at the stage of condescendence.158 As the author of Tlte Practice of the
Court of Session told the Commissioners,
'Inconveniencies have arisen, by rendering condescendences necessary, in
consequence of the vague manner in which summonses are drawn, and from
the great length to which they generally extend by the unnecessary narration
of circumstances, and the quotation of documents.'159
What Darling meant by 'unnecessary narration of circumstances, and the quotation
of documents' was that parties pleaded evidence. Not only in summonses but also in
the other documents of pleadings, it appears to have been common to plead how a
fact was to be proved as opposed to merely the fact itself. It was obviously difficult
156 Evidence of John Hope, Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, Commissioner's Report, 1834,
Appendix of Evidence, p. 84, Ans 14.
157 Murray, Introduction, op. cit. p. 23.
158 bearing in mind what was permitted to be introduced into a condescendence after a
summons.
159 Answers by James Johnston Darling; Commissioner's Report, 1834, Appendix of Evidence, p.
27, Ans.l.
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for the profession (or at least the Bar) to relinquish the desire to plead not merely
what was offered to be proved but also how it was to be proved, i.e. the evidence
which was to be adduced to prove the fact. But in any event, the difference between
averment of fact and an averment of evidence was not always appreciated. The Dean
of Faculty, John Hope, told the 1834 Commission that there was 'misapprehension
by pleaders as to what constituted evidence and what not to put in pleadings.'160 The
statutory directions and the incorporation of the provisions of the act of sederunt
prohibiting evidence in pleadings were crystal clear but they appear not to have
been universally followed and this in particular exercised the House of Lords in
Scottish appeals 161 to the extent that Lord Chancellor Brougham considered that
pleading evidence was the 'inveterate practice of Scotch pleading.'162
However, it was not always upon a misapprehension that evidence was pleaded. We
shall return to this below, but for the present, it is sufficient to note that there was a
school of thought prevalent at the Bar that the judges had returned to deciding cases
on the pleadings alone without hearing counsel in oral submission. It will be recalled
that the judges could legitimately decide cases on relevancy or in law at particular
points of the process without proof.163 To cater for this, the Bar had again reverted to
overloading their pleadings with rhetoric, argument, evidence and averments
designed to demonstrate the probable truth of the facts averred.
160 Answers by John Hope, Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, Commissioners' Report, 1834,
Appendix of Evidence, p. 84, Ans. 8.
161 M'Donald v. Mackie & Co. (1831) 5 W. & S. 462, Blincoiv's Trustee v. Allan & Company (1833-
4) 7 W. & S. 26 both per Lord Chancellor Brougham.
162 Blincow op. cit. per LC Brougham at p. 54.
163 ss. 13 and 16 of the 1825 Act.
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The requirement that parties in their defences, condescendences and answers should
meet each other by admission and denial and counter-statement also caused
considerable problems and policing it was tricky. The convoluted procedure for
condescendences and answers introduced by A.S. 11 July 1828 was designed to
preclude parties' admissions and denials from being mixed with lengthy statements
of fact, but the profession found a way of avoiding making admissions and leaving
the opposite party's detailed statement of fact as merely denied.
Following the statute, the form of averment in answers to a condescendence was that
the defender either admitted164 or denied each head in the condescendence and
following the respective acts of sederunt, any explicit averment falling within his
knowledge which was not denied was held to be judicially admitted.165 The whole
object of the condescendence and answers was to bring out the factual differences
between the parties by requiring each to state categorically what was factually in
dispute. As the Dean, John Hope, explained to the 1834 Commissioners:
'[I]n my opinion, the most important principle of the pleadings in the Court
of Session is, that the condescendence and answers are not only to contain
the averments of one party, but to obtain and enforce the admissions of the
other, and I think that the latter object of enforcing admissions has been too
much lost sight of in the last four or five years'.166
164 It was sometimes said that he 'confessed', echoing the old terminology of the ficta confessio.
e.g. see J. M'GIashan, Practical Notes on ... the Forms of Process in Civil Causes 1st ed.,
(Edinburgh, 1831) p. 91.
165 Dunns v. Livingstone 20 Dec 1828, Kay v. Miln &c. Hazel's Trs, 4 Feb. 1830, Drysdale 17 Jan
1832.
166 Evidence of John Hope, Dean of Faculty, Commissioners' Report, 1834, p. 86, Ans. 32.
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But it was sufficient for the defender to state in answer that a fact was not within his
knowledge and thereby was not admitted.167 In such circumstances it was
considered the correct response to aver 'not known, and therefore not admitted.'168 A
simple denial was sufficient to put the other party to his proof but any deviations
from these formulae - such as 'irrelevant' or 'may be true' - without the word
'denied', were held not to be denials and therefore were construed as express
admissions.169 A good illustration of what was considered the proper manner of
answering averments can be found in Maclaurin's Form of Process (1836),170 where
the author provides styles for the correct responses by a defender to the
condescendence. Where it was intended to make an admission then this was either
of the whole - 'Admitted' or in part - 'Admitted [the particular statement of fact] but
quoad ultra this article is denied'. Where averments founded upon a document
produced but the content was disputed, the response was' Admitted under reference
to the [document] itself.' Where an averment fell outwith the knowledge of the
defender the answer was 'Not known to the defender, and not admitted' and where
the averment was not admitted the correct response was simply 'Denied' or 'Denied
as irrelevant'171 or 'Denied and reference is made to the defender's statement of
facts'.172
167 M'Glashan, op. cit. p.91 If it was within knowledge, the consequences only came later at
proof when it was held to be an admission and expenses would be granted against the
offending party (even if successful) for the costs of proving those parts of the opponent's case
which he had not admitted but which were known to him.
168 J. Maclaurin, Form ofProcess ill Civil Causes before the Sheriff-Courts of Scotland (Edinburgh,
1836) 139.
169 ibid. 139. See also Ellis v. Fraser (1840) 3 D.B.M. 271 per Lord Gillies and Lord M'Kenzie
and M'Glashan, Practical Notes (2nd ed.) op. cit. p. 275.
170
p. 140ff.
171 'Denied and irrelevant' was acceptable in this period but was not 'good pleading' later.
See J.M. Lees, A Handbook ofWritten and Oral Pleading in the SheriffCourt (2nd ed.), (1920) p. 48.
172 In Appendix 2 there are the results of a short inspection of the Faculty of Advocates'
General Collection of Session Papers in the Advocates' Library.
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The profession's reluctance simply to admit or deny averments of an opponent arose
for a variety of reasons. In the first place, caution had to be exercised in making
admissions because, once made, they could not easily be retracted.173 Thus, given
that the admission on record was conclusive as judicial proof against the party
making it,174 it was the safer course simply to deny the opposite averment or at best
make a partial admission of 'immaterial' facts and then deny the remainder of the
article of condescendence [or other part of pleading] with the suffix 'insofar as
inconsistent with the following statement.' This would then permit the party to aver
his statement of facts as per the procedure under A.S. 11 July 1828. Secondly, where
proof was inevitable, it was possible by simply denying the averments to 'keep the
pursuer as much in the dark as possible, as the facts to be proved, till the proof was
led.'175
Thus the requirements of the Act of 1825 could be met by simply and generally
denying the averments of the other side and putting him to his proof176 or, if one
wished to lead evidence, by making one's own full statement of facts. As the Dean of
Faculty, John Flope could tell Professor Bell and the other commissioners,
'A practice has crept in, nobody knows how, - certainly it was not the
intention of the claim in the Act of Sederunt, - by which the original object of
173 M'Leod v. Thompsons 1822 1 Shaw 300 (N.E. 279) J.J. Murray explained to the
Commissioners, 'in practice, it frequently happens, that very serious inconvenience arises
from admissions made by the less cautious litigant' Answers of J.J. Murray, Commissioner's
Report, 1834, p. 25, Ans. 32.
174 although jury trial practice had attempted to modify this. See below.
175 M'GIashan, Practicnl Notes (2nd ed.) op. cit. pp. 275-6.
176 Hence Dickson's later discussion of where the burden of proof lay in civil proof was
founded upon this. 'It is only when the defences contain a simple denial of the pursuer's
averments, that the onus falls as a matter of course upon him [i.e. the pursuer]. In the more
common case of the defence being laid upon explanations or counter averments, which in
their nature admit of proof, the question of which party must take the lead is determined by
more discriminating rules. W.G. Dickson, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence in Scotland, 2 vols.
(Edinburgh, 1855) Vol. 1 p. 3.
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our pleadings seems to be entirely evaded. A man makes his statement, and
there is no answer to the statement but a mere general denial. Then a
separate statement is made by the other party, which ought to be in answer
to the statement of the pursuer, but which you cannot take as admissions
and the result is, that an immense proportion of cases are now sent to jury
trial...'177
He recalled how practice had developed in the immediate period after the
implementation of the Act:
'If you look at the form of the first two years of the Judicature Act, when the
statement of the respondent was always put, corresponding to the
averments of the condescender, you will see the benefit of that form of
pleading, which prevented that evasive style of pleading, by which a party
merely says, in answer to a detailed and specific article "denied:" the result
is, that we are losing sight of one of the main objects of our forms of
pleading.'178
Even the import of clear admissions on record had by 1834, been challenged in jury
trial practice:
I conceive a great deal of mischief has been done by the introduction of that
rule in the jury court, that the admission on the record was not complete
evidence, except a separate admission was added to it. It is quite right to
give to parties, before coming to trial, the opportunities of making farther
admissions; but it is wrong to say, when you have sent a record to get an
177 Commissioners' Report, 1834, p. 86, Ans. 31.
178 Commissioners' Report, 1834p. 86, Ans. 31. Although this was his personal opinion, there
were many in the Faculty who adhered.
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issue prepared, the parties were not afterwards to be conclusively held by
the admissions in that record.'179
The Dean considered that 'now-adays minute facts averred would be met with a
general denial and nothing is gained by it'180 and he expressed the opinion that
'the form of general denials should never be allowed in any instance. 1st, they
are of no use to the court in considering the case, unless it is to end in proof;
and I concur in the remarks that were made by Lord Brougham, in his speech
on the administration of justice,181 that there can be nothing so injurious to a
jury trial as the possibility of surprise which general statements or denials
almost necessarily lead to.'182
It should be remembered that the Act of Sederunt 1828 had provided that the
condescendence and answers could be 'revised' and in practice this was another
cause of delay.
The system of revisal and re-revisal, amended by the A.S. 1828, superseded the
provisions that required parties to appear before the Lord Ordinary for finally
adjusting their pleadings after the condescendence and answers to the extent that the
179 ibid. p. 86, Ans. 32.
180 ibid. p. 86, Ans. 32.
181 This is probably a reference to 'Present State of the Law. The Speech of Henry Brougham
in the House of Commons on Thursday, February 6,1828' (London, 1828) in which the MP
and future Lord Chancellor scrutinised and assessed a wide range of topics in English Law.
At p. 69, commenting on traditional English forms of pleading, he had stated 'The first great
rule of pleading should be to induce and compel the litigant parties to disclose fully and
distinctly the real nature of their respective contentions, whether claim or defence, as early as
possible. The second is, that no needless impediment should be thrown in the way of either
party.. .whereby he may be hindered to propound his case in point of fact, or of law. In the
third place, all needless repetitions, and, generally, all prolixity should, as well as all mere
reasoning, which neither simply affirms nor denies any proposition of fact, be prevented.' As
noted above, Henry Brougham had been an advocate before calling to the English bar. A year
after this speech, he would be given a peerage and elevated to Lord Chancellor in Lord
Grey's new Whig administration of 1830.
182 Commissioner's Report, 1834, p. 86, Ans. 31.
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hearing followed long periods of revisal. Under the statutory provisions,183 the right
of revisal on the motion of either party was absolute but the revisals were supposed
to be made to the pleadings under the superintendence of the Ordinary and it had
been envisaged that the procedure could be completed on summons and defences
briefly, or if necessary, on the pursuer's condescendence and the defender's answers.
There was supposed to be only one revisal; but second condescendences became
normal and with the development of the 'revised' condescendence and answers and
the 're-revised' condescendence and answers, parties came to view the first
condescendence and answers of little importance.184 Second revisals became a matter
of course and three or four revisals were not uncommon.185 As J. Murray, writing in
1831, explained in the introduction to Volume V of his Jury Court Reports,
'After the Defence come the Condescendence, the Answers, the Revised
Condescendence and Answers, and in many cases what is called Re-Revised
or Amended Revised papers; thus, in almost all cases there are three, and in
some four, statements of the case of each party. Were we not accustomed to
this it would excite surprise; but the fact is undoubted, that ninety-nine cases
in a hundred are stated three times before they go to proof.186
The revisals, contrary to whole tenor of the 1825 scheme, became 'detailed
expositions of evidence of each particular fact' producing 'great intricacy and
confusion'.187 A motion for revisal was also used as a delaying tactic.188 As a result of
183 s. 9 1825 Act and s. 105 of the 1828 A.S.
184 see Answers by Hugh Macqueen, W.S., Commissioners' Report, 1834 Ans. 20&21, p. 37.
185 See Answers by Patrick Robertson, Advocate 'Many cases of numerous and in many cases
useless revisals of the condescendence and answers are now permitted' Commissioners'
Report, 1834, Ans. 19, 20 & 21, p. 16. There was a financial incentive to agents and counsel in
drafting these revisals as they were paid according to length. See M'GIashan, Practical Notes,
op. cit., p. 298.
186 J. Murray, Advocate, Introduction to Vol. V of Reports of Cases Tried in the Jury Court (etc.)
(Edinburgh, 1831).
187 Commissioners' Report, 1834, p. 35.
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the length and frequency of revisals to condescendences and answers, it became
difficult to read the record to discover what was actually factually disputed between
the parties and the Court was often faced with papers just as long as the minutes and
memorials, condescendences and answers which existed under the old system. It
was remarked that there was nothing 'more cumbrous and unnecessary, than the
revised and re-revised papers.'189
Not only did revisals elongate the process. It seems that a practice developed of the
Lords Ordinary ordering minutes to explain or expand averments in the revised
pleadings190 and, of course, these minutes would require answers and would then
both be debated at a later date.191
This method of presentation of fact and law was far removed from what had been
envisaged in 1825 and it is not difficult to see why the situation developed. As
already remarked upon, the Faculty of Advocates in this period was a professional
body not particularly receptive to changes in pleading practice and from the very
commencement of the 1825 Act had expressed a preference for the older methods of
'ripening or maturing a cause' by copious written pleading. It will be recalled that it
had been their collective view, expressed in 1824, that the Ordinary should have a
limited role in preparation of the parties' pleadings. Moreover, as had been
envisaged by Charles Hope, the advocates appear to have successfully subverted the
scheme under the Act and A.S. so that it now operated to permit alterations,
188 Campbell v. Ricketts or Campbell (1863) 1 M. 217 per L. Curriehill at 219.
189 Evidence of Joseph Murray Commissioners' Report, 1834 Ans. 20, p. 24.
190 Anon, 'The Law's Delay - The Plea of Relevancy' (1859) 3 Journal of Jurisprudence 57 at
60. See also Fourth Report of the Commissioners 1870, pp. 9-10.
191 The usual issue of contention was whether the party had introduced a 'new case' in the
revisals or the minute.
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variations and changes to the pleadings to be incorporated in a similar manner to the
practice of the era before. The revisal procedure permitted the cause to ripen and it
was not rushed to proof or trial upon averments which had not been fully answered
or explored.
However, the Ordinaries themselves were not entirely blameless. Although in the
immediate period following 1825 the preparation of the parties' pleadings was
subjected to judicial control and most of the judges had zealously ex proprio motu
'struck out, amended and thrown out' passages in pleadings,192 or ordered
withdrawal of papers 'unnecessarily loose and voluminous,'193 by 1831 this was
done, if at all, with 'a very sparing hand.'194 The judges now preferred to allow the
parties exhaustively195 to thrash out the issues themselves, acquiescing in the
numerous revisals and only closely examining the parties' respective positions at the
closing of the record.196 Hugh Macqueen, W.S., explained the procedure, in his
evidence to the 1834 Commissioners
'According to the actual practice of the Court, the Judge before whom a
cause comes to depend in the Outer House, does not read any of the
condescendences or written pleadings until a record has actually been
completed. So that during the tedious preparation of the record, the Judge, at
best, can only have a general conception of the nature and character of the
192 Charles v. South District Market Co. (1825) 4 Shaw 506.
193 Mackenzie v. Magistrates ofDingivall (1827) 5 Shaw 339 (N.E. 314), Hamilton v. Macks (1828) 6
Shaw 1033.
194 Murray, Introduction, op. cit. p. 17.
195 Bell's description of the 'mode of pleading' of the time is peppered with this word and he
remarks that it was the duty of the judge to examine the summons, defences and
condescendences and answers to ensure that the cause was 'fully pleaded'. Bell, Principles of the
Law ofScotland (2nd and 3rd eds.) op. cit. paras. 2274 and 2271 respectively.
196 See the Answers of Dean of Faculty John Hope to Commissioners that [The Ordinaries']
'examination of the summons has not been quite so rigorously or anxiously attencied to as
was expected' This could be extrapolated to all the parts of the pleadings. Commissioners'
Report, 1834, p. 83-4, Ans. 7.
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litigation; and the parties not unfrequently lodge before him three or four
successive papers on each side. The pursuer's first paper (after the
summons,) is entitled "condescendence," and the defender's first paper
(after his defences,) is entitled "answers to the condescendence." It is not the
practice of the Judge to read these papers, in order to ascertain whether they
sufficiently meet each other, or constitute a good record. As a matter of
course, the pursuer is allowed to revise his condescendence, and the
defender to revise his answers. Entirely new papers are, after considerable
delay, given in by the parties under the title of revised papers; and it not
unfrequently happens that a tiiird set of written pleadings (still without any
examination by the Judge) is given in, under the appellation of re-revised
condescendence and re-revised answers. Numerous instances may be found,
at every bar, where these re's, on each side, extend to re-re-re-re. In the end,
the Judge makes avizandum, and at avizandum, he only reads the Inst one of
the re's upon each side, on which alone the record is afterwards closed.197
What was supposed to happen was that after revisal, the parties were required
under the Act to appear before the Ordinary for final adjustment of their respective
averments of fact and their notes of pleas in law whereupon the Ordinary was to
examine these, suggesting any new plea which would be required to exhaust the
whole disputable matter in fact and law, permitting any further adjustment as
necessary, after which the record was authenticated and closed. Occasionally the
Ordinary could order further disclosure of a party's position after the closing of the
197 Answers of H. Macqueen, W.S., Commissioners' Report, 1834, p. 37, Ans. 20 & 21. He
continued that the case was with the judge thereafter at avizandum for several months
preparatory to closing the record and when released, the record was closed and the parties
were ordered to debate on the debate roll which could take another several months. When
the debate was finally heard, it once more went to avizandum for an indefinite period.
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record198 but in general, it seems, the record comprising the revised condescendences
and answers, was held to contain the parties' separated averments of facts and
statements of law. The actual result was more often a product just as long and
diffuse as the pre-1825 pleadings, containing partial admissions and general denials,
averments and statements of facts containing evidence and argument, averments of
the probability of the truthfulness of parties' positions, mixed with propositions in
law as well as the facts both essential and non-essential and pleaded both as
averment and in the pleas-in-law. it was difficult to follow what was disputed by the
parties in fact and law.199 The House of Lords was not favourably disposed to this
presentation of pleading under the 'Scotch' system and as Lord Chancellor
Brougham remarked in 1833, there could not 'by possibility, be a more inconvenient
mode of proceeding than this'200 and that the Court was 'left to calculate and to
guess; ... [and] almost left to conjecture what the real points of difference in matters
of fact are between the parties'.201
Why was it that the advocates returned to this manner of pleading? We have already
discussed some of the reasons above, but there were two additional factors. In the
first place, there were variations among the judges as to how the statute and
provisions of the respective acts of sederunt were to be applied. Even the Divisions
198 M'Glashan, op cit. p. 99, M'Donnel v. Caledonian Canal Commissioners (1829), M'Kenzie v.
Smith (1829) D&A Reports.
199 s.106 of A.S. 11th July 1828 had attempted to remedy this by stipulating how the record
was to be made up: 'in all causes wherever the condescendence and answers, as revised and
finally adjusted for the record, shall be printed, this shall be done either in double columns
on the same page, so that the answer to each article shall be opposite to the corresponding
article of the condescendence, or each answer shall follow and be subjoined to the article of
the condescendence to which it relates.' Practice followed the latter.
200 Blincow's Trustee v. Allan & Co. (1833-4) 7 W. & S. 26 at 53.
201 ibid. p. 56.
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could vary in interpretation.202 If there were different judicial interpretations of the
provisions, all one could do was to draft the pleadings to meet the vagaries of the
Ordinary who ordered them, but insert material which might be more favourably
received by another. As Murray noted
'Besides, there is an impression prevalent at the Bar, that the Judges differ in
opinion as to what ought and ought not to be stated' and 'the Bar attempt to
meet those different, or they suppose different, views of the Judges; and it is
no unusual apology for what is pointed out as redundant in the pleadings,
that it was inserted to meet the views of the Judge who ordered the paper.'203
In his evidence to the 1834 Commissioners he expanded upon this.
'When a new system is to be introduced, it is of great importance, that it
should be under the regulation of one mind. When there are a number acting
separately, there will always be shades of difference in their views, and
where these exist, it must necessarily distract and puzzle those who must
thus have various new systems, instead of one, to learn and practise.204
Secondly, there were very strong suspicions in the Faculty that the Judges were
deciding cases on the records and not upon the viva voce pleading which was to
follow at the debate after the revised condescendences and answers had been
lodged. Their oral submissions on the written pleadings were often cut short by the
judges205 and the pleadings were advised immediately ex tempore. Requests for proof
202 e.g. the First Division considered that actions raised before the passing of the 1825 Act
were now to be regulated in accordance with that Act (Veitch v. Tennant 4 Shaw 352) but the
Second Division took the opposite view. (Scott v. Hamilton 4 Shaw 390).
2°3 Murray, Introduction, op. cit. p. 17.
204 Answers by J. Murray Commissioners' Report, 1834, Ans. 24, p. 24 See also the Evidence of
Patrick Robertson, Advocate, Commissioners' Report, 1834, Ans. 18, p. 16.
205 An article written in 1859 opined 'All attempts to get through the arrears by stopping
speeches and "bringing parties to the point" (as it is grimly called), only end by sending
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on commission or for issues to be adjusted were often denied. To all intents and
purposes, the Ordinaries had reverted to the old manner of deciding cases without
proof, on the probability of the truth of parties' respective averments. Further, where
the debate did proceed without judicial interruption, the Ordinary would frequently
sustain a party's submission that the pleadings were irrelevant or would decide the
case on the hypothetical facts (whether constituted by genuine admissions or not)
applying law and obviating costly inquiry by proof.
It was thought that this was even more prevalent where the Ordinary had ordered in
'written cases'206 in causes of importance or difficulty after the record was closed as
well as in the Inner House on reclaiming motions. The Bar considered that to
counteract this, they had to jettison any attempts to comply with the strictures of the
revised method of pleading and follow suit, not on the basis that this was a reversion
to a more comfortable style, but because it was imperative to a client's case that all
the facts connected with the case, conclusions deduced from the facts, evidence and
argument, were presented to the judge, if there was a risk that he would decide on
probability of the cause, without proof.
Even the leader of the Bar told the 1834 Commissioners that judges decided the
cause on a 'general impression' of the record which tended to 'loose decisions on the
whole matter' of the cause207 and Lord Moncrieff, looking back in 1867 to his early
counsel, agents and parties out of Court, dissatisfied and indignant, and in covering the table
of the House of Lords with appeals.' Anon., 'The Law's Delay - The Plea of Relevancy' (1859)
3 Journal of Jurisprudence 57 at 63.
206 i.e. a written pleading on the merits. The procedure was regulated by ss. 22 of the 1825 Act
and ss. 62 - 64 of the A.S. 1828. A case was prepared by printing a copy of the record as
authenticated and each ground of law or pleas as stated in the record was separately argued.
207 Answers by John Hope, Commissioners' Report, 1834, Ans 17. The Commissioners
concurred in this assessment. See First Report of the Commissioners op. cit. pp. 40-2.
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years at the Bar recollected 'when I came to the bar, the Judges, who had been
trained in the school of written pleadings, were impatient of oral debate in the Inner
House.'208
Crabb Watt, in his Memoir of Lord President Inglis, observed of the period,
'Previous to debate, meagre records - which in many instances came in place
of the time honoured minutes - were read overnight by certain judges who
came up in the morning with clear opinions (frequently indicated to the
counsel who opened) for or against either party, judgment often being given
upon air insufficient hearing.'209
It was probably for these two reasons that the profession had returned to averments
of rhetoric and argument, averments of evidence and probability and all facts
connected with the cause if the judge was to determine a cause on a view of the
whole pleadings.210
(ix) The Profession's Desire for More Superintendence in the
Preparation of Records and Striking Out Irrelevant Material.
Strangely, some of the evidence from the profession suggested that the best way
forward was for there to be greater supervision of the parties' pleadings by the
Ordinary and for the profession to realise that capital could be made from errors in
the opponent's pleadings. The future Lord Robertson told the Commissioners,
208 Lord Moncrieff, Address to Scots Law Society 1867 [repr. 'Introductory Addresses - Lord
Ormidale and the Dean of Faculty' (1867) 11 Journal of Jurisprudence 566 at 570 and
(mis)quoted by Crabb Watt op. cit. p. 55],
209 James Crabb Watt, John Inglis op. cit. p. 241.
210 This was to be an ongoing suspicion at the Bar for the next thirty years.
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'Improvement of pleading will be more securely advanced by a careful
superintendence of the Judge, and by practice211... It should not be left to the
party to admit or deny such facts as he thinks proper212... I think the Judge
ought to superintend the preparation of the record in chambers.213
And James Joseph Murray expressed this view,
'If the present form of summons is retained, it is well worthy of
consideration whether, in all cases, the facts ought not to be stated, as they
now are in the condescendence, under separate numbers or articles, and
each averred as a fact, instead of giving an involved statement of fact and
inference. This will require strict attention on the part of the Judges, and I
doubt whether any degree of attention, on their part, will ever be sufficient,
or that anything will prove an effectual check to the statement of irrelevant
matter in the summons and condescendence, till the one party can be made
to feel, that he derives some benefit, from laying hold of any error on the
part of his opponent, though undoubtedly it must be under the direction of
the Judges, till certain principles are fixed, and something like a system of
accurate pleading is formed.214
In practice, summonses were once more drafted as the 'opening gambit' and defects
therein were supplied by the condescendence. It was suggested that this could be
corrected by the Ordinaries using their powers under the Act.215
'Were all summonses containing argument, quotation of documents,
statements tending to prove the ground of action instead of merely setting it
forth in concise and explicit terms, dismissed as the present regulations
authorize, there is no need of farther enactments. The Lord Ordinary should
211 Commissioners' Report, 1834, Ans. 24 & 25, p.16.
212 Commissioners' Report, 1834, Ans. 32,33,34,35, p.17.
213 Commissioners' Report, 1834, Ans 38, p. 17.
214 Commissioners' Report, 1834, Ans. 6, p. 23.
213 1825 Acts. 6.
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enforce the principle, by expunging irrelevant statements, and giving
expenses before allowing the record to be closed.'216
The Ordinaries seem to have been reluctant, though, to 'expunge irrelevant
statements.' It seems that the only category of statements which they would ex
proprio motu order to be removed were those of an impertinent or scandalous nature,
or averments unjustifiably imputing fraud, or immoral conduct on the part of others
not parties to the action.217 This came to be the only type of irrelevant averment
which would be removed by the judge. In 1857, in an editorial attacking the use of
the general plea of relevancy, the Journal of Jurisprudence remarked
'The judges are not altogether helpless, and not entirely blameless. They are
not so confined by the strait jacket of statutory enactments and fixed rules,
that they cannot prevent, to some extent, this great scandal to the
administration of justice. Although the plea be not impertinent and cannot
therefore be struck out of the record,218 yet the defender is not entitled to
judgment on it, at his own time.'219
The reasons for the Ordinaries' reluctance to utilise the 1825 Act's powers of striking
out irrelevant material are more difficult to ascertain. The following considerations
216 James Johnston Darling, W.S. Commissioner's Report, 1834, Ans. 6, p. 28.
217 The averments were not privileged and an action for 'judicial slander' was competent. See
also infra Ch. 4 (for cases).
218 my emphasis.
219 Editorial 'The Law's Delay - The Plea of Relevancy' (1859) 3 Journal of Jurisprudence 57.
The editorial was probably the work of Sheriff Guthrie Smith who edited the Journal at its
inception. See J.C. Brown, 'Scottish Legal Periodicals 1829-1935' in An Introductory Survey of
the Sources and Literature ofScots Law (Stair Society), (Edinburgh, 1935) 317 at 319. However, it
is difficult to attribute many of the anonymous works which appeared in the Journal until its
demise in 1891. Many came from young liberal and progressive advocates. The ruling
principle of the journal from the outset was 'free discussion' and as will be appreciated from
the tenor of many of the articles quoted infra., it was not always wise to append one's name
to the article. As Brown notes, 'not a few editors and contributors diet themselves more harm
than good in the eyes of the powers that were.' ibid. p. 320.
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may have played a part in affecting the collective view of the judges as to their
proper judicial function. One might speculate that they would have considered it to
be a form of judgment on the merits of the action before the record was closed, if a
decision was taken at that stage of the relevancy of the parties' averments, and so
capable of forming a valid ground for a reclaiming petition, but this is not attractive
as the Act prescribed that it was their duty to do this prior to the closing of the
record. Of course, a closed record was different as the parties could then be held to
be resting foreclosed upon the contents thereof and thus dismissal of a cause in
relevancy based on the parties' pleadings on the record itself (even without oral
argument) was not necessarily repugnant. One might also suggest that although the
act gave the Ordinaries these powers, it had been a feature of Enlightment thinking,
a generation before, that the proper role of the judge was as an 'umpire' between two
agonistic combatants.220 Few of the judges would have been unaware of the dicta of
Lord Chancellor Eldon a few years before221 and English procedural influences were
extending into Scotland at this stage although they were to have greater effect later.
Perhaps the reasons were more mundane. It will be recalled that these judges had
been advocates at a time when the Faculty's professed position in the conduct of
litigation was very far away from any concept of judicial 'interference'. Thus,
perhaps the Ordinaries were amenable to submissions by counsel that it was not part
220 particularly expressed by Adam Smith. See further P. Stein, 'Law and Society in
Eighteenth-Century Scottish Thought' in (eds. N.T. Phillipson and R. Mitchison) Scotland in
the Age of Improvement Essays in Scottish History in the Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh UP, 1996)
148 at 162 and for an assessment of Smith's theories on law and reform of court procedure,
see J.W. Cairns, 'Adam Smith and the Role of the Court in Securing Justice and liberty' in
(eds.), RP Malloy and J. Evensky, Adam Smith and the Philosophy ofLaw and Economics
(Dortdrecht, Kluwer, 1994) 31 and by the same author 'Ethics and the Science of Legislation :
Legislators, Philosophers, and Courts in Eighteenth-Century Scotland', (2000) 8 Jahrbuch flir
Recht und Ethik 159.
221 See also the dicta of Eldon LC in Ex part Lloyd 1822 Mont 70, 72n. 'Truth is best discovered
by powerful statements on both sides of the question'. It was part of English thinking at the
time that the judge's role was as umpire, ensuring that justice was, and was seen to be, done,
overseeing the parties and the conduct of the jury trial. His role was certainly not to become
embroiled in the parties' dispute and the ascertainment of the subject matter of that dispute.
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of the judge's business to interfere with the parties' preparation of their pleadings
prior to closure of the record and in any event, it made for an easier judicial life if the
judge permitted the parties to 'exhaustively thrash' out the issues between them
using the developing rules of written pleadings, rather than descending into the
arena of conflict and sorting out the parties' positions for them.
(x) The Commission's Report 1834
Reference has already been made to the evidence provided to the Commission
appointed in 1834222 to examine the implementation of the new forms of procedure
following inter alia the passing of thel825 Act.223 Under the chairmanship of George
Joseph Bell224 it took evidence in the form of answers to questions (85 in total) which
questions are set out at pp. 11A to 15A in the appendix to the First Report. The First
Report was produced in 1834.225 In it, the Commissioners acknowledged that
'There has been, for some time past, general and increasing dissatisfaction
throughout the country, with the mode in which justice is at present
administered in the Court of Session. It seems to be generally felt, that the
advantages which were anticipated from the changes introduced by the
Judicature Act have not been realised to nearly the extent that was expected;
222 For our purposes, we concentrate on the First Report which had been required inter alia to
conduct [Purpose 2nd], diligent and full enquiry 'As to the methods now followed ofpreparing
Records in the said Court, and any alteration it may befit to make in such methods, with a view to
correct investigation, and to economy and dispatch.'
223 Also Jury Court assimilation.
224 For background to his life and work and his involvement in the 1824 Commission and his
Chairmanship of the 1834 Commission see R. Black, 'Introduction to the 1990 Reprint' in
Commentaries on the Law ofScotland and on the Principles ofMercantile Jurisprudence by George
Joseph Bell (7th ed.), (1990 Reprint) vol. 1, (Edinburgh, 1990); W.M. Gordon, 'Introduction to
the 1989 Reprint' in Principles of the Law ofScotland by George Joseph Bell Professor of the Law of
Scotland in the University ofEdinburgh (10th ed.), (1989 Reprint), (Edinburgh, 1989) and by the
same author, 'George Joseph Bell - Law Commissioner' in A.J. Gamble (ed.), Obligations in
Context: Essays in Honour of Professor D.M. Walker (Edinburgh, 1990) 79.
225 First Report of His Majesty's Law Commissioners, Scotland. 12 May 1834 (hereafter First
Report 1834).
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and that there is not merely room, but an absolute necessity for some
material reform.226
But their proposals for reform were few in number and the whole Report was really
a damp squib. The Commissioners accepted the evidence that the summons was
often defective and inaccurate as it was frequently drafted in haste to obtain
diligence but decided to retain it in the same form.227 As to abuses in the lodging of
and construction of defences, the Commission considered that any evils in form had
arisen from misapprehension, it being a new system. It acknowledged problems of
due enforcement although it considered that any 'evils' were gradually
disappearing.228
On the Faculty's suggestion that the preparation of a case for decision was no part of
proper judicial duty229 the Commission was more positive. It was their strong
conviction that records should be adjusted under the immediate superintendence of
the judge as this was the clear intention of the Judicature Act although adjustment at
the conclusion of revisal was thought to be best conducted in chambers.230
But on the anxious topic of superintendence of the preparation of parties' pleadings
before this stage was reached, the Commission thought it better to leave it to the
discretion of the court in checking such abuses as may occur. This approach was
justified in part on the basis that changes in form could have 'injurious
226 ibid. p. 30.
227 ibid, pp.31- 33.
228 ibid. p. 34.
229 Members of the Faculty of Advocates had given this evidence, still adhering to the
collective Faculty's position as per their 1824 Report.
230 First Report 1834 p. 39.
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consequences' and they noted that since 1815 there had been 1300 reported cases in
the Court of Session on points of mere form.231
No new Acts of Sederunt or Acts of Parliament followed the Commissioners' Report,
(xi) The Start of the Development of 'Fair Notice'?
We may briefly notice in this period the possible start of the development of 'fair
notice' and the relationship between what was averred on record and evidence
which was admissible at commission or in jury trial upon issues (and later which
could be led at proof). One sees a snippet in the evidence to the Commissioners
reflecting concern that a party 'should have no ground to complain of surprise in
proof.'232 This idea in the evidence of James Joseph Murray, Advocate had been
previously explained by him in his Introduction to Volume V of the Jury Court
Reports as being part of the new function of pleadings informing the other side and
not just the judge:
[the object of pleading] 'now is to inform the opposite party of the facts
which, when proved, will support the action or defence'233 [and] 'to give
information to the opposite party of the nature of the case to be proved
against him, and to prevent surprise.'234
Whilst it was accepted that the information to be given to the other party was the
facts which the party intended to prove but not how they were to be proved, Murray
had considered that a clear and distinct statement of the ground of action or defence
would 'put the opposite party on his guard as to the case which is to be proved
231 p. 36.
232 Answers of James Joseph Murray, Advocate, Commissioners' Report, 1834, Ans. 5, p. 23.
233 Murray Introduction, op. cit. p.7.
234 Murray, Introduction, op. cit. p. 10.
214
against him.'235 It is odd that in the pages of evidence submitted to the
Commissioners it was only Murray who had raised this. In the period, other
commentators had considered that the purpose of written pleadings was to facilitate
exhaustive reasoning so that the debateable grounds of the cause were fully gone
over such that the judge was satisfied that the cause was fully pleaded; and if parties
were not skilful enough to do this, the judge himself was required to direct parties to
remedy any defects before the record was closed.236 To succeed the party had to state
the whole facts of his case such as to be sufficient to infer the conclusions,237 or
'support' the conclusions, but the sufficiency element was examined technically in
the context of this 'support' not as to whether there was sufficient 'notice' to the
other side.
But the development of pleadings constituting notice to the opponent such as to
prevent surprise and thus prevent the opponent's objection to evidence led in trial
seems to have been part of jury court practice. It will be recollected that Murray
himself was the editor of the Jury Trial Reports.238 Consider also this passage from
the jury cause practice book of 1837 by the future Lord Ormidale:
all that is required [sc. for pleadings in jury actions] is, that the grounds of
action and defence are brought out with sufficient precision and distinctness
to suggest the proper issue or issues, and enable the parties, at the trial, to
lead their proof, free from any objection of not having given due notice, of
the grounds of fact or law, on which they respectively rely.'239
235 ibid. p. 26.
236 See e.g. Bell's Principles 2nci ed. (1830) op. cit. pp. 620-1.
237 Shand, Practice, (1848) op. cit. p. 330.
238 Murray, Reports of Cases Tried in the Jury Court at Edinburgh, and on the Grant from
November 1828 to July 1830 both inclusive. (Edinburgh, 1818 - 1831).
239 Robert Macfarlane, The Practice of the Court of Session in Jury Causes (Edinburgh, 1837) p. 32.
My emphasis.
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By 1842, this concept of notice to the other side as a requirement had developed. In
this year, John Hope240 was the Lord Justice-Clerk. In Neilson v. HouseJiill Coal and
Iron Company,241 a complicated patent action, he told the jury,
'if each party has not full242 and fair notice of the adversary's case, he cannot
be able to meet it in evidence; and if a verdict passes in consequence of
parties entering on a line of enquiry, of which the adversary got 110 notice,
and on which he could not be prepared, a trial would be the most imperfect
and defective mode of investigation which could be conceived. The evil of
this state of things was universally felt in England, and the eloquent and
striking problem of these evils, in the celebrated and most instructive speech
of Lord Brougham on law reform,243 led to what all think still an imperfect
and incomplete remedy in England. We have always had a complete
protection against such evils in Scotland in our system of pleadings, and in
the principles on which they are framed, and by which, under statute, they
must be framed in Scotland. The beauty of the Scotch system is, that, without
disclosing what is properly called evidence, you must at least state the line of
defence, and the main facts and points in the enquiry on which you rest, so
that the other party shall be fully able previously to investigate the case, and
be prepared for it.'244
240 whose views on written pleadings expressed to the 1834 Commissioners when he was
Dean of Faculty we have already examined.
241 (1842) 4 D. 1187. Shand ibid, cites this case as an authority for the above proposition that
the whole facts to be proved had to be set forth in the condescendences and answers - not
that it was required as fair notice to the other side to prevent surprise.
242 notice the word 'full'
243 referred to above.
244
p. 1193. The defenders had lodged a 'Note of Objections' and had argued that they were
'not to be limited to their record' (p. 1192.)
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The concept of fair notice as specification, at least outwith jury trial, seems to have
developed later245 and the modern rules are examined in the next chapter, but it
might be suggested that the origins of the concept arose about this time as part of the
practice of the jury court. By the mid fifties, Dickson could state in his Treatise on
Evidence, under the heading 'Variance between the Allegation and the Proof'246
'As the object of making up a record is to bring out the facts in dispute
between the parties, and thus to prevent surprise on either side, a different
case from that which is averred cannot be proved, although it may in itself be
a good ground of action or defence.'247
He explained that a variance between averment and proof in a matter of essential
description was fatal, because
'the other party having come prepared to meet a certain defined case, he
might be surprised and seriously prejudiced, if a case materially different in
description were allowed to be proved against him'.248
Thus, if the substance of the issue, or of the libel where there was no issue, was not
proved the defender was successful. But it was enough that the issue or libel was
proved substantially as a pursuer did not require to prove immaterial facts, and the
'Court will not listen to objections of a captious or hypercritical nature if the
verdict is clear according to a natural and common sense reading of the
verdict although not framed with technical precision or strict logical
accuracy.249
245 see infra in this chapter.
246 Dickson A Treatise on The Law of Evidence in Scotland, 1st ed., 2 vols., (Edinburgh, 1855) vol.
i, pp. 34.
247 ibid. p. 34-5.
248 ibid. p. 38.
249 citing Lawson v. North British Rail Co. (1850) 12 DBM 1250. ibid.
217
The General Session papers held in the Advocates' Library contain pleadings from
the period. Appendix 2 to this thesis contains a brief examination of terms used in
the pleadings from 1843 to 1873. The standard plea during this period was that the
'averments of the pursuer are not relevant or sufficient to support the conclusions of
the summons' or a variation thereof. By the end of this period, one sees in pleadings
'calls' for further specification such as 'The pursuer is called upon to provide dates
and particulars relating to ...' However, the first use of a plea directed to
specification per se, seems to have been around 1885 when pleas such as 'The
averments of the defenders are irrelevant and wanting in specification and should
not be remitted to probation' and 'The pursuer's statements are irrelevant and
wanting in specification' are found.
(xii) Ongoing Problems with Written Pleadings and Further Proposals
for Change
Following the Commissioners' Report, the Bar in any event continued to plead
evidence, and closure on a summons and defences was rare. On 6 March 1839 the
Lords Ordinary published a Notice in an attempt to 'purify and simplify the
records.' In their collective view, records were not being 'prepared according to the
true meaning and spirit of the Judicature Act.' They advised that from now on
'[EJvery possible encouragement shall be given to parties to close the record on
summonses and defences'; minor amendments would be permitted; and they called
upon the Faculty to 'abstain...from expositions of evidence, or displays of
circumstances, plainly meant to operate as argumentative views of the facts.' No
more than one revisal was to be allowed as a matter of course, and no 'quotations
from statutes, deeds, correspondence or other documents' were to be permitted -
'except of a few words or lines to indicate the passages relied on'.
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Regarding the use of argument, the Notice does not seem to have been closely
followed in practice, for reasons similar to those which had blunted the provisions of
1825 Act explained above, and closing on a summons and defences remained
infrequent.250
In 1847/8, the Court, in a draft Act of Sederunt, made another attempt to prohibit
bad practices in pleadings and prevent revisals and re-revisals. The draft was, in
part, a regurgitation of previous proposals. It proposed that the summons could be
amended before closing the record,251 the Ordinary could record on the Interlocutor
sheet whether it was his view that further papers were required after the summons
and defences, the defender's statement of facts would be incorporated in the
answers, admissions and denials were to be specific and no arguments, observations
or inferences were to be introduced into the record. There would be only one revisal
and the revised condescendence and answers would not form separate papers.252 An
admission could be deemed where an averment was not denied and was within or
even outwith the parties' knowledge. It was proposed that there could be no
quotation from documents other than those 'forming the ground of the action or
defence.' The Ordinary would continue to have the power of ordering matter
improperly introduced into the record, or which in his opinion was unnecessary or
irrelevant, to be deleted. At the closing of the record, it was envisaged that the
Ordinary could 'put it to the party, whether he intends to stand on particular
averments or denials.'
250 There was an act of sederunt passed 10 July 1839 once more reinforcing earlier provisions
that a fact relevantly averred which was not admitted or denied by the party within whose
knowledge it was, was held to be admitted.
251 This was later implemented. See infra.
252 This was also implemented later. See infra.
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The Faculty responded in the usual way by appointing a Committee to investigate
the proposals, which duly reported in May 1848.253 For the Committee and the
Faculty, the proposals were a curate's egg - good in parts. They considered that the
summons should contain the condescendences as articulate statements of the facts,254
and the incorporation of the defender's statement of facts was generally a good idea
but would not work in practice. They were vehemently opposed, however, to the
idea that the Ordinary could cielete parts of the record as irrelevant prior to hearing
the parties on the merits because, (as they had expressed before255) 'the party ought
to be entitled to state his case in such way as his advisers think right.'256 It was best if
the power of deletion was exercised only to delete averments improper in form such
as long quotations from documents or argumentative pleading.257 They dismissed
the idea that there could be a deemed admission of a fact outwith a party's
knowledge as an error in the draft as it would be 'plainly inadmissible.'258
The draft was abandoned. Lord Cockbum259 had been one of the draftsmen of the
proposal and with his usual sense of drama he recorded the episode in his Journal,
'The Committee of Judges (of whom the Justice-Clerk Hope and I were the
most active) framed as complete a new system as was possible without a
Statute last session, and the rest of the Court agreed with it with greater
253 Report of the Committee Appointed by the Faculty ofAdvocates to Consider the Proposed Act of
Sederunt (Edinburgh, 1848) [hereafter Faculty ofAdvocates' Report 1848].
254 Faculty ofAdvocates' Report 1848 op. cit. p. 3.
255 It will be recalled that in 1824 the Faculty had considered that it was for the parties to
'conduct their cause in the manner they think best.' They expressed the view that it was 'no
part of the business of the Judge to do more than to decide the case which the parties present
to him.' Report of the Committee of the Faculty of Advocates (Edinburgh, 1824) op. cit. p. 6
See supra.
256 Facidty Report, 1848 op. cit. p. 11-12.
257 This was how the provisions in the 1825 Act had been interpreted. See supra.
258 Facidty Report, 1848 op. cit. p. 10.
259 He had also been one of the Ordinaries who issued the Notice in 1839. See above.
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unanimity than I ever knew prevail among them on such a matter. But "The
Bodies" flew up in arms, and exclaimed against the whole project, on
grounds which implied that in their opinion everything was quite right. The
solicitors were the least bigoted - the advocates the most so. The Judges
aware of the hopelessness of their forcing good medicine down a resisting
corporate throat, gave the scheme up, but told the Lord-advocate that a
Statute was indispensable. So we stand now. If the procedure be corrected
effectually and speedily, the Court has a chance : if not, half or the whole of
it will be quashed.'260
New proposals in the form of a bill261 followed the same year drafted under the hand
of the Lord Advocate, Andrew Rutherfurd Clark, and the bill was to become the
Court of Session Act 1850. The proposed changes were again subjected to criticism
by the Faculty262 but strangely, and quite out of character, the Bar acquiesced in
many of them.
As already noted, one of the Bill's major innovations was to prohibit the Lords
Ordinary from ordering 'written cases.'263 The Lord Advocate had considered that
the system of written pleadings had been abused and it was generally thought
'that the Lords Ordinary, whenever they met with difficulties 'rushed into
cases' and that in consequence, there was a grievance that could only be
260 H. Cockburn, Journal ofHenry Cockburn, Being a Continuation of the Memorials ofHis Time
1831 - 1854 (2 vols.) (Edinburgh, 1874), ii, pp. 228-9.
261 A Bill to Facilitate the Procedure in the Court ofSession in Scotland. (Edinburgh, 1849)
262 Report of the Committee Appointed by the Facidty ofAdvocates to Consider the Bill 'To Facilitate
the Procedure in the Court of Session in Scotland' (Edinburgh, 1849), Report of the Sub-Committee
Appointed by the Facidty ofAdvocates to Consider the Clauses in the Bill 'To Facilitate the Procedure
in the Court ofSession in Scotland' Which Relate to The General Forms ofProcess (Edinburgh,
1849), (Second) Report of the Committee Appointed by the Faculty ofAdvocates to Consider the Bill
'To Facilitate Procedure in the Court ofSession' (Edinburgh, 1850).
263 s. 14 1850 Act.
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remedied by taking from the Lord Ordinary all power of ordering minutes of
debate.'254
Crabb Watt later memorably wrote that
'The 14th section of the Court of Session Act of 1850 wrought greater havoc in
the habits of lawyers than anything haci done for a hundred years.'265
and commented that whilst still at the stage of a bill
'The largest Committee of Faculty of Advocates ever appointed unanimously
condemned the proposal.' 266
But this was not strictly true. The Faculty had agreed that the change was required
as Lords Ordinary were ordering cases at the beginning of a cause before it had
'matured'267 and considered that 'some restraint of the system might be effected
without depriving the Lord Ordinary altogether, of the aid of written argument in
cases when he considered it proper for the ends of justice.'268 They had proposed to
let the clause stand as it still permitted the Lord Ordinary to report causes to the
Inner House without cases.
264 Editorial: 'The Abolition of Written Pleading. Decline of Law Learning in Scotland' 1858
op. cit. p. 49. c.f. Crabb Watt op. cit. p. 54 'The Lords Ordinary in the Outer House rushed into
"cases" to relieve themselves of difficulties, small and great, occurring before them.' See also
Report of the Council of the Society of Solicitors before the Supreme Courts of Scotland (repr.
in parts) in: Business of the Court of Session (1857) 1 Journal of Jurisprudence 274 at 275
which reported that cases were ordered where 'there was no real difficulty'.
265 Crabb Watt op. cit. p. 54. c.f. 'These four lines [scil. of section 14] have had a greater
influence upon the pleading in the courts of Scotland than all other Acts of Parliament or
Acts of Sederunt or decisions of the Courts since law was practised as a science in Scotland'.
Editorial: 'The Abolition ofWritten Pleading. Decline of Law Learning in Scotland' 1858 op.
cit. p. 49.
266 Crabb Watt, op. cit. p. 55.
267 Report of the Sub-Committee Appointed by the Faculty ofAdvocates to Consider the Clauses in the
Bill 1849) cit sup., p. 14. The Sub-Committee's Report was adopted in the following Report of
the Committee of the Faculty ofadvocates to Consider a Bill to Facilitate Procedure in the Court of
Session in Scotland op. cit. pp. 14-15.
268 ibid., p. 14.
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The Faculty were more concerned that the judges of the Inner House were deciding
cases on the record or the Minutes of Debate and recorded in their report on the bill
that the judges of the Inner House should not be 'held to have formed an opinion on
any case until the parties have been heard at the bar.'269 The abolition of written
cases or Minutes of Debate ordered by an Ordinary would actually help them to
make fuller oral submissions in the Inner House whilst there might be a chance of
retention of the institution where justice required it. The Bar perceived that if the
judges desisted from deciding the cause on the written pleadings then there would
be no need to plead argument and evidence. But even on the eve of clause 14
becoming law, the Faculty seems to have resigned itself to the disappearance of the
procedure, meekly observing that they remained
'of the opinion that it is not expedient to deprive the Lords Ordinary of the
power of ordering written argument in cases, the nature or difficulty of
which may seem to them to render this course advisable as the means of
arriving at a satisfactory judgment.'270
In the result, the ordering of minutes of debate and written cases by the Ordinary
was prohibited271 but they could be still ordered by the Inner House. Even then, their
use in that forum petered out. As the Journal of Jurisprudence recorded eight years
later,
269 Report of the Committee Appointed by the Faculty ofAdvocates to Consider the Bill (1849) cit sup.
p. 15.
270 (Second) Report of the Committee of the Facidty (1850) op. cit., p. 3.
271 s. 14 1850 Act. The Council of the Society of Solicitors before the Supreme Courts in 1857
looked back with fondness on the system as a source of learning. 'Prior to 1850 questions of
mercantile law depending as much upon English authorities as upon the judgments of the
Court of Session, invariably disposed of upon minutes or cases, and these pleadings form a
permanent source of legal knowledge of the greatest value' Report of the Council of the Society
ofSolicitors before the Supreme Courts (Edinburgh, 1857) repr. (in part) in Anon., 'Business of
the Court of Session' 1857 1 Journal of Jurisprudence 274 at p. 275.
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'Since it became law272 we believe that not a dozen cases have occurred
where either division has ordered written pleadings, however difficult the
subject or important the stake. The debate has been entirely oral.'273
But the abolition also had an unforeseen effect. Increasingly, parties reclaimed as a
matter of course to the Divisions.274
(xiii) The Court of Session Act 1850
The Bill had had a surprisingly smooth passage through the House of Commons275
and became law on 29 July 1850.276 It introduced a new form of summons in
accordance with a style appendixed to the act, integrating the condescendence and
pleas in law into the summons.277 Now the pursuer had to
'set forth in such summons, in such way and manner as the Court, having
regard to the forms set forth in Schedule (A) hereunto annexed, may from
time to time prescribe by Act of Sederunt, as applicable to the various forms
of action now in use, the name and designation of such pursuer, and the
name and designation of the defender, and the conclusions of the action,
without any statement whatever of the grounds of action;278 but the
allegations in fact, which form the grounds of action, shall be set forth in an
articulate condescendence, together with a note of the pursuer's pleas in law,
which condescendence and pleas in law shall be annexed to such summons,
and shall be held to constitute part thereof.'
272 scil. section 14.
273 Editorial 'The Abolition ofWritten Pleading. Decline of Law Learning in Scotland.' op. cit.
49 at p. 50. The session papers for the period and thereafter do however contain 'Cases'. See
comments in Appendix 1.
274 Crabb Watt, Memoir, op. cit. p. 242.
275 Pliillipson, op. cit., p. 171.
276 (13. & 14. Vict. c.36).
277 The Faculty had welcomed this whilst a provision in the Bill Report of the Sub-Committee etc.
op. cit. p. 3.
278 These had previously been stated but were now to be stated in the Condescendence.
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The parties could close the record on the summons and defences279 as before but if
not, the record was to be made by the pursuer by revising the condescendence
annexed to his summons and revisal by the defender of his defences280 although
there could be only one revisal of the condescendence and answers281 after which
parties were to attend the Ordinary in chambers with a view to adjusting the
pleadings and closing the record, the Ordinary allowing or requiring 'such
alterations and amendments to be made on the records as to him may seem
proper.'282 The act also altered the procedure regulating jury trial and the taking of
proof.283 As a result, there would develop a reluctance on the part of the judges to
decide causes on relevancy or admissions which was disparagingly said to be a
'decision on hypothetical facts'.284
With the implementation of this Act, what might be considered the modern form of
written pleading developed. In the following chapter the 'modern' rules of written
pleading are examined. As we shall see, many of the cases decided in the period 1825
onwards are still relevant as authorities.
(xiv) Continuing Reform 1850 - 1875.
279 s. 3.
280 s. 2.
281 s. 2. C.f. the Lords Ordinary Notice of 6 March 1839.
282 s. 2.
283 Briefly, s. 36: aligning practice injury trials before and after closing of the record with
other Court of Session causes, s. 37:abolishing the issue and jury clerks, s. 38: providing a
new procedure for adjustment of issues before the Ordinary, s.41: permitting closing
submissions at close of evidence, s. 45 and 46: restricting the grounds for review by Bills of
Exceptions and reclaiming Notes, s. 48: introducing a special facts procedure allowing
disposal of matters of fact without jury trial or proof on commission, s. 49: permitting the
Ordinary to take evidence by commission except in the enumerated causes (with the consent
of the parties), s.50 providing for arbitration as an alternative to litigation, s. 51: making
reporting by the Ordinary summary and verbal.
284 Mackay, op. cit. vol. ii, p. 19.
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This period was important for the development of the rules of written pleading. The
changes implemented by the 1850 Act bedded in and the old practice of revisal and
re-revisal was modified to permit only one revisal and then increased alteration at
adjustment. The introduction of amendment of the pleadings, at any time, partly
removed the need for revisal until its use petered out in practice. The powers of the
Ordinary to intervene in the preparation of the record were circumscribed by
practice, and the idea that judges could suggest additions or corrections to pleadings
or actively remove irrelevant material285 was rarely implemented in practice. This
seems to have occurred as the parties themselves raised objections to the pleadings
on pleas to the relevancy or sufficiency of averment and these objections were
thereafter discussed at debate. Development of the law of evidence continued as well
as rules defining what could be proved as related to what was averred. Fair notice as
a requirement could lead in itself to dismissal of an action prior to any allowance of
proof. Moreover, proof on commission (and the inveterate practice of prorogating
the commission) fell out of favour, as did jury trial other than in the specific causes.
The habit of judges deciding cases on relevancy and law without inquiry fell away as
proof became popular, although there was to be an increase in the allocation of proof
as 'before answer' and associated problems of what this phrase actually meant. The
Court of Session Act 1857286 altered the rules regulating how business was
distributed in the Court and the rules of procedure themselves were further
modified, which would lead up to the Court of Session Act 1868.
285 other than impertinent or scandalous averments.
286 colloquially known as the Distribution of Business Act.
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From this period onwards, written pleadings and the Court's procedure remained in
similar form right into the 20th century and remains the basis for the modern law,
examined in the next chapter.
(xv) Continuing Difficulties with Pleas in Law
The 1850 Act had not altered the requirements for stating pleas in law and the 1825
Act and subsequent provisions continued to apply.287 Pleas in law remained,
however, problematic. The pleas were supposed to state the matter of law in distinct
and separate propositions, without argument, but accompanied by a reference to the
authorities relied upon.288 But there was little guidance as to what this actually
meant. How long was this statement to be? Could there be any factual material
included? Were all the authorities to be included and, if so, were parties precluded
from advancing other authorities at a later stage? The Faculty of Advocates had
experienced difficulties with pleas since at least 1827 and we have already seen the
evidence of some of their members to the effect that they considered that a plea in
law was redundant or even injurious.289 Right up to 1869, there were calls for the
abolition of pleas-in-law. The citation of authority ceased to be followed in practice
and pursuers resorted to a practice of inserting a general plea in case the particular
pleas failed. A letter to the editor of the Journal of Jurisprudence290 commented:
[The] custom which now so universally prevails, in the preparation of
actions is to annex to the summons, instead of detailed and articulate pleas
applicable to all the points of law which are involved in the case raised, a
287 The 1850 Act had contained a Schedule detailing how summonses were to be constructed,
but under 'Note of Pleas in Law' had merely provided 'State them articulately'.
288 1825 Act s. 9.
289 See infra.
290 Correspondence to the editor of the Journal of Jurisprudence, 'Pleas in Law' (1860) 4
Journal of Jurisprudence p. 586-7.
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general plea to the effect that, 'in the circumstances condescended on, the
pursuer is entitled to decree in terms of the conclusions of his action.'
Such a plea was held by Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis to be a 'loose and unmeaning
statement'291 and the Court reiterated that:
'a plea in law ought to be a distinct legal proposition, applicable to the facts of
the case.'292
Nevertheless, the practice continued293 and sometimes records were adjusted and
closed without any other plea than the general plea being stated.294
Defenders also used general pleas, attacking the relevancy of the pursuer's
averments, in the form 'the pursuer's averments are irrelevant and insufficient to
support the conclusions of the summons' or with similar wording, with a view to
protecting themselves against specific points which they had not foreseen as well as
hopefully preventing the pursuer from getting to jury trial or at least causing him
additional expense. Moreover, any decision on the plea at debate could be reclaimed
against, causing the pursuer further delay and expense. An editorial in the Journal of
Jurisprudence for 1859 observed:
'In two-thirds of the records of the cases depending in the court of law in
Scotland, there will be found, (sic) as the first plea for the defender, the dear
old, familiar words, - "The pursuer has not set forth averments relevant or
sufficient to entitle him to decree as concluded for"...295
291 Young & Co v. Graham (1860) 23 D. 36.
292 Young, supra.
293 and could be recommended as good practice in texts on procedure written decades later.
See Mackay, Practice Vol. 1 p. 392, Mackay, Manual, p. 195, Maclaren, Practice, p. 313 and see
also Chapter 4 infra.
294 Correspondence, 'Pleas in Law' op. cit. at 588.
295 Editorial, 'The Law's Delay - The Plea of Relevancy' (1859) 3 Journal of Jurisprudence 57
at 58.
228
In not one case in one thousand is the plea sustained. It is not in that hope
that it is put upon record. It is put there in order to worry, wear out, and
weary the pursuer. A great discussion takes place before the Lord Ordinary,
if the case be in the Court of Session. Four counsel set to work, - two in
ridiculing, sneering at, and perverting the meaning of the pursuer's
condescendence, - the other two in finding in it a model of the most elegant
composition, and of terse and precise narrative.' ... The whole actors in the
affair know it is a sham and a farce; but the one is fighting for delay, and the
other is anxious to get his proof, his jury trial, and his decree.'296
The plea was directed at the relevancy of the pursuer's averments, but also at the
specification of what was alleged, that is, whether the averments were 'sufficient.'
Jury practice of the earlier period which had required specification as fair notice was
now becoming part of the ordinary procedure leading up to proof.
'Before a case is allowed proof, a lengthened discussion ensues upon what is
called the 'sufficiency of the pursuer's averments.' The object [of pleadings]
is to give fair notice to opposite party of the case that is to be maintained
against him ... but the object of this kind of discussion ... is the
ascertainment of whether the pursuer's case has been stated with technical
sufficiency and, above all, whether the details of the case which he intends to
prove have been set forth with sufficient circumstantiality and detail.297 ...
The defenders, on the chance of defeating the action, address themselves, too
often with superfluous ingenuity, to a criticism of the summons, dealing
with it as if it were an instrument to be construed, instead of being, as it is, or
ought to be, a mere notice to the opposite party of the questions intended to
296 ibid.
297 'Court of Session Practice' (1863) 7 Journal of Jurisprudence 13 at 14.
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be tried. In the generality of cases, an issue of some degree of relevancy is
found to be extractible.'298
To survive debate the pursuer's pleadings had to be 'technically accurate.'299 It will
be recalled that there was no provision for amendment after the record was closed
and thus immediately before, at, or following debate.300 A pursuer, whose pleadings
had been successfully subjected to this technical analysis, could either abandon or go
to jury trial on issues which were not those sought or could reclaim to the Inner
House. The doctrine of fair notice was advancing by this time,301 although
occasionally phrases such as 'full and fair notice' (and perhaps what was meant
thereby was a higher degree of specification) can be seen in the literature302 and
indeed the cases.303
But as above noticed, some of the Lords Ordinary were increasingly reluctant to deal
with cases on relevancy. This reluctance seems to have arisen from their anxiety not
298 ibid at 15. Although this appears in 1863, a perusal of the Session papers from 1860 - 1885
suggests that in the 60s and 70s the plea was something like 'the statements of the pursuer
are irrelevant and insufficient (as grounds of action) to support (or warrant) the conclusions
of the summons'. Specification was not mentioned. Sometimes particular averments relating
to fraud or ciishonestly are challenged with a particular plea as to their relevancy ('as being
insufficient in the circumstances of this case'). Sometimes there are 'calls' in the averments of
one party calling for 'further details' as to particular facts. So far as the writer can ascertain, it
is not until the mid 80s that the plea 'the pursuer's averments are irrelevant and are deficient
in (lack) specification and are insufficient to support the conclusions of the summons'
appears. This is an area which would benefit from further research in the session papers held
by the Advocates' Library.
299 Anon., 'Court of Session Practice' (1863) 7 Journal of Jurisprudence 13 at 14.
3°° The Record was closed and no new material could be introduced other than
condescendences res noviter veniens ad notiam although minor, trivial or clerical errors could
be corrected. Mackay, Manual, p. 250 and cases cited at fn (d), (e) and (f).
301 though not reflected in the pleadings as specific pleas-in-law directed to lack of
specification. See discussion supra.
302 even in modern times. See A. Murray, 'Fair Notice - The Role of Written Pleadings in the
Civil Justice System' in H.L. MacQueen and B.G.M. Main (eds.), The Reform ofCivil Justice
(1997) 5 Hume Papers on Public Policy 49 at 57 viz. 'both parties require full and complete
notice of the case they are to meet'.
303 see Neilson v. Househill, per L J-C Hope discussed above.
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to decide the cause on the hypothetical facts.304 An article in the Journal of
Jurisprudence of 1860 quoted Lord Kinloch in a case Inglis v. The Western Bank of
Scotland305
'The safest judicial course is first to ascertain the facts. It was a blot on our
ancient procedure that the Court was in use to pronounce hypothetically on
relevancy, and any general practice of deciding relevancy before the
ascertainment of facts, would be simply a return to the error of our
ancestors.'306
It complained that in the previous few years the 'invariable practice' of delaying
disposal of relevancy until after proof or trial had effected 'needless and ruinous
expense' and rendered the decisions of the Court 'comparatively useless as legal
authorities' as it was 'impossible to extract any ruling principle from the published
opinions of the judges'.307
But this view was not universal.
'The old system of raising questions of law in the form of discussions on
relevancy is now universally admitted to be wrong in principle, although to
a considerable extent it still deforms our practice. The plea of relevancy
either involves matter of law or matter of pleading. In the latter sense it is a
bugbear, and an unmitigated evil to both parties. As a separate occasion for
3°4 even though this was what a decision on relevancy properly entailed. English Common
Law procedure was at this time heavily influencing thoughts about Scots procedural reform.
305 The writer has been unable to trace the citation of this case
306 Discussed in Anon., 'The Expediency of Disposing of the Relevancy Before Proof (1860) 2
The Scottish Law Journal and Sheriff Court Record 28.
307 ibid. p. 29
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argumentative discussion, it should no longer be permitted to interrupt the
progress of the case to a rational issue of law or fact.'308
As it was, changes in the law of evidence and the competent modes of proof altered
pleading practice. With the demise of the practice of deciding cases on relevancy
came a decrease in the pleading of matters other than the facts pertinent to the cause.
As Alexander Asher told the Commissioners in 1869, after the changes to the modes
of competent proof:
Formerly, when many cases were disposed of without probation ... and
therefore to some extent on the prima facie aspect of the case, there was an
inducement to set forth evidence on the record in detail, which does not now
exist, because cases are now decided only on the facts as proved, and not
upon statements as made.'309
(xvi) Jury Trial, Proof on Commission and the Procedure for Proof
before the Ordinary Sitting Without a Jury
Itwill be recollected that in the early part of the nineteenth century, evidence was
almost universally taken by a commissioner,310 to the extent that it was at one time
questioned whether the court still retained the power to hear evidence.311 Jury trial,
introduced in 1815, provided an alternative method of proof, later in enumerated
causes312 and the 1825 Act permitted proof by commission where parties differed as
to the facts which did not require to be ascertained by jury trial.313 In the period
308 'Court of Session Practice' (1863) 7 Journal of Jurisprudence 13 at 17.
309 Evidence of Alexander Asher, Advocate (Evidence appended to Commissioners' 3rd
Report, December 1969) para. 17,397 p. 700.
310 following its introduction by AS 11 March 1800.
311 in 1832. See Mackay, Practice, vol. ii, p. 6.
3121825 Act s. 28.
313 1825 Act s. 14.
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leading up to the 1850 Act there was an increasing dissatisfaction with jury trial and
the retreat from jury trial began. The Act permitted proof on commission of
consent314 or where special cause was shown. Where parties consented, the Act also
provided for trial of a cause without a jury by the Ordinary, on adjusted issues.315 It
was also made competent for the Ordinary to investigate questions of fact316 without
the need for trial or commission and without the requirement to adjust issues, the
facts being decided at 'trial' by Ordinary himself317 although these provisions were
infrequently used.318 The general rule was 'that cases involving questions of fact
should go to a jury, and parties who wish(ed) a proof on commission instead of a
jury trial, need(ed) to show special cause to induce the Court to allow it.'319
However, proof before the Ordinary without jury was not far off. It had its origins in
the Conjugal Rights Act 1861320 which provided for a diet of proof before the
Ordinary where proof had been allowed.321 This was well used in such causes322 and
a Bill323 drafted two years later contemplated the allowance of proof in like form in
314 even in the enumerated causes excluding actions for libel, nuisance or in substance actions
for damages. It was also competent for the Ordinary to take this proof on commission on the
motion of one party with the leave of the Inner House upon report by the Ordinary, s. 49.
315 1850 Act, s. 46. This was unusual in practice. Anon., 'Judge or Jury? Under the Evidence
Scotland Act', 1866, (1866) 10 Journal of Jurisprudence 309 at 311.
316 called 'special facts'.
3171850 Act, s. 48.
318 'Judge or Jury' cit. sup .at 311. Mackay, Practice, vol. ii p. 7. Mackay suggests that this was
probably because the decision on fact was made final, ibid. See also Walker, Legal History, op.
cit., vol. 6, p. 519.
319 Cameron v. Kerr (1861) 23D. 1257 per L. J.-C. Inglis. I have converted this quotation into the
past tense.
320 Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Amendment Act 1861 (c. 86). Mackay considered it a 'fortunate
experiment' Mackay, Practice, vol. ii, p. 7.
321 the judge taking down the evidence himself or dictating it to a clerk and thereafter reading
it over to the witness to be signed by him, or by causing it to be taken down in shorthand by
a shorthand writer. The judge also had to make a note of any evidence admitted or rejected
(with the grounds for rejection) as well as any ruling on admissibility. Crabb Watt recorded
that shorthand had been used in practice since the 1840s in cases under the Lands Clauses
Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845. (c.19). Crabb Watt, Memoir, op. cit. p. 247
322 It was considered a 'perfect success': Editorial 'Why Jury Trial in Civil Causes Has Failed.'
(1863) 7 Journal of Jurisprudence 467 at p. 472.
323 Court of Session Consolidation Bill 1863. See 'Court of Session Bill' (1863) 7 Journal of
Jurisprudence 288 at 291 and also at 297ff for a draft of the bill.
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all actions other than personal actions for payment of money. The Bill was
abandoned but three years after that, the Evidence (Scotland) Act 1866324 prohibited
the taking of proof by commission325 and where proof had been allowed, permitted
the taking of that proof before the Ordinary326 even in enumerated causes, where
parties consented.327
(xvii) The Falling Out of Favour of the Jury Trial and the Taking of
Evidence on Commission
The provisions of the 1866 Act proved popular. The availability of proof before the
Ordinary led to a diminution in jury trials. The reasons for the popularity of proof
over jury trial in the majority of actions were fairly self evident. In the first place,
there had been long standing objections to the delay and the resultant expense in
taking a case to the jury, such that the satirist could pen this couplet:
'When a man has money and time to spare,
To the Jury-Court let him straight repair'328
and by 1859, it was said that 'for uncertainty, delay, and expense, no form of trial
exceeds that by Jury.'329 The delay could arise from upwards of two years spent
refining the pleadings before an order for proof or jury trial.330 Expense arose from
this delay, the higher fees for counsel and agents, the bringing to trial of all potential
324 (c. 112).
325 s. 1 (under exceptions contained in s. 2).
326 irrespective of the motions of the parties and no leave was required of the Inner House.
The provisions for the taking down of the evidence were the same as those in section 13 of
the 1861 Act supra.
327 s. 4.
328 'Joys of the Jury Court. A New Song' in Maidment: The Court of Session Garland (1839)
contained in (1888) reprint at 210.
329 Anon, 'Trial by Jury in Civil Causes' (1859) 1 Scottish Law Journal and Sheriff Court
Record 29 at 30-1.
330 ibid. p. 31, Anon, 'The Law's Delay - The Plea of Relevancy' (1859) 3 Journal of
Jurisprudence 57 at 59.
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witnesses, and the copying and printing of all documents.331 Jury trial was, it was
said, 'a costly luxury'332 and as Lord Ormidale told the Commissioners Appointed to
Inquire into the Courts of Law in Scotland in 1869, the expense of jury trial was so
great that it frightened people.333 As he explained,
'I have heard it suggested, and it is probably the case, that they334 make a
great parade and fuss about jury trial; it is treated as a grand dramatic
performance, and great performers are thought to be necessary for such a
proceeding ... It is thought necessary to obtain the services of certain
individuals at the bar, and probably for the purpose of securing these
individuals large and most unnecessary fees are given. That leads to very
great expense.'335
By this time he had been a judge for seven years during which time he had
superintended only 58 jury trials.336
Secondly, there was always doubt that the jurors understood the evidence. For
many, jury trial was a 'wager' or a 'haphazard lottery.'337 Although it became
unpopular, pursuers still attempted to get a jury trial in cases designed to elicit the
sympathy of a jury such as 'coal-pit accidents' where there had been a loss of life, or
cases which were essentially speculative.338
331 ibid. p. 31.
332 ibid. p.31.
333 Evidence of Lord Ormidale to 1869 Commissioners, contained in Appendix to Second
Report, p. 436, para 11,411.
334 i.e. the parties.
335 ibid. p. 436, para. 11,416.
336 p. 435, para. 11,409.
337 Anon., Why Jury Trial in Civil Causes bias Failed, (1863) 7 Journal of Jurisprudence 467 at
476.
338 E.J. MacGillivray, 'The Influence ofEnglish Law' in An Introductory Survey of the Sources
and Literature of Scots Law, by various authors, Stair Soc., Vol. 1, 207 at p. 224. 'Editorial,
Judge or Jury? Under the Evidence Scotland Act, 1866'. (1866) 10 Journal of Jurisprudence
309.
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But many jury trials were compromised before they had even commenced,339
although this frequently happened only at the door of the court. Thus, there was still
expense in getting to the compromise. Settling actions at this late stage seems to have
been fairly common. The Journal of Jurisprudence recorded that the July jury sittings
of 1863 had had 23 jury cases set down340 of which none proceeded to conclusion.341
A process of 'compromise and abandonment', it was said, proceeded at every
sitting.342 The parties' forces were 'marshalled before peace was concluded'343 and
settlement was frequently sought, even at the last minute.
'On the day of trial, the courage of the agent and of his client begins to
evaporate; and singularly enough, the courage of the opposite agent and of
the opposite client is at the same moment undergoing a similar process. And
thus in a state of alarm, nervousness and anxiety the parties approach each
other for a settlement each giving up one-half of his pretensions and each
taking the burden of his own costs.'344
The procedure for taking the proof by commission worked badly345 and was equally
ill-favoured, primarily because the whole process tended to drag on, the commission
being prorogated for additional days of evidence, agents often accommodating each
339 Anon., 'Trial by Jury in Civil Cases' (1859) 1 Scot. Law Jour, and Sh. Crt. Reporter 29 at pp.
30-31.
340 The figures are taken from Editorial 'Why Jury Trial in Civil Causes Has Failed. (1863) 7
Journal of Jurisprudence 467.
341 3 were discharged by the court. Of the 20 that remained, 11 survived a week, 2 of them
being withdrawn within half an hour of the trial commencing, and the rest disappeared one
by one, being compromised, withdrawn or abandoned.
342 ibid.
343 p. 31.
344 Why Jury Trial in Civil Causes Has Failed, op. cit. p. 466.
345 Charles Scott, Advocate in Evidence appendixed to the Second Report of the 1869
Commissioners, p. 541, para. 13,805. It was said to be the 'most dilatory, expensive and
unsatisfactory mode of proof ever devised.' Anon., 'Judge or Jury? cit. sup. at 318.
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other in each prorogation. Prorogations346 were the great evil of proofs taken before
commissioners.347
[I]n regard to prorogations - and here it is fair to state that many of my
brethren differ from me as to this matter - of old the mode of granting
prorogations led to great abuse; so much so, that an agent almost took it as a
personal affront if the opposite agent refused to grant a prorogation. The
effect of that was often to put agents in a very awkward position - between
doing an uncourteous thing to a brother agent, and doing their duty to the
client.'348
The Commissioners appointed by the Court were not bound to record exactly what
was spoken in evidence. They needed only provide the gist of witnesses'
testimony349 without comment on the import of the evidence nor any assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses. Thereafter, itwill be recalled, the evidence was
made up into a 'State' and further written pleadings were lodged by both parties
commenting on the tenor of the evidence upon which the Ordinary had to decide the
cause.
The same year brought attempts by the Court to alter the format of bringing causes
in the Court of Session.
346 likewise 'adjournments' of the commission.
347 Evidence of Lord Ormidale op. cit. p. 439, para. 11,464. See also Anon., 'Judge or Jury? cit.
sup. at 312 and preamble to Evidence (Scotland) Act 1866.
348 John Carment, Preses of SSC, in Evidence appendixed to the Second Report of the 1869
Commissioners p. 520, para. 13,386.
349 Crabb Watt, Memoir, op. cit. p. 246.
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(xviii) Moncrieff's Bill of 1863 and the Court of Session Act 1868
The Court of Session Act 1868350 followed four years of political 'to-ing and fro-ing'
following Lord Advocate Moncrieff's Court of Session Consolidation Bill of 1863. By
the early 1860s, the procedure of the Court of Session was universally considered to
be productive of the evils of delay, uncertainty and expense. The Court was losing
much of its business to professional arbiters who had sprung up after 1850 although
the general amount of business in the Court of Session had been on the decline for a
considerable time. The strictures of the rules regarding altering one's position at later
stages of the action led to calls for powers of amendment akin to English Common
Law Procedure.351 Reclaiming motions were frequent. Preparation and adjustment of
issues were time consuming. The problem of revisals has already been considered.
Debates on relevancy were almost de rigueur and were used by defenders to stifle the
progress of a cause, and the outdated and expensive modes of proof were additional
causes of complaint. There were other causes for complaint, which will be examined
shortly.
The Consolidation bill,352 in twelve parts, had proposed dividing procedure between
petitory and declaratory actions. The latter modified slightly the form of summons
permitting amendment but omitting pleas in law. Where practicable, it was
envisaged that the Ordinary would take proof in a manner similar to that introduced
by the Conjugal Rights Act. Procedure for the former class353 was streamlined. Such
350 31 and 32 Vict, (c. 100) headed 'An Act to amend the Procedure in the Court of Session and
the Judicial Arrangements in the Superior Courts of Scotland, and to make certain Changes in
the other Courts thereof.
351 Anon, 'Court of Session Practice' 1863 7 Journal of Jurisprudence 13 at 15.
352 The draft is reproduced at (1863) 7 Journal of Jurisprudence 297.
353 most commonly actions for payment of money which almost always involved some
inquiry into the facts. Anon, 'The Court of Session Bill', (1863) 7 Journal of Jurisprudence 288
at 290.
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actions were to be commenced by a summons in prescribed form similar to the writ
of summons in England under the Common Law Procedure Act.354 The defender
would 'join issue.' It was envisaged that the parties could proceed upon the
summons and defences and could even dispense with pleadings.
Where condescendences were required, each article had to contain one cause of
action,355 and law and evidence were not to be stated,356 nor any explanatory
narrative.357 The manner of pleading contract, personal injury, injury to property,
and defamation was prescribed.358 Averments of time, place, quantity, quality and
value were to be considered as merely notice and did not need to be proved (unless
essential to the cause of the action) and variance between averment and evidence
was to be considered immaterial.359 General objections to the relevancy of the whole
condescendence were not permitted. Any averment denied had to be denied without
qualification or met with a counter statement; and there was no need for any
averments 'admitted that' as all averments denied or countered were to be treated as
an issue to go straight to trial without adjustment. John M'Laren, Sheriff of Chancery
had assisted Moncrieff in the preparation of the bill and explained this part of the
procedure thus:
the defender was to be obliged to meet that360 in one of three ways. First, he
might demur; or, secondly, he might traverse the statement, that is, deny the
whole or a material part of it; or, thirdly, he might meet it by way of
confession and avoidance, or as we should say, by special defence; and in the






360 scil. the pursuer's statement of the grounds of the action.
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latter case the pursuer again might either demur, or traverse the defender's
statement, or he might meet it by replication.361
Defenders were thereafter to lodge 'rejoinders to special averments in replication'
and the condescendence and answers, replication and rejoinder were to be lodged
without revisal and would later form the record.
The proposals, and in particular the adoption of Common Law Procedure and
terminology produced an outcry.362
'There were outbursts from all quarters of the country at the anglicising of
the court, and Moncrieff and the Home Secretary Sir George Grey, were
assailed with invective.. .'363
The proposals were abandoned.364 Until 1868, no further proposals for altering the
Court's procedure followed other than an attempt365 to organise the procedure on
361 Evidence of John M'Laren to the 1869 Commissioners, Appendixed to Second Report p.
389, para. 10,398.
362 The Faculty of Advocates, Writers to the Signet, SSC, Procurators of Glasgow and the
Juridical Society all commented that the Court of Session's procedure was unsatisfactory as a
result of the delays and expense ('Reforms of the Court of Session', (1868) 12 Journal of
Jurisprudence 3 at 4) but were not all in favour of the bill as a solution. See also The Court of
Session Bill - 1863. A Voice ofWarning; with Appendix ofLetters published in the Scotsman. Bp a
Law Agent (Edinburgh, 1864), and for commentary on the proposals: 'Reviews', (1863) 2 (New
Series) Scottish Law Magazine and Sheriff Court Reporter p. 43, 'Court of Session Reform',
(1864) 3 (New Series) Scottish Law Magazine and Sheriff Court Reporter 1,
363 Crabb Watt, Memoir at 243. English terminology and concepts had been a particular part of
the Court of Session procedure in 'Exchequer Cases' since at least the early 1800s wherein it
was usual to draft pleadings as 'informations, Declarations, Bills, Pleas, Answers, Exceptions,
Demurrers, Replications &c.' See Historical View of the Forms and Powers of the Court of
Exchequer in Scotland to which is added an appendix containing the Rules ofProcedure, and certain
minutes of the Rules of Procedure, and certain minutes of the Court relating thereto. Baron Sir John
Clerk, Bart and Mr. Baron Scrope (Edinburgh, 1820) p. 264ff.
364 although some of the innovative parts were to be incorporated into the Court of Session
Act 1868.
365 A.S. 15 July 1865. It followed proposals by the Faculty. Rules for the Regulation of Procedure
Before the Lords Ordinary, Proposed for the consideration of the Court, by the Faculty ofAdvocates
(Edinburgh, 1865). See also (1865) 4 Scottish Law Magazine and Sheriff Court Reporter for
comment.
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the debate rolls to prevent the copious discharges of debates through counsel not
being available366 and an attempt to prevent the frequent continuations on the
adjustment roll by requiring that further continuations were granted only on 'cause
shown'.367 In general, however, there were ongoing complaints as to the delay and
expense of Court of Session procedure. Many wanted the power to amend the closed
record,368 as it was thought that this would lead to fewer technical discussions of the
form and sufficiency of the summons369 as parties would not feel compelled to state
their cases in as much detail if this facility was afforded them after the record had
closed. Foreclosure on points of fact was said to be a 'pestilent inheritance ... from
the Judicature Act.'370 The proper duty of the Court, it was said, was to decide
matters really in dispute between the parties and thus permit amendment to do so.371
The abolition of supplementary summonses to cure defects was mooted. It was also
thought beneficial if the Ordinary could determine the future procedure at the
closing of the record and required the parties to state whether they renounced
probation372 and general pleas were susceptible to improvement by stating the exact
ground which was deemed to be objectionable in the pleadings.373
366 This remained a problem. Lord Shand, 'Business of and Procedure in the Court of Session',
Address to the Scots Law Society, 1874 [repr. in part in (1874) 18 Journal of Jurisprudence 656
at 659.]
367 AS 15 July 1865 s. 10. Counsel attempted to soften the stricture of this by agreeing to close
the record 'on facilities', i.e. that each would give the other the facility of continuing to adjust
up until the time that the closed record required to be printed. Maclaren, Practice, p. 355. This
was a tolerated practice for a long period thereafter. See Evidence of Dean of Faculty to 1927
Royal Commission 'There is also "Closed subject to facilities," the phrase which has come
into vogue, and then you go on adjusting as you like until the case is put out.' at p. 169.
368 akin to the English common law procedure. 'Court of Session Practice' (1863) 7 Journal of
Jurisprudence 13 at 15. Provision for amendment had been made in the 1863 Bill.
369 'Court of Session Practice' cit. sup. p. 16.
370 'Reforms in the Court of Session' op. cit. p. 8.
371 ibid.
372 ibid. p. 17.
373 ibid. p. 19.
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There were calls to introduce various English pleading devices such as a 'notice to
produce documents'374 and 'notices to admit' writings or productions.375 Calls for
'issuable pleading' akin to English jury court practice were once more heard,376 and
the abandonment of stating pleas-in-law was considered the only method of
preventing the copious debates and reclaiming notes. Similar to older practice,
reclaiming was thought to be necessary in nearly every case.377
'The truth is, that the discussion before a Lord Ordinary, and the judgment
by him, neither is, nor, for obvious reasons, can, in the general case, be
looked on or treated by litigants as much more than a mere initiatory step
taken, because it cannot be avoided, towards the Inner House, whose
judgment alone is held to be decisive of anything.'378
Every interlocutor of the Ordinary became final and therefore became res judicata if it
was not reclaimed against.379 The object of a reclaiming note was an attempt to throw
the whole case open to review by the Inner House380 although the rule was that
previous interlocutors were not brought under review and parties thus felt
compelled to reclaim each interlocutor seriatim.381 Sometimes, however, the parties
attempted to avoid further delay382 and expense by 'adjusting' mutual admissions,
giving up 'what they thought the true state of the facts.'383
374 'Proofs in the Outer House' (1867) 11 Journal of Jurisprudence 1 at 3.
375 ibid. The expense of proving the documents fell on the party refusing to admit.
376 'English and Scotch Pleading Contrasted' (1863) 7 Journal of Jurisprudence 546 at 547ff.
377 "The Law's Delay - The Plea of Relevancy' op. cit. 59.
378 Lord Ormidale on the Reform of the Court of Session, (1867) 6 Scottish Law Magazine and
Sheriff Court Reporter 83 at 86.
379 which was contrary to Sheriff Court practice and in appeals to the House of Lords. 'Court
of Session Practice' op. cit. p. 20.
380 'The Law's Delay - The Plea of Relevancy' op. cit. 60.
381 'Court of Session Practice' op. cit. p. 20.
382 It was considered that each reclaiming note was 'equivalent to a sist of process for twelve
months. 'Court of Session Practice, op. cit. 21.
383 p. 541, paras. 13,807 - 13,809.
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In 1867, Lord Ormidale,384 in an address to the Juridical Society, sketched a typical
action in the Court remarking upon the 'battledore and shuttlecock'385 between the
Outer and Inner houses and the fact that one cause could produce as many as ten
reclaiming motions.386 He concluded that 'the discontent and dissatisfaction arising
from the great expense, delay and uncertainty attending the administration of
justice' amounted to a 'public scandal.'387
The 1868 Act followed the next year. It comprised a miscellany of provisions inter alia
tidying up elements of judicial arrangement,388 regulating summonses,389 calling and
decrees in absence,390 jury trial,391 Inner House Procedure392 appeals from inferior
courts,393 and accountings, suspensions and summary petitions.394 Under the fourth
part, by s. 25, neither party was now entitled as matter of right to ask for a revisal of
his pleadings; but it was 'competent for the Lord Ordinary to allow or to order a
Revisal of the Pleadings upon just Cause shown.' s. 26 provided a fixed period for
'adjustment' and thereafter closure of the record with parties being required to state
whether they renounced further probation. If so, the cause was to be debated. If not,
the cause was debated with a view to determining the nature of probation, if
allowed.395 The interlocutors of the Lords Ordinary were to be treated as final unless
384 He had long had an interest in procedure and had written on jury practice. See supra.
385 Lord Ormidale on the Reform of the Court of Session op. cit. at 84.
386 Crabb Watt, op. cit. at 244.
387 Introductory Addresses - Lord Ormidale and the Dean of Faculty (1867) 11 Journal of
Jurisprudence 566. See also Crabb Watt, op. cit. p. 244 and Reforms of the Court of Session










reclaimed against within six days.396 Reclaiming notes would operate to subject all
prior interlocutors to review397 but it was not competent to present a reclaiming note
without leave of the Ordinary against any interlocutor until the whole cause had
been decided.398
The most important measure was the allowance of amendment at any time.399 By s.
29, the Court or the Ordinary could at any time 'amend any Error or Defect in the
Record or Issues in any Action or Proceeding in the Court of Session, upon such
Terms as to Expenses and otherwise' as to the Court or Ordinary seemeci proper and
all such 'Amendments as may be necessary for the Purpose of determining in the
existing Action or Proceeding the real Question in Controversy between the Parties
shall be so made.'400
Proofs before the Ordinaries were to proceed without adjournment except on special
cause,401 and evidence could be recorded in shorthand in jury trials.402 The English
stated case procedure was made available where parties were agreed upon the facts
but disputed the law.403 Finally, the power of the Court to make regulations by Act of
Sederunt was formalised.404




399 This had been a component of the 1863 Bill which had been well received, s. 20 regulated
amendment of summonses and pleadings in undefended causes.
400 but, following the older rules, not amendments increasing the sum or property sued for.
401 s. 32.
402 s. 37.




After an eventful eight years which had seen dramatic changes to the competent
modes of proof and alterations to pleading practices, a Royal Commission was
established to Inquire into the Courts of Law and to make
'diligent and full inquiry into ... the forms of writs and pleadings, and the
rules of procedure... with a view to ascertaining whether any, and what
changes and improvements, either by altering the constitution or jurisdiction
of, or the forms of writs and pleadings, and procedure... so as to provide for
the more speedy, economical and satisfactory despatch of the judicial
business now transacted.'405
The commission worked quickly, taking copious evidence from all parts of the
profession and publishing the evidence in three reports,406 with conclusions in the
Fourth and Fifth Reports. The operation of the 1868 Act and the previous Acts
altering the competent modes of proof were reviewed in the evidence presented to
the Commission407 and reviewed by the Commissioners in their conclusions.
The Commission reported that the 1850,1861 and 1866 Acts had increased demands
on the time and attention of the Lords Ordinary.408 Although the Court of Session
Act of 1868 had not been long enough in operation to allow the full effect of it to be
ascertained, the Commissioners recorded a general concurrence of opinion that it
had introduced many important improvements in the forms of process and
405 First Report of the Commissioners 1869 p. 4.
406 First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Reports of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire
into the Courts of Law in Scotland (P.P., Edinburgh, 1868-71).
407 some of which has already been referred to above.
408 Fourth Report 1870, p. 6.
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procedure.409 Amendment seemed to be working well. As John M'Laren told the
Commissioners,
'I think that the power of amendment given by recent statute has enabled
parties to state their case shortly, because they are no longer under any
apprehension that their statements may be found irrelevant for want of
specification of details. That may be supplied by amendment at any stage;
and in practice the pleadings in the Court of Session are very much shorter
and less prolix than those of the Court of Chancery.'410
The Commission however recommended an extension of the power of amendment
introduced into the 1868 Act.411 In the end, it was left to the Court to define the limits
of amendment.412
Regarding pleas in law, it recommended their retention as
'they greatly conduce to the proper conduct of the cause. They not only
indicate the points upon which the argument is to rest, but they also lead to
accuracy and distinctiveness in the statement of the facts, by compelling
attention to the selection of such facts in the case as are relevant to the legal
grounds which are to be maintained.'413
409 ibid. p. 8.
410 Evidence of John M'Laren, Advocate and Sheriff of Chancery, Commissioners' 2nd Report
p. 394, para. 10,453 See also Evidence of Alexander Asher, Advocate (Evidence appended to
Commissioners' 3rd Report, December 1869) p. 700 para. 17,397.
411 ibid. p. 9 i.e. to permit enlargement of the conclusions permitting a greater sum (fund or
property) to be sued for than that concluded for in the summons.
412 See Mackay, Practice, Ch. 38. At one point it was thought that the Court had no discretion
to allow or refuse an amendment as the wording of s.29 was peremptory and not permissive.
See e.g. Guinness Mahon & Co. v. Goodwin & Co. (1891) 18 R. 441. However, the Court has since
determined that the allowance of amendment falls firmly within the Court's discretion. An
attempt by the pursuer's counsel before the House of Lords in Thomson v. Glasgow Corporation
1962 SLT 105 to resurrect the old approach was firmly rejected.
413 ibid. And pleas could now be added after the record had closed.
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Regarding 'sufficiency of averments' and the vexed question of what constituted
'fair notice' the Commission rejected the suggestion put in evidence that a party
should have the power to 'demand particulars', because where the Court was
satisfied that a party was 'suffering any prejudice from the vagueness or deficiency
of the statement made by his opponent', it had full power to meet the difficulty by
directing the desired information to be given in a 'minute.'414
However the Commission was more receptive to the suggestion415 that a party
'should have power to tender to his opponent a note of admissions demanded from
him, not only of documents,416 but also of certain facts.' The reason for this
recommendation was that the 'detailed form in which records were formerly drawn,
and the revisal of the pleadings, to some extent served the purpose of such a note of
admissions; but the absence of revisal417 and the shorter form of records, make it the
more necessary that some form of procedure as that suggested should be made
competent.'418 It also recommended the introduction of a Notice to Produce
Documents.419
414 ibid. pp. 9-10. This practice had developed following 'revisals' to the condescendence and
answers (or more rarely summons and defences).The Minute would require to be answered.
See supra.
415 borrowed from English Common Law procedure. See Evidence of John M'Laren,
Advocate and Sheriff of Chancery, Commissioners' 2nd Report p. 390, para. 10,415.
416 This was the extent of the English provision.
417 there was an abundance of evidence that revisal had 'almost ceased to exist', e.g. Evidence
of John Clerk Brodie W.S. in Appendix to Commissioner's 2nd Report p. 406, para. 10,719
which had led to greater alteration at adjustment. Evidence of Alexander Asher, Advocate
(Evidence appended to Commissioners' 3rd Report, December 1869) p. 700, para. 17,397.
418 ibid. p. 10. They also approved of the suggestion that where one of the parties was
requested by the other, at a reasonable time before the trial, to admit specific facts and that
party refused without reasonable cause, the judge could disallow or order costs incurred as a
result of that refusal. A 'Minute of Admissions' had been mooted in the draft A.S. of 1848. See
'Report of the Committee Appoi)ited by the Faculty ofAdvocates to Consider the Proposed Act of
Sederunt' (Edinburgh, 1848) p.7.
419 Fourth Report 1870, p. 10. Again a concept borrowed from English Common Law
procedure. Evidence of John M'Laren, Advocate and Sheriff of Chancery, Commissioners' 2nd
Report p. 390, para. 10,417.
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(xx) Conclusion
Following the 1868 Act, Scots civil procedure now possessed most of the
characteristics of the modern day procedure. The system of written pleadings was in
a near finalised state and would continue in near identical form to the present day.
Small trifles occasionally troubled the Court thereafter. Thus it became entangled for
a while as to what a proof before answer actually meant but the issue was finally
resolved.420
Statutory provisions post 1868 made further alterations but left the scheme of
procedure fundamentally the same. AS 10 March 1870 altered the procedure for
renouncing probation. AS 20 March 1907 permitted the record to be amended at any
time during the continuation of the cause. The great Codifying Act of Sederunt 1913
brought together all the acts of sederunt of the court which were still extant. Further
modernising changes to the procedure of the Court of Session were effected by the
Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933 following the work of a Royal
Commission in 1927 under the chairmanship of the first Lord President Clyde.421
Written pleadings by the start of the twentieth century were in a highly developed
state. The profession's reluctance in the earlier period to part with control of the
content of the pleadings and the pace of litigations, combined with what was felt to
be a closer affinity to England, finally pushed civil procedure away from the civilian
420 i.e. was it before answer as to the relevancy or competency or any other preliminary plea.
For discussion see Mackay, Manual, op. cit. pp 329 - 332
421 Report of the Royal Commission on the Court of Session and the Office ofSheriff Principal with
Summary of Evidence (2 vols.), Cmd. 2801 (Edinburgh, 1927)
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concepts which had informed the earlier period. This produced a legacy of
'adversarialism'. This aspect and the practice of written pleadings in the twentieth
century is discussed in Chapter Five. But before that, we must first examine the
modern rules of written pleadings.
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Chapter 4
The Rules, Form and Language ofWritten Pleadings
in Modern Civil Procedure
(i) Introduction
In this chapter, the principal 'rules' of written pleadings are examined.1 We have
already followed the development of written pleadings up to the end of the
nineteenth century. Here we examine the modern 'rules'2 encompassing the nature
1 In this chapter, I acknowledge the following sources: JE. J. G Mackay, The Practice of the
Court ofSession, (2 vols.) (Edinburgh, 1877 - 97) (hereafter 'Mackay, Practice') JE. J. G.,
Mackay, Manual ofPractice in the Court ofSession, (Edinburgh, 1893) (hereafter 'Mackay,
Manual'), J.A Maclaren, Court of Session Practice, (Edinburgh, 1916) (hereafter 'Maclaren,
Practice'), G. R. Thomson and J. T. Middleton, Manual ofCourt of Session Procedure,
(Edinburgh, 1937) (hereafter 'Thomson & Middleton, Manual'), Maxwell, D., The Practice of the
Court of Session, (Edinburgh, 1980) (hereafter 'Maxwell, Practice'), R. Black, An Introduction to
Written Pleading, Law Society of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1982) (hereafter 'Black, Introduction'),
Lees, J.M., A Handbook ofWritten and Oral Pleading in the SheriffCourt, (1st ed., 1888), (2nd ed.,
ed. T.A. Fyfe, Edinburgh and Glasgow, 1920) = reprint in: A Handbook ofWritten and Oral
Pleading & Notes on the Structure of Interlocutors (Aberdeenshire, 1988) (hereafter 'Lees,
Handbook'), I.D. Macphail, SheriffCourt Practice (1st ed.), (Edinburgh, 1988), (2nd ed.), (eds.
C.G.B. Nicholson & A.L. Stewart), (Edinburgh, 1998) [the relevant chapter on Written
Pleadings viz. Ch. 9 has minor revisals in the 2nd edition and the same paragraph numbering
is adopted] (it is hereafter referred to as Macphail, Practice), B. Kearney, An Introduction to
Ordinary Civil Procedure in the SheriffCourt, (Edinburgh, 1982), R. McEwan, Pleading in Court,
(2nd ed.) (Edinburgh, 1995), R. Wyness Millar, 'Civil Pleading in Scotland' (1932) 30 Michigan
Law Review, (2 Parts) No. 4, 545- 581; No. 5 582 - 746 (with Notes by L.P. Clyde), D. Dundas,
'Observations on the Art of Advocacy' (1903) 15 J.R. 329, D. (Lord) Blades, 'The Art of
Pleading' (1948) 64 SLR (No. 758) 25 and (No. 759) 53, J.A. Clyde, 'Practice and Procedure in
the Court of Session' (1906-7) 18 J.R. 319-340, C. Scott Dickson, 'Pleading' (1897) 9 J.R. 26, A.G.
Walker, 'Written Pleadings' (1963) 79 SLR (No. 945) 161, E. Bowen, 'Written Pleadings in the
Sheriff Court' (1999) 4(4) SPLQ 245, P. Brodie, 'Professional Conduct and Responsibility in
Drafting' (1997) (unpublished), P. Brodie, 'Basic Guiding Principles', Written Pleadings
Course, Law Society of Scotland/Update) (1993), C. Sutherland, 'Written Pleadings - Recent
Cases' Written Pleadings Course, Law Society of Scotland/Update) (1993), C. Hennessy, Civil
Procedure and Practice, (Edinburgh, 2000), R. Conway, Personal Injury Practice in the Sheriff
Court, 2nd ed., (Edinburgh, 2003), John S. MacKenzie, Written Pleadings, (Edinburgh, 2003),
Green's Annotated Rides of the Court of Session, RCS 1994 as amended (repr. from Div C of the
Parliament House Book (Edinburgh, 2003)), (hereafter 'Annotated Rules')
2 In recent years, a number of specialised categories of action in the Court of Session have
grown up, with their own specialised forms and sometimes rules for pleading. For reasons of
space, their treatment is not here considered. Thus, the quirks and specialisms of the
following are not detailed: Family actions, (RCS Ch. 49), old style Optional Procedure actions,
(RCS old Ch. 43), New Personal Injury actions, (RCS new Ch.43 (2003), Commercial actions,
(RCS Ch. 47), Intellectual Property causes (RCS Ch. 55), Petition Procedure, (RCS Ch. 14),
Minute and Note procedure (RCS Ch. 15) and Judicial Review procedure (RCS Ch. 58). Also
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and function, form and language of written pleadings. Although these modern rules
have been greatly elaborated through decisions of the courts and subsequent
legislation, much remains, at least in concept, from the earlier period.
The rules continue to be comprised of a combination of custom and practice, the
rules of court3 (including Acts of Sederunt4 and Practice Notes) and decided cases.
(ii) A Definition of Written Pleadings.
Firstly, what is meant by 'the pleadings'? We may adopt Lees' short definition, as it
is as good as any:
'"The pleadings" means the written statements by the parties of their
grounds of action and defence, which, when finally adjusted, form the
closed record.'5
(iii) The Functions ofWritten Pleadings.
Written pleadings perform various functions. In the first place they should define the
four corners of the matter in dispute between the parties. As Lord Blades, while still
at the Bar, observed, some years ago:
'Before a judicial tribunal is called upon to decide any question that has
arisen between litigants, the matter to be submitted to it should be clearly
the approach of the Court in 'Asbestosis Actions'. However, the 'rules' of written pleading
will have application to them to a greater or lesser extent. New Personal Injury actions and
Commercial actions (both in the Court of Session and the sheriff court (as applicable) are
considered briefly in the next chapter.
3 Both sheriff court and Court of Session viz. Ordinary Cause Rules 1993 as amended and
Rules of the Court of Session 1994 as amended. The language used throughout this chapter is
that of the Court of Session, although the rules have an equal application in the sheriff court.
Thus, 'conclusion' can be read also as 'crave'. A particular rule relating to sheriff court
procedure will be mentioned where relevant.
4 which can only be departed from where special cause is shown. Hutchison v. Galloway
Engineering Co. 1922 SC 497 per LJ-C Dickson at 499.
5 Lees, Handbook, para. 1.
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and precisely set forth. Hence our system of written pleadings whereby the
real issue between the parties is definitely ascertained and all that is
irrelevant to the issue or immaterial is put aside, with a great saving to all
concerned in time and to the parties in money...the parties should know
what they are fighting about, because, if they don't, nobody else is likely to
discover. In order to attain this object, it is necessary that pleadings should
be drawn according to certain fixed rules, the purpose of which is to
compel each party to state clearly and succinctly, and I should add
intelligibly, the material facts on which he relies, omitting everything that
is immaterial, and then to insist on his opponent frankly admitting or
explicitly denying every material fact alleged against him.'6
A modern commentator expresses a similar view:
The function of our system of written pleading is, accordingly, to ascertain
and demonstrate with precision the matters on which the parties differ and
those on which they agree; and thus to arrive at certain clear issues on
which both parties differ and those on which they agree; and thus to arrive
at certain clear issues on which both parties require a judicial
determination/7
Implicit in these quotations is the second function of written pleading, that is, giving
notice to others of the basis of one's case, whether that is the objective reader,
including the judge, or one's opponent.8 The Scottish procedural system remains
b Blades, The Art of Pleading, cit. sup. pp. 27-8. See also the dicta of Lord Prosser in ERDC
Construction Ltd. v. H.M. Love & Co. (No. 2) 1997 SLT 175 at 180 for very similar observations.
7 Macphail, Practice, para 9.03. See also Brydon v. Railway Executive 1957 SC 282 per L. Patrick
at 291.
8 Parker v. Lanarkshire Health Board 1996 SCLR 57 (Ex. Div) per L. McCluskey at 58.
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adversarial and it is still9 no part of the court's remit to raise issues for determination
or to suggest to parties the manner in which they should present their case.10 The
pleadings encapsulate all the elements of the case and the four corners of that case
may be assumed by the court and one's opponent to be stated within the pleadings.
Thus they serve the function of notice.
'What sometimes, I think, tends to be forgotten in the Sheriff Court, is that
the purpose of written pleadings is to enable the court, the solicitors and
everyone else concerned to discover very quickly, flicking over a few pages,
to discover at a glance, the issues between the parties and the stand which
each party is taking on these issues.'11
A case presented clearly in written pleadings will impress the court and make the
task of the court easier.12 The pleadings give the court the first impression of the
cases being advanced and defended by the parties13 before any oral proceedings and
a case set out with clarity and accuracy may create a favourable, advantageous,
impression from the start, which advantage may be never thereafter lost.14 The
present Sheriff Principal of Glasgow and Strathkelvin offers this:
'Pleadings which contain a precisely identified request for a remedy,
followed by a clear and crisp narrative of the issues by the parties, focused
in turn by accurate pleas in law, will receive the interest, attention and
respect of any judge far faster than those which ramble in a wayward and
jumbled fashion with references and cross-references to passages which
9 This is discussed in the following chapter.
10 c.f. the previous attempts to cio so examined in the previous chapter.
11 A.G. Walker, 'Written Pleadings' cit. sup., p. 162 See also, Scott Dickson, 'Pleading' op. cit.
sup. p. 14 and Blades, 'The Art of Pleading' cit. sup. p. 28 for similar views.
12 Frederick (Hon. Mr. Justice) Lawton, 'The Role and Responsibility of the Advocate' being a
public lecture in the University of Bristol 4th November 1966.
13 Macphail, Practice, para. 9-06, P. Brodie, 'Basic Guiding Principles', cit. sup. p. 14.
14 C. Sutherland, 'Written Pleadings - Recent Cases', cit. sup. p. 3.
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cannot be clearly identified and which end in a long list of garbled pleas in
law which plainly indicate that the pleader has recognised his own inability
to identify the issues.'15
This is important as it is upon the pleadings that a court will base procedural
decisions for the duration of the life of the action16.
The pleadings also serve the function of giving notice to an opponent, but this is
more of a requirement than a function. Simply stated, a party must provide the other
side with 'fair' and 'adequate' notice of the case to be met. It is part of the
requirement of specification and is examined below.
It might also be observed that the pleadings provide a summary of the pleader's case
to himself. They will act as an aide-memoire, detailing the facts he alleges support
the grounds of the action defined, and will, prior to proof, quickly highlight the facts
in dispute and to be proved.17
(iv) Care Required in Drafting Pleadings.
These functions highlight the importance of written pleadings, and the drafting of
pleaciings must be carefully discharged.18 Before drafting any pleading, it has been
the advice of various eminent commentators that the pleader shoulci firstly carefully
acquire a command of the facts and then make a thorough investigation of the law
15 E. Bowen, 'Written Pleadings in the Sheriff Court' (1999) 4(4) SPLQ 245 at 248
16 The changes introduced by OCR 1993 as amended providing for an 'Options Hearing' place
an even greater emphasis on creating a good first impression on the sheriff prior thereto.
Bowen, ibid.
17 Macphail, Practice, para. 9-06, P. Brodie, 'Basic Guiding Principles', cit. sup. p. 14.
18 Macphail, Practice, para. 9-12.
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involved in, and surrounding the subject-matter of the action.19 It has been said that
drafting written pleadings acts 'as an encouragement to each party to analyse the
substance of his case, before trying to give it expression in writing.'20 From there, the
case can be committed to writing, keeping to the forefront of one's mind the 'legal
hurdles to be jumped'21 and using only the facts which are relevant to the pleas-in-
law. To do otherwise is to engage in, what Professor Black has called 'Blunderbuss
Pleading'22 or to continue the martial theme, what Sheriff Kearney described as
'shotgun' pleading.23 In such cases the pleader attempts to scatter in the pleadings as
much as possible in the hope that somewhere in the morass there may be a relevant
case. As Lord President M'Neill said as long ago as 1856,
'I do not understand how any one can frame a record properly without
having in his mind the issue he wishes to try, and selecting from the
materials before him those, and those only, that are pertinent to that issue.
To throw into a record all matters directly or indirectly connected with the
case, or having any possible bearing on it, is not the right way of framing a
record; it may save the trouble of thinking at that stage, and relieve from the
labour of selecting and arranging the materials; but it is not the right way of
framing a record'.24
19 A.G. Walker, Written Pleadings, cit. sup. p. 165, Macphail, Practice, para. 9-12, Dundas,
'Observations on the Art of Advocacy' cit. sup. p. 329.
20 ERDC Construction Ltd. v. H.M. Love & Co. (No. 2) 1997 SLT 175 per L. Prosser at 180.
21 Black, Introduction, p. 3.
22 ibid.
23 B. Kearney, An Introduction to Ordinary Civil Procedure in the SheriffCourt, (Edinburgh, 1985)
p. 27.
24 Burden v. Mitchell (1856) 18 D 339 per Lord President M'Neill.
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It is important therefore that any written pleading has at least passed through the
'crucible of the pleader's mind',25 and he does not engage in 'stream of consciousness
pleading/26
In drafting the pleadings the pleader must be honest, candid, and at all times act in
good faith.
Lord Stott made the following observation:
'Our whole system of pleading and of disposal of cases upon preliminary
pleas must depend upon each party stating with candour what are the
material facts upon which he relies and admitting the facts stated by his
opponent which he knows to be true.'27
The pleader must have evidence for any averment made28 and should not insert an
averment in the hope that 'something will turn up' in the course of evidence.29 The
pleader must keep in mind that at all times he is also an officer of the court.30 In
25 J.A. (later Lord) Clyde, 'Practice and Procedure in the Court of Session' (1907) 18 JR 319 326
26 R. Black, Introduction, p. 17. Professor Black considers that this type of pleading is due, in
part, to the use of dictating machines, (ibid). Complaints about modern technology are not
new. One hundred years ago, the future Lord Dundas complained that '[t]he growing use of
both short hand dictation and of typewriting is making its mark on written pleading of to¬
day, and not for the good.' Dundas, Observations on the Art of Advocacy', cit sup., pp. 332-3.
In present practice, it is generally the case that counsel themselves draft pleadings on lap-top
computers using word-processing software.
27 Ellon Castle Estates Co. Ltd. v. Macdonald appr'd in Gray v. Boyd (I.H.) 1995 SCLR 1075.
28 Boustead v. Gardner (1879) 7 R. 139 per LJ-C Moncreiff at 145, Thompson v. British Medical
Association [1942] AC 764 per Lord Atkinson at 771, Macphail, Practice, para. 9-12.
29 'It is not the function of pleadings to justify an inquiry which may result in evidence being
led which might establish the pleader's case.' Morrison v. Rendall 1986 SC 69 per L. Robertson
at 78. See also Stout v. United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 1979 SLT 54 per LP Emslie at
56, Pollock v. Stead & Simpson Ltd. 1980 SLT 76.
30 Batchelor v. Pattison and Mackersy (1876) 3 R. 914 per LP Inglis at 918. The Law Society of
Scotland's 'Code of Conduct for Solicitors holding Practising Certificates' (2002) requires that
a solicitor must 'never knowingly give false or misleading information to the court' and the
Supplementary Code of Conduct for Solicitors exercising extended Rights of Audience' (Code
of Conduct, Sch. 2) requires that solicitor-advocates have a proper basis on precognition or in
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drafting his pleadings he should follow the rules, form and language of written
pleading and it is to this that we now turn.
The Rules, Form and Language of Written Pleadings
(v) The Summons and the Initial Writ.
As we have seen, the form of a pre-1850 summons consisted of the Address, Instance,
Conclusions and the Will which was altered by s. 1 of the Court of Session Act 1850
introducing the condescendence and pleas-in-law annexed to the summons. The
additional parts are now commonly considered to be part of a summons31 and the
modern day summons comprises the Instance, Address and Charge, Warrants,
Conclusions, Condescendence and Pleas-in-law.32 The action in the Sheriff Court is
commenced by an InitialWrit.
(vi) The Conclusions.
The summons may contain any number of conclusions but these should be stated in
accordance with the appropriate style contained in Form 13.2(2) of the rules.33 They
should not be vague or inspecific.34
In averring the grounds of the action, the grounds as conclusions may be pled
cumulatively,35 (i.e. multiple grounds) alternatively36 or eventually.37 Thus, common
the light of consultation with the client for stating a fact in any pleadings' See MacKenzie,
Written Pleadings, op. cit. pp. 22-3.
31 They are also so considered by the Rules of Court, see RCS 1.3(1).
32 and is in Form 13.2-A (RCS).
33 The formal requirements for a sheriff court initial writ are very well covered in Macphail,
Practice, paras. 9.40 -9.50.
34 Bmik ofScotland v. Logie 1986 SLT (Sh Ct) 47, Macphail, Sheriff Court Practice para. 17-14.
35 Mackay, Manual p. 185.
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examples of alternative conclusions are those for implement which failing, payment
and payment which failing, declarator of breach of contract and damages38.
Alternative inconsistent or mutually incompatible grounds may be averred39
but conventional advice is that such a form should rarely be resorted to, as the failure
in the principal perils the secondary conclusion. Where such an action has been
raised, the conclusion for declarator must be abandoned or decided adversely before
the conclusion for damages can be insisted in.40
(vii) The Condescendence.
The condescendence contains the allegations in fact forming the grounds of action
which must include title and interest to sue,41 and those essential42 facts which in the
particular case give a right of action.43 There should be no disconformity between the
condescendence and conclusions.44 The importance of the condescendence lies in the
fact that the averments give notice to an opponent of the case which the pursuer will
36 Thomson & Middleton, Manual, p. 64, Maxwell, Practice p. 172, M'Kellar v. Dallas's Ltd. 1928
SC 503, Mackay v. Campbell 1967 SLT 337.
37 e.g. Action for declarator with eventual conclusions for interdict and damages. See also
Mackay, Manual, p. 185 citing dicta of LP Inglis in Jameson v. Sharp (1887) 14 R. 643 at 648
(action of furthcoming).
38 Mackay's dated example is that of conclusions for declarator of marriage which failing
damages for seduction or breach of promise. Mackay, Manual, p.185 citing Robertson v.
Henderson (1833) 12 S. 70, Stewart v. Menzies (1837) 15 S. 1198.
39 Nonuich Union Life Insurance Society v. Tanap Investments V.K. Ltd (in Liquidation) (No.l) 1998
SLT 623 per L. Penrose at 628.
40 Robertson v. Henderson (1833) 12 S. 70.
41 Smith v. Stoddart (1850) 12 D. 1185, Anderson v. Duncan (1861) 23 D. 258, Kilmarnock Mags. v.
Mather (1869) 7 M. 548, Bentley v. Macfarlane 1964 SC 76 per L. Guthrie at 83, Microwave
Systems (Scotland) Ltd. v. Electro-Physiological Instruments Ltd. 1971 SC 140 per L. Thomson at
143, Fraser v. Church ofScotland General Trustees 1986 SLT 692 per L. Dunpark at 696, Mackay
Manual, p. 193.
42 Brown v. Redpath Brown & Co. 1963 SLT 219. In the sheriff court, OCR r.3(l) and App. 1,
Form G1 requires the pursuer to state the facts which form the ground of action.
43 Cameron v. Hamilton (1858) 18 D. 423, Dallas v. Mann (1853) 15D. 746 For reasons of space,
there is no treatment here of the law relating to domicile and jurisdiction, title and interest to
sue, nor parties' special capacities. Up-to-date statements of the law pertaining thereto can be
found in Macphail, Practice (2nd ed.) and Green's Annotated Rules of the Court of Session,
(2003).
44 Ewing's Trs. v. Farquharson (1829) 7 S. 464, Muir v. Braidwood (1831) 10 S. 83, Wilson v. Walker
(1856) 18 D. 673, Maxwell, Practice p. 173.
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try to prove.45 A pursuer stands or falls on his establishing the averments he makes
on record and is not entitled, in the course of inquiry into the facts, to make a new
case for which he has no record.46 A defender has to meet the case made against him
on record and nothing more.47 A pursuer cannot prove more than he avers48 and
cannot succeed, as a matter of fair notice, against a defender on a ground which is
not averred on record,49 although he may succeed in circumstances in which
evidence is led by the pursuer at proof in support of that ground which is not
objected to timeously.50
As Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley explained in Mackenzie v. West Lothian D.C.51
'Our Scottish procedure pays observance, not lip service, to pleadings. A
pursuer or petitioner must set out in his final pleadings averments
which, if established on the basis of the law on which he founds, warrant
the remedy which he seeks.'52
45 Ward v. Coltness Ironworks 1944 SLT 409.
46 Lord Reid in McGrath v. NCB (4 May 1954, unreported) applied in Hamilton v. John Brown &
Co. (Clydebank) Ltd. 1969 SLT (N) 18 and Carroll v. Scott's Shipbuilding Co. 1969 SLT 46,
Morrison's Associated Companies v. Rome 1964 SC 160 at 182; Mcintosh v. Walker Steam Trawl
Fishing Co. 1971 SLT (N) 75, Maxwell, Practice p. 173.
47 McGrath v. National Coal Board (4th May 1954, unreported) per Lord Reid.
48 Campbell v. M'Nee 1903 SLT 278.
49 Black v. John Williams & Co. (Wishaw) 1924 SC (HL) 22, "Vitruvia" S.S. Company Ltd. v. Ropner
Shipping Co. Ltd. 1923 SC (HL) 31, Morrison's Associated Companies. Ltd. v. James Rome & Sons
Ltd. 1946 SC 160 per L. Guthrie at 190. See also Cleisham v. The British Transport Commission
1964 SC (HL) 8 per L. Reid at 13 and per L. Guest at 22 (Note that the three other English law
lords considered that a case could be made outwith the corners of the record) and Riddell v.
Reid 1941 SLT 179, Gordon v. Wilson 1992 SLT 849.
50 Albacora SRL v. Westcott & Laurence Line Limited 1966 SC (HL) 19 per L. Reid at 23 and L.
Guest at 26, McGlone v. British Railways Board 1966 SC (HL) 1 per L. Reid at 12, Brown's
Executor v. N.B. Steel Foundry 1968 SLT 121, Hamilton v. John Brown & Co. (Clydebank) Ltd. 1969
SLT (N) 18, O'Donnell v. Murdoch McKenzie & Co. Ltd 1966 SC 58,1967 SC (HL) 63, Rafferty v.
J.&C.M. Smith (Whiteinch) Ltd. 1990 SLT 2, Royal Bank ofScotland pic v. Malcolm 1999 SCLR 854,
Hislop v. Lynx Express Parcels 2003 SLT 785. Factual matters which have not been specifically
averred but bear upon legal issues pled will not necessarily be excluded. Taylor v. Taylor 2000
SLT 1419.
511979 SC 433 at 437-8.
52 This has been frequently quoted. See Macphail, Practice, para. 9.14.
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The issue between the parties must raise a live, practical question and not be
something hypothetical, premature or academic.53 In dealing with relevancy of the
pursuer's case, the conclusions and condescendence will be read together.54
The condescendence should be brief55, and pointed insofar as consistent with
clearness.56 It should not be vague57 but such that the pursuer should give the
defender adequate notice of the case to be made against him.58 'Exuberance of
epithets', 'copious use of superlatives' and 'vituperative verbiage' should be
avoided.59 The averment should not commence with the words 'averred that'60
although averments following a denial of the other party's averments usually
commence with the phrase 'Explained and averred that' and sometimes 'Further
explained and averred that' as further differentiation at adjustment.61
53 Macnaughton v. Macnaughton's Trs. 1953 SC 387 per LJ-C Thomson at 392, Glasgow
Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Iron Ore Co. Ltd. 1910 1 SLT 345 per LC Loreburn at 347, Aberdeen
Development Co. v. Mackie, Ramsay & Taylor 1977 SLT 177, Marco's Leisure Ltd. v. West Lothian
District Licensing Board 1994 SLT 129.
54 M'Coll v. Gibson (1868) 5 SLR 267, Brown's Trs. v. Hay (1897) 24 R. 1108, per LP Robertson.
See infra under plea to the relevancy.
55 Dundas, cit. sup. p. 19. As the annotators to Green's Annotated Rules of the Court of Session
point out, 'an unfortunate modern practice has developed of making articles long and
cumbersome.' para. 13.2.4. See also Green's Litigation Styles at A3-005, 'Quotations, 1995
SCLR 1174. C.f. Conway, Personal Injury Practice in the SheriffCourt cit. sup. p. 62
56 Wardrope supra.
57 Jackson v. Earl ofCassillis (1833) 11 S. 908; Henderson v. Minto (1860) 22D 1126. Maclaren,
Practice p. 311, Maxwell, Practice p. 173.
58 Carruthers v. Caledonian Rly Co. (1854) 16D 425 at 429, Beattie v. Beattie (1883) 11 R. 85, Gunn
v. M'Adam & Son 1949 SC 31 at 38, Hope v. Hope's Trs. (1898) 1 F. (HL) per L. Watson at 3, Eadie
Cairns v. Programmed Maintenance Painting Ltd. 1987 SLT 777.
59 Scott Dickson, 'Pleading' cit. sup. p. 24, Black, Introduction, p. 11.
60 This is the developed practice. See e.g. E. Bowen, 'Written Pleadings in the Sheriff Court',
supra p. 249. It will be recalled post-1825 averments were required to start 'Averred and
offered to prove that...' See Ch. 3.
61 C.f. MacKenzie, Written Pleadings, op. cit. para 4.80 where the phrase is considered
'unnecessary verbiage' although ibid, see para. 5.13.
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The averments should not contain argument,62 nor set forth the manner in which the
averment is to be proved63 nor the evidence itself as averment.64 It is bad practice to
plead impertinent, scandalous or irrelevant averments65 such as allegations of
immorality,66 and professional misconduct67 where these are not pertinent to the
cause or to make averments regarding the propriety of actings of third parties who
are not party to the action.68 It is pars judicis for a court to notice such averments and
to order them to be withdrawn.69 There are some cases or averments which require a
high degree of specification. This is part of the concept of fair notice and the
requirement that pleadings be specific. These are examined below, but the following
examples may be presently observed.
62 Connell v. Ferguson (1861) 23 D 683 per L. Neaves at 686. In this case, it was averred that the
grounds of the claimants' proceedings were fully explained and averred in attached
pamphlets which pamphlets the Court considered to be written chiefly in an 'argumentative,
or rather a declamatory style'.
63 HM Advocate v. Lamont (1857) 19 D. 779 per LP M'Neill. Dundas, 'Pleadings' cit. sup. pp 23-
24.
64 Roy v. Wright (1826) 5 S. 107 (NE 98), Tulloch v. Davidon (1858) 20 D. 1045 per L. Cowan at
1056. However, in specialised circumstances, averments of evidence having a 'direct bearing'
on the resolution of the cause may be pled. Alexander & Sons v. Dundee Corporation 1950 SC
123, Bark v. Scott 1954 SC 72, Strathmore Group Ltd. v. Credit Lyonnaise 1994 SLT 1023. Also,
where a party to the litigation has made an 'extra-judicial' admission details of the admission
must be averred. Hutchison v. Henderson 1987 SLT 388, jackson v. Glasgow Corporation 1956 SC
354.
65 Wardrope, supra, A. v. B. (1895) 22 R. 402, Paton v. Clydesdale Bank (1896) 33 SLR 533, (see also
Mackay, Manual p. 194 citing Herdman v. Young 1744, M. 13,987 and Macphail, Practice, paras
10-63 citing Hamilton v. Anderson (1858) 20 D. (HL) 16, Mclsaac v. Leonard 1915 31 Sh. Ct. Rep.
303, Sellars v. IMI Yorkshire Imperial Ltd. 1986 SLT 629.
66 M. v. S. 1909 1 SLT 192, C. v. M. 1923 SC 1, MacGregor v. MacGregor 1946 SLT (N) 13
(defender's mother of immoral character), Morrison v. McArdle 1967 SLT 58 (fornication)
67 C. v. W. 1950 SLT (N) 8.
68 Wardrope, supra.
69 with expenses. Mackay, Manual, p. 194. Green's Encyclopaedia of Scots Law, vol. 1 s.v.
'Actions' [/E. Mackay] p. 119 at p. 120. See also Sproat v. Mure (1826) 5 S. 61, Wardrope v. Duke
ofHamilton supra. (1876) 3 R. 878, A. v. B. (1895), 22 R. 402, H. v. P (1905), 8 F. 232, M. v. S. 1909
1 SLT 192. The averments deleted, however, may themselves constitute sufficient notice to the
other side such as to permit a line in cross-examination. A. v. B. op. cit. per LP Robertson, H. v.
P. (1905) 8 F. 232, C. v. M. 1923 SC 1, but there must have been fair notice. Clinton v. News
Group Newspapers Ltd. 1999 SLT 590 per Lord Nimmo Smith at 592.
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Where a pursuer requires to make averments of fraud then very specific averments
are required.70 This is also true where a party alleges 'conspiracy.'71 When a party
makes a case of fault, averments of fault should also be specific.72
Where a pursuer founds on vicarious liability, the name of the negligent employee or
person should be averred or if 'his name is to the pursuer unknown'73 there must be
a sufficiency of facts and circumstances in the averments from which the defender
can establish that the person by whom the negligence was committed was his
employee.74 This is part of the general duty on a party to provide specification in the
pleadings of the identity of persons referred to therein.75
Where a pursuer sues under statute and at common law, the grounds of action must
be set forth separately and distinctly in the averments of the condescendence and in
the pleas in law76 but reference to a statute in the pleadings is not necessarily
inconsistent with a party's intention to plead common law.77 Where the same set of
70 Gillespie v. Russell (1857) 18 D. 677, Drummond's Trustees v. Melville (1861) 23 D. 450, Wright
v. Guild & Wyllie (1893) 30 SLR 785, Thomson & Co. v. Pattison, Elder & Co. (1895) 22 R. 432.
Shedden v. Patrick (1852) 14 D. 721 per L. Fullerton at 727 and (1854) 1 Macq. 535 at 581 and
586, Kaur v. Singh 1998 SC 233, Royal Bank ofScotland pic v. Holmes 1999 SLT 563 Buchan
(Stewart) Garages Ltd v. BEC (Scotland) Ltd. and Anr. (unreported) (2001 GWD 3-126) (19
January 2001 per L. Macfadyen at para. 14), Wright v. Cotias Investments Inc. 2001 SLT 353,
Semple Cochrane pic v. Clarke 2003 SLT 532 and see infra under Plea of Lack of Specification.
The same applies with statutory penalties Carruthers (1854) supra, p. 427.
71 Anderson v. Express Investments Co. Ltd. & Anr. (unreported) 4 September 2002 per L. Eassie.
72 Thomson & Co. v. Pattison, Elder & Co. (1895) 22 R. 432.
73 This is the commonly used stylistic way of stating that the person is not known to the
pursuer.
74 Davaney v. Yarrow Shipbuilders Ltd. (unreported) 4th December 1998.
75 Boulting v. Elias 1990 SLT 596.
76 M'Grath v. Glasgow Coal Co. Ltd. 1909 2 SLT 92 per L. Low at 94, Keenan v. Glasgow
Corporation 1923 SC 611, Gaitons v. Blytlnuood Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. 1948 SLT (N) 49. C.f.
Campbell v. United Collieries Ltd. 1911 2 SLT 434. However, in actions for personal injury,
where the grounds are differentiated in the condescendence a single plea of fault is sufficient.
Durnin v. William Coutts & Son 1955 SLT (N) 9. The common expression of the plea is 'The
pursuer having suffered loss, injury and damage through the fault et separatim breach of
statutory duty of the defenders is entitled to reparation from them therefor'.
77 Stuart Eves v. Smiths Gore 1993 SLT 479.
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facts founds a breach of common law and statutory duties, where the one fails, the
other may still succeed.78 Again, further examples are examined below with regard
to the plea of lack of specification.
Where a party wishes to plead a non-essential fact, (e.g. for the purposes of cross-
examination79) which is not known to him80, but which might be within the other
party's knowledge81 and the fact is a reasonable inference from facts known by him
and pled or represents an averment of belief, he may do so by employing the phrase
'believed and averred'.82 The phrase is also properly employed where the party must
prove a material fact to succeed, and the fact is not known to him: Then he may still
succeed by inviting the court to draw an inference from other facts pled as
'categorical assertions'83 - in other words, the evidence of one fact is proof of another
by reasonable inference.84 If there is an insufficiency of these other facts, the court
will not draw the inference.85
78 Oates v. Atlantic Drilling Co. Ltd. 1995 SLT (N) 71.
79 Query whether this in itself offends the general rule that only essential and relevant facts
should be averred? See Macphail, Practice, para. 9-54.
80 Shaw v. Renton & Fisher 1977 SLT (N) 60, Leslie v. Leslie 1983 SLT 186, Oil Technnics Ltd. v.
Thistle Chemicals Ltd & Ors. 1997 SLT (N) 416.
81 McCrone v. Macbeath, Cnrrie & Co. 1968 SLT (N) 24. The importance is that the fact cannot be
within the pleading party's knowledge. Leslie v. Leslie 1983 SLT 186, Shaw v. Renton & Fisher
1977 SLT (N) 60.
82 Leslie v. Leslie 1983 SLT 186 at 188, Magee & Co. (Belfast) Ltd. v. Braceivell Harrison & Coton
1980 SLT (N) 102, McCrindle v. Sandilands 1980 SLT (N) 12.
83 Brown v. Redpath Broivn & Co. 1963 SLT 219. Stark v. Crichton and Anr (unreported) 12 July
1996 per Temporary Judge Wheatley. C.f. Akbar v. Crichton (unreported) 1999 GWD 29 - 1356.
84 Strathmore Group Ltd. v. Credit Lyonnaise 1994 SLT 1023 per L. Osborne at 1032, Littlejohn v.
Wood & Davidson Ltd. 1997 SLT 1353.
85 e.g. Partnership ofOcean Quest v. Finning Ltd 2000 SLT 157, Mcintosh & Anr. v. Scottish
Borders Council (unreported) 24 April 2001 per Temp Judge Coutts. It may be difficult to
persuade a court that a reasonable inference of conspiracy can be drawn as 'believed and
averred' from averments of fraud even where the averments are properly specific. See Subsea
Offshore Ltd. v. Broom and Anr., 2003 SCLR 309.
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It is perfectly competent to plead a case on alternative factual grounds. Thus, where a
pursuer raises an action convening multiple defenders, pleading cases against them
in the alternative, where liability may lie with any one of them and it cannot be
averred which is liable, the action may be dismissed against some but still survive
against others.86 But where averments are not in the alternative then they must not be
self contradictory.87
In many cases, substantial justice requires that a case may be stated not only
alternatively but on inconsistent averments of fact.88 However, in other cases it
would not be compatible with justice to the opposite party to permit the case to
proceed on these alternative bases, and thus sometimes an election must be made.89
Although the question of pleading such cases is one of practice and procedure and it
has been thought neither necessary nor desirable to pursue too far an enquiry for
abstract principles,90 it is suggested that the following may be stated. Pleading on
alternative inconsistent bases is deemed permissible where a party is excusably in
ignorance of the essential facts91 but it is not permissible where a party is shown to
86 Stout v. UKAEE 1979 SLT 54, Gallacher v. Kleinwort Benson Trustees Limited & Ors.
(Unreported, 12 March 2003).
87 Maclaren, Practice p. 311, M'Sourley v. Magistrates ofPaisley 1902 10 SLT 86 approved in
Smart v. Bargh 1949 SC 57. For early examples see Campbell v. Grierson (1848) 10 D. 361, London
and Caledonian Marine Insurance Co. v. London and Edinburgh Shipping Co. (1867) 5 M. 982.
88 M v. M 1967 SLT 157. Maxwell, Practice p. 174, Macphail, Practice, para 9-35. The importance
is that the inconsistent cases must be stated alternatively. So, even where the pursuer was not
aware of which of two companies had failed in their duties, convening both without making
an alternative case against the second company led to dismissal against the second on the
grounds of relevancy. Allison v. Isleburn Ltd. and Eurolink Ferries Ltd. 1997 SCLR 791 per L.
Macfadyen at 796.This particular area of pleading, in the past, has caused practitioners
difficulties. For an example of the confusions which can arise see J. Morrison, 'Pleading
Alternative Cases' 1987 SLT (News) 193 and J.A. Russell, 'Further Observations on Pleading
Alternative Cases' 1987 SLT (News) 396.
89 Royal Bank ofScotland pic v. Harper Macleod & Ors. 1999 SCLR 781.
90 Smart v. Bargh 1949 SC 57 per L. P. Cooper at 61-2.
91 Finnie v. Logie (1859) 21 D. 825 per L.P. M'Neill at 829, Clarke v. Edinburgh and District
Tramways Co. Ltd. 1914 SC 775, Valley v. Wiggins Teape Ltd. 1979 SLT (N) 50, Safdar v. Devlin
1995 SLT 530.
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have knowledge which permits him to elect which case to present.92 It has been
considered that a greater latitude is given to defenders to plead such a case93 but it is
ultimately for the Court in its discretion to control the more extreme type of cases.94
In testing of the relevancy of the cause so pled, as a whole, if one branch is relevant
and the other branch is irrelevant, the whole case may be held to be irrelevant95 as
the weaker alternative is always the test of the case.96 Where one factual ground of
action is not supported by relevant averments, the whole action is dismissed.97 This
is known colloquially as the 'weaker alternative rule.' The concept has been
explained thus: 'If legal liability arises only on proof of the fact A, and if all that a
pursuer offers to prove is that it is either A or B, his pleadings are irrelevant. The
relevancy of the case is tested on the weaker alternative.'98 Where, however, legal
liability arises from proof of either A or B, then the action would still be relevant. It is
important to note that the weaker alternative is that which is weaker in law.99 The
fact that an alternative case is being made should be clearly indicated at the outset of
a separate condescendence by using the word 'Alternatively'.
Where a pursuer wishes to create an alternative case based on factual averments of a
defender which are in principle denied, he may commence the condescendence with
92 Cass v. Edinburgh and District Tramways Co. Ltd. 1908 SLT 957.
93 Smart v. Bargh 1949 SC 57 per L. P. Cooper at 61-2, Mv.M 1967 SLT 157.
94 Smart supra, Maxwell Practice p. 174, Royal Bank ofScotland v. Harper McLeod 1999 SLT 99.
95 Finnie v. Logie (1859) 21 D. 825 per LP M'Neill at 829.
96 Hope v. Hope's Trustees (1898) 1 F (HL) 1 per L. Watson p. 3 and L. Shand at 5, Smart supra
per LP Cooper at 93.
97 Finnie supra., Murray v. Wyllie 1916 SC 356, Percival v. Bairds & Scottish Steel Ltd. 1952 SLT
(Sh. Ct.) 80, Maxwell, Practice, p. 174. For examples see Weir & Anr. v. East ofScotland Water
Authority 2001 SLT (N) 1205, Grant v. Macdonald 1998 SLT (Sh Ct) 76.
98 Haigh & Ringrose Ltd. v. Barrhead Builders 1981 SLT 157 per Lord Stott.
99 Stewart's Executors v. Stewart 1993 SC 427 per L.P. Hope at 457.
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the phrase 'Alternatively, estowo [the defender's facts] (which are denied)'. Thus, if
the defender's averments are proved, and the pursuer fails in his substantive case, he
is still entitled to succeed on the defender's proven facts as he has the alternative case
on record.101
(viii) Quotations in Averments, Reference to Statutes and the
Incorporation of Documents Brevitatis Causa
Historically, correspondence or other documents102 which did not constitute part of
the grounds of the action were not to be stated at length, or incorporated ad longum
but only referred to.103 The same applied with Public General Statutes as part of the
general prohibition against pleading law - as long as the facts averred were sufficient
to bring them within the ambit of the statute.104 Where an action was based on a
private Act of Parliament the relevant provision was set out at length.105 Where a
document did form part of the ground of action, such as a libellous letter in an action
of damages for defamation, it was considered proper that it was incorporated.106 It
was formerly considered irregular to refer to a pamphlet or other extraneous matter,
and hold it as inserted in the pleading.107 Where clauses of statutes or documents
100 scil. 'assuming that'.
101 M. v. M. supra.
102 Charles v. South District Market Co. (1826) 4 S. 514, Tulloch v. Davidson (1858) 20 D. 1045
103 Lords Ordinary Notice 6th March 1839, s.3. See also Roy v. Wright, supra. Historically, in the
pleadings a produced document would be referred to as '[Document] No. [ ] of process'. It
did not require to be 'incorporated' See Chapter 3 and Appendix 2.
104 Glasgow Rly Co. v. Tennent (1848) 11 D. 212, Carruthers v. Caledonian (1854) 16 D 425, Granger
v. Geils (1857) 19 D. 1010. (Formerly, actions laid solely on the terms of the Employer's
Liability Act brought in the sheriff court required the Act and the section founded on to be
pleaded to permit transmission of the cause to the Court of Session. See Lees, Handbook, p. 36).
105 Maxwell, Practice, p. 173 following Maclaren, Practice at p. 312.
105 Maxwell, Practice, p. 173.
107 Presumably on the basis that a pamphlet could contain argument or rhetoric and
extraneous matter had no place as an 'essential fact' in the cause.
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would necessarily require to be referred to in deciding the cause, for convenience it
was the general practice to quote them in the pleadings.108
In modern practice, it is thought that some of the above is still relevant, but the law is
now clear as to what should be averred and what can be incorporated. Regarding the
averring of provisions of statutes, where the cause arises out of the contravention of
particular public general statutes the practice is to quote the relevant section or part
thereof and specify the way in which it has been contravened.109 In actions for
damages for negligence, it is the practice to aver the specific duties owed to a pursuer
by a defender by virtue of statutory provisions.110 In actions based on the Occupier's
Liability Act 1960, the Act is often averred.111 Private Acts of Parliament before 1850
require to be pled112 as does foreign law, if different from Scots law.113
Where a party bases his case on a document i.e. he 'founds' on it or a part thereof, he
must produce the document114 insofar as it is within his possession and control,115
108 p. 194. Maxwell, Practice, p. 173 following Maclaren Practice p. 312 and authorities therein
cited. See also Laming v. Seater (1889) 16 R 828 cited by Lees Handbook p. 31 and Scott Dickson,
'Pleading' cit sup. p. 25.
109 e.g. the Factories Acts. Maxwell, Practice, p. 173. See also NV Devos Gebroeder v. Sunderland
Sportswear Ltd. 1987 SLT 331 for authority that a failure to specify the statutory provision
founded upon is not always fatal, (in this case provisions of the Sale of Goods Act 1979). The
practice seems inconsistent.
110 Macphail, Practice, para 9-18. The practice has been criticised D.M. Walker, 'Pleadings in
Negligence' (1956) 72 Scot LR 241, Walker, Delict, p. 187 but it continues as the usual style of
pleading such actions. See for example Green's Litigation Styles, Styles A04-39, (Construction
(Health, Safety and Welfare) Regs. 1996, and A04-42A, (Noise atWork Regulations 1989) and
R. Conway, Personal Injury Practice in the Sheriff Court, 2nd ed., (Edinburgh, 2003) p. 68. See
also comments of Lord Kissen, 'Delict' 1966 SLT (News) 45.
111 even though the Act merely restored the common law. See Green's Litigation Styles, Styles
A04-41, A04-43.
112 Interpretation Act 1978, s. 3.
113 Emerald Stainless Steel Ltd. South Side Distribution Ltd. 1982 SC 61.
114 i.e. the whole document. Marty's Trs. v. Wilson's Exrs. 1945 SC 51, Unigate Foods Ltd. v.
Scottish Milk-Marketing Board 1975 SC (HL) 75 per L. Fraser at 106. This was always a
requirement. It is now incorporated into OCR by r. 21.1(1) and RCS by r. 27.1.
115 Western Bank of Scotland v. Baird (1863) 2 M. 127.
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and he must describe it accurately and specifically in the pleadings. A document not
produced cannot be considereci by the Court.116 Where the part thereof is in short
compass, the actual wording used in the document may be pled. If the document is
overly long to put in the pleadings, then it should be incorporated into the pleadings
by reference. This is done by using a phrase such as '[The document] is adopted and
held to be herein repeated brevitatis causa."117 The important part is the repetition
'brevitatis causa' i.e. for the sake of brevity.118 In this situation, it is the proper course
to incorporate the whole document as failure to do so prevents the court examining
the document119 unless the parties have lodged a joint minute dispensing with
probation of the document.120 Thus the phrase is not wording of mere style121. It must
be present in some form to give fair notice to the other side that the condescendence
is to be read as if the document formed part of it and to enable a court to examine the
document so incorporated by reference. Therefore a document not incorporated into
the pleadings cannot be examined by the Court at procedure roll even though the
document may be lodged.122
116 Hayes v. Robinson 1984 SLT 300 per L. Ross at 301.
117 Macphail, Practice, para. 9-67, Black, Introduction p. 12. Gordon v. Davidson (1864) 2 M. 758
per LJ-C Inglis at 758, Redpath Dorman Long Ltd. v. Tarmac Construction Ltd. 1982 SC 14 per L.
Ross at 18, Grampian Hydraidics (Buckie) Ltd. v. Dauntless Marine Engineering and Supply Co.
1992 SLT (Sh Ct) 45, Halliday v. Rolland Decorators Ltd. 1994 SCLR 305. Sometimes the phrase
'[The document] is produced herewith, adopted and held to be herein incorporated brevitatis
causa' is used - see Grampian Hydraidics (Buckie) Ltd. v. Dauntless Marine Eiigineering and Supply
Co. cit. sup.
118 It has been suggested that the latter should always be used. S. Woolman, 'Pleadings', in
H.L. MacQueen (ed.) Scots Law into the 21st Century. Essays in Honour ofW.A. Wilson
(Edinburgh, 1996) 277 at 280.
119 Gordon v. Davidson (1864) 2 M. 758.
120 Ribble PaperMills, Ltd. Clyde PaperMills Ltd. 1972 SLT (N) 25, Stone v. Macdonald 1979 SC
363 per L. Ross at 365, Trade Development Bank v. D.W. Haig (Bellshill) Ltd. 1983 SLT 107 per L.
Stewart at 109, Eadie Cairns v. Programmed Maintenance Painting Ltd. 1987 SLT 777, Grampian
Hydraulics supra, Mcllwraith v. Lochmaddy Hotel Ltd. 1995 SCLR 595 per L. Prosser at 497.
121 Grampian, supra.
122 Chalmers v. Martin 1996 SLT 1307.
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As part of the general prohibition against pleading evidence, a document containing
opinion should not be incorporated,123 particularly where the document is an expert
report and, even more so, where it refers to another report.124 Factual material,
however, such as invoices, schedules and lists can be incorporated.125
A document which 'is referred to for its terms' is not an averment of fact upon which
a plea-in-law can be based126 and a phrase along the lines of '[the document] is
referred to for its terms and adopted breintatis causa' is strictly, incorrect.127 Where a
party replies to the proper incorporation of a document with the wording '[the
document] is referred to for its terms' sometimes with 'beyond which no admission
is made' conjoined, then he may be taken to be admitting the existence of the
document but not its terms.128 But the authorities are not unanimous on this point, as
it has also been held to mean that the very existence of the document is not
admitted129 and stating that the 'alleged document is referred to for its terms' has
been construed as meaning that the existence of the document requires to be
proved.130 Macphail, Practice , offers the practical advice that the party should
123 Connell v. Ferguson (1861) 23 D. 683 per L. Neaves at 685, Westwood v. Keay (1950) 66 Sh. Ct.
Rep. 147, Barton v. William Low & Co. 1968 SLT (N) 27.
124 Englert v. Stakis pic 1996 (unreported) per Temporary Judge Wilkinson, Q.C.
125 Royal Bank ofScotland pic. v. Holmes 1999 SLT 563.
126 Macphail, Practice, para. 9.67.
127 In Royal Bank op. cit. the phrase was considered to be 'unusual' although the pursuer's
counsel accepted, for the purposes of the debate, that it could amount to incorporation. The
confusion perhaps arises from parties knowing that they must use the words 'brevitatis causa'
but not that they must also adopt the terminology of incorporation 'by reference'. It appears
that this phrase is becoming increasingly accepted by some in practice as the proper way of
incorporating documents. See MacKenzie, Written Pleadings, op. cit., paras. 3.68 and 4.174. As
noted, strictly this is incorrect or at least 'unusual'.
128 Pringle v. Bremner and Stirling (1867) 5 M. (HL) 55, H. Widdop & Co. Ltd. v. ] & ] Hay Ltd.
1961 SLT (N) 35.
129 McConnel v. Pringle (1960) 76 Sh Ct Rep 67, Maxwell, Practice p. 188, fn 2.
130 Lees, Handbook at para. 119, Maclaren, Practice, p. 377.
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actually expressly set out his position in relation to the document rather than relying
on these phrases.131
Confusion has arisen from the practical application of these rules as to when a
document may be referred to in the course of debate on relevancy and/or
specification.132 The confusion arises from dicta of Lord Avonside in Eadie Cairns
when he stated that:
'It is a strict rule of our system of pleadings, for long recognised, that in
debates related to relevancy and specification no reference whatsoever can
be made to productions lodged by one side or another said to support
written pleadings unless both sides are in agreement that such productions
are accurate and acceptable. I should have thought that this established rule
should have been known to any advocate who drafted pleadings.'133
It has been considered that Eadie Cairns was a decision on its own facts134 and the
above remarks were obiter.135 But a closer reading of the facts of the case show, it is
submitted, that there is actually little to be confused about. The pursuers' action was
based on the defective performance of a contract by the defenders where the details
of defective performance were found in various technical reports obtained by the
pursuers. These were used by them in substitution for factual averments of the
defects and of loss and damage arising therefrom. The clue to Lord Avonside's dicta
131 Macphail, Practice, para. 9.67.
132 SteelmekMarine and General Engineers' Trustee v. Shetland Sea Farms Ltd. (sub. nom Reid v.
Shetland Sea Farms Ltd.) 1999 SLT 30 per Sh. Pr. Bowen at 30-1. See E. Bowen, 'Written
Pleadings in the Sheriff Court' cit. sup. p. 250. See also, C. Hennessy, Civil Practice and
Procedure para 3.31 - 'The precise application of this rule is not entirely clear however.' and G.
Junor, 'Eadie Cairns - R.I.P.?' (2003) 8(1) SLPQ 22.
133 Eadie Cairns v. Programmed Maintenance Painting Ltd. 1987 SLT 777at p. 780E.
134 Grampian, supra.
135 Ftalliday, supra, Steelmek, supra.
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lies in the wording which the pursuers used in their attempt to incorporate the
reports. They pled: 'the said defects are as set out in two reports ... both of which are
produced and referred to brevitatis causa for their whole terms.' Strictly there was no
incorporation, repetition or adoption by reference. As noted above, the words used
are not merely stylistic.
The Court decided that in these circumstances, the grounds for breach of contract
and the details of the loss and damage caused by the defenders should have been on
record as a matter of fair notice and as a matter of relevancy and specification. Thus
without proper incorporation the case was irrelevant. What Lord Avonside was
referring to was the situation where there was no incorporation of the documents
irrespective of any enquiry into specification or relevancy of the pleadings. This
construction of the case has been confirmed by Lord Macfadyen in the recent case of
Royal Bank of Scotland v. Holmes.136 Sometimes, therefore, a party can meet the
requirements of fair notice and relevancy and specification by properly incorporating
documents but as to whether the incorporation will meet those requirements, each
case will turn on its own facts.137 We may note also that it has been held that a
properly incorporated document may itself constitute sufficient notice to the other
side as part of a case not fully averred on record.138
Against this background Lord Avonside's remarks are quite apposite and as Lord
Jauncey said in the same case:
'If the pursuers wish to rely on certain passages from the reports they
should incorporate those passages into the pleadings, so that the defenders
1361999 SLT 563 at 570F.
137 Royal Bank supra.
138 Lord Advocate v. Shipbreaking Industries (No. 2) 1993 SLT 995.
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may have fair notice of what particular points are being taken against
them.'139
The point is still to be considered by a Division of the Court of Session but it is
submitted that the approach adopted by Lord Macfadyen is the pragmatic and
correct one.
(ix) The pursuer's Pleas-in-Law.
As examined in the previous chapter, the requirement for pleas-in-law was part of
the Judicature Act 1825140 and A.S. 11 July 1828 and, although initially unpopular, the
requirement has never been dispensed with. Pleas must appear in the modern
summons and defences. Pleas-in-law represent the detailed application of the law to
the facts pled in the condescendence or answers and should be specific, distinct and
separate propositions in law without argument141 stating in as few words, as is
consistent with clearness, the rule of law founded upon.142 The pleas will mirror the
substantial parts of the conclusions and, taken with the condescendence, they should
give the defender sufficient notice of the case made against him.143 Each legal
proposition will be represented by a plea in law.144 It has been said that the stating of
the appropriate pleas-in-law remains a cornerstone of the system of written
pleadings.145 The classical definition of a plea-in-law was provided by Lord Justice-
Clerk Inglis:
139 at 783F. Emphasis added.
140 or Court of Session Act, ss. 9 and 11.
141 Maxwell, Practice, p. 174. See also Fraser v. M'Kenzie (1826) 4 S. 699 (note) (NE 706, note),
and Mackay, Manual p. 194 fn (e).
142 Mackay, Manual, p. 195.
143 Gunn & Ors. v. M'Adam & Sons Limited & Ors 1949 SC 31 at 39.
144 A.G. Walker, Written Pleadings, cit. sup. p. 166.
145 Kelly v. Capital Bank pic 2004 SLT (N) 483 per L. Carloway.
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'a plea in law ought to be a distinct legal proposition, applicable to the facts of
the case.'146
However, although there is a requirement to state specific pleas, custom, practice and
tradition sanctioned the pleading of general pleas. Maclaren states that at least one
specific plea should be averred but suggests that a general plea may be advisable ob
majorem cautelam.147 Although this is more common with defenders, particularly with
regard to preliminary pleas to the relevancy and specification,148 the older authorities
suggest the insertion of pleas such as: 'in the circumstances condescended upon, the
pursuer is entitled to decree in terms of the conclusions (or the alternative
conclusions)'149 even though it was this plea which L.J.-C Inglis had considered a
'loose and unmeaning statement'.150 It should be said that its modern use is frowned
upon151 and its use may, in any event, have abated. Lord President Clyde commented
in 1932:
'so far as I am aware no such plea was ever sustained in the Court of Session;
and obviously could not be properly sustained, since it means nothing. It has
now gone out of use.'152
Another common153 general plea for a pursuer, particularly in actions for payment, is
that 'The defender being due and resting owing to the pursuer in the sum sued for,
146 Young & Co v. Graham (1860) 23 D. 36. This is really a restatement of earlier requirements
for 'concise legal propositions' in the pleas in law. See Ch. 3 supra.
147 (for greater security). Maclaren Practice p. 313. He treats the pleas for the pursuer and
defender together.
148 see infra.
149 Mackay, Practice Vol. 1 p. 392, Mackay, Manual, p. 195, Maclaren, Practice, p. 313 Mackay,
Practice Vol. 1 p. 392
150 Young, supra.
151 Maxwell, Practice p. 174, Lorci Cullen, Reviexv ofBusiness of the Outer House of the Court of
Session (1995) p. 28.
152 R. Wyness Millar, 'Civil Pleading in Scotland' (1932) 30 Michigan Law Review, p. 562, f.n.
81. See also Scott Dickson, 'Pleading' cit. sup. pp.20-1.
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decree therefor should be pronounced as concluded for.' It is a plea of great
antiquity154 but it cannot be said to be a proposition in law and cannot therefore be a
plea-in-law.155 However, there may be one, and only one situation in which it can
have an application. In the situation where the pleadings aver a loan was made by a
pursuer to a defender which remains due but unpaid, the plea may be employed.156
It is not now thought that a Lord Ordinary would suggest any new plea which may
to him appear necessary to exhaust the whole disputable matter in fact or law157
although he may raise matters of competency which are pars judicis to notice. The
Court cannot give effect to a plea not stated on record158 and if the pleas-in-law
disclose no basis in law which would entitle a pursuer to decree, or if the pleas do
not give the defender fair notice of the case in law made against him, the action will
be irrelevant and fall to be dismissed.159 A pursuer may table preliminary pleas
against the pleadings of the defender and this is examined below.
(x) The Defences.
153 e.g. see 'Quotations' 1993 SCLR 62.
154 It appears as 'due and restand awand' in G. Dallas, System ofStiles (Edinburgh, 1697)
155 R.H.M. Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd. v. Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SLT 214 per Lord Fraser
of Tullybelton at 215, Halliday v. Rolland Decorators Ltd. 1994 SCLR 305, Pie in the Sky v.
McCajferty (unreported) 1996 GWD 34-2040, Maxwell, Practice, p. 174, Green's Annotated
Rules of the Court of Session, Annotations, para 13.2.5, Cullen Review op. cit. p. 28
156 Kelly v. Capital Bank pic 2004 SLT (N) 483 per L. Carloway, Royal Bank ofScotland pic v.
Malcolm 1999 SCLR 854. Wyness Millar, supra cites this example at op. cit. p. 574. So also
where a statute provides a government body with powers to assess payment to the Crown
and upon notification the debt becomes statutorily due. See Lord Advocate v. Johnston 1985 SLT
533 (Customs and Excise suing only upon this plea under powers of statute.)
157 Mackay, Manual, p. 195 noted that s. 10 of 1825 Act gave the Ordinary the power to do so
and considered that this was still part of procedure of the Court in 1893 although rarely acted
on. The section has been repealed and it was never utilised, as discussed in the previous
chapter.
158 Kelly v. Edmund Nuttal Sons & Co. (London) Ltd. 1965 SC 427. In the older practice the court
could - Buchanan v. Lumsden (1837) 9 Jur. 449, Broom v. Anderson (1837) 9 Jur. 450
159 Kelly v. Capital Bank pic 2004 SLT (N) 483 per L. Carloway.
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The effect of lodging defences is that litiscontestation takes place and any decree
pronounced thereafter is a decree in foro.160
The defences consist of numbered answers corresponding to the articles of
condescendence annexed to the summons and the appropriate pleas in law.161
A defender must answer concisely, accurately and candidly the pursuer's articles of
condescendence meeting every fact in the averments in the traditional way.
As Lord Stewart explained:
'Our whole system of pleading and disposal of cases upon preliminary pleas
must depend upon each party stating with candour what are the material
facts upon which he relies and admitting the facts stated by his opponent
which he knows to be true.'162
As we have seen in the previous chapters, AS 1 Feb 1715, AS 7 Feb 1810, and s.105 AS
11 July 1828 regulated admissions so that a fact averred and not denied was held to
have been admitted.163 Mackay noted that these provisions 'have not been always
enforced and laxity has prevailed in consequence in the matter of admission and
denial'164 However, in modern practice the rules are clear cut and the traditional
manner of responding to each of the pursuer's averments is by admitting, or denying
160 Act 1672 cap.40 (record edition) cap. 16 (12mo edition), article 19, Gow v. Henry (1899) 2 F.
48 per L. Young at 52, Argyllshire Weavers v. Macanlay 1962 SC 388 per L. Hunter at 394-5. See
also comments of L. Wilberforce in Dick v. Burgh of Falkirk 1976 SLT 21 and L.P. Rodger in
Coutt's Tr. v. Coutts 1998 SCLR 729 and Annotated Rules of the Court of Session, op. cit. para.
18.1.2, Maxwell, Practice p. 186, Macphail, Practice, para. 8.19. The matter, however, has not
always been without doubt. See Clydesdale Bank v. D&H. Cohen 1943 SC 244. The original
meaning of an act of litiscontestation is discussed in Chapter 1 supra.
161 RCS 18.1(1).
162 Ellon Castle Estates Co. Ltd. v. Macdonald 1975 SLT (N) 66.
163 Dunn v. Livingston (1828) 7S. 218, Drysdale v. Wood (1832) 10 S. 198.
164 Mackay Practice, Vol. 1, p. 390.
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the averment or by stating that the averment is 'not known and not admitted' or
exceptionally stating that the averment is 'believed to be true'. These responses can
be employed as single sentences in answer to the pursuer's whole condescendence, if
appropriate. As a starting point, every statement of fact made by one party should be
answered by the other.165
(xi) Admissions.
In making admissions on record, it is best practice to admit candidly all that one can
admit including those issues which are not seriously questioned or in doubt.166
Where an averment of fact is admitted this is done by starting the avermentwith
'Admitted that...'. Where the averment is admitted but coupled with an explanation
or qualification which can be shortly stated, 'admitted that ... under explanation
that...' is used. If the qualification or explanation is lengthy the averment should be
denied and an explanation added after the general denial.
An admission must be construed with reference to the averments to which it forms
the answer,167 and where qualified with an explanation, it must be taken along with
the qualification168 unless the explanation can itself be disproved169 or is held to be
irrelevant.170 One should not 'admit' what is not averred.171
165 Gray v. Boyd 1996 SLT 60, Walkers on Evidence (2nd ed.) p. 44. The Sheriff Court rules
specifically require this. OCR 9.7.
166 Macphail, para 9-26, Ellon Castle Estates Co. Ltd. v. Macdonald 1975 SLT (N) 55, Foxley v.
Dunn 1978 SLT (N) 35, Lossie Hydraulic Co. v. Ecosse Transport Ltd. 1980 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 94
167 Edwards v. Butlins Ltd. 1998 SLT 500 per LJ-C Cullen at 503F.
168 Carnegy v. Carnegy (1825) 3 S. 566 (N.E. 389) Grierson v. Thomson (1830) 8 S. 317, Scottish
Marine Insurance Co ofGlasgow v. Turner (1853) 1 Macq. 334 per L. Truro at 340, Edivards v.
Butlins Ltd. 1998 SLT 500 per LJ-C Cullen at 502K, Walker and Walker, Evidence (2nd ed.) para.
48(a). This rule is of some antiquity. See Darling, The Practice of the Court ofSession
(Edinburgh, 1833) p. 181 and previous Chapters supra.
169 Anderson v. Rintoul (1825) 3 S. 496, Gall v. Fordyce (1828) 6 S. 943, Campbell v. Arrott (1835) 13
S. 557, Milne v. Donaldson (1852) 14 D. 849, Campbell v. McCartney (1843) 14 D. 1086, Picken v.
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It is thought that care should be employed in making admissions as they are
conclusive against the party making them172 and do not require of proof173 and even
admissions deleted prior to closing of the record can form the basis for a line in cross-
examination at the subsequent proof or proof before answer.174
Equally, however, an admission must be clear and unmistakable and it has been held
that a Court will not readily assume an admission by implication175 unless the party
fails or refuses to answer a statement of fact.176 However there are other exceptions to
this. Firstly, where a party refers to statutory provisions for their terms beyond
which no admission is made, (often with an averment that the defender fulfilled all
statutory duties incumbent upon him, or like words,) this is construed as an
admission that the statutory duties arising from these provisions apply in the case,
Arundale & Co. (1872) 10 M. 987, Gelstons v. Christie (1875) 2 R. 982, Chrystnl v. Chrystal (1900)
2 F. 373, Armour & Melvin v. Mitchell 1934 SC 94 at 96. Darling ihid.
170 Robertson & Co. v. Bird & Co. (1897) 24 R. 1076, Rotluuell v. Stuart's Trs. (1898) 1 F. 81, Coghill
v. Coghill 1896 4 SLT 215, Maxwell, Practice, p. 188, Macphail, Practice, para. 9-25.
171 Scott Dickson, 'Pleading' cit. sup., p. 26.
172 in that cause. Scottish Marine Insurance Co. v. Turner (1853) 1 Macq. 334 per L. Truro at 340.
It had always been the position that admissions could not be easily retracted. Darling, The
Practice of the Court of Session (Edinburgh, 1833) p. 181 citing M'Leod (1822) 1 S 333. See also
Ch. 3.
173 Erskine IV. ii.33. See also the maxim 'confessio facta injudicio omni probatione major est'
(judicial admission is stronger than proof). It is, however, only an admission which will
permit of this. A pursuer cannot so found on an 'averment' of the defender which has not
been proved. Lee v. National Coal Board 1955 SC 151 per L. Sorn at 160, Stewart v. Glasgow
Corporation 1958 SC 28 per LP Clyde at 39, Wilson v. Clyde Rigging & Boiler Scaling Co. Ltd. 1959
SC 328 per L. Strachan at 334.
174 Lennox v. National Coal Board 1955 SC 198, Carter v. Allison 1966 SC 257. However, the Court
will attach less weight to the evidence of a party who himself is unable to explain how it has
come to appear in the pleadings, as where his solicitor has inserted it without proper
consultation with the party. Campbell v. Inverness District Council 1993 GWD 11-772 per L.
Osborne. Other changes to the pleadings after the record is closed may also form the basis for
cross-examination. Kirkham v. Cementation Co. Ltd. & Anr. 1964 SLT (N) 33.
175 Cruickshank v. Fraser & Co. v. Caledonian Rly. (1876) 3 R. 484, Wilson v. Clyde Rigging and
Boiler Scaling Co. Ltd. 1959 SC 328 per L. Strachan at 334, ('treat as admissions only such
statements as are expressly framed as admissions'), Maclaren, Practice, pp. 376-7. However,
see below.
176 Scottish North Eastern Rly. v. Napier (1859) 21 D. 700 per L J-C Inglis at 703, Lees, Handbook,
p. 46.
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and the defender is prevented thereafter from putting the applicability of the
provisions in issue.177 However, where the Court consiciers that the statutory
provision clearly has no application and considers that this would lead to an artificial
resolution of the litigation, the issue becomes a live one for the Court.178
Secondly, where a narrative is provided in the averments of a party which does not
seriously dispute similar averments of the other, then these may sometimes be taken
as impliedly admitting the opponent's narrative or version of events.179 So, although
averments have no evidential significance unless and until they are proved180 it is not
always the case that a party can found only upon what his opponent concedes to him
in the actual form of an admission. In practice, cases occur in which the court will
treat an averment in answer as equivalent to an admission depending on the
particular case and the particular pleadings.181 Thus, where in answer to a pursuer's
averment of material fact, the defenders had made a general denial but added an
explanation in which they made an explicit averment which met that of the
pursuer182 the court treated that fact as an agreed fact although not formally admitted
by the defenders.183
177 McNaught v. British Railways Board 1979 SLT (N) 99. This however, has been recently
criticised as tending towards artificiality and technicality and can be potentially misleading,
see English v. North Lanarkshire Council 1999 SCLR 310 per Lord Reed.
178 Lamont v. Monklands D.C. 1992 SLT 428 per L. Caplan, Ballantyne v. John Young & Co.
(Kelvinhaugh) Ltd. 1996 SLT 358 per L. Clyde.
179 Paterson v. Scottish Solicitor's Discipline Tribunal 1984 SLT (N) 99, Macphail, para 9-24
180 Lee v. National Coal Board 1955 SC 151 per L. Sorn at 160, Stewart v. Glasgoiv Corporation 1958
SC 28 per LP Clyde at 39, Wilson v. Clyde Rigging & Boiler Scaling Co. Ltd. 1959 SC 328 per L.
Strachan at 334.
181 Dobson v. Colvilles Ltd. 1958 SLT (N) 30 (but not reported upon this point) per Lord Sorn
and referred to in the judgment of the Ordinary (Wheatley) at first instance in Wilson supra, at
330. Dobson was reviewed by the Division in Wilson without comment.
182 instead of admitting the averment but adding an explanation.
183 Dobson v. Colvilles Ltd op. cit.
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The whole topic of deemed or implied admissions could be said to be complicated
and not necessarily coherent184 and it might therefore be considered best practice
regarding the answering of material averments to force the other party to clarify their
position with the service of a Notice to Admit185 or by making a call in the pleadings
calling upon him to expressly admit or deny that averment.186
Where an admission is withheld of a fact which is afterwards proved, the party so
withholding may be punished in increased interest and expenses, whether successful
in resisting the pursuer's claim or not.187 Further, a matter which is not admitted on
record by a party which is subsequently admitted by him in evidence will affect the
Court's assessment of his credibility.188
(xii) Averments 'Believed to be True'.
Where a defender has no knowledge of the truth of the pursuer's factual averment
but believes it to be true, then he may answer 'Believed to be true that...'. Caution
should be exercised in this, however, as it is the equivalent of an admission189 and
dispenses with the necessity of evidence to prove it.190
184 C.f. Lord Strachan's dicta in Wilson cit. sup. and Lord Sorn's dicta in Dobson as reported in
Wilson. Lord Sorn's approach has been preferred. See Lord Advocate v. Gillespie 1969 SLT (Sh
Ct) 10.
185 see infra.
186 MacKenzie, Written Pleadings, para 5.21.
187 Ganley v. Scottish Boatowners Mutual Insurance Association 1967 SLT (N) 45, J.C. Forbes v.
Duignan 1974 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 74. See also Ch. 3 for historical position.
188 McDonald v. Glass (1883) 21 SLR 45.
189 Scottish North Eastern Rly. v. Napier (1859) 21 D. 700 per L J-C Inglis at 703, Music Hire
Service (Manchester) Limited v. Roccio and Anr. 1961 SLT (N) 13. This rule is really an
continuation of the practice of the Court implemented by s. 105 of AS 11th July 1828 examined
in the previous chapter - (viz. where a statement in point of fact 'within the opposite party's
knowledge is averred on the one side and not denied on the other, he shall be held as
confessed').
190 Binnie v. Rederij Theodoro DV1993 S.C. 71.
279
(xiii) Averments 'Not Known and Not Admitted'.
Simply, if the averment of fact is not within the defender's knowledge and he is not
prepared to admit it to narrow the issues between the parties, he should answer it
'Not known and not admitted that...'. The use of the phrase in answer to an
averment of fact which is within the defender's knowledge will be treated as an
admission. The use of the phrase 'Not known but believed to be true' is a concession
of the averment, and is deemed an admission, following the practice relating to an
averment 'believed to be true'.191
(xiv) Notices to Admit and Notices of Non-Admission.
We may conveniently notice at this point a particular feature of both Court of Session
and sheriff court procedure, of fairly recent design, whereby a party may intimate
and lodge a 'Notice to Admit' at any time after the closing of the record calling on
any other party to admit any facts pertaining to an issue in the pleadings of that
cause or to admit the authenticity of a document lodged in process.192 In the Court of
Session, the party so called upon, must within 21 days of intimation, intimate a
'Notice of Non-admission' stating that he does not admit the facts or the authenticity
of the document, which failing he is deemed to have admitted the fact or the
authenticity of the document.193 From anecdotal evidence and in the writer's
experience the procedure is little used.
191 Nortli-Eastern Rly Co. v. Napier (1859) 21 D. 700 per L J-C Inglis, Lees, Handbook, p. 49
192 RCS1994 as amended, (introduced by SI 1994/1443) r.28.A.l and OCR 1993 as amended r.
29.14. It will be recollected that this was an element of English Common Law procedure
which had been part of the aborted 1863 Bill, but was not incorporated into the 1868 Act
although it was recommended for adoption by the 1869-71 Commissioners Inquiring into the
Court of Law, Fourth Report. See Ch. 3 supra. The procedure in modern form was
recommended by the Working Party under Lord Jauncey on the White Paper on Intellectual
Property and Innovation (Patent Litigation) which led to the introduction of patent actions in
1991 and was extended to Ordinary actions in 1994. See Cullen, Review, op. cit. p. 34
193 RCS 28A.2. This procedure does not prevent parties lodging minutes of admission prior to
proof in terms of RCS 36.7.
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(xv) Denials.
Any remaining averments which are to be denied should be covered by a general
denial using the formula 'Quoad ultra, denied' because where a defender fails to
deny194 an averment, of which he has knowledge then he is 'held as confessed' and
the non-admission is deemed an admission.195 To reverse it and specifically deny
averments leaving the others 'Quoad ultra, admitted' is dangerous, particularly at the
point the pleadings are adjusted.196
The party's 'knowledge' is tested as his state of knowledge at the time of answering
the averment197 on any matter which does not require investigation by him198 and
exceptionally has been held to include the knowledge of his legal representative.199
Where a defender makes a reply that an averment is 'not admitted' this is not
equiparated with a formal denial.200 An averment 'denied and irrelevant' is not good
pleading201 nor is 'denied as stated'202 which has been considered to be a
194 and it is the failure to use the word 'deny' which is crucial.
195 Ellis v. Eraser (1840) 3 D. 264, Pegler v. Northern Agricultural Implement Co. (1877) 4 R. 435 per
LP Inglis at 438 and Lord Mure at 440, Central Motor Engineering Co. v. Galbraith 1918 SC 755,
Gilmour v. Scottish Clan Motonuays Ltd. 1928 S.N. 19, Gray v. Boyd (I.H.) 1995 SCLR 1075 per LJ-
C Ross at 1079, Walkers on Evidence, (2nd ed.) (2000) p. 44, OCR 1993 r. 9.7. See also the
previous Chapters supra for the development of this.
196 Black, Introduction, p. 21, A.G. Walker, 'Written Pleadings', cit. sup. p. 171 disagreeing with
Lees' recommendation to do this, if convenient. See Handbook para. 115, p. 47.
197 Central Motor Engineering Co. supra., per LP Strathclyde at 765 and L. Mackenzie at 770.
198 O'Connor v. W.G. Aidd & Co. (Engineering) Ltd. 1970 SLT (N) 16.
199 Mohammed v. Mohammed 1954 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 93.
200 Ellis, supra., Callaghan v. ]. & A. Weir Ltd. (1955) 71 Sh. Ct. Rep. 312, Clark v. Clark 1967 SC
296 at per L. Milligan at 305.
201 Because it is one at the same time a plea and a defence. North British Rly Co. v. Brown &c
(1857) 19 D. 840.
202 as you cannot deny an averment other than stated. Scott Dickson, 'Pleading' cit. sup. p. 26
although Lees, Handbook recommends its use where the averment is not fiction but is
distorted. Handbook, p. 48, para 119.
281
'meaningless superfluity'.203 'Specifically denied' is competent but technically otiose
as the averment is but an accentuated denial.204
It is submitted that candour and frankness in admission and denial is paramount.
The use of the 'denied' answer to averments has not been, and is not always
exercised responsibly, nor with candour and frankness. In an adversarial system,
where the pursuer will generally bear the onus of proof, the more generous the
defender's admission, the easier the pursuer's task at proof and the less likely that he
will overlook some element of his case. But the whole Scottish system of pleading
depends upon a party stating with candour the material facts upon which he relies
and admitting those of his opponent which he knows to be true.205 Even in 1893,
Mackay could note that:
'In practice, two contradictory modes of pleading are in use. The one is to
admit all adverse statements which the pleader knows by his instructions to
be well founded; the other is to deny all adverse statements which are not
certain to be proved. The theory on which the latter mode of pleading is
defended is that the defender is entitled to put the pursuer to proof of his
case. ... the former, it is submitted, is the correct practice, and ought to be
enforced.'206
203 Morrison v. McArdle 1967 SLT 58.
204 Annotated Rules Annotations, para 18.1.3. It may be 'soothing to the client's feelings but it
is not as good pleading as the simple "denied" or "quoad ultra denied'", Scott Dickson,
'Pleading' cit sup. p. 26. c.f. Black, Introduction, p. 22.
205 Ellon Castle Estates Co. Ltd. v. Macdonald 1975 SLT (N) 66 per L. Stewart. See also Cook v. UIE
Shipbuilding Scotland 1989 SCLR 156 per L. Morison at 157.
206 Mackay Manual, p. 219.
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In modern practice, the law has developed a strict approach to the interpretation of
those defences which have as their object the delaying of decree and the putting of
the pursuer to his proof. We return to this below.
As touched upon in the previous chapter, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards,
a practice developed of denying the pursuer's averments 'under reference to' or
'subject to' the defender's statement of facts207. Alternatively it might be pled that the
pursuer's averments were denied 'so far as inconsistent' with the defender's
statement of facts. These constructions became the usual practice208 but it was
common and sometimes convenient for the sake of brevity not to make a separate
statement of facts but to introduce in the form of explanations or qualifications to
admissions, any separate facts which the defender deemed necessary to establish his
defence.209 There were no hard-and-fast rules and it was a matter of discretion for the
defender's counsel.210 The format of 'denied so far as inconsistent' was thought not
very safe as the defender could be held to have made admissions quite
unconsciously destructive of his case, as a fatal averment could well not be
inconsistent and was therefore to be deemed admitted.211 The better practice was to
deny 'insofar as the pursuer's statements were not coincident (or did not coincide)
with the statement of facts.'212
207 or to other heads of the defender's answers.
2°8 Mackay, Manual p. 218. In the sheriff court provision was made for this under Rule 43 of
the Schedule to the Sheriff Courts 1907 Act. For an example see Compagnie des Forges v. Gibson
1920 SC 247.
209 Mackay, Manual p. 218.
210 Maclaren, Practice p. 372. A statement could be ordered by the Court where the pursuer
did not respond to the defences and the pursuer could be ordered by the Court to answer it.
Av.B (1899) 36 SLR 533, Reid v. Reid's Trs. (1887) 14 R. 770.
211 Campbell v. Ricketts or Campbell (1863) 1 M. 217 per L. Curriehill at 219, Andersons v. Lows
1863 2 M. 100 per L. Deas at 107, Maclaren, Practice, p. 377, Lees, Handbook, para 116, A.G.
Walker, Written Pleadings, cit. sup. p. 170.
212 Campbell supra, per L. Curriehill, A.G. Walker, Written Pleadings, cit. sup. p. 170. There was
a difference of opinion among practitioners as to the use of these phrases although their use
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In modern practice remnants of this as an averment persist but the averment is used
by pursuers in answering the defender's averments of fact. In practice these
defender's explanations, qualifications and averments advancing a positive defence
now immediately follow the 'Quoad ultra, denied' formula mentioned above.
Although as a matter of relevancy, the defender is not required to state more than a
general denial of the factual averments,213 if he wishes to advance a defence he must
as a matter of notice make averments relating to that defence as he cannot succeed in
a substantive defence not stated on record.214 If he does not make such averments, he
may be prevented from invoking that ground of defence later215 and if he can get to a
proof resting on general denials, he is thereby prohibited from leading any positive
evidence i.e. adducing a substantive defence216 and the court will draw 'most
favourable' inferences from the facts as proved by the pursuer217 insofar as these
inferences are reasonable218 or legitimate.219
was common in practice, (Campbell supra, per LP M'Neill) in answering a statement of fact for
the defender, or in a Minute endorsed on the Summons and Defences consenting to close
thereon.
213 Penny v. Aitken 1927 SC 673, Ganley v. Scottish Boatowners Mutual Insurance Association 1967
SLT (N) 45, Ellon Castle Estates Co. v. Macdonald 1975 SLT (N) 66, Redpath v. McCall 1963 SLT (S
Ct) 47, Edward Gibbon (Aberdeen) Ltd. v. Edwards 1992 SCLR 561, Gray v. Boyd 1995 SCLR 1075.
C.f. Robertson Construction Co. (Denny) Ltd. v. Bone Steel Ltd. & Ors. (unreported) (29 October
2003) per L. Clarke. In this commercial action, the defender attempted to 'shelter behind a
general denial' admitting that there was a contract but refraining from saying what the
contract terms were, putting the pursuer to proof of the terms. L. Clarke considered this
insufficient where the defender was a party to the contract, under reference to Lord Stewart's
observations in Ellon Castle Estates op. cit. See also the observations of L. Penrose in another
commercial action. Hamilton Estates Ltd. v. Central Regional Council (unreported) 1996 GWD 27
-1564.
214 Robb v. Logiealmond School Board (1875) 2 R. 417.
215 Quinn v. Cameron & Robertson 1956 SC 224, Maxwell, Practice p. 189.
216 although it is thought he could still lead evidence of witnesses in simple denial of the
pursuer's positive assertion of a fact.
217 Ross v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers [1964] 1 WLR 768 per L. Reid at 775,
O'Donnell v. Murdoch McKenzie & Co. 1967 SC (HL) 63 per L. Upjohn at 66 1967 SC (HL) 63
Binnie v Rederij Theodoro DV1993 S.C. 71, Penman v. Blue Cap Logistics 1999 S.L.T. 199.
218 Johnston v. City ofGlasgow DC 1986 SLT 51.
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A defender accordingly cannot, as a general rule, plead a defence of which he has not
given notice on record220 but a defence emerging upon cross-examination of the
pursuer's witnesses and unforeseen by the defender may competently be urged.221
So, positive averments are required to establish or set up the substantive defence.
Thus, defences of e.g. contributory negligence, or defective performance require
averment. Where acquiescence is pleaded, knowledge on the part of the person
acquiescing should be averred.222 Where 'prior use' is the defence in a breach of
patent case, the prior use must be detailed.223 If the defence to an action of
defamation is privilege, details must be specified by the defender.224
(xvi) The Defender's Positive Averments in Defence.
The rules here are similar to those explored above in relation to the pleading of a
condescendence by the pursuer.225 The averments should be brief but not vague or
lacking specification,226 nor contain argument. Evidence should not be pled.227 If it is
219 Cordiner v. BRB 1986 SLT 209.
220 Smith v. Green, (1853) 15 D. 549, (1854) 16 D. 429, Hunter v. Broadwood (1854) 16 D. 441 at
449, Kerr v. Clark & Co. (1868) 7 M. 51.
221 Bile Bean Mfg. Co. v. Davidson (1906) 8 F. 1181.
222 Hunter v. Broadwood (1854) 16 D. 441 per LP M'Neill at 449 Mackay, Manual, p. 217.
223 Neilson v. Househill Co. (1842) 4 D. 1187 (c.f. Russell v. Crichton (1838) 16 S. 1155 where
general averments of prior use were permitted for issue for jury trial)
224 Smith v. Green, cit. sup., Ralston, Goodwin v. M'Lean (1857) 19 D. 878.
225 Historically, there was no fixed practice as to the cases in which it was proper to make a
'separate statement' as provided for by s. 1 of the 1850 Act. It was thought that facts collateral
or incidental to the defence could be stated in the defences but facts constituting a counter
case or a 'separate and substantive case' (Scott Dickson, 'Pleading op. cit. 26-7 citing Police
Commissioners ofArbroath v. Corsar 1893 1 SLT 596) required to be stated in the separate
statement. It became a question of convenience (LP Clyde in Wyness Millar op. cit. 576) until
practice sanctioned that any of the facts averred by the defender should be stated in the
defences.
226 Brown v. George Wilson (Stonehouse) Ltd. 1982 SLT (Sh Ct) 96, RHM Bakeries (Scotland) Ltd.
Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 SLT 3. (2nd Div.)
227 Neilson v. Househill Coal and Iron Co. (1842) 4 D. 1187 per LJ-C Hope at 1193.
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it may be ordered to be withdrawn.228 Scandalous averments may also be deleted by
the Court.229 Law should not be pled subject to the exceptions detailed above. A false
averment should not be made230 nor a frivolous defence stated which can of itself be
an abuse of process.231
Where a defender founds on a document the rules above detailed will apply. In
actions involving multiple joint defenders, where there is a 'principal' defence and
the other defenders adopt this defence,232 it is thought appropriate that the latter
defenders can 'adopt and repeat' the defence using the phrase 'The defender has
seen and adopts the statement of facts and pleas in law in the defences for A.B. and
holds them as repeated mutatis mutandis on behalf of himself.'233
Defences may be inconsistent234 and pled in the alternative,235 more latitude being
given to a defender to do so,236 although the 'weaker alternative' rule will apply237.
Denial of a debt and prescription are still frequently pleaded together.238 But
inconsistent defences ought seldom to be pleaded unless there is serious doubt of
success in the primary defence.239
228 Ure v. Pollock (1832) 10 S 450 (Action of aliment for illegitimate child, defender averred
medical evidence directed to impotency).
229 A. p. B. (1895), 22 R. 402, H. v. P (1905) 8 F. 232, M. v. S. 1909 1 SLT 192.
230 Boustead v. Gardiner (1879) 7 R. 139.
231 Stewart v. Stewart 1984 SLT 58.
232 Cowie v. Merry (1828) 7S. 23.
233 Mackay, Manual, p. 432, Maclaren, Practice p. 377. In the nineteenth century it was common
for subsidiary defenders to plead that the leading defence was 'adopted and incorporated
brevitatis causa'.
234 Buchan v. Boyd (1828) 6 S. 1025 per L. Corehouse.
235 Smart v. Bargh 1949 SC 57 per LP Cooper at 61.
236 Smart v. Bargh 1949 SC 57 per LP Cooper at 61-2, M. v. M. 1967 SLT 157.
237 Aberdein v. Straton's Trustees (1867) 5 M. 726 per L. Colonsay; Finnie v. Logie (1859) 21 D.
825, Blackball & Am. v. Machines 1997 SLT (N) 649 (not reported on this point) 3 August 1995
per L. Hamilton.
238 Campbell v. Grierson (1848) 10 D. 361, Alcock v. Easson (1842) 5 D. 356.
239 Mackay Manual, p. 218-9.
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(xvii) Skeletal Defences and Summary Decree.
As above noted, a defender is entitled to rest on a denial of the pursuer's case or any
part of it240 and, as a matter of pure relevancy, the defender need only state a general
denial of all of the pursuer's averments.
It will be recalled that the procedural reforms of the early and mid nineteenth
century aimed at coercing one party to answer the factual averments of the other241
and it was not uncommon to see in the pleadings of the period a simple 'Denied' in
answer to a condescendence.
Where, however, the defender sought to advance a positive or substantive defence
'in answer', then he had to 'set forth in explicit terms' the line of defence and the facts
on which he founded242 such that the other party could investigate them and prepare
to meet that case.243 Whether the averments in the articles of condescendence were
answered as 'admitted' or 'denied' or whether explicit facts were also advanced in
defence, the end result was that it left clearly defined alleged facts in issue for
determination thereafter. As practice developed, however, it became more usual to
make partial and limited admissions and thereafter to make a denial 'under reference
to' or 'subject to' the defender's statement of facts or his other answers to separate
articles of condescendence. From there, the practice arose of inserting positive
averments, setting up a substantive defence, into the answer itself.
240 Snbre Leasing Ltd. v. Copeland 1993 SLT 1099.
241 c.f. Court of Session Act 1825 s.2 - 'by denying the facts ... or by admitting the same'.
242 ibid.
243 Neilson v. Househill Coal and Iron Co. (1843) 4 D. 1187 per LJ-C Hope at 1193.
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In modern practice, a general and bare denial to all of the pursuer's articles of
condescendence, termed a 'skeleton defence'244, is thought to be 'rarely proper or
satisfactory.'245 In one case, the defenders simply denied the pursuer's clearly set out
factual averments including matters which must have fallen within the defenders'
knowledge. Lord Ordinary Morison considered the defenders' conduct
'reprehensible.'246
There may be cases where such a defence is perfectly fair as well as relevant.247 Thus,
for example, if the defender denies any factual or legal relationship with the pursuer,
- i.e. basically that the pursuer is a stranger to him - it may be that the proper
response to the condescendence is 'denied'.248 Even these cases are, however, very
rare249 and where a pursuer avers in detail the nature and extent of the relationship
between the parties and the defender maintains his bare denial, then the court will
probably conclude that the defender is failing to obtemper his obligation to
answer.250
The other appropriate use of skeleton defences is as a holding mechanism while the
defender endeavours to ascertain the factual position stated in the pursuer's
244 judicially recognised as a term of pleading. See Ellon Castle Estates Co. Ltd. v. Macdonald
1975 SLT (N) 66 per L. Stewart ibid. For a (somewhat outdated) account of the operation of the
rules pertaining to skeletal defences under the old summary cause rules in the sheriff court,
see R. Mays, 'The Barest of Bones' 1993 SLT (News) 137.
245 Green's Annotated Rules of the Court of Session, cit sup. para. 18.1.3.
246 Cook v. UIE Shipbuilding (Scotland) Ltd. 1989 SCLT 156 at 157.
247 Redpath v. McCall 1963 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 47, Ganley v. Scottish Boatowners Mutual Insurance
Association 1967 SLT (N) 45, J.C. Forbes v. Duignan 1974 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 74, Jarvie v. Laird 1974
SLT (Sh. Ct.) 75, Lossie Hydraulic Co. v. Ecosse Transport Ltd. 1980 SLT (Sh Ct) 94 McManus v.
Spiers Dick and Smith Ltd. 1989 SLT 806, Gray v. Boyd 1996 SLT 60.
248 Edward Gibbon (Aberdeen) Ltd. v. Lee Edwards 1992 SCLR 561.
249 Sutherland, 'Written Pleadings - Recent Cases' cit. sup. p. 6.
250 Grampian, Lossie Hydraulic supra, Ellon Castle Estates Co. Ltd. v. Macdonald 1975 SLT (N) 66,
Foxley v. Dunn 1978 SLT (N) 35.
288
summons or writ.251 Once the facts and law are elucidated, the skeletal defences
should be expanded or withdrawn.252 To leave the defence in the same state at the
closing of the record may raise questions of the character of the defender's agent or
counsel, particularly where it is an attempt to delay or postpone decree.253
Lord Stewart expressed this view:
'Whatever be the justification at an early stage in a case for the tabling of
skeleton defences, it is destructive of the whole concept of our system of civil
pleading for a defender to continue to maintain a blanket denial of pages of
relevant averments and to adopt the attitude that she is entitled to make the
pursuers prove every fact which they aver.'254
If the defence is persisted in,255 the court, at procedure roll or debate, will construe
the defence in relevancy very strictly.256 An inconsistency between averment and
other features of the pleadings may permit the court to infer an admission257 and
grant decree de piano.
A good summary of the present position may be found in Macphail, Practice at para
9.114.
'An exiguous or uncandid defence consisting mainly of a general denial may
be held to be irrelevant if it contains an admission of facts which require
251 Black, Introduction, p. 25, Macphail, Practice, para. 9-114.
252 Macphail, ibid.
253 which can amount to an abuse of process and have financial consequences for the agent
himself in payment of the other party's expenses. Stewart v. Stewart 1984 SLT (Sh Ct) 58.
254 Ellon Castle Estates op. cit. p. 66.
255 Redpath v. McCall 1963 SLT (Sh Ct) 47, J.C. Forbes Ltd v. Duigan op. cit. Jarvie v. Laird 1974
SLT 75. C.f. Turner's (Ayr) Ltd. v. Hay 1963 SLT (Sh Ct) 45.
256 Ellon Castle Estates, op. cit, Foxley v. Dunn 1978 SLT (N) 35, Lossie Hydraidic op. cit.
257 Gray v. Boyd op. cit., Park Lane Motor Ltd. v. Malcolm (unreported) (Ex. Div) 1st December
1995 (1996 GWD 2-118), Unity Trust Bank pic v. Frost & Anr. (unreported) 6lh Feb 2001 (Ex.
Div).
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explanation258 or an admission,259 or an implied admission,260 averment261or
plea-in-law262 inconsistent with the denial. When determining the relevancy
of such a defence the court will consider any material probative documents
which are produced263 and any explanations or concessions made at the
bar.'264
It may not be only probative documents which the court can consider. Where a
pursuer made detailed averments about matters which should have been within the
knowledge of the defender, which averments were denied, and the pursuer also
lodged documents which ex facie supported his averments, the defender's case was
considered irrelevant.265 In another case, where the defender made an unqualified
denial of the pursuer's detailed averments on matters which fell within the
defender's knowledge, the court regarded the defence as uncandid, 'exiguous and
evasive' and under reference to documents produced by the pursuers supporting
their position, granted decree de piano.266
258 Roberts v. Logan 1966 SLT 77.
259 Lloyd's Bank Ltd. v. Bauld 1976 SLT (N) 53, D.Roy (Roots and Floors) Ltd. v. McCorquodale 1979
SLT (Sh Ct) 96. (To this can now be added 'an inconsistency between an averment or partial
admission and other features of the pleadings notwithstanding a general denial, such as to
give rise to an irresistible inference of liability', Lntea Trustess Ltd. v. Orbis Trustees Guernsey
Ltd. 1998 SLT 471).
260 Ulferts Fabriker A.B. v. Form and Colour Ltd. 1977 SLT (Sh. Ct) 19, Brown v. George Wilson
(Stonehouse) Ltd. 1982 SLT (Sh Ct) 96.
261 Foxley, supra, Grampian Hydraulics, supra.
262 Lossie Hydraulic, supra.
263 Lloyd's Bank, supra.
264 Ellon Castle Estates, supra.
265 Oesterreichische Landerbank v. Weir (unreported) (16 August 1993 per Sh. Pr. Mowat).
266 EFT Finance Ltd. v. Hawkins 1994 SC 34. Although this case was doubted in Gray v. Boyd op.
cit. per LJ-C Ross at 1080 on the basis that it appears on one reading that Lord Osborne
accepted that the defenders' denial was uncandid and from there accepted that the pursuer's
averments were well founded; but the pursuer in this case had incorporated brevitatis causa
letters demonstrating that the matter was within the defender's knowledge. This is not
readily apparent from the report in Scots Law Times but has been confirmed to the writer by
the counsel who acted for the successful pursuer.
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However, a straight denial cannot be converted into an implied admission. Where a
defender denies the pursuer's case, even though the averments may lie within his
knowledge and even though it might be deemed that he is acting less than candidly,
this defence will not be held to constitute an implied admission merely because the
denial was less than candid.267 The decision in Gray v. Boyd268 is not wholly
satisfactory, as Lord Morison dissented269 and the other judges decided the case on
different grounds270 but in the event, the writer's view is that the Lord Justice-Clerk's
reasoning was technically correct.
Very recently, the Second Division have re-visited Gray v. Boyd and the whole topic
of uncandid skeletal defences. It appears now that a straight general denial in the
face of full averments made by a pursuer may not entitle the defender to put the
pursuer to his proof. The Court has examined the issue, not as a question of whether
a general denial can be converted into an implied admission, but whether such
defences can resist summary decree as a matter of relevancy when the pursuer has
made averments such as to set up a prima facie case. Lack of candour is evidenced by
the denial in those circumstances. In Urquhart v. Sweeney & Ors.,2n the Court has held
that,
'Where a party lodges skeletal defences that are uncandid in their responses
to positive averments of the pursuer, that party is not entitled to rely upon
general denials to put the pursuer to the proof of his averments. In such
circumstances the only serious question to arise is whether the court should
267 Gray v. Boyd op. cit (L. Morison diss.)
268 1996 SLT 60.
269 with some powerful (but flawed) reasoning.
270 It was followed 'with regret' by the Sheriff Principal in Castleton Homes Ltd. v. Eastern Motor
Co. Ltd. 1998 SLT (Sh Ct) 51, and has been again followed, (or at least not adversely
commented upon) by the Division in Unity Trust Bank v. Frost & Anr. 2001 SCLR (N) 344.
271 (unreported) 18 March 2004 (2nd Div.)
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grant summary decree. Counsel for the appellant has relied on Gray v. Boyd
for the proposition that a general denial in defences is sufficient to prevent
the grant of summary decree. That, in our view, is an overstatement. If Gray
v. Boyd were to be interpreted in that way, it would encourage the uncandid
tactical pleading that has been a problem in our procedure for so long. On
that approach, summary decree would probably be appropriate only in the
rare cases where the defences contained an admission of liability. In our
view, Gray v. Boyd is distinguishable. In that case the pursuer's claim
depended on proof by writ or oath. The court held that a general denial
could not constitute the unqualified admission for which the pursuer
contended.272
...The respondents have pled a relevant prima facie case that they are tenants
under an agricultural lease. They have lodged a prima facie valid offer of such
a lease and have averred that the offer was accepted by the taking of
possession and by the payment of rent. A fortiori... those averments, if
proved, would establish the existence of a protected agricultural tenancy. In
the face of averments such as these, it is for the appellant, if he challenges the
existence of the lease, to aver and prove why the prima facie inference of a
tenancy should be displaced. We do not accept that, by pleading a bare
denial, the appellant is entitled to an enquiry in which the respondents are
put to the proof of their averments. The court has repeatedly deplored that
sort of approach.'273
The writer's view is that this takes the law further away from Gray v. Boyd. It must
now be questionable whether there is still a principle in civil procedure that a
defender is entitled to put a pursuer to his proof, irrespective of the degree of detail a
272 at paras. 41 and 42 per L J-C Gill.
273 at para. 44 per L J-C Gill.
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pursuer inserted into his averments. In Gray, the focus was on defences being
converted into implied admissions. From Urquhart, it now seems that if a pursuer
makes positive averments, which set up a prima facie case, then a defender is not
entitled to simply deny them, such an approach lacking candour, the only question
being for the court to consider granting summary decree. The question of
construction of defenders' denials as admissions in these circumstances is neatly
side-stepped.
As referred to by the Second Division in Urquhart, the danger for a defender seeking
to rely upon a skeleton defence or otherwise 'exiguous and evasive' defence is that
he may face the prospect of a motion for summary decree from the pursuer.274 This
remedy has been available in the Court of Session since 1984 and in the sheriff court
since 1992. The present rules are found in Chapter 21 of the Rules of the Court of
Session 1994 as amended and in Chapter 17 of the Ordinary Cause Rules 1993 as
amended.
At any time after the defences are lodged, a pursuer may apply for summary decree
on the ground that there is no defence to the action, or a part of it, disclosed in the
defences.275 It has been held to apply to the situation in which there is no valid
stateable defence and procedural technicalities are used to delay settlement.276 It is
not properly used to supplant debate at procedure roll.277 A pursuer must
274 Treatment here will be brief. For further material see Green's Annotated Rules paras. 21.1.1
- 21.3.1, Macphail, Practice (2nd ed.) paras 14.71 - 14.74, and G. Maher, 'Summary Decree in
the Court of Session' (2 parts) 1987 SLT (News) 93 and 101.
275 RCS 21.2(1). Some actions are excluded. (RCS 21.1).
276 McAlinden v. Bearsden and Milngavie D.C. (unreported) 26 March 1985 per L. McDonald.
277 Friinoker (UK) Ltd. v. Mobile Technical Plant (International) Ltd. 1990 SLT 180, Brunswick
Bowling and Billiards Corp. v. Bedrock Bowl Ltd. 1991 SLT 187.
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demonstrate "near certainty" of success before he can secure summary decree278 as
the Court is concerned to discover whether a defence is disclosed.279 The court will
proceed with caution because it involves determining the case without further
inquiry into the facts.280
A matter of law raised in the motion will not prevent the hearing of the motion,281 the
test being whether it admits of a clear and obvious answer.282 If the defences raise
matters of fact it may be difficult for the court to conclude that there is no stateable
defence.283 The court is entitled to look to material beyond any pleadings and may
proceed upon affidavit evidence,284 even in the face of denials.285 The court, while
being astute to repel purely dilatory defences, should not summarily preclude
inquiry where it appears that there is a genuine issue to try.286
(xviii) The Defender's Pleas-in-law.
It has long been recognised287 that the defender's pleas-in-law fall into two
categories: (i) preliminary pleas and (ii) pleas on the merits. The former are the basis
for preliminary or dilatory defences288 and the latter for peremptory defences.289 If
the former is sustained, the case against a defender is dismissed. This does not
278 P & M Sinclair v The Bamber Gray Partnership 1987 SC 203, per Lord Prosser at 206,
Henderson v. 3052775 Nova Scotia Ltd (unreported) 9th December 2003 per L. Carloway.
279 Keppie v The Marshall Food Gronp 1997 SLT 305 per Lord Hamilton at 308.
280 Keppie v The Marshall Food Group supra at 308.
281 Royal Bank ofScotland v. Dinwoodie 1987 SLT 82.
282 Mackays Stores Ltd. v. City Wall (Holdings) Ltd 1989 SLT 835, Construction Center Group Ltd v.
Highland Council 2002 SLT 1274.
283 Patterson & O'Grady v. Alu-Lite Windows Ltd. (unreported) 10 September 1985.
284 Rankin v. Reid 1987 SLT 352.
285 Ingram Coal Co. v. Nugent 1991 SLT 603.
286 Henderson v. 3052775 Nova Scotia Ltd op. cit.
287 See previous chapters. There was in the very early period a third class of 'Declinatory'
pleas but in modern practice there are only two, the declinatory plea now being treated as a
dilatory defence following Stair, I, 39.14.
288 Ross v. Young (1831) 9 S. 275.
289 Geils v. Geils (1851) 1 Macq. 36 per Lord Chancellor Truro at 39-40.
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render the cause res judicata and the pursuer may bring a new action on the same
grounds,290 subject to the law of prescription and limitation. The latter type of plea
will result in the defender being assoilzied from the conclusions of the summons291
and does form res judicata preventing any subsequent action on the same grounds.
Generally, a preliminary plea must be disposed of before any inquiry into the merits.
Where, however, the plea is so bound up with the merits, or requires that proof
should be led and the facts ascertained in order to dispose of the plea, the Court will
permit of a proof before answer reserving consideration of the plea until after proof
rather than disposing of it on procedure roll or at debate. A preliminary plea may
itself be the subject of preliminary proof where, if sustained, it would exclude a proof
at large on the merits.292 A plea on the merits will require factual inquiry, unless the
facts have been agreed between the parties. If sustained, the defender will be granted
decree of absolvitor.
In previous chapters, the development of the law relating to the stating of
preliminary pleas and pleas on the merits in defences at the same time has been
considered. The modern position is that a defender cannot reserve or hold back from
stating his defence on the merits in the defences on the basis that he has a
preliminary plea which would dispose of the action.293
290 Menzies v. Menzies (1893) 20 R. (HL) 108 per L. Watson at 110, Govan v. Old Victualling
Society Ltd. v. Wagstaff (1907) 44 SLR 295.
291 Shirreffv. Brodie (1836) 14 S. 825.
292 The principal examples are pleas to jurisdiction and timebar. See the fuller explanation in
Macphail, Practice, para. 8.60.
293 (Historically see Court of Session Act, 1825, s.2, A.S. 20th March 1907, CAS, C, iv. 4(b))
Thorburn v. Dempster (1900) 2 F. 583, Fingland & Mitchell v. Hozuie 1926 SLT 283, Maxwell,
Practice, p. 192, Macphail, Practice, para. 9.109, Mackay, Manual, p. 218 citing Campbell v.
Grierson (1847) 10 D. 364 per LJ-C Hope, Alcock v. Easson (1842) 5 D. 366.
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Finally both types of plea must have a foundation in averment294 with the exception
of preliminary pleas to competency and relevancy ( and relevancy as specification)
based not upon specific averments, but upon the whole nature of the case as pleaded
or the pleadings as a whole.295
(xix) Preliminary Pleas.
These pleas may be divided into three categories: objections to the instance296;
objections to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the action297; and pleas against
the action itself.298 We concentrate here on the last category. Fuller treatment of the
first two categories can be found elsewhere.299
(xx) Pleas against the Action itself.
(a) Incompetency.
A plea to the competency of the action is an objection to the form of the summons.300
Generally the test is that there is some ground of law which the conclusions of the
summons violate.301 An objection to the relevancy of the summons is an objection to
media concludendi or statement of the grounds of action, but the distinction between
competency and relevancy can be narrow and 'the question whether an action is
294 NB Rly v. Brown, Gordon and Co. (1857) 19 D. 840.
295 Macphail, Practice, para. 9.115.
296 'No title to sue', and 'All parties not called'.
297 ' No jurisdiction', 'forum non conveniens', 'lis alibi pendens'
298 Macphail, Practice, para. 9.116, Thomson & Middleton, Manual, p. 77, Maxwell, Practice, p.
192 ff.
299 Macphail, Practice, para. 9.117 ff, Green's Annotated Rules of the Court of Session, op. cit.,
Annotation para. 18.1.4, Maclaren, Practice, pp. 380 ff., Mackay, Manual, pp. 221 ff., Mackay,
Practice, I, pp. 434ff., Maxwell, Practice, p. 192 ff.
300 strictly, the conclusions of the summons. McEwen v. Davies (1824) 2 S. 696, Mackay,
Practice, I, p. 436.
301 Mackay, op. cit. p. 437.
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irrelevant or incompetent is a very nice question, as they very much run into each
other.'302
So, an action for damages raised in respect of breaches of separate, unrelated
contracts will be incompetent, as will an action in a multiplepoinding where there is
no double distress or fund in medio. An action for a remedy unknown to law will be
incompetent.303 The plea should specify the ground upon which the plea is taken.304
If the action is held to be incompetent it should be dismissed and a new action
brought if so advised.305 Questions of competency may be noticed parsjudicis and an
action may be dismissed as incompetent in respect of the form of the action
presented306 or in respect of the remedy craved307 or where, to effectively decide the
cause, all parties have not been called. This is so, even though no plea is taken by one
of the parties.308
Finally, a party can be held to have waived his right to invoke his plea to competency
by his own inconsistent actings309 and he cannot challenge the competency of
proceedings which he himself has initiated.310
302 Contts v. Coutts (1866) 4 M. 802 per LP M'Neill at 803.
303 Jack v. Jack 1962 SC 24.
304 Coxall v. Stewart 1976 SLT 275 per L. Maxwell at 276, Thomson & Middleton, Manual, p. 77,
Macphail, Practice, para. 9.121, Green's Annotated Rules, Annotation 18.1.4, Black,
Introduction, p. 26.
305 Coutts supra., M'Naught v. Milligan (1885) 13 R. 366 per LP Inglis at 368, Maxwell, Practice,
p. 194, Maclaren, Practice, p. 388.
306 Clark v. Campbell (1873) 1 R. 281 per LP Inglis at 283.
307 Macphail, Practice, para 2.14 and authorities cited at fn 59.
308 Hamilton v. Murray (1830) 9 S. 143, Macgregor v. Macfarlane (1914) 31 Sh. Ct. Rep.104,
McCallum v. Cohen (1915) 32 Sh. Ct. Rep. 39. Maxwell, Practice, p. 194, Macphail, Practice, para.
9.121, Lord Advocate v. Black 1995 SLT 540 per Temporary Judge Coutts at 542. C.f. Maclaren
Practice, p. 289 citing Connell v. Ferguson (1857) 19 D. 482.
309 North British Raihvay Co. v. Carter (1870) 8 M. 998. It is suggested that it is not clear when
the court should ex proprio motu dismiss an action on the grounds of competency having
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(b) Relevancy.
A plea to the relevancy311 of the pursuer's averments manifests itself in two ways.
First, the case will be relevant if the facts of the case all add up to justify the remedy
sought. Thus irrelevancy, following Stair and the maxim frustra probatur,3u will arise
when, even assuming that the pursuer's averments are true,313 he is not entitled to
the remedy which he seeks - in other words, his averments do not support the
conclusions of the summons and he is bound to fail.314
The following quotations are helpful:
'The object of a condescendence is not merely to give fair notice to the other
side of what the framer hopes to establish in fact, but - coupled with the note
of pleas-in-law - to present a relevant case, that is, to disclose a position in fact
and law which requires or justifies the remedy asked. It is as if the pursuer
came into court and said: 'This is a summary of my case.' The summary must
be sufficiently full to enable the court to determine whether, assuming the
facts to be verified either (a) instanter by admission or by probative
documents, or (b) by evidence to be subsequently led, the pursuer has a good
noticed the incompetency pars judicis, and the circumstances where the defender has
implicitly waived his entitlement to invoke the ground. Every such decision will turn on its
own facts but it is submitted that the Court will determine the question against the principles
of safeguarding the public interest in ensuring the proper conduct of litigation or protecting
third parties not called to the litigation against prejudice in the event that the cause would
otherwise proceed. See generally Macphail, Practice, para 2.09.
310 Davie v. Edinburgh Mags. 1951 SC 720.
311 See generally D.M. Walker, 'The Theory of Relevancy'(1951) 63 J.R. 1.
312 See previous chapters, supra.
313 Thus, in testing the relevancy of the party's pleadings, his averments of fact are said to be
taken 'pro veritate.' It will be recalled that evidence should not be averred and a party cannot
be criticised in relevancy for not specifying the evidence which he proposes to adduce to
prove the averments. Horsburgh v. Thomson's Trustees 1912 SC 267, Mackay v. Campbell 1966 SC
237 per L J-C Grant at 249.
314 Hope v. Hope's Trs. (1898) 1 F (HL) 1 at 3, Jamieson v. Jamieson 1952 SC (HL) 44 per L.
Normand at 50 and L. Reid at 63, Wilson v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Soc. Ltd. 1999 SLT
1139 per L J-C Cullen at 1140H, Maclaren, Practice, p. 389.
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case in law. If the pursuer fails in this, his case is dismissed without enquiry
into the matters of fact alleged on either side'315
In stating a plea to the relevancy the pleader effectively
'says: 'What the opposite party says may be true, or it may not, but even if it
be assumed that it is all true, nevertheless he cannot prevail against me, either
because an essential fact is unrepresented in his averments, or because the
facts he avers would not, even if proved, justify the application of the legal
principle to which he appeals.' The plea to the relevancy, in short, avoids, or
at least postpones, any joinder of issue in the merits of the case.'316
This quotation expresses both the meanings of relevancy. The process of cietermining
relevancy might be simply put. First, a defender examines the law and acquires a
grasp of what must be established by the pursuer, in law, in order to succeed; then he
comes to examine the pleadings and discovers that the pursuer has failed to plead a
material and crucial fact required by the law or has failed to make factual averments
from which that fact may be inferred. Then the pursuer's case is irrelevant.
The second manifestation of relevancy is where there is no omission of a material fact
but, upon closer inspection, the defender has brought a case upon facts which, if
proved, would not assist him in establishing the grounds of the action such as to
support the conclusions as remedies which he is seeking.
315 Lord President Clyde, Explanatory Note in R. Wyness Millar, 'Civil Pleading in Scotland'
(1932) 30 Mich. L.R. 545, 709 at 561-562, fn 74.
316 L.P. Clyde, ibid. p. 568, fn 96.
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Of the first type, if in an ordinary action for damages for defamation,317 it is not
averred that the defamation was false318, the action is irrelevant. Again, if the
defamatory statement was uttered on a privileged occasion, and facts and
circumstances inferring malice are not averred,319 the action is irrelevant.320 These
somewhat dated examples are taken from the practice books. A simple example
would be where a pursuer sued in negligence but failed to aver fault on the part of
the defender321 or failed to aver facts from which fault could be inferred by the Court.
Another example of this type would be where a pursuer's case was based on a
defender's inadequate system of inspection and maintenance. The law requires a
pursuer in these circumstances to make averments defining the intervals at which the
inspection ought to have taken place, and averments to support the conclusion that
such a system would have been reasonable and practicable.322 Without these
averments, the action would be irrelevant. So also the situation where a pursuer
bases his case upon the defender's fault in maintenance. In that scenario the
maintenance which the pursuer contends should have been implemented must be
specified.323
Of the second type, we may examine briefly Donoghue v. Stevenson which went as far
as the House of Lords on a plea to the relevancy.324 The pursuer and a friend visited
Mr. Minchella's Wellmeadow Cafe in Paisley, where they intended to have 'ice
317 The older authorities refer to 'slander'.
318 Campbell v. Ferguson (1882) 9 R. 467, Gray v. S.S.P.C.A. (1890) 17 R. 1185, Maxwell, Practice,
p. 195, Maclaren, Practice, p. 389.
319 Gordon v. British & Foreign Metaline Co. (1886) 14 R. 75, Gray, supra, Murdison v. SFU (1896)
23 R. 449, Maxwell, Practice, p. 195, Maclaren, Practice, p. 389.
320 Maclaren, Practice p. 389, Maxwell, Practice, p.p. 194-5.
321 Duffv. National Telephone Co. (1889) 16 R. 675.
322 Riddell v Reid, 1941 SC 277 per LP Normand at 283; Gibson v Strathclyde Regional Council.
1993 SLT 1243.
323 Argyll & Clyde Health Board v. Strathclyde Regional Council 1988 SLT 381.
324 1932 SC (HL) 31. For a full discussion of the case, see A.F. [Lord] Rodger, 'Mrs. Donoghue
and Alfenus Varus' 1988 CLP 1.
300
drinks.' Her friend bought some 'ginger' in an opaque bottle and poured the contents
over Mrs. Donoghue's ice cream. The 'ginger' had been manufactured by Stevenson.
There was no contractual nexus between the manufacturer and the pursuer. Later in
the evening the same friend poured the remainder of the 'ginger' over ice for Mrs.
Donoghue and as the last of it emptied from the bottle, a decomposing snail fell into
her ice which resulted in Mrs. Donoghue becoming ill. She had no contractual
remedy against either Minchella or Stevenson as the ginger was purchased by the
friend. She sued the manufacturers in delict. Their response to her pleadings was
that even if she could demonstrate all of the above factual material, there did not
exist in law a liability on the part of the defenders as manufacturers to this pursuer as
an ultimate consumer of the product. This was their plea to the relevancy of the
pursuer's averments.325
Other common examples include situations where the pursuer seeks to establish that
the locus of an accident causing injury was e.g. a 'building' or 'construction site' or
'place of work' for the purposes of statutory provisions and regulations or where he
contends that the work he was doing was a 'manual handling operation' for the
purposes of statutory regulations, or where he hopes to demonstrate that the
equipment which he was using which caused the accident was e.g. 'work equipment'
or some other statutory phrase for the purposes of statutory regulations.326 The plea
to the relevancy will contest that, in law, the 'item or place or operation' falls within
the statutory definition. If it does not, the action is irrelevant.
325 Obviously their plea was repelled.
326 There are very many examples. See further Munkman on Employer's Liability 13th ed.
(2001), Redgrave's Health and Safety, 3rd ed., 1998 and supplements.
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So also, where the pursuer avers that there is a duty on a defender to do something
or to prevent something which, in law, does not exist then upon discussion as to the
relevancy the action will be dismissed insofar as it is related to that contention.327
In both spheres of relevancy, the onus falls upon the defender.328 He must show that
the pursuer's action must necessarily fail.329 Where a pure case of irrelevancy arises,
it ought to be decided before inquiry into the facts.330
In judging of the relevancy of the pursuer's averments, the Court will examine those
averments, taking account of any admissions of the defender's averments331 and may
take into account a pursuer's bare denial of the defender's averments on an essential
matter.332 But the Court will prefer the most reasonable and ordinary construction of
the averments under consideration and will avoid an analysis which, 'pushed to
extreme, would evacuate simple and plain statements and tear their plain meaning to
pieces.'333
327 e.g. McGuffie v. Forth Valley H.B. 1991 SLT 231, Spiers v. British Railways Board 1997 SLT
1144, Duncan v. Beattie 2003 SLT 1243.
328 Jamieson v. Jamieson 1952 SC (HL) 44 per L. Normand at 50.
329 Millar v Galashiels Gas Co 1949 S.C.(H.L.) 31, Jamieson v. Jamieson supra, per L. Normand at
50 and L. Reid at 63, McArthur v. Raynesway Plant Ltd. 1980 SLT 74, Millar v Galashiels Gas Co.
1949 S.C.(H.L.) 31. The dicta in Jamieson are very frequently cited. For a recent example see
Nisbet v. North Lanarkshire Council & Anr. 2003 SC 324 (Extra Div.)
330 Mackay Manual, p. 223.
331 Pringle v. Bremner & Stirling (1857) 5 M. (FLL.) 55 per L.C. Chelmsford at 58 and L.
Colonsay at 61, Hamilton v. Santi (1916) 32 Sh.Ct. Rep 73.
332 Murray v. Edinburgh D.C. 1981 SLT 253 per L. Maxwell at 256. This includes not only a bare
denial but also poorly formulated averment in answer to such an averment by a defender.
Potter & Co. v. Braco de Prata Printing Co. Ltd. (1891) 18 R. 511 per LP Inglis at 517.
333 Baikie v. Glasgow Corporation 1919 SC (TIL) 13 per L. Shaw at 17.
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Actions for damages for negligence will be dismissed as irrelevant only in clear cut
cases334 and in simple 'running down cases' or simple road traffic cases the pleadings
are generally not scrutinised with strictness.335
It will be seen that relevancy in the senses used here will always involve an
interpretation of the substantive law pertaining to the facts of the individual case.
One cannot determine whether a material fact has been omitted or whether the
pursuer's case in averment fails to meet a test in the law if the law has not been
ascertained.
Historically the plea to the relevancy was stated as 'The averments for the pursuer
are not relevant or sufficient to support the conclusions of the summons, and the
action should therefore be dismissed.'336 But in modern practice the plea is invariably
taken in conjunction with a plea to the specification of the averments, along the lines
of 'The pursuer's averments being irrelevant et separatim lacking in specification, the
action should be dismissed.'337 The proper disposal upon relevancy or specification is
dismissal. A plea to the effect that 'The pursuer's averments being irrelevant et
334 Miller v. S.S.E.B. 1958 SC (HL) 20, per Viscount Simmonds at 32, and L. Reid at 33, Murray
v. Edinburgh D.C. 1981 SLT 253, McGeouch v. Strathclyde R.C. 1985 SLT 321, Blaikie v. British
Transport Commission 1961 SC 44. It is almost de rigueur for Miller supra, to be cited by a
pursuer at debate in a personal injury action. For examples of such 'clear cut cases', see Davie
v. Edinburgh Corporation 1977 SLT (N) 5, Robb v. Dundee D.C. 1980 SLT (N) 91, Rae v. City of
Glasgow Council 1998 SLT 292, Nisbet v ChiefConstable, Strathclyde Police, 2003 SLT 634
335 Adamson v. Roberts 1951 SC 681, Prentice v. Chalmers 1985 SLT 168, Barrow v. Bryce 1986 SLT
691, McLatchie v. The Scottish Society for Autism (unreported) 4 February 2004 per Lord
McEwan, Macphail, Practice, para. 9.33. See R. Conway, Personal Injury Practice in the Sheriff
Court, para 17.14.
336 see Ch. 3.
337 But not reduced to a rump 'The pursuer's statements are irrelevant' or 'No relevant case'
or 'irrelevant'. J.S. (later LP) Clyde, Practice and Procedure in the Court of Session' (1906-7) 18
JR 319 at 327-8. As discussed in the previous chapter, it seems that the plea as here
formulated appeared about the mid-1880s.
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separatim lacking in specification they should not be admitted to probation' was
considered to be unusual and incorrect in form.338
The plea to the relevancy that 'The averments for the pursuer are not relevant or
sufficient to support the conclusions of the summons, and the action should therefore
be dismissed' is a general plea attacking the action as a whole, and a general plea is
enough.339 It has often been said that this is a defect in the system of written
pleadings. The Annotators to the RCS offer this advice:
'It is good practice to disclose in the plea the ground on which the plea is
taken, particularly in the case of general pleas of relevancy and specification;
the practice heretofore of regarding proper notice of fact or the line of
evidence as essential but not notice of the point of law is defective.'340
In the writer's experience, the plea (in conjunction with a plea to specification) will
be found in nearly every summons drafted by counsel, if only ob majorem cautelam as
Maclaren suggested.341 But it is perfectly competent and proper to direct a plea of
relevancy against particular averments in the pursuer's pleadings, e.g. 'The pursuer's
averments in Article 2 of condescendence etc.' or the pursuer's averments anent (or
relating to) [particular matter] etc.'
338 McSkimming v. The Royal Bank ofScotland pic 1997 SLT 515 per L. Gill at 518C. C.f.
Annotated Rules of the Court of Session, Annotations to 18.1.4 at A(9).
339 Black, Introduction, p. 28
340 Green's Annotated Rules of the Court of Session, Annotations to 18.1.4 at A.
341 see supra.
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If particular averments are irrelevant but that irrelevancy is insufficient to lead to
dismissal, there should be a plea to the effect that the pursuer's averments being
irrelevant et separatim lacking in specification, should not be remitted to probation'.342
Although the above passage has concentrated upon the plea of irrelevancy343 as
being at the disposal of a defender, a pursuer may himself table a plea against a
defender's positive or substantive defence, on the basis that even if the defender
proves all of his averments, he will still necessarily fail in establishing a defence such
as to resist the pursuer's claim.
(c) Specification.
The plea of lack of specification finds its proper application in a case where the other
party344 does not know the case against him and objects to being taken by surprise at
proof.345 Thus, it has been said that the test in matters of specification is whether the
opponent can be said to be prejudiced by lack of fair notice of what the case against
him is.346 The rules requiring pleadings to be specific thus giving fair notice-347 are
based in fairness and where in all the circumstances fair notice has been given, the
opponent cannot object to the pleadings on the basis of lack of specification.-348 The
342 C.f. McSkimming v. The Royal Bank ofScotland pic, supra. In actual practice this plea is very
common. It might be suggested that the judge in McSkimming took exception to the plea as it
in part sought to exclude the pursuer's averments from probation on the basis of relevancy,
dismissal being the proper disposal. However, where averments are lacking in specification,
but not sufficiently to warrant disposal by dismissal, it is suggested that this is the
appropriate plea.
343 alternatively stated as 'the plea to the relevancy'.
344 most commonly the plea is taken by a defender, although a pursuer may table the plea
against the averments of a defender.
345 Macdonald v. Glasgow Western Hospitals 1954 SC 453 per LP Cooper at 465, Macphail,
Practice, para 9-29.
346 Allison v. Islebnrn Ltd. and Eurolink Ferries Ltd. 1997 SCLR 791 per L. Macfadyen at 796.
347 Brydon v. Railway Executive 1957 SC 282 per L. Patrick at 291.
348 Buchanan (Stewart) Gauges Ltd. v. BEC (Scotland) Ltd. & Anr., (unreported) (2001 GWD 3-
126) 19 January 2001 per Lord Macfadyen at para. 14.
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objection based upon this ground of lack of specification and want of fair notice can
be viewed as a form of irrelevancy349 or perhaps a species of the genus irrelevancy,
although they are separate points.350 Thus, it can be possible for a case on record to
be relevant in that the averments support the conclusions yet be lacking in
specification as not giving the other party fair notice of the facts which are to be
established in evidence.
As Lord McCluskey explained,
To test the relevancy of the pursuers' pleadings it is necessary to ask whether
or not the pursuers, if they prove no more than what is averred, are entitled to
succeed.351 But it goes further than that. Pursuers must also give sufficient
specification of what they intend to prove. Thus, for example, if a pursuer
averred that an accident was caused by the fault of the defenders, and, at
proof, proved fault, he would be entitled to recover damages for the loss,
injury and damage sustained in the accident. But if, at an earlier stage, the
relevancy of the pleadings had to be determined, a bald averment of "fault"
would nonetheless fail to pass the test of relevancy; because the pursuer must,
in the ordinary case, specify what the fault is. Exactly how much specification
is needed will certainly vary from case to case. In a simple street accident case,
a strict and literal interpretation of the pleadings would be inappropriate
(Adamson v. Roberts 1951 SC 681.) But a sufficient basis of fact would have to
be condescended upon in the pleadings.'352
349 Campbell v. United Collieries Limited 1911 2 SLT 434.
350 Sinclair v. NCB 1962 SLT 422 per L. Hunter at 423.
351 pace Lord McCluskey, this may be considered a judicial 'slip of the pen'. The true test of
relevancy is whether on the facts as presented, the pursuer is, or is not, bound to fail. If he is
not, the action is relevantly pleaded. Jamieson v. Jamieson 1953 SC (HL) 44 per L. Normand at
50. For another example of loose language in this regard see M'Dougal v. M'Dougal's Trs 1931
SC 102 per L. Hunter at 114.
352 Argyll & Clyde Health Board v. Strathclyde R.C. 1988 SLT 381 per L. McCluskey at 383.
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The degree of specification required for fair notice does depend on the particular
circumstances of every case,353 but as a minimum, the other party should be able to
know what is being alleged against him and to prepare his case accordingly.354 In
assessing whether fair notice has been given, the Courtwill consider the matter in
broad terms and not subject the record to 'the careful and meticulous scrutiny
devoted to a conveyancing deed'.355 It is only where material prejudice is occasioned
to a defender through the want of fair notice that the court will entertain and sustain
the plea.356
It has been suggested that all material dates, times and places which ought
reasonably to be known to the party should be averred357 unless these cannot be
ascertained by the party and they fall within the knowledge of the other, in which
case the plea may be repelled.358
Generally, where qualitative terms are averred in respect of the defender's failures or
otherwise, e.g. 'not proper' or 'excessive' or 'inadequate' or 'insufficient', the
standard which the defender should have fulfilled or obtempered must be averred,359
353 Macphail, Practice, para 9-29.
354 Boulting v. Elias 1990 SLT 957, Kennedy v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society 1994 SLT 617.
355 McMenemy v. James Dougal and Sons Ltd. 1960 SLT (N) 84 per L. Guest (O.H.). See also
Tucker v. Gray & Duncan 1994 GWD 20-1235, and Galbraith's Curator ad litem v. Stewart 1997
SLT 418 per L. Osborne at 424D (both using the same conveyancing analogy). Even in 1863 it
was complained that defenders subjected the summons to criticism 'as if it were an instrument
to be construed', Anon., 'Court of Session Practice', (1863) 7 Journal of Jurisprudence 13 at 15.
356 Avery v. Hew Park School for Boys 1949 SLT (N) 6, Lockhart v. National Coal Board 1981 SLT
161 at 170.
357 A.G. Walker, 'Written Pleadings' (1963) S. L.R. 161 at 169. See e.g. the comments of L.
Carloway in Dunn v. Solaglass and Tibbet and Britten UK pic (24th May 2002, unreported)
358 Gunn v. McAdam & Sons 1949 SC 31, Johnston v. Gill 1978 SC 74, Macphail, Practice, para 9-
29.
359 Argyll & Clyde Health Board v. Strathclyde R.C. 1988 SLT 381 per L. McCluskey at 384,
('properly maintained') and McGhee v. National Coal Board 1973 SLT 14 per Lord Reid at 21
('sufficiently cooled'), Maroney v. Hugman 1997 SLT 240 ('too heavy'), McArthur v. Strathclyde
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although in certain circumstances a Court may accept the broad averment as
sufficient.360 Thus where a pursuer averred that the defenders did not carry out
frequent and regular inspections, as a matter of notice he required to specify the
circumstances by which it was to be proved that the defenders' system of inspection
was inadequate giving notice of the system which the pursuer averred that they
should have instituted.361 In some circumstances the pursuer will also have to aver
that the inspection would have revealed the defect.362 Frequently a pursuer's
averments of 'loss' will be attacked as lacking in specification.363 There must also, as a
matter of notice, be averments of causation, connecting the loss with the basis of
liability alleged. If these are absent the action will be dismissed.364
Where a pursuer brings his case under the provisions of the Occupier's Liability Act
1960, he must place on record averments directed to the defenders being the owners
or occupiers or having control of the defective premises.365
Regional Council 1995 SLT 1129 (obstruction 'associated with' road works) There are many
other examples.
360 Marony v. Hugman 1997 SLT 240, O'Connor v. Auld 1970 SLT (N) 16. See also broad
averments for professional negligence as sufficient in Rownllan Creamery Ltd. v. Henry Dawes &
Sons 1988 SLT 95.
361 Davie v. Edinburgh Corporation 1977 SLT (N) 5 per L. Kincraig at 7. See also Johnstone v. City
ofGlasgow DC 1986 SLT 51.
362 Kilbride v. Scottish & Newcastle Breweries 1986 SLT 642, Cordiner v. BRB 1986 SLT 209.
363 e.g. Johnston v.WH Brown Construction (Dundee) Ltd 2000 SLT 223 (loss arising from
defective works), Galbraith's Curator ad litem v. Stewart 1997 SLT 419 (specification of
necessary services as component of claim for loss, injury and damage). MacKenzie, Written
Pleadings, op. cit. para 4.114. However, there are some heads of loss which may proceed upon
the very briefest of averment where the Court's assessment of loss will be approached on a
broad basis. See Smith's Executrix v. J. Smart Contractors pic. 2002 SLT 779 per LP Cullen at 780
(loss of support). Historically, the averments of loss were often very briefly stated. See
Wyness Millar's pleadings example op. cit. p. 715 (Cond. 4).
364 MacKenzie para. 4.115 citing the examples of Moffat v. West Highland Publishing Ltd 2000
SLT 335, McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board 1998 SLT 307, Gilles v. Lynch 2002 SLT 1420.
365 Murray v. Edinburgh Corporation 1981 SLT 253, Wallace v. City ofGlasgow DC 1985 SLT 23.
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Where a pursuer founds his action on the defender's breach of statutory duty, the
particular statutory duty breached must be averred together with averments directed
to how the duty was breached by the defender.366
Vague terminology and looseness of language, will signal a specification point. In
one case, matters stated to 'several friends' without specifying the friends was held
to be lacking in specification367 as was a case based on 'several accidents' in the recent
past.368
In actions for damages for negligence it is a basic requirement of fair notice that the
pleader sets out the essential facts relied on with reasonable clarity and then plainly
states the duties alleged to have been breached, being duties which a court can be
satisfied at least might have been incumbent upon the defenders in the
circumstances.369 As Lord McCluskey observed:
[The] 'normal method of pleading is to set forth the general duties in law and
then, by reference to the particular circumstances, to deduce and set forth
particular duties which counsel, at the trial or proof will argue were
applicable and were breached on the occasion of the accident'.370
The particular duties must be set in the context of some general framework set by
precedent or law or practical standard and it is not appropriate to aver a general
366 Macphail, Practice, para 9-30, British Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Lithgozus Ltd. 1975 SLT (N) 20 (Sale
of Goods Act 1893).
367 Boulting v. Elias 1990 SC 135.
368 Murray v. Nichols 1983 SLT 194. This would have been competent if specification of the
accidents had been averred. W. Alexander & Sons v. Magistrates ofDundee 1950 SC 123.
369 Jamieson v. Allan McNeil & Son W.S. 1974 SLT (N) 9 per L. Maxwell, Stevenson v. Glasgow
Corporation 1908 16 SLT 302.
370 Ayre v. Milne 1989 SLT 659 per L. McCluskey at 660.
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duty and then to 'pluck out of the air' alleged particular duties which are not set in
that context.371
In relying upon fault as culpa, the pursuer must aver facts and circumstances from
which fault can be inferred. The pursuer must also give notice either of the precise
fault founded upon or of the facts and circumstances which, in the absence of a better
explanation, infer some fault on the part of the defender.372 General allegations are
not sufficient .373
In pleading duties in actions for damages for personal injury374 it has been
considered a well settled rule that when a general duty is averred followed by a
particularisation of the specific ways in which that duty has been breached,375 the
inquiry on the facts is restricted to the specific breaches of which notice has been
given, excluding any evidence directed towards establishing a breach of that general
duty in another way.376 That is not to say that, generally, a pursuer cannot succeed
where his proof deviates from the four corners of his record.
Where the evidence presents a case which is 'variation, modification or development'
of the case on record, so long as it is not something 'new, separate and distinct' the
371 GUS Property Management Ltd. v. Littlezuoods Mail Order Stores Ltd. 1982 SC (HL) 157 per L.
Stewart (OH) at 161-2 under reference to the 'major and minor premisses' of the 'old form of
indictment in criminal cases.'
372 Argyll & Clyde Health Board v. Strathclyde R.C. 1988 SLT 381 per L. McCluskey at 383.
373 Harper v. Dunlop & Co. (1902) F. 208 per L. M'Laren.
374 Helpful analyses of the key requirements in pleading such an action can be found in
jamieson v. Alan McNeil & Sons W.S. 1974 SLT (N) 9 and Stevenson v. Glasgow Corporation 1908
SC 1034. See also Macphail, Practice, para 9-34.
375 Sinclair v. National Coal Board 1962 SLT 422.
376 Morrison's Associated Companies supra, per LP Clyde. See also Hook v. Brown and Ors. 1963
SLT (N) 52.
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pursuer may still succeed.377 Whether he should be entitled to do so is a question of
fairness between the parties378 and cases will often turn on their own facts.379 In this,
the Court may construe averments in particular ways380 or read averments of broad
duties generally,381 or look to whether a defender has sought to counter a pursuer's
case on general or particular grounds,382 or on rare occasions, found on facts averred
by the defender and spoken to in evidence by his witnesses as the basis for
liability.383 However, where the case so put forward is wholly inconsistent with the
pursuer's case on record, as a matter of fairness and notice, he is not entitled to
succeed.384 Where, in proof, it becomes apparent that the evidence being adduced has
departed from what has been presented on record, the proper course to be adopted
by a party is to make a motion to amend fairly soon after the difficulty has arisen.385
377 Burns v. Dixon's Iron Works 1961 SC 102 per L J-C Thomson at 107-9, Carroll v. Scott's
Shipbuilding and Engineering Co, Ltd. 1969 SLT (N) 46 per L. Cameron at 47, O'Hanlon v. John G.
Stein & Co. Ltd 1965 SC (HL) 23.
378 Maclean v. The Forestry Commission 1970 SLT 265 per LJ-C Wheatley at 272.
379 McCluskey v. Wallace 1998 SC 711.
380
e.g. McCusker v. Saveheat Cavity Wall Insulation Ltd. 1987 SLT 24.
381 Gibson v. British Rail Maintenance Ltd. 1995 SC 7.
382 Wyngrove's C.B. v. Scottish Omnibuses Ltd. 1965 SLT 286. C.f. in a question of relying upon
the defender's averments (as opposed to admissions) for corroboration, Lee v. National Coal
Board 1955 SC 151 per L. Sorn at 160.
383 O'Hanlon supra per L. Guest at 42 and L. Reid at 39 i.e. without the pursuer having made
an alternative case on an esto basis exploiting the defender's own averments and evidence. Cf
Kemp v. Secretary ofState for Scotland 1997 SLT 1174 per Lord Johnston and North Scottish
Helicopters Ltd. v. United Technologies Corporation Inc. (No. 2) 1998 SLT (N) 778 per L. Davidson
where a pursuer was held not entitled to advance a case of fault against one defender upon
averments and evidence of another where these were radically different from his own
averments.
384 Johnstone v. Clyde Navigation Trs. (1949) 82 Lloyds Reports 187 per Lord Reid at 195, Gunn v.
McAdam & Son. 1949 SC 31,Lawrence v. Sir William Arrol & Co. 1958 SC 348, Hamilton supra,
Carroll supra, North Scottish Helicopters Ltd. supra, Macphail, Practice, para 9-28.
385 Lawrence supra., Gunn supra., Black v,. John Williams & Co. (Wishaw) 1924 SC (HL) 22,
'Vitruvia' S.S. Co. Ltd. v. Ropner Shipping Co. Ltd. 1924 SC (HL) 31, (disapproving Davidson v.
Logan 1908 SC 350), Thomson v. Glasgow Corp. 1962 SLT 105.
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With the modern development of the law of negligence, at common law, averments
of foreseeability386 must be supported with averments of the facts and circumstances
from which such foreseeablity can be inferred,387 whether these are specific previous
complaints388 or specific previous and similar accidents.389 And where a duty of
inspection is pled, as a matter of fair notice the intervals of inspection which were
reasonably practicable must be averred.390 There is a recognised exception to this in
Factories Acts cases.391 Where the pursuer can show a breach of a statutory provision,
in some cases the statute will provide the defender with a defence of 'reasonable
practicability' but the defender bears the onus of proof and averment in this.392
With the increase393 in European Directives regulating health and safety at work,
implemented in member states through regulations394 it is suggested that it is now
easier to formulate a case in negligence which falls within the ambit of the
386 Reasonable foreseeablity is an essential ingredient of any case of negligence at common
law. Parker v. Lanarkshire Health Board 1996 SCLR 57 (Ex. Div) per L. McCluskey at 61. See also
R. Conway, Personal Injury Practice in the SheriffCourt, para. 8-29.
387 Macphail, Practice para 9-30, Robb v. Dundee D.C. 1980 SLT (N) 91.
388 Bryce v. Allied Ironfounders Ltd. 1969 SLT (N) 29.
389 W. Alexander & Sons v. Dundee Corporation 1950 SC 123, Murray v. Nicholls 1983 SLT 194,
Stirling v. Wood 1987 GWD 1-33.
390 McGuffie v. Forth Valley Health Board 1991 SLT 231.
391 Mains v. Uniroyal Englebert Tyres Ltd. 1995 SLT 1115.
392 Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan & Sons 1967 SC (HL) 79, Gibson v. BICC1973 SLT 2 per L. Reid at
3.
393 what Munkman describes as the 'European Revolution'. Munkman, op. cit. pp. 17ff.
394 Framework Directive 89/391, Management of Health and Safety atWork Regulations 1992
(SI 1992/2051) and the following 'six pack' regulations: Workplace (Health, Safety and
Welfare) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3004), Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations
1992 (SI 1992/2932), Personal Protective Equipment atWork Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/2966),
Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/2793) Health and Safety (Display
Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/2792) and Control of Substances Hazardous to
Health Regulations 1992 (SI 1994/3246) and Control of Asbestos atWork (Amendment)
Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/3086). These have been amended (e.g. Management of Health and
Safety at Work Regulations 1999, Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998)
and many further Regulations have been implemented following 1992 (e.g. Lifting Operations
and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998). The Regulations must be construed 'purposively'
by the Court and any dispute resolved by reference to the wording of the Directive, see e.g.
Cullen v. North Lanarkshire Health Board 1998 SLT 846, English v. Lanarkshire Health Board 1999
SCLR 310, McGhee v. Strathclyde Fire Brigade 2002 SLT 680.
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appropriate regulation. Whilst considerations of foreseeability and proximity and
considerations of fairness, justice and reasonableness are still frequently required as
being necessary for a relevant claim395 and whilst there is no 'strict liability' per se
under the regulations, often the test of reasonable foreseeability under a regulation
will be less demanding than at common law.396 In such actions parties draft
averments under a common law article397 and a statutory article.398 The latter often
simply narrates that e.g. the 'work, equipment or place of accident' was as ciefined in
the regulations, detailing the wording of the regulation399 and that the defenders
were under a duty to comply with the regulations. Then it is stated, in short
averments, the facts which constitute the breach of the regulation and that the breach
caused or materially contributed to the injury and concludes the condescendence by
specifying that the defenders failed in their duties under the regulations anci are
liable to make reparation.400 This formula will often withstand arguments based on
specification at debate. In Mcintosh v. City of Edinburgh Council,401 Lord McEwan
noted of such a formula402 :
'The modern trend following the Coulsfield reforms is to have less said in
pleadings than formerly. In my view in a case involving these Regulations
very little needs to be said. The averments were criticised as " formulaic". In
my opinion they do not merit this description, since they give fair notice to
the defenders of the facts which the pursuer offers to prove. I do not consider
395 Bennett v Lamont & Son 2000 S.L.T.17 at p.21.
396 Hall v City of Edinburgh Council, 1999 S.L.T. 744, per Lord Macfadyen at page 746H-L.
397 Pursuers increasingly have departed from presenting common law cases, resting entirely
on the statutory provisions as it is easier to formulate the case, avoid debate and get to proof.
398 kept separate, see infra.
399 This has not been held as offending the requirements not to plead law in articles of
condescendence.
4°° gee Green's Litigation Styles op. cit. for a number of examples.
404 2003 SLT 827 per L. McEwan.
402 The case was brought under the Manual Handling Regulations.
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it necessary to be more specific about the Regulations and their application
than appears here.': Millar v Galashiels Gas Co 1949 S.C.(H.L.) 31
Where in a cause relating to contract, a party seeks to incorporate general conditions
of contract by implication as arising from 'prior or a previous course of dealings
between the parties' the previous dealings must be specified403 and if it is alleged that
the cause rests on an implied term of the contract, there must be averments
explaining why and how the term came to be implied.404
Averments relating to knowledge of the defender often fall foul of specification.
Thus, if in an action for damages arising from an accident occasioned by a defect in
heritable property the pursuer does not aver that the defender had a duty to inspect
and repair same, or that he knew of the defect and did not put it right, the action will
be dismissed as irrelevant.405
Some averments, by their nature, require a high degree of specification. As noted
already, averments of fraud must be minute and specific.406 and there should be
detailed specification in respect of averments in actions of defamation.407 The very
403 GEA Airexchangers Ltd. v. James Howden Ltd. 1984 SLT 264.
404 Fraser v. Tennent Caledonian Breweries Ltd. 1990 SCLR 284, Anderson v. Commercial Union
Assurance Co. pic 1998 SC 197 So also, it may be required as a matter of notice to aver the
details of an offer and acceptance and the fact that the acceptance was communicated to the
offerer. Sabre Leasing Ltd. Copeland 1993 SLT 1099.
405 M'Martin v. Hannay (1872) 10 M. 411, Paterson v. Kidd's Trustees (1896) 24 R 99 See Lees,
Handbook, p. 41.
406 Bousted v. Gardner (1879) 7 R. 139 per LJ-C Moncrieff p. 145, and Lord Young p. 147. Wright
v. Guild and Wyllie (1893) 30 SLR 785, Thomson v. Pattison, Elder & Co. (1895) 22 R. 432, per
Lord Low, p.435 and Lords Dunedin and Kinnear, Wright v. Cotias Investments Inc. 2001 SLT
353 per L. Macfadyen at 366.
407 In an action of defamation, where it was envisaged by a pursuer that the defender would
plead privilege it was necessary to plead that the defender had acted maliciously or at least
make sufficient averments from which this could be inferred. M'Bride v. Williams (1869) 7 M.
427, Hamilton v. Emslie (1868) 7 M. 173, Gibb v. Edinburgh Brewery Co. (1873) 11 M. 705. Lees in
his Handbook deals with this under the heading 'The Averments must be Sufficient' op. cit. at
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words used, or insofar as remembered must be averred and the place where and the
persons before whom the defamatory words were uttered all require to be averred.408
Where the defamatory statement consists of innuendo, the meaning to be attached to
the words used as comprising defamation must be averred.409 Where the slanderous
statement was privileged, malice must be averred and the circumstances in which
malice consisted must be averred.410
A party can insert into his pleadings an averment411 'calling' on the other party to
provide further specification.412 This is often employed where a party requires the
other to lodge a document founded upon. In addition, where a party has a
preliminary plea to the relevancy of another's averments, a call413 will operate to put
that other party on notice that the averments referred to are considered irrelevant or
lacking in specification and so there can be no complaint at a later date when they are
challenged at debate.414 A call need not be answered if it is unrelated to a plea in law
or if the party considers that it is not necessary in law or fact to do so,415 but where
the call is answered, it should be removed by the party who inserted it.
p. 37. Bare averments of malice will not be enough. Campbell v. Cochrane (1905) 8 F. 205, Suzor
v. McLachlan 1914 SC 306, Quilty v. Windsor 1999 SLT 346.
408 Lees, Handbook, p. 40 citing Broomfield v. Grieg (1868) 6 M. 992, Walker v. Camming (1868) 6
M. 318. See also Martin v. McLean (1884) 6 D. 981, Bisset v. Ecclesfield (1864) 2 M. 1096.
409 Lees Handbook op. cit. p. 41, citing Fraser v. Morris (1885) 18 R. 454, A. v. B. (1898) 25 R.
1888, Godfrey v. Thomson (1890) 17 R. 1108. See also Reid v. Moore (1893) 20 R. 712, Murdison v.
Scottish Football Union (1896) 23 R. 449.
410 Scott v. Turnbull (1884) 1 R. 1135, Gordon v. Brit & For. Metalline Co (1886) 14 R. 75, Selbie v.
Saint (1891) 18 R. 88 although in some cases a general averment of malice can be sufficient:
Innes v. Adamson (1889) 17R. 11, Ingram v. Russell (1893) 20 R. 777.
411 it is not an averment of fact.
412 The terminology is a 'call.' The averment will usually be in the form 'The [defender] is
called upon to produce [document].'
413 in the form 'The [pursuer] is called upon to aver...[details of the specification sought]'
414 Gordon v. Donaldson (1864) 2 M. 758 per LJ-C Inglis at 768, Bryce v. Allied Ironfounders Ltd.
1969 SLT (N) 29, M Publications (Scotland) Ltd. v. Meiland 1981 SLT (N) 72, Woodland v.
Advocate General & Ors. (Unreported) 2004 RepLR 63 per Temporary Judge Gordon Reid.
415 Bonnor v. Balfour Kilpatrick Ltd. 1974 SC 223.
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(xxi) Peremptory Pleas or Pleas on the Merits.
The pleas or defences on the merits of the action will depend upon the nature and
facts and circumstances of the individual case and thus are as numerous and various
as the grounds of action.416 Where the plea is successful, the court will grant decree of
absolvitor in favour of the defender. When the issue between the parties involves a
matter of disputed fact, the defender should state a general plea to the effect that 'the
pursuer's averments, so far as material, being unfounded in fact, the defender should
be assoilzied.'417 Where a sum of money is concluded for, it is also often practice to
insert another general plea to the effect that 'the sum sued for being excessive, decree
should not be pronounced as concluded for.'418
(xxii) Adjustment.
As noticed in the previous chapter, under the procedure prior to the 1868 Act, parties
were entitled to revise their pleadings419 under the supervision of the Court. With the
abolition of revisal other than on cause shown, it became mandatory420 to 'adjust' the
printed pleadings421 on what was termed the adjustment roll,422 which adjustment
416 Macphail, Practice, para 9.125. There are number based on practice and procedure which
are commonly employed viz. res judicata; compensation; prescription; mora; taciturnity and
acquiescence; and retention.
417 Scott Dickson, 'Pleading' cit. sup., p. 21, Macphail, Practice, para. 9.127, Green's Annotated
Rules of the Court of Session, p. C160/1. The classical expression of the plea has the wording
'from the conclusions of the summons' at the end. See J.A. (later LP) Clyde, Practice and
Procedure in the Court of Session, (1906-7) 18 JR 319 at 327.
418 Green's Annotated Rules ibid.
419 the summons and the defences, and frequently the condescendences and answers.
420 1868 Acts. 26
421 called the 'Open Record'. In the sheriff court, the procedure (introduced by the Sheriff
Courts Act 1907) was different. The pleadings were not printed, the record was not made up
until after adjustment, which adjustment was supposed to be carried out by the Sheriff
Substitute on the suggestion of parties' agents.
422 The adjustment roll was abolished in 1998 (AS (Rules of the Court of Session Amendment)
(Miscellaneous) 1998 [S.I. 1998, 890]) although the calling boards in Parliament House still
refer to 'Continued Adjustment Rolls'.
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was then examined by the Court.423 In modern practice, the object of adjustment is
still to make the parties' pleadings meet one another so that the issues in dispute
between them may be ascertained.424 In Court of Session practice,425 an open record is
ordered to be made up within 14 days after the lodging of defences, and the
pursuer426 must lodge two copies in process and send copies to every other party in
the action.427 On lodging, the date of the commencement of an eight week adjustment
period is assigned by the Keeper's office428 during which parties are entitled to adjust
their pleadings, intimating the adjustments to each other.429 At the end of this period
the record closes. At adjustment the parties have large powers to extend, amplify,
and revise their condescendence, answers and pleas in law as they see fit430 other
than alterations to the instance of the cause or the conclusions, which must be altered
by amendment. The Court now has no control over the nature or scope of the
adjustments made by the parties431 and parties may adjust to make quite radical
423 There had been adjustment after revisal previously but those adjustments before the
Ordinary could not amount to or be equivalent to what should have been a revisal. With the
dramatic decrease in revisal after 1868, this rule was no longer enforced. See Mackay, Manual
229.
424 M'Bain v. Wallace (1881) 8 R. (HL) 106 per L. Watson. See also A.G. Walker, 'Written
Pleadings' op. cit. at 162-3.
425 This is not required in sheriff court procedure. The procedure for adjustment in the sheriff
court differs slightly following the implementation of the Ordinary Cause Rules 1993 as
amended. The procedure is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
426 or sometimes minuter or petitioner.
427 RCS 22.1.
428 The rule provides that it is the Deputy Principal Clerk of Session. RCS 22.2(1)
429 Formerly the adjustments were marked on the Open Record which produced a 'ticker
tape' like document which was hard to follow. Professor Black described the process as a 'sort
of nightmarish combination of a jigsaw puzzle and a game of Scrabble.' Black, Introduction, p.
31. Under present practice, it is more common to mark the adjustments electronically and for
the ciocument to be emailed between the parties.
430 Maclaren, Practice, p. 355.
431 originally other than the noticing and ordering the removal of scandalous or impertinent
averments. See supra, and Sellars v. IMI Yorkshire Imperial Ltd. 1986 SLT 629 per L J-C Ross at
635-6. Modern practice operates against the Court being able to do so until the action is
brought back to the Court on closure of the Record. At that point it is submitted that the
Court retains the power to order the removal of such averments, (see supra.) However, their
incorporation at adjustment may ultimately be considered to be sufficient notice of a line of
cross-examination to be employed at proof, even though the averments are ordered to be
removed by the Court, (see sitpra).
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alterations to their pleadings, such as introducing wholly new cases, even where
such a case is outwith the statutory time limit.432 This period of adjustment may be
extended as the Court thinks fit.433
The process of adjustment is usually initiated by the pursuer, who must admit,434
deny or state 'not known and not admitted' in answer to the defender's averments
on the same principles as the defender's answers to the condescendence.435 This
process is often prefaced with a phrase such as 'With reference to the defender's
averments in answer... admitted, not known and not admitted.. .etc.'436 Thereafter
the pursuer may introduce new averments and where these answer averments
introduced in the defences, the phrase 'Explained and averred' can be used,
although it may be more convenient to insert these in the midst of existing
averments.437 The pursuer may wish to use the defender's averments to present an
'esto case' in the alternative and this should be reflected in the averments438 and
where necessary, the pleas-in-law.439 To prevent accidentally admitting averments
impliedly, as already noticed, the pursuer should end the averments with a phrase
such as 'Quoad ultra the defender's averments in answer are denied except insofar as
432 Sellars v. IMI Yorkshire Imperial Ltd. 1986 SLT 629.
433 RCS 22.2(3)(b).
434 or aver that the averment is 'believed to be true'.
435 see supra.
436 This phrase acts as a signpost to someone quickly reading the record that the following
passage is the pursuer's answer to the defender's positive averments of fact.
437 Black, Introduction, at 32.
438 employing the preface separatim if the defender's facts differ from those pled in the
condescendence. Macphail, Practice, paras. 9.46 and 9. 56.
439 Macphail, Practice, paras. 9.56, 9.57, 9.104 and 9.128.
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coinciding herewith.'440 If the pursuer adds a plea to the relevancy of the defender's
averments at adjustment, this should be inserted after the original pleas in law.441
The defender may thereafter adjust in light thereof442 and the whole process may
continue until the end of the adjustment period.
(xxiii) Procedure on Closure of the Record.
In the Court of Session, on the automatic443 closure of the record, within four weeks
thereafter the pursuer must lodge copies of the closed record444 (comprising the
pleadings of the parties and the interlocutors pronounced to that date) and send
copies to the defender and other parties to the cause.445 The pursuer must then lodge
a motion craving the Court to appoint further procedure.446
A plea to specification, usually linked with relevancy, will be disposed of in
Procedure Roll and the plea either reserved or disposed of. If the averments are
440 Central Motor Engineering Co. v. Gnlbraith 1918 SC 755. This has become accepted practice
(see e.g. Macphail, Practice, para 9.131) although it was at one time thought that it could be
dangerous to use this phrase. See supra.
441 Macphail, Practice, para. 9.131. Inserting it before the original pleas and then renumbering
is a common error. Black, Introduction, p. 31.
442 introducing a counterclaim or inserting averments setting up a third party notice.
443 An interlocutor was previously required.
444 There can be a motion to allow the closed record to be received late. See P.N. No. 5 of 1991
for provisions regulating such motions.
445 RCS 22.3(1).
446 The parties are required to discuss further procedure at closing (Practice Note No. 3 of
1991) and the expenses of an unnecessary hearing on the By Order (Adjustment) Roll will be
awarded against the party who has not entered into such discussions. Where parties are
agreed on further procedure the motion will crave one of Procedure Roll debate, preliminary
proof on specified matters, PBA, proof, issues for jury trial or some other specified order.
Where parties are not agreed, the motion is to appoint the cause to the By Order (Adjustment)
Roll where further procedure is determined. If a party insists in a preliminary plea the cause
is sent to procedure roll although the other party may in such circumstances offer a Proof
Before Answer, for the purposes of ultimate expenses, should the insisting party fail at
debate.
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irrelevant or wanting in specification, or both, the court may dismiss the case447 or
refuse to allow such averments as are irrelevant to be proved448 or, if requested, give
the pursuer the opportunity of amending his record.449 At procedure roll, the onus is
on the defender. There is no onus on the pursuer to show that if proved his action is
bound to succeed.450 If the pursuer's averments are relevant and specifically stated
the defender's plea will be repelled.
Where the relevancy of the case is so doubtful, or so bound up with the merits, that it
is necessary to have the facts ascertained before deciding upon relevancy then the
Court will assign a Proof Before Answer.451 Previously, this course was often
followed in actions of reparation452 although the Court may do so in any cause.
(xxiv) Notes of Argument.
In Court of Session procedure, if the cause has been appointed453 to the procedure
roll,454 then preliminary pleas are debated and disposed of455 and irrelevant
447 Mone v. Anderson (1842) 4D 786, Chiene v. Archibald (1868) 6 SLR 62, Gray v. Scottish Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (1890) 17 R. 1185, Evans v. Stein & Co. (1904) 7 F. 65 per
L. Kinnear 72.
448 A. v. B. (1895) 22 R. 402, Inglis v. Natiojial Bank ofScotland 1909 SC 1038 per L. M'Laren
449 Robertson v. Cockburn (1875) 3 R. 21. It was thought previously that a case was rarely
dismissed for want of specification as the Court either allowed an amendment or ordered a
proof before answer. See R.E. Monteith Smith, Advocate, in (ed. J Chisholm) Green's
Encyclopaedia of the Law ofScotland (Edinburgh, 1910) s.v. 'Defences' at 323. This is probably
still apposite, as it has been considered unjust to dismiss an action because of a formal
pleading defect which can be put right without prejudice to the other side. GUS Property
Management Ltd. v. Littleiuoods Mail Order Stores Ltd. 1982 SC (LIL) 157 per Lord Keith of
Kinkel at 178.
450 Jamieson v. Jamieson 1952 SC (HL) 44 at 50 and 63.
451 Robertson v. Murphy (1867) 6 M. 114, Macvean v. MacLean (1873) 11 M. 506, Gilillan v. Lanark
County Council (1902) 9 SLT 432.
452 Hunter v. John Brown & Co. 1961 SC 231, Robertson v. Smith 1962 SC 628, Cole-Hamilton v.
Boyd 1963 SC (HL)1.
453 following a motion by either party. The party not so moving is not however precluded
from debating his own preliminary plea. Mcintosh v. Cockburn & Co. Ltd. 1953 SC 88.
454 see infra.
455 including whether inquiry into the facts should proceed by proof or jury trial or whether
there should be a preliminary proof.
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averments are excluded.456 In an ordinary action,457 the Court may at its own instance
or on the motion of a party, ordain a party to lodge in process a concise note of
argument458 consisting of numbered paragraphs stating the grounds on which he
proposes to submit that a preliminary plea should be sustained.459 It has been said
that 'the provisions of Rule of Court 22.4 and of the Practice Note No.4 of 1997 are
intended to facilitate the efficient use of diets allocated for Procedure Roll discussions
by the conveyance of information by one party to another party concerning the
criticisms which the former intends to level at the pleadings of the latter.'460 In
practice, the procedure has not worked particularly well, and late or non-existent
Notes of Argument will not necessarily prevent a party arguing his preliminary
pleas at procedure roll discussion.461 Where a Note has been ordained, this
requirement is often obtempered by lodging a Note containing some degree of
argument, not necessarily concise, nor containing all of the points which could be
taken. At Procedure Roll discussion, it is not uncommon for counsel to depart from
the grounds contained in the Note.462 There does not appear to be any sanction
456 Inglis v. National Bank ofScotland Ltd. 1909 SC 1038.
457 There are separate provisions in respect of (old) personal injury actions, commercial
actions and intellectual property actions.
458 one may note that the requirement re-introduces what had been practised, although
discouraged, in the previous period. See Chapters 2 and 3.
459 RCS 22.4. The rule seems to give the Court a discretion in ordering Notes although Practice
Note 4 of 1997 requires the Ordinary (peremptorily) to 'appoint' a note within 28 days
(without specifying the starting date) although a practice note will not alter the discretion of
the court or alter a statutory instrument. The confusion which has arisen has been said to be
'unfortunate'. Fairbairn v. Vayro 2001 SLT 1167 per L. Osborne. The P.N. is rather
unsatisfactory as it also does not specify how it is to be read in conjunction with a previous
practice note, viz. P.N. No. 3 of 1991, introduced to reduce the number of causes appointed
unnecessarily to the Procedure Roll (80% appointed taken off before hearing). The 1991
provision required that where a cause was appointed to the P.R., the party whose plea was to
be argued would inform his opponent of the nature of the proposed argument at the earliest
opportunity. It has been suggested that this provision has been superseded by the 1997
provision, although the former has not been (and ought to be) formally withdrawn. Fairbairn
supra.
460 Fairbairn supra.
461 Speirs v. British Railways Board 1997 SLT 1144 (under P.N. No. 3 of 1991), Fairbairn supra.
462 See e.g. Livingstone v. Fife Council (unreported) 13th January 2004 per Lord Philip.
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attached to this practice other than the usual adverse award of expenses in the more
extreme type of case. Even in a proof before answer, it may be open to a party to take
a point of relevancy of which no notice has been given in the Note, at a very late
stage.463
In the sheriff court, under OCR 22.1, where a party seeks to insist upon a preliminary
plea, he must lodge a 'Note of Basis of Preliminary Plea'464 not later than three days
before the 'options hearing.' He will be deemed to be no longer insisting upon the
plea should he fail to do so and the plea(s) will be repelled465 and will not be
permitted to be re-inserted in the course of amendment.466 Parties in the Sheriff court
will only be permitted to proceed to debate where the court is satisfied that there is a
legal point worthy of debate.467
(xxv) Debate, Proof Before Answer and Proof.
It will be apparent from the above that a debate468 proceeds upon the law pertaining
to the case. For the purposes of a debate, the averments of the parties are taken pro
veritnte. If, after argument, the court is minded to finally determine the action, the
result will be dismissal of the action or decree de piano. Prior to debate the parties
must give intimation of the basis of the points which they will be seeking to
463 See Caledonia North Sea Ltd. v. London Bridge Engineering Ltd. 2000 SLT 1123 which was a
(391 day) proof where the defenders had a general p>lea to the relevancy in their pleadings,
although obviously no Note of Argument. They were held to be entitled to insist in the plea
on day 381. See further MacKenzie, Written Pleadings, op. cit., p. 189.
464 often referred to as a 'Rule 22 Note'.
465 Bell v. John Davidson (Pipes) Ltd. 1995 SCLR 192, Group 4 Total Security v. Jaymarke
Developments 1995 SCLR 303, Colvin v. Montgomery Preservations 1995 SCLR 40, Ferguson and
Menzies v.JW Soil Suppliers 1998 SCLR 1043.
466 unless they are directed at new material in the other party's minute of amendment. George
Martin (Builders) Ltd. v. Jamal 2001 SLT 119.
467 OCR r. 9.12(3)(c), Gracey v. Sykes 1994 SCLR 909, MacFarlane v. Falkirk Council 2000 SLT (Sh
Ct) 29, Colvin op. cit.
468 In the Court of Session, a debate is usually called a 'Procedure Roll Discussion' following
the terminology of an earlier period. In practice, however, it is increasingly also called a
'Procedure Roll Debate.'
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debate.469 If the court considers that the point of law raised cannot be decided
without inquiry into the facts, it will permit the case to go to a proof before answer.
In the Court of Session, in ordinary actions, a party may still insist in his preliminary
pleas and take the case to debate. In other types of Court of Session action470 and in
the sheriff court, a debate will only be granted if the court is satisfied that there is a
point to be debated. Debates on relevancy as specification were once common place,
strict interpretations of the pleadings were entertained and this frequently resulted in
dismissals.471 Now, the general tendency in the Court of Session seems to be against
such an approach.472 A proof will be allowed473 where, (as appropriate) the parties do
not insist in their preliminary pleas or where the court is either not satisfied that
there is a point to be debated or decides that Proof before Answer is inappropriate.
(xxvi) Amendment in Defended Actions.
The introduction of the power of amendment and its development at the end of the
nineteenth century has been examined in the previous chapter.474 The Court is still
seized of the power to permit parties to make alterations to their pleadings. The
procedure is governed by RCS 24.1.475 The Court may476 at any time before final
judgment, allow an amendment of a principal writ, which may be necessary for the
469 In the Court of Session by a Note of Argument and in the sheriff court by a Rule 22.1 Note
of Basis of Preliminary Plea, (see supra.)
470 i.e. in commercial causes under Chapter 47. In 'new personal injury actions' under new
Chapter 43 debate is heavily discouraged.
471 see Chapter Five infra.
472 see e.g. McLatchie v. Scottish Society for Autism (unreported) 4 February 2004 per Lord
McEwan.
473 the terminology harks back to the period examined in Chapter One whereby a party was
granted an Act of Litiscontestation or Act Before Answer, and then a 'Term for Proving'
circumducing what could be proved and thus proof was permitted or 'allowed'.
474 Following the 1871 Commissioners' Fourth Report the power of amendment was
eventually greatly increased by AS 20 March 1907 such that the record could be amended at
any time during the continuation of the cause on conditions as to expenses.
475 ss. 20 and 29 of the 1868 act were repealed by the Court of Session Act 1988, Sch. 2. In the
sheriff court, amendment is regulated by OCR, r. 18.2 in similar terms to Ch. 24 of the RCS.
476 The allowance is discretionary. Thomson v. Glasgow Corporation 1962 SC (HL) 36.
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purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties,477
notwithstanding that in consequence a sum sued for is increased or restricted or a
different remedy is sought from that originally concluded for478 and it may allow and
amendment of a condescendence, defences, answers, pleas-in-law or other pleadings
which may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between
the parties.
From its introduction in 1868, there has been a progressive relaxation of the system
thought too rigid for modern conditions. Amendment is, in theory, a belated
adjustment for which the laggard has to pay.479 In amendment480 the court has a wide
discretion.481 The amendment must be competent and the Court must be satisfied
that it is in the interests of justice that the amendment is allowed.482 The Court, in
exercising its discretion, will consider any delay in seeking the amendment, any
prejudice occasioned to another party by the allowance of amendment as well as the
stage at which amendment is sought. It may attach conditions to the allowance of
amendment, such as the expenses occasioned thereby.
The amendments to his pleadings proposed by a party will be contained in a minute
of amendment. The procedure for amendment is contained in RCS 24.2 and OCR
18.2. A party may seek leave to amend at any time from the closing of the record to
477 the modern wording mirrors the 1868 wording. See supra Chapter 3.
478 RCS 24.1(1) and (2). The rule also permits changes to the instance. See RCS 24.1 and supra.
479 LJ-C Thomson in Thomson v. Glasgow Corporation.
480 In the following the principal points relating to amendment will be noticed. The case law
pertaining to amendment is considerable and reference is made to Macphail, Practice, Ch. 10,
Green's Annotated Rules of the Court of Session, Annotations at paras. 24.1.Iff. and Maxwell,
Practice at pp. 161-2, 214-5, 303, 307-9 and 330 ff.
481 Rackshaw v. Douglas 1919 SC 354.
482 Thomson op. cit. per LJ-C Thomson at 51, Dryburgh v. National Coal Board 1962 SC 485 per L.
Guthrie at 492.
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final judgment. It is accordingly competent to seek leave before or at procedure roll
discussion, once proof or issues have been allowed, immediately before (or during)
proof or jury trial and even after the proof or jury trial but before judgment.
Amendment may also be sought before appeal or reclaiming, during it, and again
after it.483
483 There is much case law relating to amendment at all of these stages. See Macphail, Practice,
paras. 10.15-10.28, and Green's Annotated Rules 24.1.Iff.
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Chapter Five
The Use of Written Pleadings in the 20th Century.
(i) Introduction
At the present time the system of written pleadings in Scotland is under attack. It is
more the practice than the theory which is criticised, yet the system as a whole is
seen as productive of delay, expense and failing to perform the functions attributed
to it at the start of Chapter 4. The causes of these failures are complex but lie partly in
the foundation of the system as being based in 'adversarialism' and partly because
twentieth century practice developed in a particular way. Now the system and the
traditional roles of the judge and the parties in civil litigation are being re-assessed.
Abolition of written pleadings as traditionally practised is a possibility and is
examined in the next chapter. In this chapter, I trace how Scottish civil procedure
embraced English notions of 'adversarialism' albeit with modifications and how
written pleadings were practised in light of that in the twentieth century. At the enci,
I offer some of my own reflections on the rules of written pleadings and their
practice, drawing on their evolution in this period.
(ii) The Historical 'Civilian Stock' in Scottish Civil Procedure.
In the first three chapters of this thesis, the development of written pleading has been
traced from the late seventeenth century onwards and in Chapter Four, a statement
of the modern rules relating to written pleadings in Scots civil procedure has been
attempted. In this development, we have noticed the early control exercised by the
Court in requiring parties to state their pleas in fact and law as short propositions,
written down, and debated as to relevancy. Proof was not automatic, only being
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permitted through the vehicle of the act of litiscontestation. The opportunity of
representation, reporting and reclaiming provided avenues for parties to force the
Court to reconsider decisions and was part of the Civilian doctrines which it had
inherited from its institution. As procedure developed, the Court still exercised
control over the preparation of parties' positions in fact and law, albeit that parts of
this procedure increasingly were in written form. The introduction of civil jury trial,
however, was the first step in parties' pleaciings stating facts quite independently of
the statements of law. With the development of the Court's procedure under the
Court of Session Act 1825 and the Court of Session Act 1850, the Court was still
nominally controlling the content of written pleading. But the element of
'supervision' and 'intervention' was little used, perhaps for the reasons discussed in
Chapter Three, and parties came to control the content of the pleadings, and to a
large extent, the pace of progress of the cause. As demonstrated in the last chapter,
the modern rules1 for written pleading reflect the fact that it is still for the parties to
control the content of the pleadings.2 Subject to recent innovations in Court of
Session and sheriff court procedures, some would maintain that the parties retain de
facto control of the pace of 'their' litigation. The detailed rules regulating admissions,
deemed admissions, the requirement for formal denial, the circumstances in which a
party may aver that he does not know the truth of an averment, and the 'weaker
alternative rule' all operate against this background of party control. If there is
anything remiss or which offends one of the rules, it is for the opposing party to
endeavour to bring it before the Court for consideration, not for the Court to notice it
and suggest an alteration. Although historically the Court has had powers to do so,
1 i.e. the traditional rules or those conventionally understood to apply to written pleading.
2 subject to the Court ordering the removal of impertinent or scandalous averments.
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the right of controlling the content of written pleadings has been jealously guarded
by the profession.
Recent reforms to the system of written pleadings have altered traditional views.
Procedure in the Court of Session is presently undergoing incremental change both
in practice and theory. Litigation has conventionally been conducted 'adversarially.'
These reforms have implicitly called into question whether certain elements of
adversarialism still have a place in modern civil litigation.
In the examination of the operation of pleadings in the 'culture of adversarialism'
one may question the true role of the judge and the parties. The characterisation of
Scottish civil procedure as adversarial pre-conceives a number of factors. These are
relevant to any consideration of how civil procedure and written pleadings should
operate or, indeed, should be reformed.
From there, we can legitimately question whether our system of written pleading is
inherently flawed and, if so, we might ask how the system should be changed.
Should pleading in writing be removed altogether, or simplified, or is it the case that
the system requires only minor alteration? If alterations are required to modern civil
procedure should we proceed with caution on the basis that such changes can have
as profound an effect as alterations to the substantive law?3 The first point of
exploration in answering these questions is to consider what is meant by civil
procedure operating as an 'adversary' system and it is to this that we now turn.
3 C.K. Davidson, [Rt. Hon. Lord], 'Law Reform - Who Cares?' (1992) 37 J.L.S.S. 130.
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(iii) The Adversarial Culture and the Role of the Judge.
In modern practice it is uncontentious to say that the nature of the rules of civil
procedure and the system of written pleadings in Scotland is adversarial4 or
accusatorial.5 From the earliest periods in the history of civil procedure, an action
was brought by a pursuer summoning the defender and thereafter the parties battled
it out until the court found in favour of one or the other. In the battle, the parties
could use the courts' procedure tactically. Written pleadings initially were designed
not to give the other side notice of one's case but to provide information to the court
which would help in its decision making, hopefully in one's favour.
But a classification of a civil procedural system as 'adversarial' or 'accusatorial' also
brings with it pre-conceived ideas about the function of the judge, fact finding and
the role of written pleadings. These ideas are directly inherited from the
development of English civil procedure and other 'common law' systems.
Historically,6 in Anglo-American jurisprudence, the adversary system was7
considered fundamental to civil procedure, and almost an article of faith for the
common lawyer.8 Written pleadings played a key role in the selection of matters of
controversy between the parties and reflected the role of the Court.9 Because the
concept of adversarialism required the court to act as a kind of impartial judicial
4 Hon. Lord Cullen, Review of Business of the Outer House of the Court ofSession (1996) accepted
this as stated fact. Here I mean that the system is adversarial in the wide sense of pitting
adversaries against each other.
5.1.D. Macphail, 'The Path to the Summit' 1963 SLT (News) 21.
6 for the purposes of this discussion, after the English Judicature Acts 1873-75.
7 the past tense is used as English procedural law has recently retreated from the adversarial
principles of this period.
8 J. Jacob, The Fabric of English Civil Justice (Hamlyn Lectures, 1987) p. 5ff.
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umpire,10 only deciding matters between the parties,11 it was for the parties as
adversaries to formulate their cases in their own way subject to the rules of
pleadings,12 setting out the material facts and answering the pleading of his
opponent detailing his response to each allegation of fact. The parties could not
depart from their pleadings without leave of the court and the parties would thus
know each other's position and would not therefore be taken by surprise at trial. In
this, it was no part of the duty or function of the court to enter upon any inquiry into
the case before it other than to adjudicate upon the specific matters in dispute which
the parties themselves raised in their pleadings.13
In the pre-1873 period in England, the rules of pleading in the fora of common law
and equity, had become highly complex and irrational.14 In 'common law pleading'
the plaintiff had to choose a form of action to which he was thereafter tied, and
mistakes were fatal, and in 'equity pleading' the goal was to bring all the facts before
the court.15 There followed the large procedural reforms of the nineteenth century.16
9 W. Holdsworth, A History ofEnglish Law (4th ed., 1926) Vol. IX, pp. 280-1, J. Jacob and I.
Goldrein, Pleadings, Principles and Practice, (Sweet & Maxwell, Litigation Library) p. 8, Fallon v.
Calvert [1960] 2 QB 201 per Pearce LJ at 204.
10 A.A.S. Zuckerman, 'A Reform of Civil Procedure - Rationing Procedure rather than Access
to Justice' (1995) 22 Journal of Law and Society 155 at 158.
11 J. Jacob, 'The Present Importance of Pleadings' (1960) 13 Current Legal Problems 171 at 174
12 L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication' (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 353, Esso
Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corporation [1954]2 QB 182 per Morris LJ at 207.
13 Jacob, 'Importance' ibid. p. 175. also quoted by Macphail, Practice op. cit. para 9.05
14 D.A. [Mr. Justice] Ipp, 'Reforms to the Adversarial Process in Civil Litigation' (1995) 69
Australian Law Journal 705.
15 See further W. Holdsworth, A History ofEnglish Law, op. cit., Vol IX, p. 336, J. Jacob,
Pleadings, Principles and Practice, op. cit. pp. 19-26.
16 This has been touched upon in previous chapters. In particular see the explanatory foot
notes on demurrers in Chapter 3. The reform was incremental through the Hilary Rules 1834,
Law Procedure Acts 1852 and 1854 (abolishing demurrers for want of form), the Judicature
Acts 1873-75 (which swept away both forms and replaced them with a uniform system of
pleading) and the 1883 Rules of Court which abolished demurrer and replaced it with a rule
which permitted the taking of a preliminary point of law on the pleadings which was dealt
with as a separate issue whereby if the point was decisive of the rights of the parties, then
there was no need for a trial on facts and if the claim was bad in law, even on the assumption
that the facts alleged by the plaintiff were true, the action could be dismissed. See Jacob,
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With the reforms came the ultimate abandonment of common law 'issuable pleading'
i.e. that the pleadings would culminate in the emergence of a single issue of fact or
law between the parties,17 with its rigid and technical defects of inter alia 'demurrer'
and 'protestation.'18 The reforms refined 'equity pleading' i.e. that all the facts should
be brought before the court in its determination of all the matters in controversy
between the parties.19 Thereafter, 'fact pleading' was to operate, i.e. that parties had
to state a series of allegations of fact, not evidence, nor legal conclusions drawn
therefrom and the defendant had to deny such of these statements as he wished to
put in controversy, alleging any additional facts upon which he relied to which the
plaintiff could reply.20
Following these reforms, it was still the proper function of the judge in civil
proceedings to act impartially, not entering into the merits of the case between the
parties before he was called upon to do so, and thus the function of pleadings was to
determine the issues for adjudication. Like an umpire at a cricket match, the judge's
role was to answer the question 'How's that?'21 In American civil procedure, the
approach was the same, - what was called the 'sporting theory of justice'.22
Pleadings, Principles and Practice op. cit. ibid., and in addition K. Zweigert and H. Kotz,
Introduction to Co7nparative Law (3rd ed., tr. Tony Weir), (Oxford, 1998) 198, J. A. Jolowicz,
'Abuse of Process of the Court: Handle with Care', (1990) Current Legal Problems 77 at 82-3.
17 and thus fact would go to the jury and law for decision by the court. See supra Ch. 3
18 J. Jacob, Pleadings, Principles and Practice, op. cit. pp. 22.
19 J. A. Jolowicz, Reform of English civil procedure: a derogation from the adversary system?'
in (same author) On Civil Procedure (Cambridge UP, 2000) 373 at 373-4.
20 J.A. Jolowicz, 'Some twentieth-century developments in Anglo-American civil procedure'
in (same author) On Civil Procedure (Cambridge UP, 2000) 23 at 35. Fact Pleading had
developed in New York in 1848. ibid.
21 Pollock and Maitland, History ofEnglish Law (2nd ed.) (Cambridge UP, 1968) 670-1.
22 This was Roscoe Pound's term. He had castigated this theory of justice as 'rights' of one
party were vested in procedural errors of the other and did not provide substantive justice. R.
Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (1906) 40
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In summary, the central tenets of the Anglo-American traditional adversarial system
were: that it was the parties who initiated the action; framed the pleadings; selected
the material facts; selected the bases in law upon which the suit proceeded; and
determined to a large extent the progress of the suit, the conduct of the trial and any
appeal thereafter.23 The pleadings and the procedure pre-trial were all directed
towards a set piece, single session trial24 at which both sides would confront each
other before the presiding judge and the jury.25 Thus justice would be best served if
the advocate and the decision maker were different persons.26 The task of the judge
throughout was to ensure the due administration of justice between the parties, not
necessarily the ascertainment of truth.27 The judge was the referee and the parties
were the competitors. As Lord Denning commented in Burmah Oil Co. v. Bank of
England,28
'In litigation, as in war. If one side makes a mistake, the other can take
advantage of it. No holds are barred.'29
American Law Review 729. See also DAO Edward, Different Assumptions - Different
Methods, SSC Biennial Lecture (23 November 1990) p. 9.
23 M.R. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal
Process (Yale UP, 1986) 104ff, C. Glasser, 'Civil Procedure and the Lawyers - the Adversary
Principle and the Decline of the Orality Principle' (1993) 56 MLR 307, N. Andrews, 'The
Adversarial Principle: Fairness and Efficiency: Reflections on the Recommendations of the
Woolf Report in (eds. A.A.S. Zuckerman & R. Cranston) Reform ofCivil Procedure. Essays on
'Access to Justice' (Oxford, 1995) 169 at 171.
24 which could not be adjourned.
25 P. Stein, Legal Institutions: The Development ofDispute Settlement (London, 1984) 36-7.
26 B. Danet and B. Bogoch, 'Fixed Fight or Free-For-All? An Empirical Study of
Combativeness in the Adversary System of Justice' (1980) 7 British Journal of Law and Society
36.
27 Air Canada v. Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 A.C. 394 per L. Wilberforce at 438-9 and L.
Denning M.R. at 411. However, there have been contrary opinions expressed. Thus, 'Truth is
best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question' per Lord Chancellor
Eldon in Ex part Lloyd 1822 Mont 70, 72n and see Denning L.J. himself in Jones v. NCB [1957] 2
Q.B. 55 at 63 also quoting Macauley that the 'fairest decision is obtained when two men argue
as unfairly as possible, on opposite sides' for then 'it is certain that no important
consideration will altogether escape notice'. Note, also referred to by I. D. Macphail, 'The
Path to the Summit' op. cit. p. 22.
28 [1979] i VVLR 473 at 484.
29 Such an approach gives credence to Couture's concept of civil litigation as 'civilisation's
substitute for vengeance' (E. Couture, 'The Nature of Judicial Process (1950) 25 Tulane LR 1 at
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Before considering the Scottish position, we must notice the other historical approach
to civil procedure and judicial function in Western legal thought and tradition.
'Continental' or 'civil law' systems are said to be 'inquisitorial'.30 What is meant by
this, at its simplest, is that the civil law procedural systems do not possess a jury, do
not rely so heavily upon written pleadings and the judge is vested with greater
powers to investigate the 'truth' of the parties' contentions and he is bound to
question, inform, encourage and advise the parties, lawyers and witnesses so as to
get a true and complete picture.31 The judge is normally a trained professional.32 He
may even make findings on legal grounds not advanced by the parties.33 Previous
cases on similar facts do not necessarily determine the dispute in the present, civil
law systems placing a greater store on the elucidation of principle from institutional
writers, codes and principles encapsulated in previous decisions.
Separately but related to this, Lord President Cooper saw differences between the
two systems in the modes of reasoning employed in each:
A civilian system differs from a Common Law system much as rationalism
differs from empiricism or deduction from induction. The civilian naturally
7). C.f., however, the comments of Lord Donaldson, M.R. in Davies v. Eli Lilly and Co. [1987] 1
WLR 428 at 431 - '[L]itigation is not a war or even a game.'
30 which to many in common law systems conjures up images of the methods of the Spanish
Inquisition. J.A Jolowicz, 'Fact-Finding: A Comparative Perspective', in D.L. Carey Miller and
P. Beaumont (eds.), The Option of Litigating in Europe, United Kingdom Comparative Law
Series, vol. 14, (Edinburgh, 1993) 133 J. Chorus, Civilian Elements in European Civil
Procedure', in: D.L. Carey Miller and R. Zimmerman (eds.), The Civilian Tradition and Scots
Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays, (Berlin, 1997) 295 at 298.
31 K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd ed., tr. Tony Weir), (Oxford,
1998) 273.
32 i.e. from an early stage, candidates are selected for judicial training and do not practise as
opposed to the common law systems in which the judge will almost always be appointed
after a long period in practice.
33 J. Chorus, Civilian Elements in European Civil Procedure', in: D.L. Carey Miller and R.
Zimmerman (eds.), The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays, (Berlin,
1997) 295 at 301.
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reasons from principles to instances, the common lawyer from instances to
principles. The civilian puts his faith in syllogisms, the common lawyer in
precedents; the first silently asking himself as each new problem arises,
"What should we do this time?" and the second asking aloud in the same
situation, "What did we do last time?" The civilian thinks in terms of rights
and duties, the common lawyer in terms of remedies. The civilian is chiefly
concerned with the policy and rationale of a rule of law, the common lawyer
with its pedigree. The instinct of the civilian is to systematise. The working
rule of the common lawyer is solvihir ambulando.'34
In conclusion, it might be said that the two systems approach reasoning and 'fact¬
finding' in different ways. The common law tradition 'perceives fact-finding as a
'lay' activity separate from, and generally anterior to the 'judicial' activity of
interpreting and applying the law' whereas the civil law tradition sees 'fact-finding
as an integral part of the process by which a dispute between laymen is submitted
for determination by a trained professional judiciary.'35 It has been said that there is
also a psychological distinction in this approach to fact-finding, the adversarial
system assuming a witness will be unlikely to tell the truth unless he testifies in open
court and is challenged by the party against whom he is testifying anci the
inquisitorial procedure assuming that a witness will be inhibited by the prospect of
challenge and is more likely to tell the truth in private to a judge who questions him
from a neutral standpoint.36
34 Rt. Hon. Lord Cooper of Culross, 'The Common Law and the Civil Law - A Scot's View' in:
Selected Papers 1922 -1954 (Edinburgh, 1957) 201 at 204. Note, though, that he added that this
was a deliberate overstatement of the position, ibid.
35 D. Edward, 'Fact-Finding: A British Perspective', in D.L. Carey Miller and P. Beaumont
(eds.), The Option ofLitigating in Europe, United Kingdom Comparative Law Series, vol. 14,
(Edinburgh, 1993) p.43 at 55.
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In reality, these two classifications are probably more misleading than helpful37 as
they presuppose two parallel procedural systems which can be directly compared
point by point. Broad comparisons can of course be made38 but in practice,
continental systems differ amongst themselves and there are elements of
adversarialism in all.39 Sometimes inquisitorial systems do not actually employ all of
the elements which the common lawyer would perceive as inquisitorialism in civil
(i.e. non-criminal) actions.40 So also, common law systems have retreated from the
standards of adversarialism and for some time have adopted, in part, so-called
'inquisitorial' approaches.
(iv) Civilian and Common Law Elements in the Development in Scots
Civil Procedure From 1800 Onwards.
What of Scotland? Scots law is said to be a 'mixed system' of law. What is meant by
this, very simply, is that Scots law, as a result of its development, has one foot in the
English common law system and the other in the civil law tradition.41 This is so in the
context of civil procedure. From the examination of civil procedure and the
development of written pleadings in the previous chapters, it is apparent that up to
the introduction of civil jury trial, Scotland from the inception of the College of
36 P. Stein, Legal Institutions: The Development ofDispute Settlement (London, 1984) 38.
37 D. Edward, 'Fact-Finding' cit sup. p. 43, idem., Different Assumptions - Different Methods
SSC Biennial Lecture 1990 at 8, J.A Jolowicz, 'Fact-Finding: A Comparative Perspective', in
D.L. Carey Miller and P. Beaumont (eds.), The Option ofLitigating in Europe, United Kingdom
Comparative Law Series, vol. 14, (Edinburgh, 1993) 133 at p. 133-5, J. Chorus, Civilian
Elements in European Civil Procedure', in: D.L. Carey Miller and R. Zimmerman (eds.), The
Civilian Tradition and Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays, (Berlin, 1997) 295 at 298.
38 J.A. Jolowicz, 'Fact-finding' in On Civil Procedure, (Cambridge UP, 2000) p. 205
39 D. Edward, 'Fact-Finding' cit sup. p.43.
40 D.A.O. Edward, Different Assumptions - Different Methods SSC Biennial Lecture 1990 p.
11.
41 This is very simplistic. In recent years there has been considerable debate on the past,
present and future relationship of Scots Law with common law and civil law. The purpose of
the following is to assess Scottish civil procedure against the background of some of the
constituent elements of common law 'adversarialism' and civil law (historical and present)
'inquisitorialism.'
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Justice in the sixteenth century, had a form of process which had been influenced by
Romano-canonical procedures of the ecclesiastical courts. Thus the deployment of
syllogistic or enthememic argument in pleading, the summons in writing, the nature
of defences available to defenders, the oral dispute or debate, which was carefully
noted, judged in the first instance in relevancy (taking fact in the hypothetical) and
then followed by litiscontestation with warrants for proof, (the allowance of
probation being a matter for the Court) were all features of Romano-canonical
procedure and the old civilian systems of the continent. So too, the use of rhetorical
written pleadings to advance arguments in probability, the power of the Ordinary to
act unilaterally in reporting, the sitting of the Court unitarily, the power of the judges
to suggest to parties pleas which if inserted might be relevant,42 the availability of
proof other than by oral testimony, the oaths and presumptions and the questioning
of witnesses by judges,43 and initially at least, unrestricted opportunities for review
also demonstrate this lineage. Later, the practical operation of deciding causes on
written pleadings with little viva voce or oral pleading also mirrored developments
on the continent.44 The avowed intention of the Court at the start of the nineteenth
century was to separate fact and law in pleadings for the proper determination of
causes such that the newly introduced jury trial could determine issues of fact. This
marked the start of the slide towards English common law procedure. But that is not
to say that jury practice converted the Scottish system of written pleadings into one
akin to the contemporaneous English common law. The 1825 Act was packed with
provisions which could be categorised as derived from civilian stock. As has been
42 Stair, IV. 39.14. See also J. Chorus, 'The Judge's role in the conduct of civil proceedings:
Some Continental and Scottish Ideas from before 1800', in D.L. Carey Miller and
D.W.Meyers, (eds.), Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots Law: A Tribute to Professor Sir
Thomas Smith, Q.C., (Edinburgh, 1992) 32 at 46.
43 by the Ordinary on Oaths and Witnesses.
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shown, the summons was still a logical ratiocination of law as the major premise, the
facts as the minor and the conclusion (under that heading) the order or remedy
sought. The law as the major premise was stated in pleas-in-law. Defenders required
to answer the facts by denials or admissions, the ficta confessio being an integral part
of interpreting these answers; and where a defender required to insert his statement
of facts, this was executed in the same syllogistical maimer, and the pursuer's
answers were interpreted in the same way. The judge himself was required to
examine into the accuracy of the summons and defences, order the removal of
irrelevant material, and could mention 'anything which occurred to him' including
suggesting new pleas which had been omitted but which, if the parties inserted
them, he would consider relevant. It was the judge who had the power of ordering
amendment of the summons and defences, as well as condescendences and answers,
and it was his job to put the record into a shape 'most conducive to the ends of
justice', authenticating it as properly prepared under his supervision. As Bell
remarked, the pleadings proceeded under the 'special superintendence and guidance
of the judge'.45 It was also the proper function of the judge to decide himself whether
the action could be disposed of on relevancy upon the pleadings alone or whether
the action should be permitted (i.e. by him) to proceed to jury trial46 or to proof. If the
latter was permitted, it was invariably sent to a commissioner for the taking of
witnesses' evidence but this practice had arisen not from the Court relinquishing its
power of questioning witnesses but from the practical consideration that there was
insufficient judicial time to permit of it and also, that it was considered a hardship to
insist in bringing witnesses from distant parts of the country to be examined in
44 P. Stein, 'Common Law and Civil Law in historical perspective', (1997) 5 Zeitschrift fur
Europaisches Privatrecht 385 at 389.
45 G.J. Bell, Examination, op. cit. p.87 See Chapter 3 supra.
46 although the delineation of 'enumerated causes' restricted this to those causes.
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Edinburgh.47 Finally it was the judge who decided whether to order 'written cases'
thus permitting the argument in writing of older practice.
In all of this, the Ordinary was not merely a 'judicial umpire'. Whilst the parties
selected the facts, his statutory responsibilities required him actively to look behind
the parties' pleadings and to investigate their positions, even suggesting
improvements which each could make, ultimately with the judicial aim of producing
in one document the elements of fact and law upon which the parties were at issue.
Thereafter it was within his judicial power to decide how the action was best
disposed of. It was not for the parties to insist on disposal by relevancy, or proof on
commission and the allowance of jury trial was statutorily and, as already noted,
judicially controlled.
With the passage of time, the functions of the judge, the parties and the pleadings
changed and took on a character which would bear the hallmarks of English civil
procedure. Reclaiming, reporting and representation were all severely restricted. As
discussed in Chapter 3, the pro-active powers of the Ordinary under the 1825 scheme
came to be infrequently exercised, certainly in the 'expunging' of irrelevant material
from the pleadings. Pleadings were drafted by a profession trained in 'ripening'
causes over a period of time and whose professed creed was that it was no part of
47 Preamble A.S. 11 March 1800. Proof before the judges was supplanted by proof by
commission. Mackay quotes James Ivory, Form ofProcess as authority for the proposition that
by 1815, proof by commission was 'near universal'. In fact, Ivory notes that proof 'is generally
appointed to be taken by a commissioner' (Vol. I, p. 220) but where a proof by witnesses was
allowed, 'this proof is now always taken before a commissioner' (Vol. I, p. 229) [my
emphasis]. It was even debated in 1832 whether it was still competent for the Court to order
the taking of the proof before itself. The court considered that it was only practice which had
changed. See Mackay, Manual, op. cit. 323 and Practice, op. cit. vol. ii, 6.
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judicial business to do more than ciecide a cause,48 that it was for the parties to
conduct their cause in the manner they chose, and it was expressly stated that it was
'proper' for a party to state his case in such a way as 'his advisers saw fit/49 There
was a realisation by the profession that capital could be made by taking points of
procedure and pleading. Tactical pleading developed. The general denial was
competent as a defender had to meet what was averred on record and nothing
more.50 Through failures in drafting technically correct pleadings and by tactical
subversions, causes came to be still 'ripened' but now in the fields of
condescendences and answers, revisals thereto and the re-introduced minutes and
answers. Over time, the control of the pleadings haci been wrested from the hands of
the Ordinaries, parties thrashing out their positions 'exhaustively.'
The rules of pleading developed against this background of judicial non-intervention
in the preparation of the parties' positions on record, and to a large extent reflected
what had happened and was happening in English civil procedure.51 The pleadings
had to define the issues for the court's determination, but importantly their
preparation came to fall outwith the ambit of the judge. The civil jury trial and the
preparation of issues pushed general pleading practice in the direction of English
48 Report of the Faculty ofAdvocates (1824) See Chapters 2 and 3 supra. There is occasionally
reference in the literature to the judge as 'judicial umpire'. See e.g. A Letter to the Hon. Fox
Maule, M.P. Chairman of the Committee of the House ofCommons appointed to enquire into the
Administration of the Law in Scotland, on some points connected with the subject of that enquiry, by a
Member of the College ofjustice, (Edinburgh, 1840) pp. 8-9 (Quoted in Phillipson, Scottish
Whigs, op. cit., p. 170).
49 Faculty Report (1848). See Chapter 3 supra, although some in the profession had thought
that greater not less judicial supervision was required. Evidence to 1834 Commissioners. See
Chapter 3 supra.
50 paradoxically this was an inheritance from the older civilian based system.
51 The first Lord Clyde, whilst still at the Bar, considered in an essay on Scottish procedure,
that the Scottish practice lay between a system of written pleadings which excluded oral
argument which was 'nearly universal' in continental Europe and the oral system which was
characteristic of England. J.A. Clyde, 'Practice and Procedure in the Court of Session', (1906-7)
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common law. The trial was a single session which the parties worked towards, the
issues in controversy between them crystallised in the pleadings, which had to be
specific and could not admit of 'surprisal' during trial. With the advent of
dissatisfaction with jury trial and the development of proof before the Ordinary
sitting without a jury, Scots pleadings were performing a function similar to those
found in Westminster Hall. Even the commissions to take evidence, at which the
commissioner stood in the Ordinary's stead and at which the parties were
circumscribed in what could be put to witnesses,52 fell away, and came to be used to
only take the evidence of frail or elderly witnesses or those unable to travel to
Edinburgh. It is not surprising that the influence of English civil procedure was at its
greatest in this period, and that there were calls for reforms which emulated 'issuable
pleadings.' Nor is it surprising that there were actual proposals to incorporate
English methods into Scots practice,55 nor that on occasion parts of English procedure
did find a place in reforms of Scottish procedure. The feeling of this time, influenced
by England, was that it was best to get to the facts, hence the dissatisfaction in some
quarters with the continued inclusion in the record of pleas-in-law as to the merits, as
well as complaints about pleas to the relevancy. The development of pleas to
specification (albeit as a species of relevancy), the reluctance of the Court to decide
cases on relevancy (pejoratively referred to as 'deciding cases on hypothetical facts')
and the increased employment of the proof before answer were also part of this
approach. The requirements of fair notice and specification seem to have originated
in jury practice (following English procedure), to have been translated to particular
18 JR 319 at 325. This mis-categorises the English position. Although the 'orality principle'
was a key feature of English adversarial procedure, written pleadings were also important.
52 By 'interrogatories'.
53 at the behest of the Lord Advocate. See e.g. the 1863 proposals in Chapter 3 supra.
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types or categories of averment54 as a protection to the parties55 and as a guard
against judicial slander56 which was thereafter adopted in general practice.57
The allure of English procedure was significant from the 1860s onwards and, even as
late as 1927,58 there were calls for the adoption of elements of English procedure,
from the profession generally, from senior members of the Bar and even from some
of the Bench.59 English procedure was considered simpler, more expeditious and
cheaper although there were some in the profession who considered that the judge
should exercise greater control in the preparation of parties' pleadings and exclude
irrelevant averments.60 The Royal Commission of 1927, under Lord Clyde's
chairmanship, rejected the English system as a possible model for reform, and swept
54 e.g. fraud, malice, dishonestly, immorality, professional misconduct, other averments
affecting reputation or anything impertinent or scandalous. See Chapter 4 supra.
55 particularly those not party to the action.
56 In the nineteenth century, if slanderous or false statements were averred by a pursuer
which were not pertinent to the issue between the parties, the pursuer could be found liable
in damages and even if the averments were pertinent, if they were made maliciously, the
agent could also be held to be liable for the fault of his client. See Mackay, Practice, 1,112,
Forteith v. Earl ofFife 2 M. 463, Mackellar v. Duke ofSutherland (1859) 21 D. 222 and 24 D. 1124,
Bayne v. Macgregor (1862) 24 D. 1130, Taylor v. Swinton (1824) 1 S. 60, Johnston v. Scott (1829) 7
S. 234, Lees, Handbook, p. 36. See also Scott Dickson's comments in 'Pleading' cit. sup. p. 16
57 see Chapters 3 and 4 supra.
58 Report of the Royal Commission of the Court ofSession and the Office ofSheriff Principal with
Summary of Evidence, (Chairman, Lord President Clyde) 2 vols., (1927) Cmd. 2801. (hereafter
'1927 Report'). Some of the Commission's Recommendations were incorporated into the
Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933 c. 41.
59 in particular the adoption of the English claim and defence (Evidence of Mr. James H.
Jameson W.S. on behalf of the W.S. Society, Summary of Evidence, p. 42, Evidence of Hon.
Lorti Ashmore, ibid p. 95) or at least simple 'forms' (Evidence of the Faculty of Advocates
represented by JCS Sandeman, Dean of Faculty, Mr. J. Keith, Advocate and Mr. TM Cooper,
Advocate, ibid., p. 167-8), the abolition of the device of the closed record, replaced with the
power to call for further particulars and the removal of the plea of relevancy (Evidence of
Hon. Lord Moncrieff, ibid., pp.107,110 and 113, Evidence of the Faculty of Advocates p. 161
re. 'particulars') and the dispensing with pleas-in-law (Lord Moncreiff, ibid., p. 110, Evidence
of the Faculty of Advocates , ibid., p. 161, Dean and Cooper dissenting).
60 See evidence of Dean of Faculty Sandeman to the 1927 Commission, ibid., p. 169 that it
should be the judge's duty to cut down and strike out irrelevant material 'just as with
scandalous pleadings', his decision on this being final. See also the evidence of the W.S.
society that it would be better if the Ordinary exercised more supervision over the record as
they had to do under s. 6 of the Judicature Act. ibid., p. 48ff. This approach of course had
historical precedent.
341
such suggestions to one side, as they were not 'strongly pressed' and were 'not
unanimous.'61
It is against the background of all of this that the rules of written pleading, examined
in Chapter Four, developed and Scots civil procedure was brought into almost
perfect alignment with 'adversarial' English common law procedure, David Hume's
comments in 1807 about the 'English yoke' resonating across the decades.62 But why
only 'almost'? Scots law has never separated equity from law63 and had never
subordinated the right to the remedy.64 Further, the required formulation of the
summons as a syllogism and the retention (albeit sometimes precariously) of the
doctrine of relevancy65 have remained as vestiges of the former civilian system.
(v) Modern Scots Procedural Law and 'Adversarialism'.
In modern Scottish practice, written pleadings and civil procedure are part of the
common law adversarial family.66 However, the retention of relevancy gives Scottish
civil procedure a slightly different character to other members of the family. Further,
61 1927 Report, p. 74. See also comments of Lord Gill in 'The Case for a Civil Justice Review.
Contemporary Relic in Need of an Overhaul', (1995) 40 JLS 129 at 132.
62 '[I]n new modelling our plan of judicial proceedings after the English standard, we are
preparing our necks, and those of our posterity, for the yoke of servitude to the law of
England.' Substance of the Speeches delivered by some Members of the Faculty ofAdvocates at the
Meetings on 28 February, 2 and 9 March 1807 to consider the Bill "for better regulating the Court of
Justice in Scotland and the Administration ofJustice therein'" (Advocates' Library, Law Tracts,
1.2), P. 25.
63 T [Lord President] Cooper, Selected Papers, op. cit. p. 183, D. Walker, 'Equity in Scots Law'
(1954) 56 JR 103.
64 Cooper ibid., N.R. Whitty, 'From Rules to Discretion: Changes in the Fabric of Scots Private
Law' (2003) 7 Edin LR 281 at 304.
65 Although England recognised something similar after 1883, it was a preliminary point and
had to be disposed of before any exploration of the facts. See supra. A PBA was unknown.
66 Usually this is explained by the Scottish adoption of civil jury trial. D. Edward, 'Fact-
Finding: A British Perspective', op. cit. p. 46, J. A. Jolowicz, 'Fact-Finding: A Comparative
Perspective' op cit. p. 134.
342
the formulation of pleadings as a syllogism, whereby the principle of law67 is
advanced as the major premise and stated as the plea-in-law, and the facts forming
the 'grounds of the action' are the minor premise subsumed thereunder and the
conclusion necessarily following, is the legal justification for granting the remedy
sought.
It is sometimes said that in searching for major premisses the Scots lawyer is more
concerned with principles than precedents68 and the process of reasoning is
deductive,69 the remedy necessarily following as a conclusion. Also, from this, it is
has been considered a characteristic of Scots law that decisions are founded on
principle rather than precedent.70 It is not the place here to consider the merits of
these assertions but it might be suggested, as Lord Rodger has, that Scots Law has
long been built by the working out of doctrine in the case-law and it is this that gives
strength to any statements of principle which may from time to time emerge.71
The point is that, on occasion, Scots lawyers have considered that the formulation of
written pleadings, the rationalisation of the law with the facts and the ultimate
decision all operate in accordance with the rules of logic whether the major premise
is derived from statements of institutional principle72 or from principles to be found
67 as the ratio decidendi of a previous decision or an existing or novel principle of law.
68 D.M. Walker, 'Principle and Authority as Sources of Norms' 1982 JR 198 at 212
69 Which has spawned a jurisprudential theory of legal reasoning in itself. See N.
MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) (reprint with corrections, Clarendon
Press, 1994).
70 Lord Macmillan, 'Two ways of thinking', Rede Lecture 1934 [repr. in Law and Other Things
(1937) at p. 76], See also comments in A. Rodger, 'Thinking About Scots Law' (1996) 1
Edinburgh Law Review p. 3 at 11.
71 A. Rodger, 'Thinking About Scots Law' cit sup. at 5. See also comments of D. Edward,
'Scottish Legal Education and the Legal Profession in H.L. MacQueen, (ed.), Scots Law into the
21st Century. Essays in Honour ofW.A. Wilson (Edinburgh, 1996) 50 at 63.
72 c.f. R. Black, 'Practice and Precept in Scots Law' (1982) JR 31 at 46.
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in previous cases.73 This is so even though in practice the system of written
pleadings, up until the consideration of relevancy, operated and operates in the
elucidation of matters in controversy between the parties in a manner akin to
common law procedures.74
The difference in the two procedures is that in testing any principle or rule advanced,
a party in Scotland will employ this plea to the relevancy.75 So taking the averments
of fact pro veritate, if the averments of fact focussed by the pleas-in-law do not
support the conclusions of the summons then the pursuer is bound to fail and the
action is irrelevant.76
(vi) Notions of Judicial Function in Scotland: The Adversarial System,
the Preparation of Pleadings and the Role of the Judge at Proof
If Scottish civil procedure is 'adversarial', what then is the role of the judge in the
single session trial of fact?77 Is the judge there to ascertain the truth as in
continental systems, or is he or she the umpire or referee overseeing the rules of
the game?
Proof before a judge became increasingly popular from the 1860s onwards and, as
in the preparation of the parties' pleadings, the role of the judge at proof was
'hands-off', permitting the parties to lead such evidence as they saw fit. The
73 Walker, 'Theory of Relevancy' op. cit. p. 14.
74 The interplay between averment and proof however, differs.
75 T.B. Smith, Judicial Precedent in Scots Law (Edinburgh, 1952) 71, D. Walker, 'The Theory of
Relevancy' (1951) 63JR1.
76 See Chapter Four.
77 in Scotland, the proof or if relevancy is postponed the proof before answer. The
terminology of 'trial' is English although the new procedures for personal injury actions use
the phrase. See below.
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judge's function was to listen to the evidence adduced by examination in chief,
cross examination and re-examination, rule on evidential points as they arose, hear
parties' submissions on the evidence and then simply adjudicate thereon at the
close of proof. He himself could not call witnesses, and could question them only
with caution, leaving it to the parties to present their cases virtually uninterrupted.
But if it was the judge's job to ensure the due administration of justice between the
parties, was he also there to ascertain the truth? In the late 1950s, Lord Justice-
Clerk Thomson observed:
'Judges like to think that the object of a litigation is to discover the truth. We
try to do so and fortunately we often do discover it. But the decision of a
[trial judge] is in the last analysis only an adjudication by a trained mind on
the material which the parties can or choose to put before him.'78
A year later he expanded upon this.
'Judges sometimes flatter themselves by thinking that their function is the
ascertainment of truth. This is so only in a very limited sense. Our system of
administering justice in civil affairs proceeds on the footing that each side,
working at arm's length, selects its own evidence ... It is on the basis of two
carefully selected versions that the judge is finally called upon to adjudicate.
He cannot make investigations on his own behalf; he cannot call witnesses;
his undoubted right to question witnesses who are put in the box has to be
exercised with caution. He is at the mercy of contending sides whose whole
object is not to discover truth but to get his judgment. That judgment must
be based only on what he is allowed to hear ... A litigation is in essence a
trial of skill between opposing parties conducted under recognised rules,
78 Islip Pedigree Breeding Centre v. Abercromby 1959 SLT 161 at p. 165 per LJ-C Thomson.
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and the prize is the judge's decision. We have rejected inquisitorial methods
and prefer to regard our judges as entirely independent. Like referees at
boxing contests they see that the rules are kept and count the points.'79
We can note in the latter quotation that Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson considered that
Scotland had rejected inquisitorialism which he equated with a lack of independence,
the litigation being a trial of skill with the judge merely adjudicating upon two
competing versions advanced by the parties. A contemporaneous reviewer of the case
thought that
'Lord Thomson clearly envisaged each party to the litigation manoeuvring
its forces, uncovering its batteries and deploying its fighting strength
according to the exigencies of the struggle and with the general object of
destroying the enemy.'80
Indeed the dicta of Lords Wilberforce and Denning on fact-finding in adversarial
English civil procedure in Air Canada v. Secretary ofState for Trade81 and Lord
Denning's 'litigation as war' analogy in Biirmah82 sit remarkably well with Lord
Justice-Clerk Thomson's view of the Scottish position.
But just as in England, there were differing judicial opinions as to whether this was
really the case. Lord Thomson himself had expressed a view years earlier that there
79 Thomson v. Glasgow Corporation 1961 SLT 237 at per L J-C Thomson at 245-6. The pursuer's
counsel in the case thought that the judgment was 'entertaining in a cynical kind of way'. See
G. Stott, Lord Advocate's Diary 1961-66 (Aberdeen UP, 1991) 4-5.
80 'Notes from Edinburgh' (1962) 78 Scottish Law Review 47 at 48.
81 Air Canada v. Secretary ofState for Trade [1983] 2 A.C. 394.
82 Burmah Oil Co. v. Bank of England [1979] 1 WLR 473 at 484.
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was nothing more 'sacred' than 'ascertainment of truth and the doing of justice'83 and
in the same year as Thomson, the First Division under LP Clyde had commented,
'[If] litigations in these courts were just games of skill and ingenuity that
argument [by counsel of the defender] might have some force: but the object
of a litigation is to enable the court to ascertain the truth, not to give either
scope or, indeed, encouragement to tactical manoeuvring.'84
Can these views of Scottish procedure be reconciled? Taking both positions, it might
be said that the proper function for the judge at proof is to decide where he thinks the
truth lies on the evidence which the parties have adduced before him. Fie is not the
seeker of truth nor the adducer of evidence and is therefore, in the adversarial
context, impartial.85
In conclusion, the traditional Scottish position may be stated as follows. The process
is adversarial; the litigants are in competition and they possess the initiative; the
judge is impartial and decides between them; and the 'truth' is derived from the
evidence which those litigants lead.86 The process of the parties' preparation of their
pleadings is directed towards this 'end game' of proof, so that they tie themselves and
tie their opponent to specific matters of law and fact for determination. This is one of
83 Lennie v. Lennie 1948 SLT 382 at 385. See also I Macphail, 'The Path to the Summit' op. cit. at
22.
84 Duke ofArgyll v. Duchess ofArgyll &Am. 1962 SLT 333 at 338. The same review supra
commented that the two expressions of judicial function were 'totally different' although the
two divisions might be taken as agreeing 'to differ'. 'Notes from Edinburgh' ibid.
85 See comments of Lord Migdale in McCallum v. Paterson 1969 SC 85 at 93 and Macphail,
Practice para. 16.38.
86 The essence of Scottish procedural law.. .is that the initiative is left almost exclusively to the
parties and their advisers, the role of the Court being the relatively passive one of
determining by interlocutory or final judgments the various matters presented by the parties
for determination, but only as and when these matters are so presented.' Lord President
Cooper, 'Defects in the British Judicial Machine' in Selected Papers, op. cit. 244 at 253.
347
the most important functions of written pleadings.87 But because the concept of
relevancy is still an integral part of Scots law and by virtue of the fact that the parties
are in competition, in the Scottish system the parties can attack the pleadings of each
other, before the controverted issues get to proof, thus removing the need for the trial
or they can coerce each other to state in more explicit terms their assertions of fact and
law thus saving time and expense.88 The pre-trial rigidity of relevancy and its
disposal before proof is conventionally considereci an inherent strength of Scottish
procedure and prevents a later 'roving or raking inquiry' at proof and is better
therefore than 'more free-and-easy forms of procedure.'89 As Lord Shaw of
Dunfermline explained,
It is difficult to overestimate the value of this procedure to Scotland. Under
it the scandals which sometimes appear elsewhere are avoided - of a trial
taking place involving a prolonged, harassing, and most costly inquiry upon
an issue which, if it had been stated to begin with in plain words, and there
and then adjudicated upon, would have been settled... for a fraction of the
expense and in a fraction of the time... For ... persons charged with fraud
know from the beginning the substance of what they have to meet, and they
are not exposed to the hardships of a merely fishing or raking inquiry.'90
87 see Chapter 4 supra.
88 H. Burn-Murdoch, Notes on English Law as Differing From Scots Law (Edinburgh 1924) p. 10
citing Clydesdale Bank v. Paton (1896) 23 R. (FIL) 22 per L. Halsbury at 388, N. StaffRly. Co. v.
Edge [1920] SC 254 per L. Dunedin at 264. See also Edgar v. Lord Advocate 1965 SC 67, Bryce v.
Allied Ironfounders Ltd. 1969 SLT (Notes) 29,1.D. Macphail, 'Summary Adjudication in Civil
Proceedings in Scotland' in I.R. Scott (ed.), International Perspectives on Civil Justice, Essays in
Honour ofSir Jack I. H. Jacob, Q.C. (1990) 67 at 75.
89 Gibson v. BICC1973 SC (HL) 15 per Lord. Kilbrandon at 32.
90 Mair v. Rio Grande Rubber Estates Limited 1913 SC (HL) 74 per Lord Shaw of Dunfermline at
p. 78.
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(vii) The House of Lords and the Plea to the Relevancy.
If Scottish civil procedure is a member of the Anglo-American adversarial family,
when it periodically pays a visit, with its baggage of relevancy, to its English relations
it is perhaps sometimes viewed as an unruly cousin. An understanding of the
development of English and Scottish pleadings from the nineteenth century onwards
and in particular the Scottish insistence in relevancy and the English abandonment of
demurrer, will explain what sometimes appears in reported decisions on Scottish
appeals to the House of Lords91 to be English law lords' misunderstandings of, or
failures to appreciate the Scottish concept of relevancy and/or the nature and
function of Scottish pleadings in general.92 It will be recollected that demurrer was
never known to Scots procedure93 and the plea to the relevancy only ever at best
'roughly corresponded'94 to, or was 'analogous'95 to, or 'comparable'96 with
demurrer.97
91 i.e. when the English judges do not merely concur with their Scottish brethren and venture
into the unsheltered waters of Scottish civil procedure.
92 see e.g. R. Wyness Millar, 'Civil Pleading in Scotland' op. cit. p. 586.
93 There might be said to be an exception to this, as the device was known in old Exchequer
procedure but not surprisingly so as the procedure used was English. See Chapter 3 supra.
The Union in 1707 established the Court of Exchequer (Act 6 Anne, c.26) and it was provided
that the court was to employ English procedure. The Court was abolished in 1856 (Exchequer
Courts (Scotland) Act 1856). The Court's power, authority and jurisdiction was transferred to
the Court of Session. However, in Exchequer causes in the Court of Session, English
procedure was still employed. Commencing with the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, a number
of statutes supplanted the English procedure with Scottish civil procedure in Exchequer
cases. Presently, Exchequer cases commence by summons and follow the procedure of an
ordinary action. RCS 48.2. See further Lord President Cooper, 'The Central Courts After 1532'
in: An Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society) (Edinburgh, 1958) 341 at 347-8, GCH
Paton, 'The Eighteenth Century and Later' ibid. p. 50 at 55, Green's Annotated Rides of the Court
ofSession, Chapter 48, Annotations at RCS 48.1.1-2.
94 R. Wyness Millar, 'Civil Pleading in Scotland' ibid.
95 Lord President Cooper, 'The Scottish Legal Tradition' in Selected Papers, op. cit. p. 193
96 T.B. Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law ofScotland (Edinburgh, 1962) p. 92. Cf however
T.B. Smith, British Justice : The Scottish Contribution (Hamlyn Lectures) (London, 1961) p. 78.
97 Lord President Normand, in a 1941 lecture (which was not delivered on account of the war
but which was published), explained that the plea to relevancy 'is not the demurrer formerly
in use in England. For in the debate on relevancy the party taking the plea merely accepts his
opponent's averments for the purpose of the argument. If therefore the plea is repelled by the
court the issue of fact remains and must be decided.' Scottish Judicature and Legal Procedure,
Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club, (1940-1) p. 36.
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We may leave to one side the often acerbic remarks of the Lords of the nineteenth
century, so joyously chronicled by Dewar Gibb,98 and concentrate here on more
modern pronouncements and views of the Lords expressed in the twentieth century
when Scottish written pleading as a system was highly developed. The Introduction
to this thesis has already examined the case of Gibson v. BICC99 in which Lord Morris
of Borth-Y-Gest was content to follow (one suspects blindly) the Scottish judges,100
and there was Viscount Dilhorne's frank admission that he was in ignorance of the
particular aspect of Scottish pleading before the House. Consider also the following.
InMair v. Rio Grande Rubber Estates Limited,101 Haldane LC for some reason considered
that questions of relevancy did not easily apply in cases of fraudulent
misrepresentation102 although Lord Shaw of Dunfermline forcibly set the record
straight.103 Lord Moulton thought relevancy equated with the old English
demurrer.104 InM'Kinlay v. Darngavil Coal Co. Ltd105 Viscount Cave LC in an appeal on
relevancy commented that 'The practice of stopping a case on what amounts to
demurrer is less common in England than it was, but in this case the Scottish practice
has to, of course, be followed.' Cleisham v. British Transport Commission106 was an
appeal relating to corroboration and whether the evidence at jury trial had fallen
98 A. Dewar Gibb, Law From Over the Border. A short account ofa strange jurisdiction,
(Edinburgh, 1950) pp. 42-114.
99 1973 S.C. (H.L.) 15.
100 ibid. p. 23.
1011913 SC (HL) 74.
102 ibid, at p. 77.
103 ibid, at p. 78.
104 'The defenders allege as a plea in law that the pursuer's averments are irrelevant to
support the conclusions of the summons, or, as one would have said in old times in England,
they demur to the whole declaration, i.e. they allege that it discloses no valid cause of action'
ibid, at p.83.
105 1923 SLT 203.
106 1964 SC (HL) 8.
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within the ambit of the pleadings. While the two Scottish judges107 dissented and
followed the Inner House, the three English judges108 allowed the appeal, Lord Devlin
accepting that he was 'accustomed to much less stringent rules of pleading than those
which prevail in Scotland.'109 In Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan & Sons110 Lord Upjohn
could mention the 'much stricter rules of pleading in Scotland.' In McGlone v. British
Railways Board111 Lord Pearce comes close to suggesting that the difference which
appeared between averment and evidence was 'academic.'112 There are other
examples. Lord Denning in Miller v. South of Scotland Electricity Board113 observed that
the defenders had
'taken in this case a course similar to that taken by the defender in Donoghue v.
Stevenson. They have objected to the action on the ground that the pursuer's
averments are irrelevant and insufficient in law to support the conclusion of
the summons. The only question on such a plea is whether, taking the
pursuer's averments pro veritate, they disclose a case relevant in law so as to
entitle him to have them remitted for proof. This procedure in Scotland is
similar to the old procedure of demurrer in England...Demurrers were
abolished in England by the rules of 1883 and since that time the English
Courts prefer to decide the facts first so as to see whether the point of law
really does arise: but the Scottish Courts are still ready on occasion to decide
the law first so as to see whether it is necessary to have an inquiry into the
facts at all. That is what happened in this case.'114
107 Lords Reid and Guest.
108 Lords Morris of Borth-Y-Gest, Hodson and Devlin.
109 at p. 27. For good commentary on the case see W.A. Wilson, 'Cleisham and Corroboration',
1964 SLT (News) 57.
1101967 SC (HL) 79.
111 1966 SC (HL) 1.
112 at p. 18.
1131958 SC (HL) 20.
114 Miller v. South of Scotland Electricity Board 1958 SC (HL) 20 at 36. See also his comments in
Bulmer v. Bollinger [1974] 1 Ch. 401 at 423 'As a rule you cannot tell whether it is necessary to
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From these examples, one might ask whether it really matters that English members
of the Flouse of Lords on occasion have experienced difficulty with the Scottish
system of written pleadings and the doctrine of relevancy and whether there were
any real consequences for Scots law. If so, the thesis is simple. If the Lords considered
that relevancy was the same or 'equated to' the old demurrer, then, in their minds,
the pursuer would have no recourse 'to law' thereafter if the case was irrelevant. It
was perhaps not appreciated that if the pursuer's action was dismissed he could still
bring a new action. Moreover, if they thought that relevancy was demurrer, then
perhaps they failed to appreciate that a pursuer's case, if relevant, still permitted an
inquiry into the facts or if relevancy was not easily determined without inquiry into
the facts, a proof before answer. Debate on relevancy was not the joining of the
parties on the issue of law only as the final and only determination of the case.
Further, the English judges may have been intolerant of a technical procedure or
class of rules which impeded the court getting to the facts of the case. Whilst Lord
Diplock considered that it was only 'natural that lawyers from two countries should
prefer that system of pleading with which they are the more familiar,'115 if there was
confusion then it related to understanding of the concept of relevancy in Scots law
and the Scottish requirement that one could only prove what one had averred. One
might ask whether this could have been a factor in these judges preferring less
technical constructions of the pleadings.
Alternatively, it could be posited that those who are not immersed in the intricacies
of a system are able to put that system in context, or point out deficiencies from the
decide a point until all the facts are ascertained. So in general it is better to decide the facts
first.'
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broader point of view or elucidate the true principles, viewing the wood not the
trees. What is true is that the House of Lords in a period from the 1950s to the early
1970s decided a number of cases which eased what had become a strain between
form and equity as fairness in the interpretation of written pleadings. The strict
administration of the system of pleadings, particularly in the Divisions, had made it
rigid, inelastic and often unfair. Technical pleading points often succeeded. The
approach adopted by the House of Lords in the period to a large extent ignored these
technical rules of written pleadings and looked at the broader picture and the equity
in the cases before it. This was particularly so in actions for damages for personal
injuries.116
(viii) Pleading Practices, Reparation and Jury Trials in the 1960s and
1970s. The Development of the 'Procedure Industry'.
From the nineteenth century the law relating to damages for personal injury
frequently produced harsh decisions and particularly so in 'death' cases. This arose
sometimes for policy reasons which were judicially sanctioned. At times it was
simply because the court took a hard line on matters of pleading. Errors in pleading
frequently would be fatal. The cards were stacked in favour of defender employers
or 'masters' and the defences of common employment, and contributory negligence
were complete defences. Many a pursuer's case failed for lack of corroboration. The
hurdles were significant for a pursuer before he could recover against his employer
and latterly a high degree of specification was required.
115 Rockware Glass Ltd v. MacShannon [1978] AC 795 at 815.
116 Since 1988, the Court of Session has interpreted the Court of Session Act 1988 c. 36, s.
40(l)(b) as not permitting an appeal to the House of Lords on a matter of Scottish pleading or
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There had been the importation of categories of wrongdoer into Scots Law in
occupier's liability cases via the House of Lords in Dumbreck v. Addie & Sons
Collieries777 which was only remedied by s. 2 of the Occupier's Liability Act I960.118
Prior to this, the pursuer had to make averments relating to the injured person as
invitee, licensee or trespasser.119 The defence of common employment was
particularly pernicious. It had never been part of the law of Scotland and had been
introduced by the House of Lords into Scots Law. In England, Priestly v. Fowler120 had
established that an employer121 owed an employee a duty of care at common law and
that an employee could sue his employer if the breach of the duty caused physical
injury. But it also introduced into England the doctrine of 'common employment':
that, if the injury had been caused by a fellow employee, the employer was not
vicariously liable for that negligence.122 The employee was taken to have assumed
the risk of negligence of a fellow employee when working in his employment. In
Scotland, Priestly was initially rejected.123 From at least 1839, the Scottish courts had
developed a different jurisprudence regulating the employer/employee relationship.
The employer's common law duties to his employee were to provide a safe system of
practice. See Rt. Hon. Lord Hope, 'Taking the Case to London - Is it All Over?' (1998) 43 J.R.
135 at 147.
1171929 SC (HL) 51.
118 Lord Reid in M'Glone v. British Railways Board 1965 SC (HL) 1 at 11, refused to apply the
old case law to the new statutory provisions.
119 M'Glone op. cit.
120 (1837) 3 M & W 1. On the case and its background see R.L. Howells, 'Priestly v. Fowler and
the Factory Acts' (1963) 26 MLR 367.
121 The terminology used at the time was 'master' and for employee - 'servant'
122 There was one exception to this. If the injured employee could demonstrate that the fellow
employee was incompetent, then the employer could still be in breach by negligently
engaging him. See further, Munknian on Employer's Liability, (eds. ]. Hendry & M. Ford) 13th
ed., (2001) para. 1.13. See also 'Negligence' in: (eds. K. Reid and R. Zimmermann) A History of
Private Law in Scotland, vol. 2 (Obligations) 517 at 540-1. On the whole topic see also J. Ingman,
'The Rise and Fall of the Doctrine of Common Employment' 1978 J.R. 106, and further P.
Simpson, 'Vicarious Liability' in History ofPrivate Law, ibid p. 584 ff.
123 Dixon v. Ranken (1852) 14 D 420, although not unequivocally. Simpson, op. cit. 589-91.
354
work,124 and safe and adequate equipment.125 He was placed under a duty126 to take
care for the safety of his employees,127 by taking all reasonable precautions to protect
them from accident.128 The case which introduced or rather imposed common
employment on Scotland was Bartonsliill Coal Co. v. Reidd29 From then on, the
employer owed inherent duties to an employee, duties in reasonable care to employ
competent servants, to provide and maintain adequate equipment and to provide a
safe system of work. However, he was not vicariously liable for the actings of a
negligent fellow employee.
From the late 1870s and early 1880s onwards, those representing employers
frequently seem to have taken specification points (i.e. lack of fair notice pleading
points) against pursuers, which in turn could account for the extension of
specification as fair notice into general actions at about this time.130 As the Coulsfield
Working Party noticed, this would also account for comments in Lees' Pleading and
124 Sword v. Cameron (1839) 1 D 493 (quarry 'shot-firer' detonating explosion before pursuer
far enough away.)
125 Brydon v. Stewart (1855) 2 Macq. 30.
126 As Professor Black has pointed out, in reparation actions in the period, it became common
to plead that the employer had a 'duty' to do such and such and that he 'had failed to do so'.
See R. Black, A Historical Survey of Delictual Liability in Scotland for Personal Injuries and
Death, Part III', (1975) 8 CILSA 318 at p. 321.
127 Paterson v. Wallace & Co. (1854) 1 Macq. 748.
128 Brydon v. Stewart (1855) 2 Macq. 30 followed in Adair v. Colville & Sons 1926 SC (HL) 51 per
Lord Atkinson at p. 58. See the latter for analysis of the employer's duties to his employees at
pp. 58-9.
12917 D 1017, (1858) 20 D (HL) 13,13 Macq. 266, Bartonshill Coal Co. v. McGuire (1858) 20 D
(HL) 13, 3 Macq. 300 was also decided at about the same time. Common employment as a
complete defence had been rejected in both cases at first instance and in the First Division. See
D. Walker, The Law ofDelict in Scotland, (2nd. ed.) (Edinburgh, 1981) at p. 551. See also Rt. Hon.
Lord Hope of Craighead, Taking the Case to London - Is It All Over?' (1998) 43 J.R. 135 at p.
142.
13° gee Chapter 3 supra. From the author's brief inspection of the General Collection of Session
Papers held by the Faculty of Advocates, it is about this time that a preliminary plea directed
to specification itself as opposed to 'irrelevant and insufficient to support the conclusions of
the summons' appears in pleadings.
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Interlocutors reflecting the author's anxiety that averments should be sufficient to
ensure the leading of evidence and the provision of 'fair notice' to his opponent.131
The doctrine of common employment was restricted thereafter,132 through the
Employers' Liability Act 1880,133 and its effects were mitigated by the Workmen's
Compensation Acts of 1897,134 1906,135 and 1925136 until it was finally abolished137 in
1948.138 The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 removed contributory
negligence on the part of an employee as a complete defence.
Concurrently, Parliament instituted a series of statutory safeguards to protect
workers. There followed the Mines Act 1911,139 Mines and Quarries Act 1954, Factory
131 Report by Working Party on Court ofSession Procedure (Chairman: Lord Coulsfield) (2000)
[This report will be hereafter referred to as 'Coulsfield Report'], Ch. 6, p. 3. By Lees' time,
pleas to specification were well established. See supra. Chapters 3 & 4.
132 For development of the law up to 1947 see Viscount Simon in Miller v. Corporation of
Glasgow 1947 SLT 63 and Neilson v. Glasgow Corporation 1948 SLT 42. See also Simpson, op. cit.
pp. 592-599.
133 Shortly, the employee could succeed if he could prove that the injury was caused by the
accident and the accident resulted from defects in the 'ways, works, machinery or plant' or
from the negligence of an employee whose orders the employee had to obey or the negligence
of an employee placed in a position of superintendence, or in railway cases, the negligence of
a signalman or engine driver. See Munkman, op. cit. para. 1.22.
134 Compensation was payable where an employee was injured and incapacitated due to an
accident 'arising out of and in the course of employment' (restricted to particular industries)
without the requirement of proof of negligence of the employer or any of its employees.
135 increasing cover to employees earning above a particular sum. This had the net effect of
decreasing common law proceedings in the Court of Session. J.L. [Later Lord] Wark, 'The
Business of the Law Courts', Address delivered to the Glasgow Juridical Society on 11
February 1930 by Mr. J.L. Wark, K.C., Sheriff of Argyllshire (1930) 46 Scottish Law Review (in
3 parts) p. 73, 93,153 at p. 73.
136 Mainly a consolidating Act, but also covering industrial accidents. In its final form the
scheme under the Act was enforced in the sheriff courts.
137 see comments of L J-C Thomson in Sullivan v. Gallagher & Craig and Ors. 1960 SLT 70 at 77.
138 Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948, s.l(l). See also Lindsay v. Charles Connell & Co.
1951 SC 281. The Act repealed the 1880 Act and the Workmen's Compensation Acts
139 and associated Regulations e.g. General Regulations for Coal Mines 1913 (S R &O 1913, no.
748) Lee v. National Coal Board 1955 SC 151.
356
and Workshop Act 1901140, the Factories Act 1937 amended by the Factories Act 1948
and 1959 before the Factories Act 1961. The Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act
1963 extended protection to other workplaces culminating in the Flealth and Safety at
Work etc. Act 1974.
These statutory provisions provided much work for the courts. To obtain damages,
the injured pursuer firstly had to bring himself within the terms of the statute or
statutory regulations, and the courts, in determining personal injuries cases, were
obliged to engage in statutory interpretation, e.g. laying down what type of
circumstances fell within a statutory wording. Thus under the Workmen's
Compensation Act 1897 if the pursuer was not injured in a 'factory', there could be
no compensation, as the injury had occurred in a place outwith the statutory
definition and thus the case was irrelevant.141
To the modern eye, many of the decisions turned on fine and narrow distinctions.
Technical objections to formulations of cases in pleadings were often entertained. So,
as noticed in Chapter 4, when damages were sought at common law and
alternatively under Employer's Liability Act 1880 and where there was no separation
of the facts under each alternative head and no differentiation in the pleas in law
between the two, it was considered that this amounted to lack of fair notice to
defenders and the pleadings were irrelevant.142
140 s.79 also permitted the Secretary of State to make Regulations in regard to dangerous
manual labour, e.g. The Building Regulations 1926 (S R & O 1926, No. 738). For an example
of a case based in these statutory regulations, see Riddell v. Reid 1941 SC 277.
141
e.g. Campbell v. M'Nee 1903 SLT 771.
142 M'Grath v. Glasgow Coal Company Limited 1909 2 SLT 92 (Second Division) per Lord Low at
p. 94. C.f. Campbell v. United Collieries Limited 1911 2 SLT 434. The Court continued to insist in
this, although it became a matter of proper pleading as opposed to a lack of relevancy. Keenan
v. The Corporation ofGlasgow 1923 SC 611.
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By the 1940s the House of Lords had become less disposed to permitting the
dismissal of actions for damages for personal injuries on mere technicalities. For
example, it held that a different standard of pleadings was required in Workmen's
Compensation cases and that it was, in general undesirable to dismiss such cases on
a plea to the relevancy.143 From there, the First Division held that only in two
exceptional circumstances should Workmen's Compensation cases be so disposed of,
firstly, where the issue was focussed in a point of law independent of any dispute in
fact and secondly where the claim was presented 'without a shred of averment to
supply the background or foundation for any claim under the Workmen's
Compensation Acts.'144
With the removal of common employment as a defence and of contributory
negligence as a complete defence, reparation actions for personal injury in the Court
of Session increased dramatically.145 Injured workmen were often sponsored by their
trade union,146 the actions were frequently resisted by insurance companies for
employers147 and such cases were very keenly contested. The defenders looked for
any pleading point, technical or otherwise, to defeat the pursuer's claim. Lord
Justice-Clerk Aitchison once told counsel that he thought that such cases were 'just a
game between the workman's union and the employer's insurance company, in
which the poor man's interests were never considered at all.'148 Where the litigant
was impecunious and without any funding, there were counsel who took actions
143 M'Mahon v. David Lawson Ltd. 1944 SC (HL) 1.
144 Garty v. Jute Industries Ltd. 1947 SLT 16.
145 J.C.K.M., (James Cyril King Miller) Fifty Years ofParliament House 1970 (Edinburgh, 1977) p.
15.
146 and later Legal Aid.
147 plus qa change!
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speculatively, their payment coming from the expenses following success.149 They
required to be adroit in their pleadings to avoid dismissals at debate in order to earn
some kind of living.150 In all events, technical sure footedness was required by
pursuers at debate.
A major objective for defenders in contesting a pursuer's claim for damages was not
just to dispose of the action on relevancy but to stop the case going to a jury.
Following the decrease in their popularity after the 1868 Act, civil juries came once
more into vogue at the turn of the century, averaging 21 trials per annum between
1900 and 1926;151 and this increased to 46 per annum in the following decade, despite
disparaging remarks in the 1927 Royal Commission Report. The prominence of the
civil jury even defied the general decrease in judicial business and depression of
trade of the 1930s. Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley remembered that when he was called
to the Bar in 1932, only rarely did reparation actions not go to jury trial,152 and in
1941, Lord President Normand, in a prepared lecture for an English audience,
explained that the practice of those times was that actions of damage for personal
injury were normally sent to jury trial unless of course special cause to the contrary
was shown.153 Jury trials were effectively suspended during the Second World War
but again became very popular154 in the 1950s and 1960s155 - considered by some to
148 quoted in Fifty Years ofParliament House, op. cit. p. 16.
149 Such practices were initially frowned upon but thereafter appreciated as serving those
who had nowhere else to turn for legal redress. See Fifty Years ofParliament House, op. cit. p. 2,
Rt. Hon. Lord Wheatley, One Man's Judgment. An Autobiography, (London, 1987) p. 64.
150 Fifty Years ofParliament House, op. cit. p. 2.
151 1900 - 1926. The figure reflects only those cases which 'ran'. Many civil jury trials were
compromised before trial, just as in the 1860s and 70s. What follows regarding the figures is
taken from A.M. Hajducki, Q.C., Civil Jury Trials (Edinburgh, 1998) p.10.
152 Rt. Hon. Lord Wheatley, One Man's Judgment, op. cit. p. 64.
153 LP Normand, Scottish Judicature and Legal Procedure, Presidential Address to the
Holdsworth Club (Holdsworth Club, University of Birmingham, 1940-41) at 37
154 Hon. Lord Brand, An Advocate's Tale, (1995) p. 46.
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be the golden age for the civil jury trial.156 Industrial accidents and road traffic
accidents157 seem to have been the most common type of case which proceeded to
jury trial. A dip into Lord Stott's recollections and reminiscences of the time in his
'Q.C.'s Diary' testifies to their prevalence in this period.158 The trials rarely lasted
more than two days159 and senior counsel could be involved in two reparation
actions in a week.160
The reason pursuers wanted to get to jury trial was that juries gave bigger awards of
damages than judges did at proof and would decide cases upon considerations of
sympathy rather than the evidence161 - or at least that was the perception. Juries were
viewed by many in a bad light.162 It will be recalled that the right to jury trial was
statutorily enshrined and it was only where there was 'special cause' to withhold the
case from the jury that the case would be decided at proof. Therefore, as now,
defenders sought to take the case to debate to prevent the risks of an inflated sum of
damages being awarded against them in a jury trial. To succeed in this, defenders
would attack the pursuer's pleadings in relevancy and specification at the debate.
155 see the figures for incidence of jury trial between 1955 and 1959 in the Strachan Committee
Report, Civil Jury Trial in Scotland. Report by a Committee Appointed by the Secretary of State For
Scotland (Chairman Hon. Lord Strachan) Cmnd. 851 (1959) at para. 26 and Appx. D.
156 Hajducki, Civil Jury, op. cit. ibid.
157 Lord President Cooper thought civil jury trial was an 'accessory of the internal combustion
engine' Selected Papers, op. cit. p. 194. See also ibid p. 63.
158 Rt. Hon. Lord Stott, Q.C.'s Diary 1954 - 1960 (Edinburgh, 1998). See also Lord Advocate's
Diary 1961 - 1966 (Aberdeen University Press, 1991), and his Judge's Diary 1967 - 1973
(Edinburgh, 1995).
159 Hajducki, Civil Jury, op. cit. ibid.
160 Lord President Hope, 'Judicial Business - A Review' (1991) JLSS (in 2 parts) pp. 219 and
266 at 219.
161 e.g. Wark, The Business of the Law Courts, op. cit. p. 154. Cf D. Walker, 'Civil Jury Trial'
(1959) 75 Scottish Law Review 181 at 182.
162 e.g. Wark, ibid. p. 154, viz., the general issue is 'in many cases an instrument of evil'
weighing the 'scales heavily against defenders.' Also Lord Kilbrandon considered civil juries
a 'bingo session' (Hamlyn Lectures quoted in Hon. Lord Brand, An Advocate's Tale op cit. p.
75). See also Lord President Cooper, 'Trial by Jury in Scotland: Is there a Case for Reform?' in
Selected Papers, op. cit. p. 58.
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'Pernickety' or merely technical pleading points were entertained and were often
successful. Some thought that this was because the Court was minded to protect
defenders from the vagaries of jury trial. In a case review, Professor Wilson
expressed this view.
'It can be argued that the continuing conflict of views in recent years between
the Inner House and the House of Lords on questions of relevancy, pleading
and corroboration is a result of the existence of the civil jury. The modern
Scottish view of these matters is based on a desire to give defenders some
protection against the jury. If all cases went to proof before a judge, we would
be content to have them decided on credibility and not on technicality.'163
So ciefenders required the pursuers to jump through all the procedural hoops to
ensure that their cases in their pleadings were tightly formulated, and relevant in
both senses if they were to get to jury trial and thereby the possibility of a larger sum
of damages than would have been awarded by a judge, whether or not the trial
actually proceeded.164 Lord Gill, in a lecture, has explained that
'Essentially problems first arose in the 50s and 60s with the growth of the
procedure industry in the Court of Session. Often matters were determined by
jury trial in personal injury actions. At this time the jury trial mattered.
Corroboration was required...There were strict rules regarding hearsay... At
that time you required a jury trial. To get one you would require to answer
calls in the defences, specify in answer to the defender's requirements, survive
163 W.A. Wilson, 'Cleisham and Corroboration' 1964 SLT (Notes) 57 at 59.
164 As in the previous period, the costs involved in a jury trial and the concerns of defenders
that juries would not necessarily decide on purely legal grounds meant that trials were
compromised at the last minute. The settlement would obviously be at a higher level than if
the parties had compromised before proof. The same applies today and it is thought that the
'judge award multiplicand' will attract a multiplier of 1.5 up to 3 for the purposes of settling a
jury trial.
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a Procedure Roll Debate, amend and only then would you get your jury
trial.'165
In another lecture Lord Gill pointed out that,
'Twenty-five years ago it was still possible for an advocate to make a good
living on the procedure roll taking pleading points to which the court was all
too willing to listen but which nowadays seem pettifogging and pedantic.'166
The Coulsfield Report noted,
'It is notorious that during that period highly technical objections were made,
and were accepted by the court, at least to the extent of holding that a case
was unsuitable for jury trial. It is not too strong to say that the system of
written pleadings was distorted during that period.'167
The 'distortion' of the system arose from the technical approach to the interpretation
of written pleadings. Just about any point, no matter how technical, could and would
be taken, not just at debate, but as objection in the course of proof leading to
interruptions in the leading of evidence, in highly technical submissions on the
import of the evidence thereafter or in motions for new trials on the basis that the
evidence did not accord with the pleadings. Judge Edward has recollected:
'Until the House of Lords insisted on a laxer approach, the rules of pleading
were strictly applied and much linguistic ingenuity was devoted for the
165 Hon. Lord Gill, 'The Standard ofWritten Pleadings': Lecture to a Seminar 'Written
Pleadings in the Sheriff Court' (LSA, 12 February 1996).
166 Hon. Lord Gill, 'The Case for a Civil Justice Review' (1995) 40 J.L.S.S. 129 at 132.
167 Report of the Working Party on Court ofSession Procedure (Chaired by Lord Coulsfield), Ch. 6 p.
4. See also infra Lord Cullen's reference to the 'overcritical attitude to pleadings which was
part of the culture of the courts some 40 years ago' in Lord Cullen, Review ofBusiness of the
Outer House of the Court ofSession (1996) op. cit. p. 15.
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pursuer, to guarding against the uncertainties of precognition168 and, for the
defender, to taking nice pleas to the relevancy, objections to evidence and
motions to withdraw.'169
Against this background, there were numerous cases which were taken to London,
appealed on points of procedure and pleading. Such cases gave the House of Lords
the opportunity of reviewing the law on grounds of broad principle which, as
indicated in the above quotation, resulted in a relaxation of the rules relating to
written pleading; and this relaxation 'was brought about through what amounted to
judicial legislation by the House of Lords during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s.'170
These appeals were on pleading points and relevancy and, whatever the English
judges understood of the doctrine of relevancy and the rules of written pleading as
applied in Scotland, the net effect of the decisions in the period was to temper the
strict approach to the interpretation of pleadings in the Scottish courts.
(ix) The House of Lords and the Development of Pleading Practices in
the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.
For the reasons above examined, litigation in the 1950s and 1960s was a keenly
contested affair. Examining cases reported in the Session Cases for the period
demonstrates the points which would be taken, the types of arguments advanced to
the Court and how the decisions of the Court of Session and the House of Lords
shaped pleading practice thereafter.
168 Gordon Stott, whilst still at the Bar was particularly skilled in the art of deceptively simple
pleading, being responsible e.g. for the formula 'The pursuer lost his footing' to cover all
possible variants of 'tripped' slipped' or 'stumbled'.
169 D. Edward, 'Scottish Legal Education and the Legal Profession in H.L. MacQueen, (ed.),
Scots Law into the 21st Century. Essays in Honour ofW.A. Wilson (Edinburgh, 1996) 50 at 53-4
170 DAO Edward, Different Assumptions - Different Methods, SSC Biennial Lecture, op. cit., p.
9.
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Although the status of the Open Record and the averments therein had been clarified
for some time,171 often parties would insert averments founding on any adjustments
made by an opponent which removed averments from the Open Record. Lord
Guthrie noted in 1955 that 'for many years one has frequently seen in written
pleadings references by one party to statements made by the other in his summons
or defences which have been deleted or altered at adjustment.'172 It was thought that
these averments were necessary for setting up in cross-examination a line of
questioning directed to why the averments had been removed at adjustment. Lennox
held that such averments were irrelevant.173
A pursuer's pleadings would be taken to debate on relevancy in the strict sense and
on relevancy as specification. As Lord Gill recalled, in this period there was a
'procedure industry'174 i.e. most cases were taken to debate on procedure roll, the
industry being the ingenuity of counsel. The test for relevancy had been definitively
stated by the House of Lords in Jamieson v. Jamieson,175 that any action would not be
dismissed as irrelevant unless it had to necessarily fail even if all the pursuer's
averments were proved.
171 Clydesdale Bank Ltd. v. D. & H. Cohen 1943 SC 244 per LJ-C Cooper at 246.
172 Lennox v. National Coal Board 1955 SC 438 at 439. Lord Brand thought that Lord Guthrie had
'a pharisaic veneration for the Rules of Court.' Hon. Lord Brand, An Advocate's Tale (1995) at
p. 28.
173 although it was still possible to cross-examine a witness on the changes. See also Carter v.
Allison 1966 SC 257.
174 Hon. Lord Gill, 'The Standard ofWritten Pleadings': Lecture to a Seminar 'Written
Pleadings in the Sheriff Court' (LSA, 12 February 1996).
175 1952 SC (HL) 44.
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At this time, a party's written pleadings in their formulation really did matter. The
pursuer's case required to be corroborated evidentially and desperate measures were
sometimes employed in the search for corroboration.176
The decade before had seen the development of the law of negligence and the
requirement for reasonable foreseeability. A defender would not be liable unless
what happened to the pursuer was reasonably foreseeable177 which subsequently
was considered a 'sort of jury question' forjudges.178
By the mid fifties, the Court of Session placed a considerable stress on a party
formulating his case in a particular way and as a matter of fair notice did not permit
him to depart from it, if he wished to succeed.179 Sometimes this approach developed
the law. The Court developed the test for professional negligence at this time.180
Actions of reparation founding on the developing statutory regulations noticed
above, required to be properly pled181 and defenders would take relevancy points if
there was any deviation182 or if there was any doubt as to whether the regulation
applied to the facts of the individual case. As already noticed, what might be now
176 see. Lee v. National Coal Board 1955 SC 151 where the pursuers at the motion for new trial
unsuccessfully argued that they could found on the averments of the defenders as
corroboration. The Court considered that averments had no factual significance until they
were proved although an admission on record would be equivalent to proof.
177 See e.g. Boitrhill v. Young 1942 SC (HL) 78, Mnir v. Glasgow Corporation 1943 (SC) 3, Malcolm
v. Dickson 1951 SC 542.
178 Harvey v. Singer Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 1960 SLT 178.
179
e.g. McGrath v. British Transport Commission (Unreported, 4 May 1954, House of Lords),
Jackson v. Glasgow Corporation 1956 SC 354 per Lord. Russell at 362, Esso Petroleum v. Southport
Corporation [1956] 2 WLR 81 per Lord Normand at 87, Quinn v. Cameron & Roberton 1956 SC
224 per Lord Russell at 240.
180 Hunter v. Hanley 1955 SC 200. For the pursuer's counsel's account of this case see Stott,
Q.C.'s Diary pp. 19-20.
181 Gaitens v. The Blythswood Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. 1948 SLT (Notes) 49.
182 Durnin & Ors. v. William Coutts & Son 1955 SLT (Notes) 9.
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termed technical objections or 'nice pleas to relevancy' were entertained by the
Court.183 In 1958, the House of Lords attempted to dictate practice regarding
relevancy and personal injury actions. In Miller v. SSEB'184 it was held that in claims
for damages for alleged negligence, it was only in 'rare and exceptional
circumstances' that an action could be disposed of on relevancy.185 Nevertheless
defenders continued to take pleading points in reparation actions in the hope of
dismissal although it was argued for pursuers (albeit unsuccessfully) in Blnikie & Ors.
v. British Transport Commission186 that this decision meant that it was no longer open
to the Court to dismiss such actions as irrelevant and all such cases had to proceed to
proof before answer.
In any event, the Court of Session continued to insist on the 'proper' formulation of
cases as a matter of relevancy and fair notice, dismissing actions at debate and
sustaining appeals after proof or granting new trials where respectively the case was
not properly laid or the evidence did not meet the averments on record. Moreover it
was well established that averments of duty had to be formulated generally and then
particularised,187 the scope of inquiry being restricted to the specific breaches of
duties of which notice had been given, and evidence directed to other ways in which
the general duty had been breached was excluded.188 The only exception to this was
183 e.g. Sugar v. The National Coal Board 1955 SC 424, Angus v. The National Coal Board 1955 SC
175.
184 1958 SC (HL) 20.
185 Lord Keith of Avonholme at 33. See also Viscount Simonds at 32.
1861961 SLT 189.
187 no particularisation would be fatal. Baxter v. Colvilles Ltd. 1959 SLT 325.
188 Hook v. Brown & Ors. 1963 SLT (Notes) 52, Morrison's Associated Companies Ltd. v. James
Rome and Sons Ltd. 1964 SC 160 per Lord President at 182. This was so in both contractual and
delictual cases. Morrison's was a breach of contract case. The Coulsfield Report describes this
as a 'heresy' of the time. (Ch. 6 p.6). The Report also notes that there was another heresy
apparent in the cases which was that 'if the pursuer made an averment of a certain point, he
then required to prove it, whether or not the averment was necessary to his case as a matter
of law.' ibid. This was not true generally but it might be assumed that the Report was making
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if a pursuer could table on record a case of prima facie fault (with sufficient notice)
and then, if he failed in proving certain breaches or failures in precaution the prima
facie case of fault might not be displaced and he would still succeed.189
Particularly in proof, a party could not deviate from his case on record as, again as a
matter of fair notice, it would be unjust for a defender to be found liable on a ground
which he could not refute, having prepared to meet the case on record.190 This was
strictly applied.191
In reparation actions against an employer, prior to the decision of the House of Lords
in Broxvn v. Rolls Royce Ltd.192 it had been pleading practice, following what was
known colloquially as the 'Dunedin Formula', to make averments that an employer
was at fault because it had not done something which was commonly done by other
such employers in like circumstances.193 In Broxim, it was held that in an action
founded on negligence, it was for a pursuer to show that the defenders had been
negligent and that that negligence had caused the injury. In this, if it was averred
that the employer had not followed a common practice followed by other like
employers this might yield an inference of negligence but that the court had to
consider the issue against all the circumstances of the case. Before the decision in
reference to the case law on 'reasonable practicability' which developed through cases such as
Hall v. Fairfield Shipbuilding Co. 1964 SC (HL) 72, Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan & Sons Ltd. 1967
SC (HL) 79, Jenkins v. Allied Ironfounders Ltd 1970 SLT 46 (HL) and Gibson v. BICC1973 SC
(HL) 15. See infra.
189 Gunn v. M'Adam & Son 1949 SC 31.
190 Morrison's Associated Companies op. cit. per Lord Guthrie at 190.
191 see Thomson v. Glasgow Corporation 1962 SLT 105.
1921960 SC (HL) 22. See Black, Introduction, op. cit., p. 29
193 Lord Dunedin had considered in Morton v. Dixon 1909 SC 807 that in order to prove fault
on the part of the employer it was necessary to show (a) that the thing which was not done
was commonly done by other persons in like circumstances, or (b) that it was something
which was so obviously wanted that it would be folly in anyone to fail to provide it.
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Brown it had been thought (and in some cases held194) that once the pursuer had
proved that the defenders had not followed common practice, the onus shifted to the
defenders such that they would not escape liability unless they proved as a
reasonable certainty that even if they adopted the common practice it would have
had no effect. Brown, following Cavanagh v. Ulster Weaving Co.195 and Paris v. Stepney
Borough Council196 held that Lord Dunedin's dictum in Morton v. Dixon had merely
expressed a proposition of good sense and not a principle of law.197
By the mid sixties, the House of Lords had ameliorated the stringency of the rules
that a deviation between record and evidence might be fatal by holding that a
pursuer could succeed, if, following the approach of LJ-C Thomson in Burns v.
Dixon's Iron Works,198 the case established in evidence was a variation, modification
or development of the case on record.199 Cleisham was concerned with whether the
pursuer's evidence during a jury trial supported her own case on record and whether
there was corroboration for her version of events. The English judges considered that
the case established in evidence was a variation of the case on record;200 the Scottish
judges both concluded that the evidence did not support her only case on record201
with Lord Guest arguing that a record could not be extended to cover a case not
falling fairly within the terms of the pleading, 'if the sanctity of pleading was to be
194 see Brown v. Redpath Brown 1963 SLT 219 (decided 1952) purportedly following Morton v.
Dixon 1909 SC 807. See also McLaughlan v. Craig 1948 SC 599.
195 [1959] 3 WLR per Lord Keith at 274.
196 [1951] AC per Lord Normand at 382.
197 see further discussion of the case in 'The Dunedin Formula - An Obituary?' (1960) 76
Scottish Law Review 57.
198 1961 SC 102 per LJ-C Thomson at 107.
199 See Cleisham v. British Transport Commission 1964 SC (HL) 8 and O'Hanlon v. John G. Stein &
Co. 1965 SC (HL) 23.
200 Lord Morris of Borth-y-Guest at 13 ff, Lord Hodson at 20 ff, and Lord Devlin at 24 ff.
201 Lord Reid at 13 and Lord Guest at 23. For analysis of the decision see W.A. Wilson,
'Cleisham and Corroboration' op. cit.
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preserved in any real sense.202 Nevertheless the English judges were persuaded that
the pursuer's case was so covered and that there was corroboration.
Even so, in the Divisions and the Outer House, pleadings continued to be strictly
construed, both at debate or in proof or jury trial. The rules for pleading were
elaborate, technical and to some extent artificial. One commentator remarked:
'it is becoming increasingly obvious that sooner or later the Scottish
rules of pleading will have to be reconsidered. It is impossible to read
such decisions as Cleisham and Thomson v. Glasgow Corporation, without
reflecting that the rigour of the record may sometimes result in
injustice. Strict rules of pleading may have worked well in more
leisurely days but under modern conditions they perhaps make too
little allowance for the frailties of litigants and their advisers.'203
In 1966, the House of Lords in two cases made further inroads into the conventional
rigour of the record by holding that a failure to object to evidence substantiating a
case not on record would permit the court to consider the evidence in assessing
liability. The point was first developed in M'Glone v. British Railways Board204 and
then confirmed in Albacora SRL v. Westcott & Laurence Line Limited.205 In another case
the same year, Lord Reid, in view of the 'increasing frequency of attacks on the form
202 Cleisham, op. cit., per Lord Guest at 23.
203 Wilson, 'Cleisham and Corroboration' op cit. at 59.
204 1966 SC (HL) 1 per Lord Reid at 12 and per Lord Guest at 14-5.
205 1966 SC (HL) 19 per Lord Reid at 23 and per Lord Guest at 26. Note Lord Pearce followed
the Scots judges but based his judgment on the fact that, in his view, 'neither party had been
prejudiced by the misconceived allegations of the other party.' (at 26). See also O'Donnell v.
Murdoch M'Kenzie & Co. 1966 SC 58; 1967 SC (HL) 63 in which evidence for a pursuer which
materially differed from his record was 'reluctantly' treated by the Second Division as
competent evidence in the case in the absence of timeous objection: per LJ-C Grant at 1966 SC
60 (Macphail, Evidence, (Edinburgh, 1987) para 8.40) Note however, that the defenders did not
call any evidence and the House of Lords considered, following Ross v. Associated Portland
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of pursuers' pleadings in Scottish appeals' drew attention to the fact that the Scottish
system of pleading, 'admirable' as it was, required 'care and skill to be exercised in
framing the condescendence.'206
Further decisions of the House of Lords in the sixties brought the issue of strict
interpretation of pleadings in Scots Law to the fore and put in sharp relief the
artificiality or at least the complexities which sometimes arose from such an
approach. Throughout the period, the law was in a state of flux as to which party
bore the onus of proof in relation to statutory duties, qualifications therein and
failures thereof, which affected pleading practice in such cases. The issue was
important as many of the statutory regulations made provision for a defence of
'reasonable practicability' and if as a matter of relevancy a pursuer required to aver
this, then he was also required to prove it, the onus of doing so remaining upon him.
This of course was consistent with the general onus on a party to prove his case and
for a defender to put him to his proof. In Wardlaw v. Bonnington Castings Ltd.207 the
Court considered that in a case based upon breach of statutory duty, the onus was on
the pursuer to prove the breach of the duty averred and that the breach caused the
injury. Hall v. Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd.208 went to the House of
Lords on the same point, the Lords deciding that if a pursuer made averments of
reasonable practicability and then failed to establish them in evidence then he was
precluded from presenting a case on a broader front.209 Lord Reid (in a dissenting
Cement Manufacturers [1964] 1 WLR 768, that the most favourable inferences could therefore
be drawn from the pursuer's evidence.
206 Wyngrove's Executrix v. Scottish Omnibuses 1966 SC (HL) 47 per Lord Reid at 80.
2071956 SLT 135.
208 1964 SC (HL) 72 per Lord Reid at 79-80.
209 per Lord Guest at 84.
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speech210) noted that the pursuer could refrain from making averments directed
towards reasonable practicability on the basis that it was for the defender to aver and
prove reasonable practicability as a defence. In Hall, he did not do so and the point in
law as to whether it was a defence or an inherent part of the statutory offence was
not decided.211 The pursuer having made averments of reasonable practicability was
held to have accepted the onus of proving them. As he could not discharge the onus,
he failed. In Donno v. British Railways Board212 it was held that it was for the pursuer
to aver and establish reasonable practicability213 whilst a year later, in Duncan v.
Smith & Phillips214 it was held that it was for the defender to do so. Nimmo v.
Alexander Cowan & Sons215 settled the issue. The case concerned s. 29(1) of the
Factories Act 1961 which required that every place at which any person had at any
time to work 'shall, so far as reasonably practicable, be made and kept safe for any
person working there.' The pursuer averred that the place of his work was not made
and kept safe but did not go onto aver216 that it was reasonably practicable for the
defenders to do so. The defenders appealed to the House of Lords on the point that
the case was irrelevant in the absence of this latter averment. Lord Reid accepted that
there was much doubt where the onus rested in cases where a statutory duty was
qualified217 and in a dissenting judgment considered that the onus lay with the
210 Lord Reid later explained his rationale in Gibson v. BICC 1973 SC (HL) 21 that the ordinary
rule was that the burden of proof rested upon a pursuer and that (pre Nimmo) the pursuer
had thus accepted the onus in making averments of reasonable practicability. If he was
contesting the onus, he should have taken the case to debate on relevancy on the basis that
the defenders had not made positive averments that it was not reasonably practicable to have
made the work place safer. (Conversely, this is what the defenders did to the pursuers in
Nimmo to force a decision on relevancy in the absence of averments of reasonable
practicability on the pursuer's record.)
211 Lord Reid at 80.
2121964 SLT (Notes) 108.
213 see also Fern v. Dundee Corporation 1964 SLT 294.
214 1965 SLT (Notes) 16.
215 1967 SC (HL) 79.
216 deliberately, as it was presented as a test case.
217 ibid, at p. 96.
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pursuer. But by a majority, the Lords held that the onus rested with the defender.218
For a period thereafter, there remained a tension between Hall (decided on the facts)
and Nimmo (decided as a matter of relevancy) as to the consequences of a pursuer
making averments of reasonable practicability.219 Jenkins was appealed to the House
of Lords.220 The Lords did not find any inconsistency between Hall and Nimmo but
affirmed that if a pursuer made averments about reasonable practicability then he
had to prove them. If there were no averments then the pursuer could not lead
evidence to demonstrate how the work place could have been made safe as a matter
of reasonable practicability but would be entitled to cross-examine the defender to
demonstrate measures which would have been reasonably practicable. These cases
all led up to the decision of the House of Lords in Gibson v. BICC221 examined in the
Introduction to this thesis in which there is found Lord Diplock's scathing
assessment of Scottish pleading practice of the time. In Gibson, the House of Lords
confirmed the decision in Nimmo that the onus of proving reasonable practicability
rested on the defender. Lord Reid, who had dissented in Nimmo, considered in
Gibson that the defender was bound to prove a negative, i.e. that it was not
reasonably practicable to make the place safer and he only required general
averments and proof in general terms in doing so. It was then open to the pursuer's
counsel in cross-examination to put to defender's witnesses whether particular
methods not adopted were in fact reasonably practicable. A concession would assist
the pursuer, as the defender would have failed to discharge the onus on him
following Nimmo. But without averments on record as to reasonable practicability the
218 Lord Guest deciding that the onus lay on the defender as did Lords Upjohn and Pearson,
Lord Wilberforce following Lord Reid.
219 See Jenkins v. Allied Ironfounders Limited 1969 SC 139 where, by a majority, the First Division
followed Hall.
220 1970 SC (HL) 37.
221 1973 SC (HL) 15.
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pursuer would be prevented from leading positive evidence.222 Thus, as Lord Reid
appreciated, a pursuer's counsel faced difficulties in conducting such litigations
because: if the pursuer wished to allege that there was a method which his employer
should have employed and that that method was reasonably practicable, then to
succeed on that basis, he required averment and proof. Doing so, however, might
endanger the whole of the pursuer's case, as he periled the case on proving the
method, following Hall. Sometimes therefore, it was better as a precaution against
that eventuality, to refrain from making averments about reasonably practicable
methods, and simply leave it to the defenders to discharge the onus upon them,
following Nimmo. This would permit the pursuer's counsel to try to elicit a
concession from the defender's witnesses that there were other reasonably
practicable methods which were not employed, which concessions would be
founded upon by the pursuer.223 The question for the court in Gibson was whether
the pursuer's averments directed to reasonable practicability, which were denied on
record by the defenders but in any event were not proved by the pursuer in
evidence, discharged the defender's general onus imposed following Nimmo. Lord
Reid revisited his dissenting opinions in Hall and Nimmo and came to the view that if
the pursuer averred methods of reasonable practicability he was still to prove them
by positive evidence and could not prove any other methods beyond those averred;
but even if he did not or could not prove them, this did not absolve the defender
from the general onus imposed after Nimmo, requiring proof that there was no other
reasonably practicable method.224 Lord Kilbrandon accepted that the 'Scottish
requirement of detailed pre-trial notice of the foundations of the parties' respective
222
per Lord Reid at 20.
223 even though the pursuer by that stage could not lead positive evidence of the other
reasonably practicable methods.
224
per Lord Reid at 22.
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cases' had been 'criticised in the past and is not without its detractors in the present.'
Considering that the Lord President's analysis of the law was inadequate in the
lower court225 he opined that the defenders in this case were coming to proof not
only under the burden of meeting the pursuer's case on record but also under the
obligation of proving at the trial that it was not reasonably practicable to make and
keep safe the place of work.226 In agreement with Lord Reid, he expressed this view:
'In such a case, the pursuer must specify that neglect as part of his grounds
of fault if he wishes to lead evidence about it. But if no such specific ground
is alleged, or if, being alleged, it fails of being proved, that does not affect the
onus incumbent on the defenders of proving that it was impracticable to
make a dangerous place of work reasonably safe, nor is the pursuer's
counsel inhibited from challenging the evidence given by a defender's
witness by asking him about the practicability of any method which that
witness may expressly, or impliedly by ignoring it, have repudiated.'227
The development of these cases on reasonable practicability raised matters of
pleading. The courts had to reconcile four principles inherent in the Scottish system
of pleading with the statutory qualification: namely that the onus of proof was
normally on the pursuer; that in making averments of fault, a pursuer was required
to make general averments of duty and then to particularise duties arising
therefrom;228 that this was required as a matter of fair notice to a defender; and to
succeed a pursuer required to prove the particular duties and could not set up a case
225 as he had not even referred to Nimmo in his judgment.
226 per Lord Kilbrandon at 34-5.
227
per Lord Kilbrandon at 36.
228 see supra.
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for which there was no averment on record229 as a defender needed only to prepare
to meet the case on record. 230 The end result was, to put it mildly, a complicated set
of rules for averment and proof where a pursuer founded upon a statutory provision
which contained wording such as 'insofar as reasonably practicable'. Against this
background, one can perhaps understand Lord Diplock's comments on a system of
pleading which could require or enable counsel for the pursuer to cross-examine a
defender's witness, without any notice, as to methods of reasonably making a work
place safer in the hope of gaining an admission in his favour which failing the
pursuer was debarreci from leading any positive evidence in rebuttal, as
'capricious'231 and a 'game of skill and chance.'232
Before moving on to examine the legacy of this era in modern pleading practice, one
final aspect of pleadings of this time should be noticed. As might be imagined, when
pursuers' pleadings were subjected to attacks in relevancy and when the courts
construed the pleadings strictly, applications to amend as a result were frequent.
Parties also sought to do so when proof or jury trial was imminent. At the time,233
amendment was governed by Rule 117(1) (d) of the Rules of Court 1948 which
provided that it was 'competent for the Court at any time before final judgment to
allow any amendment of pleadings which may be necessary for determining the real
question in controversy between the parties.' It seems that up until the early sixties it
229 Morrison's Associated Companies. Ltd. v. James Rome & Sons Ltd. 1946 SC 160 per L. Guthrie at
190. See also Cleisham v. The British Transport Commission 1964 SC (HL) 8 per L. Reid at 13 and
per L. Guest at 22.
230 Lord Reid in McGrath v. NCB (4 May 1954, unreported) applied in Hamilton v. John Brown &
Co. (Clydebank) Ltd. 1969 SLT (N) 18 and Carroll v. Scott's Shipbuilding Co. 1969 SLT 46,
Morrison's Associated Companies v. Rome 1964 SC 160 at 182; Mcintosh v. Walker Steam Trawl
Fishing Co. 1971 SLT (N) 75.
231 per Lord Diplock at p. 28.
232 per Lord Diplock at p. 30.
233 i.e. pre 1965 (when the Rules of Court were changed).
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was relatively easy to obtain an amendment at a late stage in a case.234 Thereafter
however, the Inner House became more severe on late amendments. In Thomson v.
Glasgow Corporation,235 LJ-C Thomson considered that amendment was, in theory, 'a
belated adjustment for which the laggard has to pay.' He appreciated that it was well
known that parties would amend following relevancy debates236 but considered that
amendments put forward at a late stage were generally undesirable, noting that
'the number of minutes of amendment which are now tendered at
various stages is far too great. The habit has been gradually increasing
over the last few years. It is a bad habit and one which reflects no credit
on those responsible for the initial preparation of the case or for the state
of the pleadings. The present Rules of Court as to amendment were
intended to get rid of rigidity and formality. They were not intended as a
cloak for laziness, ignorance and incompetence.'237
In Dryhurgh v. National Coal Board,238 Lord President Clyde remarked that if delays in
the legal machinery were to be eliminated, 'last-minute amendments on the eve of
inquiry by proof or jury trial must, except in highly special circumstances, in my
view, be refused.'239 Less than a year later he remarked in Strachan v. Caledonian Fish-
selling and Marine Stores Co.240 that:
234 See Anon., 'The Pleader', (1958) 74 Scottish Law Review 217 and Anon., 'Notes from
Edinburgh' (1962) 78 Scottish Law Review 48.
235 1961 SLT 237.
236 ibid at 247.
237 ibid at 248. For commentary on the case, see 'Amendment of Pleadings' (1961) 77 Scottish
Law Review 21. For the private thoughts of the pursuer's counsel who moved the
amendment before the court in this case, see G. Stott, Lord Advocate's Diary 1961 - 1966
(Aberdeen UP, 1991) p. 5. For a similar sentiment in modern times, see C. Glasser, 'Civil
Procedure and the Lawyers - The Adversary System and the Decline of the Orality Principle'
(1993) 56 M.L.R. 307.
238 1962 SC 485.
239 per LP Clyde at 491.
240 1963 SC 158.
376
'there have been recently far too many instances of this practice of attempting
to bring forward late amendments which, with proper preparation, could
have been made much earlier and would have avoided a postponement of the
trial or proof beyond the date fixed for it...If a case is so inadequately
prepared that only a very short time before the trial or the proof some new
matter is brought up which reasonable diligence could have revealed before,
the party concerned may well have to suffer the consequences of his own
failure.'241
Perhaps reasons for the frequency of late amendments are not too difficult to guess,
and one might posit that frequently the counsel involved in these cases, whilst proof
or jury trial was imminent, realised late in the day that there were flaws in the
pleading of the case, which flaws, of course, could be fatal.
(x) Drafting and Standards of Written Pleadings.
Throughout the period examined in the previous chapters, it is clear that,
systematically, rules were created by the Court regulating its procedure and
providing standards for practitioners to follow. These were frequently not followed
in practice, sometimes because lawyers were not aware of the terms of the
regulations, at other times because the lawyers perceived the regulations or rules to
be disadvantageous to their clients and persuaded the Court not to require them to
be followed. Again, the lawyer could persuade the court to twist the application or
interpretation of the rule, this then became a precedent in itself and, in time, the
accepted interpretation of that rule. In the literature, it is a frequent theme that the
procedures of the court or the actings of the parties were sources of delay and
241 per LP Clyde at 160-1.
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expense and that parties were not pleading properly. One might recall the remarks of
Charles Hope at and following the implementation of the 1825 Act, the attempts of
the Lords Ordinary in 1829 to 'purify and simplify records', the Court's draft act of
sederunt in 1847, leading up to the 1850 Act with the abolition of written cases before
the Ordinary, Lord Advocate Rutherfurd Clerk's attempts to regulate written
pleading along English lines in 1863; and the terms of the 1868 Act whereby the
finality of the closed record was finally softened by the allowance of amendment. In
this evolutionary process, up to the end of the nineteenth century, the rules
regarding pleadings became clearer as cases were decided and it appears that the
standard of written pleading improved.242 Even so, from then onwards, the Court
frequently bemoaned the fact that the standard was falling and that, although the
system was a good one, more could be obtained from its operation if the rules of
pleading were followed more closely. Consider Lord President Clyde's comments in
1906:
'It is possible to doubt whether we are getting as full value out of our
written pleadings as we formerly did, or as we might still do ... our
pleadings are becoming less and less well written... And the increasing
unwillingness of the Court to throw a case out on the pleadings alone
encourages a laxity which threatens to forfeit the most valuable of the
advantages which the system of written pleadings ought to secure to
us...Slipshod draughtsmanship is the outward sign of a degeneracy in our
written pleadings which goes deeper than external form.'243
242 Even from the brief examination of the Session Papers contained in Appendix 2.
243 James Avon (later Lord President) Clyde, 'Practice and Procedure in the Court of Session',
(1906-7) 18 JR 319 at 326.
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Increasingly however, it is the system of written pleadings itself which has been
subject to attack. The Royal Commission of 1927, under Clyde's Chairmanship
reported that the practice of adjustment of the Open Record before closing was a
'fruitful source of delay' and that delay was the 'one serious defect in the Scottish
system of written pleadings.'244 Recently there have been more trenchant criticisms
which have raised prominently issues of cost, delay, access to justice, the proper role
of the parties and the judge and the role of traditional written pleadings in a modern
civil justice system. The last decade produced some vigorous debate245 and although
there was heat there was very little light.
Certainly, it is only now that it has been appreciated that the approach to written
pleading as exemplified in the reported cases of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s has had a
detrimental effect on the modern practice of drafting pleadings. The approach
emphasised the need for proper formulation of parties' cases on record, which failing
parties could and would lose actions on pleading points. The reaction to this has seen
pleadings become engorged with unnecessary detail in order that parties are
protected (as they suppose) from attacks by an opponent based on fair notice and
244 Report of the Roynl Commission on the Court ofSession and the Office ofSheriff Principal with
Summary of Evidence (2vols) 1927 Cmd. 2801, Vol. 1 p. 78. However the Commission
considered that the merits of the Scottish plan did 'not lack appreciation in other countries'
ibid. p. 74.
245 See for example: H. Neilson, 'Sheriff Court Options Hearings' (1993) 38 J.L.S.S. 425, N.M.P
Morrison, 'The Rules of the Court of Session' (1994) 39 J.L.S.S. 315, N.M.P. Morrison,
'Scotland's New Commercial Court' (1994) 39 J.L.S.S. 354, The Hon. Lord Morton of Shuna,
'Procedural Reform of the Court of Session', (1995) 1 Civil Practice Bulletin 2, M. Upton, 'The
Cullen Review' (1996) 41 JLSS 111, R. Mays, 'Case Management in the Scottish Civil Courts.
Whose Case is it Anyway?' (1997) 1 S.L.P.Q. 65, N. Morrison, 'The Cullen Report' 1996 SLT
(News) 93, R. Wadia, 'Judicial Case Management in Scotland. Indecision and Indigestion.'
1997 SLT (News) 255, R. Clancy, A. Murray and R. Wadia, 'The New Commercial Cause
Rules' (2parts) 1997 SLT (News) 45; 1997 SLT (News) 53, B.G.M. Main and A. Park, 'Pre-trial
Settlement: Who's for Two-way Offers?' (1999) SLPQ 30, A. Murray 'Court of Session
Procedure: Past, Present and Future' 1997 SLT (News) 259, R. Mays, 'Frying Pan, Fire or
Melting Pot? - Reforming Scottish Civil Justice in the 1990s', (1997) 2 J.R. 91, N.M.P.
Morrison, 'Reform of Civil Procedure' 1998 SLT (News) 137.
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specification. Lord Cullen observed in his Review of Business of the Outer House of
the Court of Session,246
'The overloading of pleadings with unnecessary detail is not a new
development but has, in my view, become more obvious as pleaders have
reacted to the over-critical attitude to pleadings which was part of the culture
of the courts some 40 years ago. I am in no doubt that in general pleaders aver
too much and overstep the boundary between what is required to give fair
notice of their case and what is more a matter of evidence.'247
The writer respectfully agrees with this proposition. In my relatively short
experience of written pleadings as a solicitor, research scholar and now advocate,248 it
has frequently occurred to me that much more detail is inserted into pleadings than is
strictly necessary. So, in a basic breach of contract case where there is a disputed
written contract, one often sees averments of how the parties originally met, how
their relationship developed, and what each was thinking and doing up to the point
that they entered the contract. Strictly, all of this is unnecessary and would in any
event be classed as pleading evidence. Even when 'extraneous' averments are
necessary for setting up a case based on implied terms of contract, or upon a previous
course of dealing, often there are no averments or inspecific averments until the third
article of condescendence where there may be found a bald averment that there was
an implied term of the contract upon which the pursuer founds but the basis for the
term being implied is not immediately apparent. Similar considerations apply in
reparation actions for damages for personal injuries and in the construction of cases
of fault at common law.
246 (1995).
247 ibid, para 3.24.
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There is a gulf of difference between fair notice and full notice. It is a recognised tactic
of defenders to require full averments on every facet of the pursuer's case thus
pushing the pursuer into periling his case on very narrow points.
Certainly, in drafting, one is on the watch for inspecific averments and the possibility
of being taken to debate but I suspect that this is not the whole answer for when
written pleadings fall short of the mark. In the previous chapter, we noted the sage
advice on drafting pleadings that before doing so, one masters all the facts and then
conducts a thorough investigation of the law applying to the case and then analyses
the substance of the case. I doubt whether in practice this commonly happens.249
Experienced practitioners may already know the law, but less experienced
practitioners may rush to style books or previous pleadings, slavishly converting the
style rather than analysing the law and facts first and then modifying the style as
applicable. It is not suggested that practitioners are sloppy or slip-shod in their
methods250 but simply that the preparation of written pleadings in the modern legal
world where time is short, money even shorter and pressures for delivery are
constant, the resources available to the practitioner to sit and analyse the facts and
law of the case before drafting are circumscribed. There is always a more pressing
matter at hand. The Hughes Commission noted in 1980 that 'there is a human
248 Incidentally the author does not suggest that his own drafts of written pleadings are
always the epitome of clarity and good practice!
249 The main point in law can be overlooked, even in those cases which reach the House of
Lords. Lord Keith of Kinkel in GUS Property Management Ltd v. Littleiuoods Mail Order Stores
Ltd. 1982 SC (HL) 157 observed in the circumstances of that case that 'there is no doubt that
the pursuers' pleadings are not drawn with that degree of accuracy which counsel might
normally hope to achieve. The draftsman does not appear to have had in the forefront of his
mind a sound grasp of the true legal position, namely that the pursuers are suing not for their
own loss, but for that suffered by [their predecessors in title.' (at p. 178).
250 Some have so suggested. See A. Murray, 'Court of Session Procedure: Past, Present and
Future' 1997 SLT (News) 259 at 262.
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tendency for even the most responsible professionals, if they are busy men, to put off
work which can wait/251 Perhaps drafting pleadings lends itself to an attitude that
there will be procedures available at a later stage in the course of the litigation to 'sort
things out'.
The manner of drafting pleadings may not lend itself to best practice. Professor Black
considered that 'stream of consciousness' pleading was due, in part, to the use of
dictating machines.252 One hundred years ago, the future Lord Dundas complained
that '[t]he growing use of both short hand dictation and of typewriting is making its
mark on written pleading of to-day, and not for the good.'253 In 1957, the future Lord
Stott was obviously so amazed that 'five juniors now dictate their summonses and
other writings to (sic) [tape recorders]' that he recorded the fact in his diary.254 In
present practice, at least at the Bar, the tendency is to draft pleadings on lap-tops
using word processing packages and then to email the agent the draft.255 This in itself
may give rise to a tendency to 'cut and paste' from previous drafts of pleadings.
At its best and with resources of time and money, the system of written pleading
does perform all of the functions ascribed to it at the start of Chapter 4. Lord Gill
expressed this view that,
'The Scottish system is logical and intellectually disciplined. In theory, it
enshrines a regard for the basic structures of legal philosophy: a rigid
distinction between fact and law; the consideration of relevancy before
251 Royal Commission on Legal Services in Scotland, (Chairman, Rt. Hon. Lord Hughes) Cmnd.
7846 (2 vols.) (1980) See also A. Deutsch, 'Two Gripes from the Sheriff Court', (1996) 10 CPB 8
'The natural human tendency is leave everything to the last minute.'
252 R. Black, Introduction, op. cit. p. 17.
253 Dundas, Observations on the Art of Advocacy', op. cit., pp. 332-3.
254 G. (Hon. Lord) Stott, 'Q.C.'s Diary 1954 - I960' (Edinburgh, 1998) at p. 143.
255 See Chapter 4 supra.
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inquiry into fact - a concept central to the practice of the canonists from
medieval times until today; and the epitomisation of a party's legal
propositions in the form of concise pleas-in-law relating fact to law and
relating the law to the remedy sought. In an ideal world in which time and
cost are irrelevant it is an intellectually satisfying way in which to conduct
civil litigation.'256
But it cannot be said that drafting pleadings is easy or a skill that is easily acquired.
The rules relating to written pleading are fairly complex. It takes years of training
and experience before a solicitor or advocate can be said to be truly proficient in
drafting written pleadings.257 Thus it has been said that drafting written pleadings is
an 'art/258 as well as a 'science/259 or a 'skill/260 or a 'craft'261 to be learned. However
defined, the mastery of written pleading is fundamentally necessary for practice in
the courts. Without a knowledge of the rules, once cannot negotiate the procedural
obstacles and ultimately successfully pursue or defend a claim. But knowledge may
not be enough. It is often said that a full understanding of the rules of written
pleading will not be acquired until one has had one's own attempts scrutinised at
debate or until one comes to make legal submissions at the end of a proof or proof
before answer relying on the pleadings. The Faculty of Advocates has long required
256 Lord Gill, 'The Case For a Civil Justice Review' op. cit. p. 132. See also Lord Cullen, Review,
op. cit., para. 3.21 and the Coulsfield Report '[T]he composition of satisfactory written
pleadings, and the criticism of them, are, in some ways, a challenging and a satisfying
intellectual exercise. Coulsfield Report, Ch. 6 op. cit., para. 4.
257 C. Hennessy, Civil Procedure and Practice, Preface, v.
258 D. Dundas, 'Observations on the Art of Advocacy' (1903) 15 J.R. 329, D. (Lord) Blades, 'The
Art of Pleading' (1948) 64 SLR (No. 758) 25 and (No. 759) 53, R. McEwan, Pleading in Court,
(2nd ed.) (Edinburgh, 1995) p. 1, D. Walker, The Scottish Legal System (6th ed) (Edinburgh, 1992)
222, J. MacKenzie, Written Pleadings, op. cit. p. 1.
259 B. Kearney, An Introduction to Ordinary Civil Procedure in the SheriffCourt, (Edinburgh,
1982), p. 32.
260 A.G. Walker, 'Pleaders and Pleading in The Sheriff Court' (1951) 67 Scottish Law Review
33 at 42, E. Bowen, 'Written Pleadings in the Sheriff Court' (1999) 4 SLPQ 245.
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'devil advocates' to undergo a period of 'devilling' or training, under the close
supervision of an experienced junior counsel.262 As part of that training, for
approximately seven months, devils daily are required to draft pleadings using the
materials sent to their 'devil master' which attempts are then corrected by their devil
master (often extensively).263 Thus the devil acquires training in the skill or craft of
drafting written pleadings. He or she will build up a bank of knowledge and
experience and often a collection of styles for future use. On calling, the new
advocate will enter into practice and will be expected to be fairly proficient in
drafting written pleadings. Even then, in cases which require a formulation in
pleading which is unusual or unorthodox, he or she will have recourse to the
collective pool of knowledge of others at the Bar,264 styles from the Session Papers as
well as advice from their devil master. Solicitors are not so favoured in their training.
Whilst they are better equipped to learn the skills of drafting than previously265 and
all solicitors have instruction in pleading whilst at University,266 they do not have the
same period of intensive instruction available to the devil advocate. If they choose to
261 P. Brodie, 'Basic Guiding Principles', Written Pleadings Course, Law Society of
Scotland/Update) (1993) p. 3
262 Long ago it was considered the 'idle year' during which the prospective advocate 'purged'
himself of outside business interests and prepared for entry to the profession (see e.g. Lord
Macmillan, A Man ofLaw's Tale, (London, 1952) p.26) but from 1968 onwards the Faculty re¬
organised the Regulations for devilling. DAO Edward, 'Faculty of Advocates: Regulations as
to Intrants' 1968 SLT (News) 181, D. Edward, 'Scottish Legal Education and the Legal
Profession' in H.L. MacQueen, (ed.), Scots Law into the 22s' Century. Essays in Ho7iour ofW.A.
Wilson (Edinburgh, 1996) 50 at 56.
263 As Professor Black has wryly noted: 'Torn apart (and frequently torn up)'. Introduction, op.
cit. p. 2. The writer's efforts as a devil were frequently torn apart and invariably interlineated,
delineated and marked in the margins with copious devil master remarks. These marks did
decrease towards the end of devilling.
264 informally of course. It is one of the greatest strengths of the Scottish Bar that its collegiate
nature permits advocates to converse with one another on points of difficulty or upon
problems in cases in which they are engaged.
265 See E. Bowen, 'Written Pleadings in the Sheriff Court' op. cit. p. 246.
266 in the Diploma in Legal Practice.
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practise court work, they will then progressively acquire increasing experience in the
skills of drafting written pleading in the same way as a newly called advocate.267
As the Coulsfield Report noted,
'Counsel have learnt, and indeed have devoted a considerable amount of
time and energy to learning, the skill of writing written pleadings in their
present form and the skill of analysing and picking holes in such written
pleadings. Further, the composition of satisfactory written pleadings, and
the criticism of them, are, in some ways, a challenging and a satisfying
intellectual exercise.'268
If the training period for advocates is longer than that enjoyed by solicitors, does this
affect the standard of written pleading in the Court of Session and the sheriff court?
Again from my limited experience I would say that the standard of written pleading
in the Court of Session is higher. My experience apart, it has been remarked that in
the sheriff court, the standard is lower than that in the Court of Session269 and
historically pleading in the sheriff court has been trenchantly criticised.270
Is the standard of written pleading declining? From the literature, it seems that the
standard has been declining ever since the Court of Session Act 1825. But for long the
author has suspected that the answer to the question depends upon who is asked.
267 Although perhaps less so. This is not a criticism. The junior advocate's daily work is the
drafting of pleadings. It is a key component of the occupation. The solicitor may not be
required to draft pleadings every day.
268 Coulsfield Report, op. cit., Ch. 6, p. 4.
269 J. MacKenzie, Written Pleadings op. cit. p. 109, R. Black, Introduction, op. cit. p. 1. Scottish
Law Commission, Multi-Party actions: Report by Working Party Set Up BY Scottish Law
Commission (1993) para. 3.43. LP Clyde considered sheriff court pleadings as 'often rough and
defective.' R. Wyness Millar, 'Civil Pleading in Scotland' op. cit fn 184 at pp. 719-20.
270 See comments in Boyle v. Glasgow Corporation 1949 SLT 274, McGrath v. Glasgow Coal Co.
Ltd. 1909 2 SLT 92.
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At a formative research stage, I set up a study designed to elicit the views of
solicitors and sheriffs as to written pleadings in the sheriff court. The methodology
and results can be found at Appendix 3(b) and 4(b). In particular, I wished to test
what the profession and the judiciary thought about the standard of written pleading
in the sheriff court and whether it had declined following changes to the sheriff court
rules. The results were interesting. In the Sheriff Study,271 31%272 of sheriffs thought
the standard of written pleading in the sheriff court was poor, 54% thought it fair
and only 6% thought that the standard was good. As to whether they thought that
the standard of written pleading had fallen in the previous ten years, the response
was equally divided. 50% of sheriffs thought that it had and 50% considered that it
had not. In the Solicitor Study, 5% of solicitors thought that the standard of written
pleading in the sheriff court was good, 78% thought it moderate and 15% thought it
poor. When asked whether the standard had fallen in the previous ten years, 25%
thought that it had and 73% thought that it had not. When asked whether the current
system of written pleadings should remain part of civil litigation, 63% thought that it
should and 37% thought that it should not.
The research was carried out in 1997-8 and from the results it might be suggested
that the impression of both sheriffs and solicitors on standards of written pleading in
the sheriff court at that time was that they were 'not good'. Whether the standard
had dropped seemed to be matter of personal opinion, although the division in the
Sheriff Study was marked. In any event, whatever the standard of written pleading,
271 Reference will hereafter be made to the 'Sheriff Study' corresponding to Appendix 2 and
the 'Solicitor Study' corresponding to Appendix 3.
272 The responses in the Sheriff Study varied from question to question and for ease of
analysis I have converted the figures into percentage terms.
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in both the sheriff courts and the Court of Session, one might ask the more pertinent
and fundamental question of whether the system should continue in modern civil
procedure.
(xi) Some Thoughts on Written Pleading.
If it takes considerable time and energy to master the Scottish system of written
pleading, the question must arise: why? Is the system overly complicated? Is it the
case that written pleadings really act as a trap for the unwitting or unwary.273 Is it
right that cases can be won and lost on pleading points or that a decision after proof
rests on what was or was not covered by the party's pleadings? Is the expenditure of
time in the composition of the closed record really worth the effort?
Before returning to these broad issues, let me start with some general observations
which have occurred to me during my research of the development of written
pleadings.274 In researching the topic, I have realised that there are themes which
emerge from an examination of the historical development of written pleading.
Many of these themes run through what has been already analysed in the previous
chapters. I consider that it is important that the historical development is understood
before contemplating reforms to modern civil procedure. To this extent, I would
associate myself generally with Stein when he notes that
'[Ojnly one who has a sure grasp of the historical origins of a rule of law, and
of the connection of that rule with a particular set of social or economic
273 C. Hennessy, Civil Procedure and Practice, (Edinburgh, 2000) para. 3.03.
274 There are twelve. I will follow these with four specific observations.
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conditions, can see that the time has come to abandon it when the challenged
circumstances no longer require it.'275
(xii) Themes in the Historical Development ofWritten Pleadings and Civil
Procedure.
Firstly, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Scottish civil procedure, whilst always
adversarial in the sense of pitting a pursuer against a defender, would historically
not have recognised the judge as an impartial observer in the preparation of
pleadings. Ffis function necessarily required participation in defining the matters in
dispute between the parties. The plea of specification as a species of relevancy was a
relatively late development, as initially pleadings were for the judge's information,
not for informing the other side of the basis of one's case. The canonical ficta confessio
was utilised in attempts to force the parties to meet each other in law and fact,
implying admissions in the absence of formal denials and thus producing clear
issues for judicial determination. The idea of the judge as legal umpire arose from
voluntary non-participation by the judges in rules of court which gave them such
powers, practitioners' expressions of opinion that the judge should have no role in
this preparation which then shaped practice, the effect of jury practice and ultimately
the implicit adoption of English ideas on the proper function of the judiciary. As the
rules for written pleading developed, issues in dispute were focussed without the
need for judicial assistance.
Secondly, and following this, it seems to me that those who champion the detailed
rules and conventions of full written pleading in Scots civil procedure do so from the
275 Peter Stein, 'Law and Society in Scottish Legal Thought' in (eds. N.T. Phillipson and Rosalind
Mitchison) Scotland in the Age of Improvement (EUP, 1996) p. 148 at p. 158.
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standpoint that these rules are inherently 'Scottish', have much to commend them
and should be altered only with a light hand. They perhaps believe that traditional
written pleadings are part of the tradition of Scots Law. As posited in the
Introduction, those who express such views point to historical laudatory reviews of
the Scottish system and take umbrage at less admiring reviews. The sentiment is that
if pleadings must be reformed, we should not go a-whoring after the 'strange gods'
examples of other common law jurisdictions but should find a national cure for any
internal maladies. Whilst I would agree that cures should be 'internally valid',
objections to reforms in pleading which proceed upon the basis that it is no part of
the judge actively to assist parties in the preparation of their positions in these
pleadings is not only historically inaccurate, but simply mimics the nineteenth
century contentions of the Faculty of Advocates, which subverted the idea of judicial
participation in the first place. The rules of written pleading which developed
proceeded upon notions of party and judicial function which were inherently
English. Where the defenders of the Scottish system of written pleadings argue that
any changes must incorporate retention of the doctrine of relevancy, I accept that
they are on surer historical ground.
Thirdly, it seems to me that changes to the earlier form of process and more modern
civil procedure have always been incremental in nature and have redeployed ideas
from before, sometimes unconsciously. Even the changes implemented by the Court
of Session Act of 1825 and 1850, considered by some the/o?ts et origo of the Scottish
system of written pleadings, incorporated ideas from the past and were in other
parts simply a reaction to ongoing practical problems in civil causes. Modern
complaints about tinkering reforms to civil procedure fail to appreciate the historical
tradition that all reforms to civil procedure have been incremental. Perhaps with the
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exception of the failed attempts to incorporate English pleading methods in 1863,
Scots Law has never thrown away the principles and doctrines of her civil procedure
and started again from scratch. I do not consider that this would be possible without
supplanting it with a foreign system, as was contemplated in 1863.
Fourthly, in making changes, the Court has always struggled to devise a system
which is sufficiently rigid to ensure that parties are compelled to state their positions
in fact and law for final determination within a relatively short time frame but also
allows within the system a degree of elasticity or latitude for parties to alter their
positions in light of each other's pleadings and further information which becomes
available in the course of the litigation.
Fifthly, and following this, parties to litigation have always reacted against being
forced or compelled to state their final positions at a very early stage of a litigation.
The previous thinking that a cause required to 'ripen' is just as apposite today as it
was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Sixthly, the success of any changes which have been made have depended to a large
degree on the willingness of practitioners to follow such changes thereafter as well as
the attitude of the court in imposing sanctions for non-obedience. Unpopular
procedural changes have in the past been thwarted, frustrated or by-passed by
practitioners, often with the tacit (and sometimes the express) consent of judges.
Where changes have been followed by sanctions for non-compliance in conjunction
with strong expressions of disapprobation from the bench, the older practices have
often re-emerged later or have corrupted the intentions of the changes. In light of this
phenomenon, frequently the Court has had to consider a tension in its proper role in
delivering justice to litigants and the chastisement and education of litigants and
practitioners should they thwart, frustrate or generally fail to follow rules of court.
Examples include the successive acts of sederunt of the eighteenth century as well as
Charles Hope's attempts to coerce parties to follow the reforms instituted by the 1825
Act which attempts, in the event were only partially successful and a decade on,
practitioners had reverted to older practices, albeit as adaptations of the rule
changes.
Seventhly, it occurs to me that since at least the seventeenth century, defenders have
attempted to put as many obstacles in the way of a pursuer and his decree as
possible. Perhaps by virtue of the fact that it has always been the pursuer who raises
the action, defenders have always sought delay. Moreover, historically, delay and
resultant expense have been more hurtful to a pursuer than a defender. It might be
said that this is just an example of exploiting the adversary nature of civil litigation.
For certain, practitioners have always used procedural devices to gain advantages
over their opponents and, as a corollary, advantages have often been obtained over
an opponent through his failure to follow the court's procedure. In addition, general
denials and general pleas to the relevancy have been used by defenders as tactics to
delay final determination of litigation. It should be remembered that those who
litigate want to win and failure has always come at a price. Tactics have always been
important.
Eighthly, defenders have traditionally been entitled to put a pursuer to his proof.
Thus, as a minimum, they have only ever required to meet the case pled against
them. As the rules developed and jury trial and proof became the established modes
of proof, this was extrapolated to restrict the extent of any evidence which the
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pursuer sought to lead in that he was not permitted to prove what he had not
averred. This was part of the development of the concept of fair notice mentioned
above. As part of this, before a cause got to proof, defenders, with 'superfluous
ingenuity',276 made detailed textual criticisms of, and the courts favoured strict
interpretations of, pursuers' pleadings at debate on pleas to the relevancy.
Ninthly, the advice to practitioners in drafting summonses, defences,
condescendences and answers has been consistent from the beginning of the
nineteenth century up to the modern writings examined in the previous chapter.
Although the Court has repeatedly required, and the practice books have repeatedly
advocated, the pleading of 'essential' or 'material facts', separated from law, not as
evidence nor even rhetoric, there is perhaps a natural temptation to plead evidence
in factual articles of condescendence, as well as 'law' outwith the plea-in-law. When
parties have done this by design, such an approach may have been exacerbated by
misconceptions about the degree of specification which is actually required in
written pleadings.
Tenthly, from the establishment of civil jury trial and thereafter proof before the
Ordinary, parties have prepared pleadings and their evidence with these diets in
mind. The phenomenon of settling causes just prior to, or at, such diets seems to have
developed because, by that stage, the parties and their advisers had assembled their
cases ready for final determination, had marshalled their facts and evidence,
prepared legal submissions and thus were in command of all facets of their case,
knowing the strengths and the weaknesses. So prepared, they were in a position to
negotiate a settlement.
276 as was said in 1863. See chapter 3 supra.
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Eleventh, as noted already, the House of Lords has affected pleading practices in
Scotland throughout the centuries. At the start of the nineteenth century, it was the
large number of appeals from the Court of Session which was partly the catalyst for
the introduction of jury trial and the introduction of the reforms in the 1825 Act. The
Lords in Scottish appeals thereafter do not seem to have appreciated the nuances of
the new Scottish written pleading. As seen in Chapter 3, some of their decisions are
not easily understood. As discussed earlier in this chapter, more modern
pronouncements of the House of Lords in respect of Scottish methods of pleading
suggest a similar lack of appreciation. The decisions of the House in the 1960s to the
early 1970s did have effects on pleading practices in Scotland, although it may be
maintained that the overall effect was beneficial.
Finally, the practice of written pleading has always been susceptible to 'trends'.
Thus, in the past, parties have pled evidence when they thought that Ordinaries were
deciding cases on probability. At one time parties truncated their pleas-in-law. From
the Session Papers, it is clear that the vocabulary of pleading altered to the point
where the averments in parts were highly formulaic. The development of taking
specification points as relevancy also betrays a trend incorporated from jury court
practice. Lastly, in taking pleas to relevancy and specification, there have been trends
in going to debate on the pleas and not doing so, 'keeping the powder dry' and not
alerting opponents to flaws which might be cured if warning was given.277
277 See S. Woolman, 'Pleadings' in H.L. MacQueen (ed.) Scots Law into the 21st Century. Essays
in Honour ofW.A. Wilson (Edinburgh, 1996) 277 at 281.
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The above points are general points which have occurred to me in my research of the
development of written pleadings. There are also four specific points relating to
pleading practice which I would like to highlight.
(xiv) Four Problem Points of Practice?
I have always found it difficult to understand why a system which was designed to
focus matters in dispute permitted a general plea to the relevancy. The plea
developed (in slightly different language278) in the nineteenth century and has
continued to be part of civil procedure. But I have often considered that it is
irrelevant and lacking in specification in itself. At best it was only ever a safety net
for a defender who might not have noticed particular relevancy points in the
pursuer's pleadings. It was inserted, as Maclaren observed, oh majorem cautelain.279
Professor Black considered it 'one of the most serious defects in the Scottish system
of pleading.'280 Other eminent writers on procedure have agreed.281 Retaining the
concept of relevancy but proscribing the general plea, would, I have always thought,
compel parties to focus on relevancy at a much earlier stage in the life of a case.
There is evidence in the literature that defenders previously sheltered behind general
pleas with no intention of debating the plea.282 Moreover, a specific plea to relevancy
would fulfil the requirements of fair notice which are often said to be a central
characteristic of the system. Recently the introduction of Notes of Argument in the
278 i.e. that there were 'insufficient averments to support the conclusions of the summons'.
What this meant was that the averments had to be 'sufficiently positive and clear' and the
conclusions 'regularly and legally deduced.' See Gillespie v. Russel (1857) 18 D. 897 at 913.
279 (for greater security). Maclaren Practice op. cit., p. 313.
280 Black, Introduction, op. cit., p. 28.
281 See I.D. Macphail, 'Summary Adjudication in Civil Proceedings in Scotland' in (ed.) I.R.
Scott, International Perspectives on Civil Justice. Essays in Honour ofSir Jack I.H. Jacob Q.C.
(London, 1990), Macphail, Practice, (1st ed.) op. cit., paras. 13-21,13-22, Woolman, 'Pleadings'
in H.L. MacQueen (ed.) Scots Law into the 21st Century. Essays in Honour ofW.A. Wilson
(Edinburgh, 1996) 277 at 282.
282 See Chapter 3, and in this chapter infra.
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Court of Session and the Options Hearing and Rule 22.1 Notes in the sheriff court
have required that parties intimate the basis upon which they intend to found on
their relevancy plea, but this focus occurs after the pleadings are drafted, not during
the drafting.
I have also considered whether the incorporation of documents brevitntis causa is just
a stylistic formality which has proven more obstructive than helpful. Obviously fair
notice has traditionally required that an opponent knows the parts of the document
which are being founded on, but if the document is lodged and those parts are
referred to in the pleadings, maybe that should be sufficient. Historically,
'incorporation brevitatis causa' was used in the specialised circumstances where there
was more than one defender convened by the pursuer, and the subsidiary defenders
adopted the averments in the defences of the principal defender. From a brief
examination of the Session Papers as well as the decided cases of the nineteenth
century, it is apparent that the phrase was not used in the context of documents and
the pleadings. In fact, I have found only one case in the period where the phrase was
used in the sense of incorporation.283 The pursuer concluded for payment and had
averred that the 'defender is justly addebted and owing to the pursuer the sum of
£27.17.6 as per account herewith produced and herein referred to and held to be
repeated brevitatis causa.' The question for the court was whether these averments
were sufficient to support the conclusions of the summons. The court considered that
they were on the basis that the account had been produced and could be considered
part of the summons. Ordinarily, documents were averred to be 'produced and
referred to', and later with the addition 'for their terms.' The obligation was to
produce the documents founded upon, not to ensure that they were incorporated
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into the pleadings. In modern practice, as discussed in Chapter 4, the decision of
Eadie Cairns v. Programmed Maintenance Painting Ltd,284 caused confusion for
practitioners as to what documentary evidence could be referred to in the course of
debate, although in reality there was little to be confused about, and the case turned
on its own facts. Two recent cases, one decided in the Outer House285 and the other
decided by the Sheriff Principal of Glasgow and Strathkelvin286 reflect, it is
submitted, the true position in law, but is the stylistic phrase really required? I do not
think so.
My third specific point relates to candour and the ability of defenders to deny simply
the averments of the pursuer and put him to his proof . In Chapter 4, the issue of
skeletal defences and the case of Gray v. Boyd287 was discussed. I concluded that the
decision was unsatisfactory although technically correct. The procedure for summary
decree has alleviated the problem to some extent and the decision of the Second
Division in the very recent case of Urqnhart v. Sweeney & Ors.288 must be taken to
advance the law further. However, it is still possible for a defender to aver that
something in the pursuer's pleadings is 'not known and not admitted' when in
reality they could, with little or no effort acquire that knowledge and make the
appropriate admission.289 Further, and as an integral part of the adversarial system,
parties can, and are expected to, keep all of their evidential cards face down until the
date of proof.
283 Newberry & Sons v. Abbey (1827) 6 Shaw 7.
284 1987 SLT 777.
285Royal Bank ofScotland v. Holmes 1999 SLT 563.
286 Steelmek Marine and General Engineers' Trustee v. Shetland Sea Farms Ltd. (sub. nom Reid v.
Shetland Sea Farms Ltd.) 1999 SLT 30 per Sh. Pr. Bowen.
2871996 SLT 60.
288 (unreported) 18 March 2004 (2nd Div.).
289 See also Lord Gill, 'The Case for a Civil Justice Review' op. cit. p. 132.
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Finally, I have often questioned whether the system of written pleadings in Scots
civil procedure, with all of its rules and the myriad byzantine exceptions to those
rules, is not capable of root and branch simplification. In the course of my research,
various schemes for implementing a system of shortened or 'abbreviated' pleadings
have been proposed and in some cases290 implemented. Initially, I thought that any
system of abbreviated pleading would necessarily require more pro-active judicial
participation in the preparation of cases for determination than was traditional in an
'adversary system'. From there, I wondered whether this discretionary participation
would lead to inconsistency and a lack of coherence in judicial approach to the
management of preparing causes, which would cause unpredictability in forecasting
likely attitudes of the court and lead to the administration of justice on an nd hoc
basis.291
I still hold the view that abbreviated pleadings generally do require greater judicial
input. Whether this proceeds under the label 'case management' or some other
description does not matter. There would be nothing novel in such an approach.
Supervision of the preparation of pleadings, not just in form, but also to a degree in
content, was historically part of the role of the courts. I now believe that some parts
of procedure can operate in abbreviated form without this greater input but that
where this is so it is derived from the nature of the actions brought under it. I
consider that any changes to civil procedure and the system of written pleadings
290 To date, these changes have affected particular types of actions in the Court of Session.
291 This was part of the focus for the author's article 'Access to Justice : Lessons from the
Sheriff Court?' in the Hume Papers on Public Policy publication, examining the operation of
the Ordinary Cause Rules 1993 as amended in the Sheriff Court. The article is reproduced in
Appendix 6. The same considerations informed some of the questions posed to participants in
397
would require to incorporate some elements of the existing system and possess a
degree of institutional 'fit' if they are to be successful.292 Success, I believe, is
dependent upon a willing implementation by the profession and the attitude of the
courts in ensuring compliance. However, I believe that it would always remain open
to reformers to create an abbreviated system but to retain traditional pleadings for
cases of complexity or difficulty.
I would now argue that discretion does not equate with inconsistency,293 provided
there are guidelines or principles or policy considerations which police the exercise
of that discretion.294 Finally, I remain uncertain how the rules of traditional written
pleadings which require fair notice of a case to be proved to be pleaded with
sufficient specification and that proof beyond that is prohibited would be applied to
abbreviated pleadings where such specification is not necessarily required and the
same degree of notice is not given. In other words, if the record does not dictate the
extent of proof, then there must be real dangers that the inquiry into fact could
become a 'raking or fishing inquiry' and therefore longer, not shorter, proofs and
jury trials would result.
(xv) Conclusion.
The above are some of my thoughts on written pleadings as they were practised in
the twentieth century. In the following chapter some of these issues are developed
my empirical Sheriff Court study. See Appendices 3 & 4. Cf also comments in Coulsfield
Report op. cit. Ch 3, p. 1.
292 What, the Coulsfield Working party, in the context of their remit, called 'a local solution to
a local problem'. Report, op. cit. Ch 1, p.2.
293 although 25/66 sheriffs in my sheriff court study thought that it did. See Appx. 4(b). In my
solicitor study, 66% thought that increased judicial discretion leads to decreased consistency
in judicial approach. See Appx. 3(b).
294 Coulsfield Report, op. cit. Ch. 3, p. 1.
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further in contemplating the future for written pleadings. Practice in the Scottish
courts increasingly is moving away from the concept of strict adversarialism, with its
attendant ideas of judicial passivity, full written pleadings and their strict
interpretation. Novel parts of procedure in the Court of Session and the sheriff court
run counter to such traditional views. Whilst all litigation in Scotland is still
adversarial (in the widest sense) the roles of the judge, practitioner and litigant under
these procedures are all being re-defined. Whether traditional written pleadings will
survive is a moot point.
Further, as is characteristic of the historical development of civil procedure in
Scotland, and as was characteristic of the development of written pleadings from the
start, doctrinal changes proceed slowly and incrementally, shaped by practitioner
attitudes to them and judicial approach to their implementation. The thesis
concludes by examining recent changes to component parts of civil procedure which
may indicate an uncertain future for traditional written pleadings. If these changes
represent the start of a doctrinal slide away from conventional adversarialism
towards a different system of pleading and procedure with a re-defined role for
pleading in writing, the end result may produce a modern system which is,
ironically, not only in sympathy with older 'forms of process' but which is not
dissimilar to how the system of written pleadings was actually intended to operate at
a formative stage. The recent changes are now examined.
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Chapter Six
The Future for Written Pleadings?
A Conclusion.
(i) Introduction
In recent years commentators, judges and academics have started to address such
questions as: should written pleadings continue in the Scottish civil procedural
system?; are they unnecessarily complicated?; do they perhaps obstruct rather than
assist the resolution of civil disputes? This re-assessment of the role of written
pleadings has occurred against the background of a debate on the civil justice system
as a whole. There have been incremental reforms to parts of the system setting up
specialised procedures which do not require and actively discourage the use of the
full panoply of written pleadings as per the traditional system. Such specialised
procedures are still the exceptions to proceeding in the courts, but as their operation
proves increasingly successful, one queries whether they should be exceptions rather
than the rule?
(ii) The Need for Reviewing the System of Written Pleadings: The
Rationale.
The rationale behind calls for a review of modern civil procedure and the system of
written pleadings is relatively simple. Presently, litigation is not expeditious and is
inefficient, and therefore the costs involved in litigating are unnecessarily high.
Approximately 95 per cent of actions settle but most of them do so only a short time
before a diet of proof or jury trial or at the 'door of the court' itself. Thus there is
wasted time, effort, money and judicial resources in settling cases at a late stage
which could have been settled earlier. The system of written pleadings leaves the
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parties to determine the content of their pleadings and allows them to decide the
evidence to be adduced. The court's role is in making interlocutory pronouncements
en route to parties finalising their respective positions and thereafter determining the
case on the evidence led as restricted by these pleadings. When written pleadings are
operated well, disputed issues are focussed expeditiously and therefore cheaply, well
before this final determination. So focussed, parties should be able to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of their cases and if necessary compromise their claims in
early course, weighing risk and cost in the usual way. But as the system is based in
adversarialism, it is open to abuse or can be manipulated to avoid this important
focussing function. Pleadings can hinder rather than assist focus and expedition,
cases drag out, the adjustment period is ill-used, the pleadings are frequently
'tinkered with' under the hand of different counsel and become bulky and
unreadable,1 the matters in dispute remain unfocussed, and parties' true positions
frequently become apparent only in the course of amendment at a late stage
(incurring extra and unnecessary expense).2 When the Record is closed, many
consider this the end of the beginning and not the beginning of the end.3 Thus, if a
system of abbreviated pleading can be devised which performs the focussing
function in early course, and which is not so apt to be manipulated, then the 95 per
cent of cases which settle late can settle earlier with savings to all in time and money.
Judicial time is saved as the court will know which actions are to proceed on any
1 S. Woolman, 'Pleadings' op. cit. p. 280.
2 In the more extreme cases of delay, in my experience, the pleadings per se have not been the
cause. I have been personally involved in two actions where the litigation carried on for
years. In the first, a trust case, it had gone on so long that fixing a procedural hearing was
problematic as many on the present Bench had had previous involvement with the case. In
the other, a damages for personal injury case (fatal), the accident had occurred in 1986,
proceedings were initiated in 1996 (limitation period interrupted by reason of pursuers' non¬
age) and the record is still not closed. In both cases, no delay arose for pleadings reasons. In
both however, the capacity of the system to tolerate delay was and is an issue.
3 Lord Gill, 'Case for Civil Justice Review', op. cit., p. 129.
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particular day. Parties save money as they cio not have to pay for lengthy pleadings
documents and such documents are restricted in number. Moreover, as the
abbreviated pleadings are fairly simple, there is less scope for technical complexity
and the costs of preparation are less.
(iii) Recent Criticisms of Scottish Civil Procedure and Traditional Written
Pleadings.
The impetus for review of civil procedure and the reform of written pleadings has
continued throughout the last decade to the present time. Prior to that, periodically
there were comments by judges and Royal Commissions and committees and other
consultative bodies on the efficacy of the procedure. As early as 1906 the first Lord
Clyde4 questioned whether all litigation in the Court of Session 'required the luxury
of professional assistance of the highest class.'5 In 1953, Lord President Cooper
wondered why the courts offered a 'hand-made Rolls Royce' service when it might
have been better to offer a 'mass-produced utility article', and he questioned whether
the public actually wanted a procedure which at its best was a magnificent article, on
which infinite care was lavished but which inevitably consumed in its production a
great deal of time and of money.'6 He bemoaned the fact that time was lost in the
'laborious adjustment and amendment of written pleadings' and suggested that the
time was ripe
'for a revision of the whole system of procedure by giving the Court
effective powers to take control of the litigation once it has been brought into
4 whilst still at the Bar.
5 J.A. Clyde, 'Practice and Procedure in the Court of Session', (1906/7) 18 JR 319 at 331.
6 LP Cooper of Culross, 'Defects in the British Judicial Machine' in Selected Papers, op. cit. 244
at 257.
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court, and by greatly simplifying the preparatory stages, even at the risk of
occasional prejudice to one or other of the parties.'7
We have already examined the remarks on the adjustment of pleadings made in the
1927 Royal Commission Report under the chairmanship of the first Lord President
Clyde.8 In 1967 the Grant Committee observed that court procedures were 'notably
slow, and apparently tortuous.' It thought that in some instances greater speed could
be shown'9 but appreciated that 'progress of litigation was in the hands of the
parties.'10 It noted, however, that adjustment was the most important single cause of
delay in disposing of civil proceedings11 and that solicitors sometimes tolerated
dilatory tactics on the part of their opponent.12 It found that four-fifths of pleas to the
relevancy had no substance and were intended only to delay matters.13 It
recommended 'the institution of a timetable indicating with reference to the date of
the service of the initial writ, the various procedural steps that the parties are
required to take and the time for taking them.'14 The recommendation was not
implemented. In 1979 the Kincraig Committee considered that adjustments and
amendments were highly contributory to delays in personal injury litigation.15 In
1980, the Hughes Commission on Legal Services suggested that a solution to the evils
of cost and delay in procedure and the 'well known but intractable problem of late
settlements' might lie in 'the court taking a more active role in controlling the
7 ibid. p. 254.
8 Report of the Royal Commission on the Court of Session and the Office ofSheriffPrincipal with
Summary ofEvidence (2vols) 1927 Cmd. 2801, Vol. 1 p. 78.
9 Rt. Hon Lord Grant, The SheriffCourt. Report by the Committee Appointed by the Secretary of
State for Scotland (Chairman: Rt. Hon. Lord Grant) 1967 Cmnd 3248, para. 60.
10 ibid, paras. 19 to 22.
11 ibid. para. 584.
12 ibid. para. 586.
13 ibid. para. 593.
14 ibid, para 577.
15 The Hon. Lord Kincraig, Consultative Document on the Report on Procedure in the Court of
Session in Personal Injury Litigation (Chairman: Hon. Lord Kincraig) (1979).
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conduct of a case than has been traditional in our brand of adversary procedure.'16 It
questioned whether the procedures in the system for ensuring that each party had
fair notice of the other's case were 'unnecessarily sophisticated and whether again,
perhaps by greater intervention on the part of the court, the required result could be
achieved with less delay and formality.'17 In 1986 the Maxwell Report found that
only 60% of judicial time was expended in hearing cases18 primarily as a result of late
settlements.19 In 1993, Lord Rodger, (as Lord Advocate) commented in an academic
article that,
'[tjhere must be room for further consideration of our system of written
pleadings. They can, of course, serve a most useful purpose in certain cases.
But they absorb an enormous amount of the time of counsel and solicitors
and it is not always clear that so much effort and resulting expense are
justified."20
(iv) Changes to Civil Procedure in the 1980s and 1990s.
Following these Reports and comments, changes were made to parts of procedure in
the 1980s and 1990s which reflected the start of a 'sea change' in procedural thinking.
In 1984 the rules for summary decree were introduced as it was perceived that the
normal rules for pleading did not prevent a defender simply putting a pursuer to his
16 Royal Commission on Legal Services in Scotland (Chairman: Rt. Hon Lord Hughes) 1980
Cmnd. 7846 (2 vols.) para. 14.7.
17 ibid, para 14.8. Quoted by Lord Cullen, Review ofBusiness, op. cit., para. 3.29.
18 Hon. Lord Maxwell, Report of the Review Body on the Use ofJudicial Time in Superior Courts
(1986) para. 2.28.
19 ibid. para. 6.46.
20 Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, 'A Civil Justice System in Motion' in IT. L. McQueen, (ed.) The
Costs ofJustice. Proceedings ofa Conference Sponsored by The Faculty ofAdvocates 3rd November
1993 (DHI, Occasional Paper No. 43,1993) 13-14.
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proof on minimal defences which necessitated the pursuer having to wait to go to
debate.21
The Optional Procedure for reparation actions followed in 1985. This was designed
to expedite simple actions,22 it being envisaged that an optional procedure case
would last six to nine months from signeting to proof. The procedure was said to be
ideally suited to cases arising out of road traffic accidents, and those arising from
industrial accidents where the facts were in small compass and the medical evidence
straightforward.23 Written pleading requirements were less stringent than in
ordinary Court of Session actions24 although still required a sufficiency of
specification as fair notice.25 Although initially popular26 there followed a number of
decisions which introduced more conventional aspects of ordinary pleading
practice,27 and practitioners came to dislike the relatively rigid structure of the
procedure. They considered the judicial application of the rules to be inconsistent
and were often uncertain as to the degree of specification required for optional
procedure pleadings.28 The general nature of averments under the procedure also
gave rise to difficulties in dealing with objections at proof.29 Its popularity waned,
and at the end,30 was little used.31
21 (S.I. 1984, No. 499) They were based upon the model of the English procedure for summary
judgement (then) (RSC Ord. 14). See Green's Annotated RCS op. cit., Annotation 21.2.1.
22 (SI 1985, No. 227) following Report of the Kincraig Committee 1979.
23 Giles v. Fleming Bros. Structural Engineers Ltd 1987 SLT 114 per L. Jauncey.
24 Dunbar v. British Coal Corporation 1988 SLT 437.
25 McFarnon v. British Coal Corporation 1988 SLT 642.
26 R. Sutherland, 'Optional Procedure in the Court of Session 1991 SLT (News) 17.
27 Rodgers v. British Steel pic 1990 SLT 642: averment that injury was sustained from slipping
on floor due to mixture of dust and water. Evidence disclosed there was on the balance of
probabilities only dust on the floor at the time of the accident and pursuer failed.
28 Coulsfield Working Party Report, Ch. 5, p. 1.
29 Hon. Lord Cullen, Review ofBusiness, op. cit. para 3.55.
30 The procedure has been replaced by the new Personal Injury Actions procedure introduced
in 2003.
31 Coulsfield Report, ibid.
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Following the remarks of Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in Brown v. Hamilton District
Council32 new rules were introduced for a remedy of judicial review in which
applications proceeded on simple pleadings.33 In 1994 the Rules of Court were
overhauled.34 The same year, following the report of a working party chaired by
Lord Coulsfield,35 the procedure for commercial causes was radically overhauled.
There had been a previous procedure36 but it was perceived as failing to meet the
needs of the business community for early decisions by 'business aware' judges.37
The Commercial Cause Rules 1994 attempted to address these and introduced to
Court of Session practice simple abbreviated pleadings and a pro-active judge.38
(v) Changing Cultures. The Experiment of the Sheriff Court Ordinary
Cause Rules 1993.
In 1993, new rules were introduced into the ordinary procedure of the sheriff court
which incorporated a judicial pro-activity element. In the early 1990s, the Sheriff
Court Rules Council instigated a review of sheriff court civil procedure concentrating
on ordinary cause procedure with a view to reducing 'delay, cost and complexity.'
Many thought that the rules required alteration.39 Following two consultation
32 1983 SC (HL) 1 at 49.
33 (SI 1985 No. 500).
34 (SI 1994, No. 1443). See further, N. Morrison, 'The Rules of the Court of Session' (1994) 39
J.L.S.S. 315.
35 Report of the Review Body on Commercial Actions in the Court ofSession (Chairman, The Hon.
Lord Coulsfield) (Scottish Courts Administration, 1993).
36 as constituted by (SI 1978, No.690) which was amended in 1988 and 1990.
37 R. Clancy, R. Wadia and A. Murray, 'The New Commercial Cause Rules' 1997 SLT (News)
(2parts) 45, 53 at 45.
38 This is examined infra.
39 In my sheriff study, 59/69 sheriffs agreed that the old rules required revision. See Appx.
4(b). In the solicitor study, 90% thought so. See Appx. 3(b).
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papers,40 the Rules Council issued a Report with draft rules, which draft, with minor
modifications, became the new rules for ordinary actions in the sheriff court.41 The
Council had set itself five policy objectives in drafting the rules. 1. cases should call
in court only when necessary; 2. the number of callings should be kept to a
minimum; 3. the rules should prescribe periods for completion of the various stages
of procedure; 4. the control and management of cases should be vested in the court
rather than leaving the parties free to litigate at their own pace; and 5. the procedures
of the Court of Session and the sheriff court should be harmonised wherever
possible.42 The new rules undermined the assumption that the function of a judge
was simply to act as a judicial umpire. As Sheriff Principal Risk Q.C. observed,
'The 1993 Rules have changed certain of the underlying assumptions upon
which litigation is conducted, one of their main principles being that the
sheriff should take an active part in ensuring the progress of the cause
through the court'43
The rules created an 'options hearing' at which the court exerted control over the
future progress of case.44 The sheriff is under a duty to 'seek to secure the expeditious
progress of the cause by ascertaining from the parties the matters in dispute'45 as well
as any other matters relating to further procedure. Duties were also imposed on the
40 Sheriff Court Rules Council, Consultation Paper. Review ofSheriffCivil Court Procedures and
Practices. (SCA, Edinburgh, January 1990) and Sheriff Court Rules Council, Consultation
Paper. Proposals for Review of the Format of Processes Used in Civil Litigation in the Sheriff
Court. (SCA, Edinburgh May 1990).
41 Act of Sederunt (Sheriff Court Ordinary Cause Rules) 1993 SI 1993 No. 1956. For further
discussion of the causes of delay prevalent in the sheriff court pre-1993, the Consultation
Paper and Report see D. Parratt, 'Access to Justice: Lessons from the Sheriff Court?' in LLL.
MacQueen and B.G.M. Main (eds.), The Reform ofCivil Justice (1997) 5 Hume Papers on Public
Policy 96 at 97-9. [Repr. in Appendix 6],
42 See also Sheriff Court Rules Council, 'The New Ordinary Cause Rules' (1993) 38 JLSS 334.
43 Welsh v. Thomhome Services & Ors. 1994 SCLR 1021.
44 Note that the rules of written pleading were unaltered.
45 OCR 1993, r. 9.12(1).
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parties. A pursuer is required to lodge a certified copy of the record not later than
two days before an options hearing or continued options hearing46 At the hearing,
both parties are under a duty to provide the sheriff with sufficient information to
enable him to conduct the hearing as provided for in the rule. To be entitled to go to
debate, parties must lodge a Note of Basis of Preliminary Plea,47 foreshadowing the
points for debate, three days before the options hearing and the sheriff is not bound
to send the cause to debate unless he is satisfied that there is a preliminary matter of
law which justifies the debate.48 Adjustment is time limited and ceases 14 days prior
the options hearing.49 No further adjustment is permitted other than with the leave of
the sheriff.
The rule changes were welcomed by many and viewed as innovative. Lord Morton
of Shuna considered that they 'demonstrated a line that could be followed with
profit'50 and in the House of Lords he recorded his regret that the Court of Session
did not incorporate such elements.51 Lord Cullen in preparing his Review, noted in
the rules the 'elements of a case management system'.52
The implementation of the rules was not without teething problems.55 There was for
some time divergence in shrieval views as to aspects of the rules, even at the level of
sheriffs principal. Practitioners, initially, did not obtemper the requirements. Records
46 OCR 1993, r.9.11.
47 colloquially known as a Rule 22.1 Note.
48 OCR 1993, r.9.12(3).
49 OCR 1993, r. 9.8.
50 The Hon. Morton of Shuna, 'Procedural Reform of the Court of Session' (1995) 1 CPB 2 at 3.
51 'There has recently been a radical review of procedure in the sheriff court,
including a system under which the sheriff has much more control of the way the
case proceeds and the speed at which it proceeds. Unfortunately, none of that applies
in the Court of Session....' (Hansard No.1614: 16lh November to 24th November 1994,
No. 183).
52 Hon Lord Cullen, Review of Business, op. cit. para 6.9.
53 See Parratt, Access to Justice, op. cit.
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were late, time limits were missed, and Rule 22.1 Notes were not lodged. The courts
prevaricated over whether such misdemeanours required to be punished by
dismissal or whether the expedition of the cause required a lesser sanction or a more
purposive construction of the rules. The former approach was consistent with
altering practitioner attitudes,54 the latter with doing overall justice between the
parties without additional expenditure to one party consequent on dismissal.55
Sheriffs themselves were uncertain how to exercise their pro-active function.56
The differing approaches were satisfactorily resolved, and practitioners increasingly
fulfilled their duties under the rules. But idiosyncratic practices had arisen in
different sheriff courts. The incidence of dismissal for default varied widely.
Adjustment continued after the periods permitted. Procedure was innovated upon.
Aberrations of procedure were condoned. Procedural lay-bys such as procedure rolls
or miscellaneous procedure rolls were created in some courts.57 Tactically,
adjustments were intimated on the last days of adjustment periods. The writer's
research confirmed many of these points although it was apparent that both sheriffs
and solicitors considered the rules to have been a success.58
54 and brings to mind Charles Hope's approach at the implementation of the 1825 Act.
55 On these points see Parratt, op. cit. pp. 102-5.
56 E. Samuel and R. Bell, Defended Ordinary Actions in the SheriffCourt: Implementing OCR (93)
(Scottish Office, 1997), para 5.92.
57 This was found in the writers sheriff court study. See Appendices 3&4. See also E. Samuel
and R. Bell, op. cit. para. 7.12.
58 In my sheriff study: 47/69 of the sheriffs considered that the rules had altered practitioner
attitudes, 60/69 of them thought that the rules had reduced delay. 63/68 agreed adjustments
should be time limited. Only 8/68 said that they would dismiss an action for there being no
record lodged prior to the options hearing at which the parties were in attendance, but the
majority said they would award expenses against a defaulting pursuer on a defender's
motion; 60/68 of sheriffs had a Miscellaneous Procedure Rolls (for which there was no
provision in the rules). The majority thought that the incidence of diets of debate was lower.
In the solicitor study: 81% thought that 1993 rules had reduced delay in ordinary actions;
83% thought that the rules had altered practitioner attitudes; 82% thought that there was
inconsistency in shrieval approach to interpretation of the rules; 85% thought that sheriffs
were pro-active at options hearings; 90% thought that adjustment should be time limited; 69%
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Since then, anecdotal evidence and the writer's experience confirm the view that the
sheriff court rules for ordinary causes, now seem to operate fairly efficiently59 and
the 'pro-active sheriff' is a permanent and understood fixture in sheriff court
practice.
(vi) Changing Cultures in the Court of Session: The 1994 Commercial
Cause Rules.
As mentioned above, in 1994 the Commercial Court was established with its own
dedicated chapter of the rules of procedure60. The rules introduced the concepts of
'case management' and 'judicial proactivity' to the Court of Session. Put simply,
cases of a business or commercial nature are managed through three principal types
of hearing: preliminary hearing, procedural hearing and then a final disposal
hearing.61 Generally speaking, cases appear before the same judge throughout.62 The
judge acts pro-actively.63 For our purposes, it is important to note that the formal
requirements of written pleadings as practised in ordinary Court of Session actions
are usually dispensed with. A summons need contain only the orders sought, detail
of the parties to the action, the transaction or dispute from which the action arises,
and a summary of the circumstances out of which the action arises and the grounds
thought that the incidence of debates was lower than pre-1993; 80% were required by sheriffs
to justify Rule 22 Notes at options hearings; 82% reported that their courts had Miscellaneous
Procedure Rolls or Procedure Rolls. See appendices 3(b) and 4(b) infra.
59 Cf Mays' anecdotal evidence from 1997 in 'Frying Pan, Fire or Melting Pot? - Reforming
Scottish Civil Justice in the 1990s', (1997) J. R. 91 at 97.
60 RCS 47 and associated Practice Note, No. 12 of 1994.
61 The intention here is not to examine in depth all the workings of the Commercial Court. For
analysis of the operation of the Court see Clancy et al., op. cit., N. Morrison, 'Scotland's New
Commercial Court' (1994) 39 J.L.S.S. 354, C. Macleod, 'The Commercial Court' (UPDATE
course: 'Court of Session Practice and Procedure', Clyde Flail, Glasgow, 3rd March 1997.), and
the Annotations to Chapter 47 in Annotated Rules of the Court of Session 2003.
62 Although there is an increasing tendency to transfer cases among the 'commercial judges'.
63 He is required to do so. See PN No.12 of 1994, para. 5. See Clancy et al. op. cit. for what this
has meant in practice.
410
on which the action proceeds. Appended to the summons is a schedule listing the
documents founded upon or adopted as incorporated in the summons.64 In practice,
the pleadings will vary according to the nature of the case although the Practice Note
gives guidance that the pleadings should be 'in an abbreviated form'.65 Where the
parties seek a judicial construction of a term in a contract, the pursuer may serve a
summons simply containing details of the contract and averments of the preferred
construction.66 There is no necessity to make up a summons containing headings
'condescendence' and 'pleas-in-law.' Lengthy narrative in averment is discouraged.
Lengthy quotations from documents are not necessary. Detailed written pleadings
are not expected nor required.67 There is still a requirement of fair notice68 and
parties are expected to make full and frank disclosure and may be pressed to do so
by the commercial judge.
Although there are the three types of hearing, RCS 47.5 provides that 'the procedure
in a commercial action shall be such as the commercial judge shall order or direct.'69
Defences are in the form of answers with any additional statement of facts or legal
grounds. If documents are founded upon or adopted as incorporated in the defences
they must be lodged and listed in a Schedule attached to the defences.
64 RCS 47.3. Note that there is no need to employ the pleading phrase 'adopted etc. brevitntis
causa'.
65 PN No 12 of 1994, para. 3(1).
66 ibid.
67 Morrison, 'Scotland's New Commercial Court' op. cit., p. 355.
68 and detailed notice is required where a party makes allegations of fraud. Kaur v. Singh 1998
SC 233.
69 in practice, the Court will deal with and dispose of most actions at Preliminary Hearings
and continuations thereof. Clancy et al. op. cit. conducted research into the disposal rate,
finding that 75% of cases settled at or before the preliminary hearing stage.
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The commercial judge has a very wide discretion at the preliminary hearing70 and the
procedural hearing.71 The hearings will take place on a set day at a set time. The
preliminary hearing is used to identify and focus the real issues in the case. It is not
automatic that the court will allow further adjustment of the pleadings. If further
pleadings are necessary, these will be controlled and superintended by the court.
Adjustment 'at large' is unusual. It is more common that the Court orders a party to
amplify an aspect of his case and a specific period will be permitted to do so. The
emphasis is on candour and disclosure and technical pleading conventions such as
'Not known and not admitted' or partial admissions coupled with 'Quoad ultra
denied' are discouraged. The judge has the power to determine whether further
specification is required, if so, the extent of the specification and how that
specification should be presented.72 It need not proceed by way of written pleadings.
The court will desire to have relevant documents produced at the earliest
opportunity and the traditional rules for recovery of evidence will not apply. In
practice, if you know or even suspect that your opponent has a document and that he
has not produced it, then mention of it to the judge with submissions on the import
of the document will often result in the court ordering the party to produce it.
Prior to the procedural hearing, parties must produce written proposals for further
procedure, written notes of argument (if debate is sought) lists of witnesses and
expert reports. From this information the court will determine how the case should
progress. Debates will be granted only if the commercial judge considers that a
debate will assist the resolution of the case. Insisting in preliminary pleas will not





rare, if it happens at all.73 Methods other than conventional proof may be considered
in determination of the case. Proof is not restricted to the pleadings but may include
matters set out in written statements lodged in advance of the procedural hearing.74
The fact that proof is led beyond the four corners of a record will not found an
appeal. Commercial cause proofs are still susceptible to late settlement75 although, in
practice, a by order hearing will be fixed shortly before the proof for parties to advise
on the likelihood of settlement.
On balance, the commercial cause procedure of the Court of Session works well. It
has delivered the 'speedy resolution of commercial disputes'76 which the Scottish
business community had originally called for. In an empirical study, Clancy et al.
showed that 87 per cent of commercial causes were disposed of within a year with 55
per cent of that figure disposed of within 6 months.77 The same researchers found
that there were 3 or 4 preliminary hearings in 31 per cent of cases.78
The traditional function of written pleadings in narrowing the matters in dispute is
limited in commercial causes. It is extremely unlikely that a commercial cause would
be lost due to poor written formulation. The procedure impliedly rejects traditional
conceptions of the judge as a 'boxing referee' counting the points. The judge is
heavily involved in superintending and managing the case from the start, but he
does not ex proprio motn determine what the parties' factual and legal positions
73 A party will indicate to the court that he wishes greater specification on a point. He does
not take it to debate.
74 Highland and Universal Properties Ltd. Safeway Properties Ltd. 1996 SC 424.
75 Clancy et al., op. cit.
76 Lord Coulsfield's Review Body reported that this was of over-riding importance to
commercial litigants.
77 Clancy et al., op. cit. p. 46.
78 Anecdotal evidence suggests that this percentage might now be higher, although there has
been no recent research on the operation of the Court.
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'should be', but uses the procedure to compel the parties to define those positions in
early course. To that extent he does not act like an inquisitorial civilian judge. For
this reason his decision-making at the final determination cannot be called into
question on the grounds of partiality or lack of judicial independence nor can he be
accused of having 'pre-judged' the merits of the action.79
The commercial cause procedure, however, is not above criticism. First, by its nature,
it requires extensive, and therefore expensive, preparation on the part of the parties
at the start of the action, whereas in ordinary actions the heavier costs are usually
incurred towards the end of the action leading up to the final determination.80
Secondly, as a matter of principle, where a court is provided with discretionary
powers, in the interests of justice, fairness, consistency and predictability, the scope
of that judicial discretion should be defined. It has been said that 'Loose and
unfettered discretion.. .is a dangerous weapon'81 and the exercise of a wide discretion
may cause unpredictability82 and arbitrariness.83 In practice, again from anecdotal
evidence, the approaches taken by the commercial judges do vary, but the variation
appears to be accepted by the profession as part and parcel of the procedure84 and to
my knowledge, in ten years of operation, no appeal has ever been taken on the point.
That is not to say that some appellate guidance on the scope of discretion is not
desirable. Thirdly, the proceciure is demanding of judicial time. Preliminary hearings
79 Cf N. Morrison, 'The Cullen Report' 1996 SLT (News) 93 at 96-7.
80 although focussing of issues may prompt earlier settlement and as Clancy et al. point out,
the costs at this stage may save greater expense being incurred in a proof at large' op. cit. p.
57.
81 Morgan v. Morgan (1869) LR 1 P&D 644 per Lord Penzance.
82 Sir Roger Ormrod, 'Judicial Discretion' (1987) Current Legal Problems 123 ibid.
83 M. Zander, 'Consistency in the Exercise of Discretionary Powers' (1996) 146 New Law
Journal 1.
84 It might also be argued that the concurrent increase in judicial pro-activity in other types of
Court of Session action has led to the profession being more comfortable with the concept.
See infra.
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are set down for, and normally take half an hour. The cost to the court is higher than
in other types of action.85 Fourthly, it might be argued that the procedure enables a
judge to decide the issues he/she wants to decide rather than those which the parties
seek determined.86 As previously discussed, this is an argument of some longevity.
Where the issues are focussed with the assistance of the parties, then those parties
cannot complain that they were not party to defining the issues for decision. Finally,
Clancy et al.S7 questioned whether the procedure conflicted with the traditional view
'that there was no rule of practice or principle that required a defender as a matter of
relevancy to state more than a general denial of the factual averments on any issue
raised between the parties'.88 Following the recent case of Urquhnrt89 the law may be
moving away from this as a statement of principle in any event.
(vii) Further Inroads Into The Theory ofWritten Pleadings: The Cullen
Report 1995.
On 24May 1995, Lord Cullen was appointed by Lord President Flope to carry out a
review of the business of the Outer blouse of the Court of Session.90 Fie reported in
85 see N. Morrison, 'The Cullen Report' 1996 SLT (News) 93 at 95 and 'Reform of Civil
Procedure' 1998 SLT (News) 137 at 142.
86 Cf N. Morrison, 'The Cullen Report', op. cit. p. 97.
87 op. cit. at 58.
88 Ganley v. Scottish Boatowners Mutual Insurance Association 1967 SLT (Notes) 46 per LJ-C
Thomson quoted with approval in Gray v. Boyd 1996 SLT 60.
89 (unreported) 18 March 2004 (2nd Div.).
90 In summary, his remit was 'to review the manner in which business was administered,
conducted and allocated' with a view to making recommendations as to improvement, and in
particular to consider what measures should be taken (whether by changes in the rules of
procedure, the practice of pleading etc.) to simplify procedure and expedite the progress and
disposal of cases; achieve a greater degree of judicial control and management of cases;
minimise the late settlement of cases and ensure that cases are allocated among Judges, and
judicial time is used, to best advantage. Hon. Lord Cullen, Review ofBusiness, op. cit.,
Foreword, p. 1.
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December 1995 and the report was published in January 1996. Some of his
observations have already been examined.91
Lord Cullen recommended a system for abbreviated written pleadings (which could
be expanded to full traditional pleadings at the order of the court); the earlier and
wider disclosure of evidence; the introduction of case management hearings and pre-
proof reviews;92 and the organisation of business to avoid delays in proofs and jury
trials.93 In relation to written pleadings, he had five criticisms viz. 1. that the parties
averments, and in particular the averments of the party on which the burden of proof
lay tended to become encumbered by detail94; 2. frequently there was a lack of
candour in defences95; 3. that an undue reliance on points of pleading was prejudicial
to the doing of 'justice on the facts of the case'96; 4. the system of pleading was
unduly elaborate97 particularly in the simpler case, in requiring explicit answers in
the form 'admitted', not known and not admitted' etc. which led to a formality of
pleadings;98 and 5. the system of pleadings did not operate well in exposing latent
ambiguities or differences of understanding between the parties prior to proof.99 He
accepted that the progress of an ordinary action was affected to a significant extent
by the conduct of the parties and that the court was restricted in what it could raise
91 In the following, I will cover the Report's general observations and concentrate on the
principal points relating to Lord Cullen's comments on written pleadings and case
management. For fuller analyses of the Report and his Recommendations see N. Morrison,
'The Cullen Report' op. cit., M. Upton, 'The Cullen Review' (1996) 41 JLSS 111, The Hon Lord
Gill, 'The Woolf, Cullen and Coulon Report. Justice, Money and Efficiency' (1997) 42 JLSS 437.
92 It has been argued that these three recommendations were evidently influenced by the
Lord Woolf's report into English Civil Justice. (Lord Woolf, Access to Justice, (1995)) Mays,
'Reforming Civil Justice in the 1990s, op. cit., p. 102.
93 N. Morrison, 'The Cullen Report' 1996 SLT (News) 93.




98 ibid . para 4.13.
99 ibid . para 3.28.
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itself.100 He noted that the court had limited ability to inflict sanctions for non¬
compliance with the rules.101
Lord Cullen rejected calls for the replacement of the system of pleadings by forms
similar to those used before statutory tribunals, as they would not permit the giving
of fair notice of the case and facts relied on in support of the stated ground on which
the case was based102 nor permit a candid acknowledgement by the opponent of the
facts relied on which he knew to be true. In this, he considered pleadings had an
essential role to play.103 Instead he recommended abbreviated pleadings in which the
condescendence would contain brief statements of fact forming the grounds of the
claim and 'appropriate' pleas-in-law.104 Defences would no longer require to answer
individually every averment of the pursuer.105 The defender would not be permitted
to adjust other than with the consent of the pursuer or the judge.106 If the court was
satisfied that the action was 'difficult or complex',107 then the pleadings could
proceed in 'normal' form but with the defender under an explicit duty to make a
candid response to the pursuer's averments108 and the parties entitled to adjust
within a 'tailor made' time frame, decided nb ante.109
100 ibid . para. 3.30.
101 ibid, para 3.37
102 ibid, para 4.4.
103 ibid.
104 ibid paras. 4.9 - 4.12.
105 ibid para 4.14 which would have removed 'implied admissions'.
106 ibid, para 4.28.
107 The test of unsuitability for Optional Procedure. Note that Lord Woolf at the time was
recommending a two track approach in England, but based upon the value of the claim.
108 ibid, para 4.17. Lord Cullen rejected a suggestion that the pleadings should also contain
'argument'.
109 ibid, para 4.30.
417
With regard to judicial control exercised through case management, the Faculty of
Advocates' response was at least historically consistent. Lord Cullen recorded the
Faculty's objections in short.110 These were:
1. that the adversarial system and judicial passivity had functioned
reasonably well in the Court of Session and there would not be an advantage
in judges being given an interventionist role; 2. the parties and their advisers
were best placed to know what is in the parties' respective interests and to
manage their case; 3. judicial intervention would reduce the function and
effectiveness of the bar; 4. judicial pro-activity could conflict with the
appearance of due impartiality; 5. the number of judges would have to be
increased and 6. the problems in the procedure of the Court of Session could
be resolved by indigenous means allowing the traditional judicial role to be
retained.
Lord Cullen queried the Faculty's use of the word 'interventionist' and confirmed
that there was no question of 'moving away from the adversarial system.' What he
was proposing was the application of a degree of control and direction to
litigation.111 Fie thereafter laid out his version of case management suitable for the
Outer House.112 On ancillary matters, Lord Cullen proposed allowing Notices to
Admit at any time from the time defences were lodged.
(viii) The Debate 'Post- Cullen' and the Continued Criticism ofWritten
Pleadings.
110 ibid. para. 6.12.
111 ibid. para. 6.15
112 ibid, paras. 6.16 - 6.39 Prior to case management hearings parties were to be required to
complete questionnaires and the Court would 'seek consistently with doing justice between
the parties, the expeditious progress of the action and the avoidance of unnecessary expense.'
para. 6.19 and 6.31.
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Lord Cullen's Report re-ignited debate on the role of written pleadings in Outer
House procedure in the Court of Session and whether there was a place in that
procedure for a pro-active Lord Ordinary. The Faculty's stated position remarkably
adopted arguments similar to those advanced by it in the nineteenth century.
Another commentator thought that the proposals would allow of inspecific defences,
and he prayed in aid fallacious historical precedents,113 warning of the dangers of
adopting elements of English procedure by another name,114 the loss of the Scottish
doctrine of relevancy115 and the removal of the advantages of encapsulating parties
positions in one document. In addition to the Faculty arguments, Morrison stated
that case management would 'enable the judge to decide what issues he or she wants
to decide rather than what parties wished determined,'116 would in any event be
performing the function traditionally ascribed to written pleadings and was an
English procedure which if adopted would result in the system falling into the
unfortunate state of the English legal system in relation to procedure.117 One
commentator even thought that the proposals, if implemented, would introduce
English discovery procedure into Scotland.118
Some commentators took the opposite line, complaining that Lord Cullen's approach
was merely reformist119 of a system in crisis,120 that lawyers could not be trusted to
promote revolutionary reform and that wholesale review was imperative.121 Others
113 Morrison, 'The Cullen Report' op. cit. p. 94.
114 Another historically recognised manoeuvre for resisting changes to written pleadings.
115 implying the demise of the whole doctrine as opposed to specification as relevancy, ibid.
116 ibid. p. 97.
117 ibid. p. 100.
118 A. Murray, 'Fair Notice - The Role of Written Pleadings in the Scottish justice System' in
H.L. MacQueen and B.G.M. Main (eds.), The Reform ofCivil Justice (1997) 5 Hume Papers on
Public Policy 49 at 59.




advocated solutions incorporating elements from different juristic and cultural
traditions,122 with the Cullen Report being the first step and not the last word.123
Some pointed to England and the Woolf Reports for inspiration.124
As it became apparent that there were undisclosed problems with implementing the
Cullen Report recommendations, some academics called for reasoned and rational
debate on all the issues raised in the Report.125 Debate, though was half-hearted.
Of all Lord Cullen's recommendations, only a few of the more insignificant ones
were implemented in the period thereafter. Notices to admit before proof, a
requirement for lodging medical records, and making averments about medical
treatment were implemented in 1996. For a period of seven weeks, the star of
pursuer's offers126 shone brightly before imploding when the rule was revoked.127
Traditional written pleadings continued to be criticised in the literature and cases.
In 1996, Lord Prosser made these remarks on the theory and practice of written
pleadings in the Scottish courts.128
122 Hon. Lord Gill, 'The Woolf, Cullen and Coulon Reports' op. cit. 437.
123 ibid.
124 R. Mays, 'Case Management in the Scottish Civil Courts. Whose Case is it Anyway?' op cit.
125 R. Wadia, 'Judicial Case Management in Scotland. Indecision and Indigestion' 1997 SLT
(News) 255 at 258, A. Murray, 'Court of Session Procedure: Past, Present and Future' 1997
SLT (News) 259 at 262.
126 recommended by Lord Cullen, para. 7.2 and introduced by RCS 34A.6(2)
127 By SI 1996 No. 2769. On the whole fiasco, see further B.G.M. Main and A. Park, 'Pre-trial
Settlement: Who's for Two-way Offers? 1999 SLPQ 30, D. Stevenson, 'Pursuer's Offers' (1996)
11 Green's Civil Practice Bulletin 2, D. Bartos, 'Pursuer's Offers to Settle in the Court of
Session, Settle or Else?' (1996) 41 J.L.S.S. 434, Anon, 'Pursuers' Offers: The Legacy' 1997 SLT
(News) 21. For status and history of pursuer's offers, see Tenbey v. Stolt Comex Seaway Ltd. &
Am. 2001 SLT 418
128 ERDC Construction Ltd. v. HM Love & Co 1996 SC 523 at 532. For commentary on the case
see J. Murray 'Letting Arbiters Get on with the Job'1997 SLT (News) 64.
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'I should like to add to your Lordship's comments about written pleadings.
Whatever machinery is used for the resolution of a dispute, there is likely to
be some place for both written and oral material. A requirement that each
party should formulate its position in writing at the outset has fundamental
advantages, not only as a means of giving fair notice to the other side and
helping to focus and cut down issues in dispute, but also, and
fundamentally, as an encouragement to each party to analyse the substance
of the case, before trying to give it expression in writing. In my opinion, if a
high quality of written formulation can be achieved at the outset, much
expensive and time consuming oral procedure can be avoided. I would not
therefore wish to say anything which might be interpreted as denying the
importance of written formulation, or encouraging recourse to oral evidence
or submissions without such a written formulation. That said, I am quite
satisfied that pleadings of the type currently used in ordinary court
procedure are frequently, and indeed normally, ill-suited to their true
function, failing to put essentials in sharp focus, and often putting in sharp
focus inessential matters of detail, which then become the subject of
pointless procedural scrutiny.'
In 1998, (the then) Lord President Rodger told a conference that he thought that
pleadings needed to be simplified.129 Lord Gill told the same conference that
procedure in Scotland was productive of delay, Scottish civil justice needed reform
and opined that it was inevitable that Scotland would adopt a simplified civil
procedure.130
129 Rt. Hon. Lord President Rodger, Introduction to Conference 'The Reform of Civil Justice'
DHI/Faculty of Advocates, 1 June 1998.
130 Lord Gill, 'Future Directions', Paper presented to Conference 'The Reform of Civil Justice'
DHI/Faculty of Advocates, 1 June 1998.
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(ix) The Coulsfield Proposals and the New Personal Injury Rules in the
Court of Session.
Following Lord Cullen's Report, the more radical proposals to introduce case
management and abbreviated pleadings were shelved as it was considered that case
management hearings in all defended causes would simply add another expensive
layer to a large number of cases which would, in any event, settle well before proof
or trial; and whilst intensive case management might be desirable in more complex
cases, it did not at first sight seem necessary in all.131 A short study of cases coming
into the court was conducted by Lord Coulsfield which suggested that cases could be
divided between those requiring a simple form of procedure and those which might
require management. In light of the study the Lord President set up a working party
under the chairmanship of Lord Coulsfield with the remit to consider whether
routine cases (mainly cases of personal injury) could proceed under a simplified
procedure and to devise such a procedure eliminating unnecessary delay and
expense, making the most of judicial and administrative staff time.132 The Working
Party reported in 2000. Lord Cullen's proposals for case management in all cases
were abandoned and the group recommended reforms for personal injury reparation
actions. The reforms envisaged inter alia a fixed timetable, light supervision of
parties' preparation of their pleadings; and minimal pleadings. The Rules Council
thereafter rejected the proposals as they favoured extended pleadings, particularly in
relation to the merits of actions for damages for personal injuries.133 Part of the group
met again and once more reported to the Lord President by Supplementary Report in
2002. The group endorsed the recommendations of the Working Party, considering
131 Coulsfield Working Party Report, op. cit. Ch. 1, p. 1.
132 ibid.
133 Supplementary Report of Lord Coulsfield's Working Party on Court of Session Procedure
(2002) (hereafter Coulsfield Supplementary Report).
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that unless extremely well carried out, written pleadings tended to obstruct rather
than facilitate the proper progress of an action but had a place in cases where there
was novelty or real difficulty. In response to a suggestion made to the group that 'it
was desirable that parties should apply their minds to their real cases at an early
stage and that the present concentration on written pleadings enabled that to be
done', the group considered that observation to be contrary to common experience
and that the final formulation of a party's position is normally in a Minute of
Amendment prior to proof. The group accepted that changes to written pleading
practice depend for success on the daily operation of the changes in individual cases,
but emphasised that the pleadings should be short and simple, not technical nor
artificial and should exclude 'stylistic standard phrases and ritual incantations.'
Illustrations of style were attached to the 2002 Report. Finally they expressed the
view that the pleadings should require individual answers to particular averments of
fact, whether made by pursuer or defender and thus discourage general denials. The
new rules for the disposal of personal injury actions came into force on 1 April
2003134 together with Practice Notes Nos. 2 and 3 of 2003.
The summons135 now has no 'condescendence'. It is termed the 'statement of claim.'
Pleas-in-law are not attached.
The new personal injury actions in the Court of Session have now been in operation
for a year. From experience and discourse with colleagues, I would tentatively
suggest that the rules are operating efficiently, that they were generally well received
and that there has been little complaint or criticism. Abbreviated pleadings are now
134 SSI 2002, No. 570.
135 As Form 43.2-A.
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part of reparation practice which is still the largest class of actions in the Court of
Session. Experience of 'by order' hearings suggests that agents also have come to
grips with the new procedure. A number of reported decisions have ironed out early
problems.136 Cases seem to be settling more quickly than they would have done
under the old procedure.
Case management is increasing in other parts of civil procedure. It is now used for
asbestosis and mesothelioma cases in the Court of Session in the period leading up to
proof where they appear in a separate roll.137 The judge is pro-active. He can
continue the by-order for production of documents or the clarification of a party's
position. The nature of such actions makes them fairly formulaic. Actions are often
very old and the by orders are used to push (often multiple former employer)
defenders towards agreeing periods of employment, negligence exposure, medical
evidence and diagnosis of pursuer's condition.
Mention was made above of Judicial Review procedure.138 The Court of Session
exercises its supervisory jurisdiction under this accelerated procedure. The form of a
136 Tudhope v. Finlay Park (unreported) 7 January 2004 per Lord Cameron of Lochbroom
(whether action against solicitors for professional negligence in respect of a Vibration White
Finger claim was a 'personal injuries action' in terms of RCS 43.1.1 (no); Hamilton v. Seamark
Systems Ltd (unreported) 26 February 2004 per Lady Paton (non-automatic entitlement to
procedure roll debate, and whether proof therefore is proof simpliciter or whether before
answer is competent. (PBA competent if Note of basis); Clifton v. Hays pic (unreported) 7
January 2004 per Lady Smith, (although simplified pleadings, defenders entitled to be able to
ascertain without undue difficulty the nature of the case against them. Pursuer still required
to set out the bones of case in order to obtemper RCS 43.2 i.e. stating all the facts necessary to
establish the claim.)
137 The creation of this roll proceeded from the policy decision taken by the Court that such
actions required a quicker disposal than other reparation actions. This was because pursuers
in such cases are often close to death and damages (even interim) should be awarded if
appropriate ante mortem.
138 RCS Ch. 58.
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petition for judicial review must be in Form 58.6 which encourages short and brief
statements.
In 2001 provision was made for the creation of Commercial Actions in the Ordinary
Cause Rules in the sheriff court.139 The rules provide for dispensation with written
pleadings in actions turning on the construction of a document140 and lengthy
narrative is discouraged in pleadings in other actions. The commercial sheriff holds
Case Management Conferences.141
(x) A Disparate Approach to Pleading in Writing.
We are now at a juncture where a number of procedures in the Court of Session and
the sheriff court operate different aspects of case management/judicial pro-activity
and abbreviated pleadings to a greater or lesser degree. Thus the ordinary cause
rules in the sheriff court permit traditional pleadings but judicial pro-activity is
applied on their completion. The commercial rules in the sheriff court permit
traditional pleadings but spreadsheets, schedules and electronic presentations are
increasingly used in substitution and the sheriff is pro-active throughout.
Commercial causes in the Court of Session discourage traditional pleadings and the
judge is again pro-active throughout. The new personal injury actions do not use full
pleadings and the judge does not exercise a high degree of pro-activity. Asbestosis
cases also use traditional written pleadings but the pro-activity of the judge comes at
a later stage prior to proof. Petitions for judicial review encourage brief and short
139 by Ordinary Cause Rules (Act of Sederunt (Ordinary Cause Rules) Amendment




statements as the process is accelerated and by necessity decisions must be issued
quickly.
As for the inter-relationship between abbreviated pleadings and case
management/pro-activity it seems that there is a direct correlation. The more
abbreviated the pleading the greater the judicial role. The only exception to this is the
new personal injury procedure, in which the judge's pro-active role is limited
although the pleadings are abbreviated. This is because of the nature of such actions.
The heads of claim for damages for personal injuries will fall into particular
categories: solatium; interest thereon; wage loss (past with interest and future);
services (past with interest and future) etc. Indeed, the personal injuries procedure
anticipates this in the 'quantum of damages' form to be completed by the parties.
Thus, by requiring completion of various stages by particular times, parties can be
edged, with slight judicial encouragement, to agreement and settlement.
The overall increase in such procedures and the decreasing use of the system of
traditional written pleadings in civil procedure necessarily raises the question of
whether the system as conventionally practised can remain part of Scottish civil
procedure.
(xi) Conclusion. The Future for Traditional Written Pleadings.
This thesis started with three questions. The last question was whether the system of
written pleadings as traditionally practised would continue to play a part in Scottish
civil procedure.
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As I appreciated from the beginning, answering that question is problematic. It is
always difficult to predict what is round the civil procedural corner. But if the
historical perspective is understood, tentative and speculative predictions about the
future might be made.
I have remarked already that the historical perspective is useful in this, not just as
historicism but because parallels can be drawn between what has happened in the
past and the challenges of the present and future. This is sometimes lost on those
who advocate reform but who have not made a study of the past.
The author's publication reproduced in Appendix 6 was one of five essays on 'The
Reform of Civil Justice.' A reviewer of all these essays said this:
'The history of procedural reform is almost as old as the history of
procedure. And history, or a knowledge of history, is the proper framework
for forming public policy. If a small criticism can be made of this valuable
collection of five essays, it is perhaps that historical perspective is largely
absent; and that, in consequence, there is here and there a little too much
earnestness (as if these problems had never happened before).142
And to paraphrase the CoulsfieldWorking Party, a system which places a reliance on
written pleadings will demonstrate certain tendencies which are inherent in the
system.143
142 Angus Stewart, Q.C. : Book Review of 'The Reform ofCivil Justice', [Hume Papers on
Public Policy (Edinburgh, 1997)] in (1999) 3 Edinburgh Law Review 265 at p. 265-6.
143 Coulsfield Working Party Report, Ch. 6.
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First, as will be apparent from the context, when I have referred to 'traditional
written pleadings'144 I mean the system as discussed in chapter 4. Written pleadings
are the basis of a litigant's case which is then developed orally in court. Could reform
of civil procedure accommodate a purely oral system or a purely written system?
Neither, I suggest, is likely. As Lord Prosser considered, 'Whatever machinery is
used for the resolution of a dispute, there is likely to be some place for both written
and oral material.'145 Lord President Hope expressed the view that 'orderly
presentation of facts, both on paper and at the bar' was the method 'which [wa]s
most helpful to the judges'146 and discounted the introduction of a system of written
presentation with a minimum of oral argument as he thought that it would impede
the conduct of judicial business.147 He doubted whether oral advocacy could be
safely dispensed with 'which provides us with so much of the information which is
the basis for our decision-making/148
Historically, sometimes Scots law has relied on oral presentation by itself, and at
other times nearly exclusively on written presentation. In early practice the 'dispute'
followed the pursuer's summons and was conducted orally, parties' positions being
noted down. Once the Court of Session accepted pleading in writing, its role in the
preparation of pleadings steadily decreased as the traditional approach to oral
presentation was expressed in the pleadings, until practice went to the other extreme
and there was little pleading viva voce. The reforms at the start of the nineteenth
century sought to strike a balance using both approaches, much to the chagrin of the
144 in chapter 5 and in this chapter.
145 ERDC Construction Ltd. v. HM Love & Co. cit sup.
146 Rt. Hon. Lord Hope of Craighead, 'Inside the Crystal Ball' (1991) 36 JLSS 305 at 307.
147 Rt. Hon. Lord Hope of Craighead /Judicial Business - A Review' (2 parts) (1. Of judges and
Criminals, 1991 36 J.L.S.S. 219-222) and (2. The Court ofSession, (1991) 36 J.L.S.S. 266-269 at 267
148 Rt. Hon. Lord Hope of Craighead, Helping Each Other to Make Law' (1997) 2 Scottish Law
& Practice Quarterly 93.
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Bar. When in 1825 Charles Hope proclaimed that Scotland was entering a 'new era in
the administration of justice' the novelty was that pleadings had to be 'brief' in a
certain form and in a 'condensed style' and the judges had to ensure that they
carefully 'superintended' the preparation of the parties' pleadings, if necessary
suggesting to them improvements in style and content. For 'condensed style' and
'superintendence' we might substitute 'abbreviated pleadings' and 'pro-active case
management'.
After over a century of presenting arguments to the court in writing, the condensed
style did not come easily to the practitioners. They were accustomed to 'ripening' a
cause and it was for them to select the material which was to be presented to the
court. Hence the truculent remarks of the Faculty that it was 'no part of judicial
business to do more than decide a cause'. But what they were really objecting to was
that the new statutory scheme permitted a judge to suggest improvements in the
presentation of the merits of the case rather than overseeing its progress and
compliance with the statute. Hence the comments in 1834 that improvement of
pleading would be 'more securely advanced by a careful superintendence of the
Judge, and by practice.'
Perhaps history repeated itself with Lord Cullen's proposals and the Bar's response
examined above. Lord Cullen was suggesting the application of a degree of control
and direction to litigation and the introduction of abbreviated pleadings. The Faculty
however latched onto the word 'interventionist', imbued it with a meaning which
was not intended, and directed their attack on the proposals on the basis of
arguments about 'judicial impartiality' and 'non-interference in what the parties and
their advisers were best placed to know was in the parties' respective interests' in the
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management of their case. Note that there was no attack on abbreviated pleadings
per se.
When one considers the position a decade on and the prevalence of procedures
which now incorporate a 'pro-active' element in conjunction with 'abbreviated
pleading' the reaction to Lord Cullen's proposals seems to be rather extreme,
particularly as these procedures have proved popular and the very same
practitioners have voted with their feet. Again we may observe such a phenomenon
from a historical perspective. The Cullen proposals came at a time when England
was engaged in a systematic review of its whole civil procedure. By 1995, Lord Woolf
had published his Interim Report which had recommended the implementation of
case management. In fact, the concept had swept through the Anglo-American
common law world from the late 1980s. Perhaps the Scottish sensitivities of those
reading the Report were perturbed by the thought that Scotland was about to
incorporate an English procedure and the Faculty and those doughty defenders of
conventional pleadings were 'flicked on the raw'. This would explain the Faculty's
comments that 'the adversarial system and judicial passivity had functioned
reasonably well in the Court of Session' and that 'problems in the procedure of the
Court of Session could be resolved by indigenous means.' So we can compare this
with the attempted introduction of jury trial in the late 1700s. Originally rejected as
an English procedure, it was nevertheless introduced and thereafter became the
practitioners' chosen method of disposing of cases on fact.
There were other reasons why civil jury trial came to be so successful. One of these
was that practitioners became accustomed or acclimatised to the innovation, realising
that the institution was actually beneficial to their clients. This resulted in the
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arguments about it being an English institution polluting the Scottish form of process
and it being a contravention of the Act of Union being quietly discarded.
Practitioners' acclimatisation or accustomisation to changes in civil procedure and
the system of written pleadings is part of what I have referred to in this thesis as the
incremental development of civil procedure. Practitioners have always had the best
interests of their clients at heart and thus, generally, a change in procedure which is
beneficial will be embraced and a change which is considered malign or contrary to
interest is railed against by arguing against it, or appealing it or even ignoring it. The
practitioner is not expected to take the law as he finds it, but may subvert it, bend it
and shape it in the interests of the client.149 His duty is to win his case and he may do
so by adopting a narrow or even backward looking approach if that is the way to
carry the argument.150 So, historically, acts of sederunt have ossified and fallen into
desuetude and rules have given way to their derogations. New rules have been
introduced and not followed or distorted in practice and approaches under old rules
have periodically re-surfaced. The duty of the advocate may often be to do so.151
Thus, incrementally, changes take effect within civil procedure as time passes and
what was rejected at one time is embraced at another.
149 The Rt. Hon. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, 'Thinking About Scots Law' (1996) 1 Edinburgh
Law Review 3
150 The Rt. Hon. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, 'The Bell of Law Reform' 1993 SLT (News) 339 at
344.
151 An argument is sometimes maintained that the practitioner's professional duty to the court
precludes him from disobeying the rules of court, see e.g. A. Murray, 'Fair Notice - The Role
ofWritten Pleadings in the Civil Justice System' in H.L. MacQueen and B.G.M. Main (eds.),
The Reform ofCivil Justice (1997) 5 Flume Papers on Public Policy 49 at 62. This operates
within limits and will be a question of degree. See Justice D.A. Ipp, 'Lawyers' Duties to the
Court' (1998) 114 LQR 63.
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Incorporation of new aspects of procedure can affect procedure in established areas
both benignly and malignantly. So historically the civil jury trial forced practitioners
to separate in their pleadings issues of fact from issues of law if they wanted a jury
trial. This in turn affected ordinary procedure and helped the profession understand
how fact and law could be separated. So too the plea of specification which seems to
have grown from civil jury trial and was exported to ordinary actions from the 1850s
onwards. More recently, the pleadings for civil jury trial in the 1950s and 1960s
distorted the practice of written pleadings in actions in the Court of Session. At the
present, as different parts of procedure in the courts increasingly employ non-
conventional rules, the traditional system becomes increasingly fragile.
I would speculate that we are in the midst of an incremental move towards case
management and abbreviated pleadings being applied in all actions in the Court of
Session. Practitioners are increasingly exposed to the concepts involved and have
acclimatised to the procedures. These procedures are popular and, where elective,
well used. The traditional adversarial view that a judge must be passive and only
decide what is placed before him must now be seriously open to question. The once
staunch defenders of traditional written pleadings have become less vociferous. The
exceptions are already eating into the traditional rules and the winds of change are
blowing in a very definite direction.
If this prognosis is correct, one might then question when this transition might take
place. Although this belongs to the realm of prophesy, we might speculate that the
432
changes will be incremental, perhaps with the retention, initially at least, of full or
traditional written pleadings for cases of difficulty or complexity.152
Lord Penzance once said that
'Procedure is but the machinery of the law after all - the channel and means
whereby law is administered and justice reached. It strangely departs from
its proper office when, in place of facilitating, it is permitted to obstruct, and
even extinguish, legal rights, and is thus made to govern where it ought to
subserve.'153
The Scottish system is habile to accommodate these flaws. In these times, the cost of
litigation is often prohibitive except for the rich, the poor and those with legal
expenses insurance. Delay is money and wasted resources.
So too in this modern era in civil procedure, when substance is more important than
form, and where tradition yields to efficiency, the Scottish system of written pleading
is perhaps an antiquity belonging to a by-gone age.
And yet, if our tentative speculations on the future for written pleadings are well
founded, it is somewhat ironical that, the procedure produced will be a more faithful
emulation of older Scottish practice, which might satisfy traditionalist and reformer
alike. Although the old system of written pleadings would slip away, Scottish civil
procedure would start the 21st century dressed in an inherited christening gown, and
not draped in an olci shroud.
152 Perhaps simultaneously addressing the 'four problem points of practice' discussed in
chapter 5.
153 Kendall v. Hamilton (1879) 4 App. Cas. 504 at 525.
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Appendix 1
The Heritors ofKingsbarns against Rev James Beatson.
An Example of Eighteenth Century Pleading
As referred to in Chapter One, it is useful to scrutinise in detail an actual example of
late eighteenth century pleading in writing, which scrutiny highlights some of the
issues discussed in that chapter and demonstrates some of the problems of the
conduct of litigation in the Court of Session up to this period. The search for a
suitable form of process for the Court of Session started a period of dramatic change
in civil procedure which continueci to the end of the nineteenth century.
1 have selected the case of (full title) The Hon. Henry Erskine, Demi of the Faculty of
Advocates, and Others, Heritors and Feuars in the Parish ofKingsbarns, in the County of
Fife, whose Funds are not Church Lands, Suspeniiers against The Reverend Mr. James
Beatson, Minister of the Gospel at Kingsbarns, Charger7. As might be gathered from the
instance, the dispute between the Dean of Faculty and the others (as Feuars and
Heritors) and the minister, related to a glebe for the minister from lands owned by
some of the suspenders2 who were heritors of the parish by virtue of their feu-
holding. The case is interesting in that, not only did the Dean act and appear in his
own instance3 and thereby one might expect the Dean's pleadings to be the epitome
of clarity and contemporary good practice,4 - at least in his own cause - but in
11 have used the Faculty Collection Session Papers relating to the case as well as Morison's
reporting of the decision(s). There are many tomes of Session Papers in the Advocates Library
beyond this collection. See Angus Stewart, Q.C., 'The Session Papers in the Advocates
Library' in H.L. MacQueen (ed.), 'Miscellany Four' (Stair Soc., Edinburgh, 2002) 199.
2 see infra.
3 and Henry Erskine was regarded as 'the leading practising lawyer of his time.' Francis Watt,
The Book ofEdinburgh Anecdote, (London & Edinburgh, 1913) pp. 17-8
4 Moreover, it is also a good example as Erskine had by this time acquired a reputation for
knowledge and experience in Church matters. See Lieut.-Colonel Alex. Fergusson, The
i
addition, he was assisted in his cause by his able friend,5 David Cathcart, Advocate,
later to become Lord Alloway. On the other side were retained the notable advocate
William Tait,6 assisted by the equally able James Clerk, Advocate.7
A slight quirk of the case is that it did not commence by summons as an ordinary
action, but as a bill of suspension which was remitted to the ordinary procedure to
continue as an ordinary action. Whilst it related to land and the rights and duties
attached thereto, which had always been a common currency of the Court, in this
case it related to the duties of heritors and the designation of glebes.8 The ultimate
decision is interesting as the Court was to recognise unfairness to the Reverend
Beatson but in this instance did not temper the decision with equity, as the question
raised had to be answered as a matter of strict statutory interpretation.9 The point
finally determined in the Dean's action was to become (in time) the position in law in
respect of glebes.10
By way of background to the case,11 the parish of Kingsbarns in Fife had been
disjoined from the parish of Crail in 163112 and thereafter a manse and offices were
Honourable Henry Erskine Lord Advocate for Scotland with Notices ofcertain ofhis Kinsfolk and of
his Time Compiled from Family Papers and Other Sources of Information, (Edinburgh, 1882) at p.
155.
5 Fergusson at pp. 405 and 511ff. They were both ardent Whigs. Erskine was the older man and
was the senior advocate and it is likely that Cathcart was acting as his junior.
6 Henry Brougham considered Tait one of the most accomplished lawyers of his time. The Life
and Times ofHenry Lord Brougham. Written by Himself (3 vols.), (Edinburgh and London, 1871)
vol. 1, p. 232.
7 Brougham thought Clerk's knowledge of the law as profound as Tait's 'in all its branches,
and not merely in its theory, but in all its most minute details of practical application' and
noted that he would 'argue points of the greatest difficulty, and propound original views
which sometimes at first startled himself.' Life and Times, ibid.
8 The terminology is hereafter explained in gremio of the facts.
9 The fact that equity was raised and discussed throughout is indicative of the leanings of the
Court. This was normal. See supra.
10 See e.g. Green's Encyclopaedia of Scots Law, Vol. 6, s.v. Glebe
11 the following is taken from the later respective Informations for the parties.
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built for the minister of the newly erected parish by the heritors of the parish.13
However, there was no glebe14 designated for the parish. In 1720, the heritors had
come to an arrangement with the then incumbent Minister that they would pay L.60
Scots, yearly, in lieu of glebe. The Reverend Beatson had not been content, like his
predecessors, to rely upon this, and had applied to his presbytery of St. Andrews, on
8 April 1790, for a glebe to be designated. There were church lands within the
parish15 but the presbytery assigned four acres of temporal16 lands which lay
contiguous to the manse. The Dean, had through marriage, acquired the 'considerable
estate' of Newhall, close to Crail, in the East Neuk of Fife17 The Dean took command
of the litigation as first heritor suspender.18 From one of the Informations19 given in
for the Dean and the other suspenders, they submitted the whole proceedings of the
presbytery to the review of the Court by bill of suspension, which bill must have
passed the preliminaries and continued as an Ordinary action. Thus inrolled, it came
to be heard at the 'debate' stage before the Ordinary in the Outer House, who, on 19th
January 1791, was Lord Monboddo. His Lordship, having heard the parties 'discuss',
12 by the Court of the High Commission of Teinds. At the time, this was a separate Court but
operated with the same Judges of the Court of Session - exercising different powers under a
different jurisdiction. The jurisdiction had been passed to the Court by The Kirks and Teinds
Act 1706.
13 A heritor was strictly any landowner, but in practice the term was confined to a landowner
in his role of a person liable to contribute to the upkeep of a parish. Dewar Gibb Students'
Glossary ofScottish Legal Terms (Edinburgh, 1946) p.40
14 a 'glebe' was land, which the minister of a landward parish had right to, over and above his
stipend. Dewar Gibb, op. cit. [citing Erskine, Principles I, v., 16] at p. 38,. See also The Law
Society of Scotland and Butterworths, Glossary Scottish Legal Terms and Latin Maxims and
European Community Legal Terms (Edinburgh, 1992), p. 34
15 We are informed in a later Information that these were the lands of Pitmillie and Falside
and Newton. (The spelling varies.)
16 as opposed to the spiritual lands
17 Fergusson op. cit., p.131
18 It appears that he had title and interest in the raising of the suspension on the basis that he
was a feuar and heritor of the parish as opposed to any of the lands of Newhall being taken
for the glebe.
19 It should be recollected that the Session Papers of this time normally contain only the
printed pleadings of the parties at the point of informing on a representation as well as later
procedure in the Inner House including reclaiming petitions and answers.
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pronounced an interlocutor,20 finding the minister entitled to the benefit of n glebe
(my emphasis) and ordaining the heritors of Kingsbarns to produce their title deeds
to their respective lands and to put them in process against the next calling,
appointing the 'parties procurators to be then ready to debate on the other points in
the cause.' It is explained in a later Information for the charger (the minister), and
much must have been made of it at the early dispute, that his opponents had
originally advanced the argument that the minister was not entitled to a glebe as his
predecessors had been used to a sum in lieu, thereby waiving entitlement,21 This,
however, was later removed by the suspenders at the dispute.22
The next calling took place on 29 June of the same year, the minutes of the debate
having been printed and memorials23 given in for the reverend charger, as well as for
the suspenders.24 The Lord Ordinary,25 considering the minutes and the memorials
20 it seems immediately, without taking it to avizandum.
21 The Information goes into great detail as to the machinations of his predecessors and the
predecessors in title of the heritors.
22 as it is alleged 'they saw very plainly, that there was not the smallest ground or pretence of
reason for maintaining such a plea' It will be noted that this was a dilator exception which
elided the charger's position that as a minister he was entitled to a glebe, an exception
probably dropped at the initial dispute as there would no likely legal basis for asserting that
the Reverend could be, here, bound by the actings of his predecessors. Hence the terms of
Monboddo's interlocutor.
23 Here a Memorial commenting upon the content of the Minutes of Debate. Much is made of
the suspenders' failure to produce the title-deeds within the period of eight days of the
previous interlocutor which had had 'serious consequences' for the minister being prevented
from obtaining possession of a glebe. As we will see, at least one of them was forced by letters
of diligence to do so. Moreover, this was in contravention of an existing A.S. regulating the
lodging of productions as ordered by the Court. On the eventual production of the titles, they
disclosed that Pitmilly was Bishop's land and Fallside was Prior's land and were situated a
mile and a half from the minister's manse. See infra.
24 It will be recalled that the Memorials, often called 'Mutual Memorials' where both parties
were to give them in, should have been ordered by the Ordinary and stated in the
Interlocutor. It seems here, however, that although the Ordinary ordered them, it was not
contained within the interlocutor.
25 In usual course, it would be Lord Monboddo, either at the side bar or in the Ordinary roll if
it was his week, he having heard parties in the dispute.
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for both sides, and hearing the parties' advocates, found26 that the minister was
entitled to half an acre for his house, stable, barn, byre and garden, which had to be
supplied from lands contiguous to his manse, whether church lands or others and to
this extent (my emphasis) the Ordinary approved of the designation made by the
presbytery, and decerned.27 However, with respect to the glebe, the Lord Ordinary
was not so sure. He made a finding stating that,
'before he determines any thing upon these points, desires to know
whether there be any more church lands in the parish28and desires also
to be informed, how these, and other church lands that may be in the
parish, are situated with respect to the manse, and at what distance
from it.'
Regarding the first part of the interlocutor, this was reclaimed against to the Inner
House by the suspenders, which petition was refused on 22 November 1791.29 This
seems to have been sufficient for the Dean and his fellow feuars and heritors30 which
left only the question of whether the glebe lands had to be designated from the
existing church lands of the parish or more conveniently situated temporal lands.
The Lords remitted the case back to the Outer House to proceed on the remaining
ground of what related to the designation of the glebe and whether it had to be
designed out of the church lands of the parish or temporal lands, if more
conveniently situated for that purpose, mutual memorials being ordered on the
26 By making an interlocutor which was termed 'advising' of the Minutes and 'advising' of
the Memorials.
27 also allowing the minister the building of a barn, of consent of the parties.
28 besides those of Pitmillie and Falside (there are various spellings)
29 The minister's later Information states: 'these arguments were disregarded by your
Lordships, who unanimously, of this date (22 November 1791) refused the Petition without
answers; so that the first two points in this interlocutor are finally settled.'
30 Probably as a result of the unanimity of the Court in its finding. An uncommon occurrence.
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point. There seems to have been something of a hiatus31 as the cause is not back
before the Ordinary until 29 June 1793, when upon advising these memorials,32 he
took the cause to report and ordered Informations for that purpose.
The parties then drew Informations in relation to this point. For the suspenders, the
Information33 was drawn by David Cathcart and extends to 21 pages. For the
charger, the Information34 was drawn by James Clerk and extends to 17 pages.35
Firstly the suspenders' position as laid in the Information is summarised (bearing in
mind that this would probably have been considered good written pleading). After a
three page narration of the previous procedure, it states the 'facts which relate to the
point'. It opens with drawing the Lords attention to the importance and novelty of
the point:
'Your Lordships will be sensible, that this is a question of very
considerable importance to the proprietors of temporal lands in
Scotland, as this attempt, which is now for the first time made, goes the
length of subjecting their property to a severe and heavy burden, of
which it has always hitherto been entirely free ...'
although continues that 'the question, although of importance, seems not to be of
very difficult discussion.'
There then follows a full discourse on the position of glebes before the Reformation,
noticing statutes 1563. cap. 72, and 1572. cap. 48 with full incorporation of their
contents, together with Sir George M'Kenzie's (sic) observations on the latter act and
31 perhaps due to various representations to the Ordinary?
32 These are not in the papers.
33 It is dated 5th September 1793
34 It is dated 10th September 1793
35 It was common to have even lengthier pleadings.
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the case of Inverkeithing contra Kerr 11th February 1631, Durie's Decisions. Then
there is a discussion relating to contiguous glebes, covering the previous defects in
the law, which were rectified by statutes 1592, cap. 118 and 1593, cap. 165,1606 cap.
7,1644, cap. 31 (again with quotations), the law developing such that any designation
to a minister should be from the lands of the parish. Over the next five pages, the law
is applied to the particular facts of the case. Then reference is made to the 'opinions
of our lawyers' citing Stair,36 Bankton37, Erskine,38 all showing that 'Every lawyer,
then who has written upon the subject, is clearly of opinion, that a glebe cannot be
designed from temporal lands, if any church lands remain in the Parish.'
There follows an analysis of the charger's position in law,39 and this is applied and
tested against the facts. It concludes,
'Upon the whole, therefore, the suspenders humbly flatter themselves,
that they have shown your Lordships, that it has been the constant and
invariable intention of the Legislature, to confine the burden of glebes to
church lands alone; and that temporal lands can only at present be
designed in the event of there being no church lands in the parish; and
as, therefore they have pointed out church lands, most convenient for a
glebe, within half a mile of the kirk, they cannot doubt that your
Lordships will suspend the decree of the presbytery, making a
designation of the nearest temporal lands. In respect whereof, &c.'
36II, 2, 40 and the case of Lord Forrat contra Maters, 6th February 1678
37II, 8,126
38II, 10, 596
39 (including his previous 'objections') which are measured against reported cases. Nicolson
contra Porteus 2nd July 1722 Diet. Vol. (obliterated) p.337; Haliburton contra Paterson 13"1 July
1636 Durie's Decisions, Pottar against Ure, reported by Lord Kaimes in Dictionary Vol. I voce
Glebe 5th December 1710 (which the Charger states was differently reported by Lord
Fountainhall and which report is any event analysed), Durie and Black contra Thomson 12th
December 1755 Diet., vol. 3, p. 147 voce Glebe,
The Reverend charger's Information40 commences in the same manner, detailing all
of the preceding procedure, then the facts relating to the lands of the parish and the
same Acts (with slightly different passages therefrom quoted). Erskine is cited,41 as is
Bankton,42 Stair being notable by his absence. Much is made of the decision observed
by Fountainhall43 and only some of the cases44 cited by the suspenders, are referred
to as they 'are the only ones that bear any reference to it' the charger leaving 'this
branch of the cause to your Lordships consideration without any farther
observations, being firmly persuaded that your Lordships will be guided by the
spirit and intendment of these acts of Parliament'. All of this is 'his argument upon
the general point' before progressing (at page 11) to 'the particular circumstances of
the case' which it is said 'will tend to strengthen the argument upon the general
question very much, and to show that the exemption claimed by the heritors of
temporal lands, is neither founded in the strict interpretation of the acts of
Parliament, nor in the equity of the case'. Arguments are then advanced, applying
'the intention of the Legislature to accommodate clergymen' to the individual facts of
the village and Parish of Kingsbarns. The arguments of the suspenders are
discredited, the stronger their plea is based 'upon the general point' - so much the
better it is for the charger's argument as it 'endeavours to deduce45 from the
particular situation of the parish.' Inferences are drawn, presumptions argued, and
appeals are made to judicial knowledge, lest the temporal heritors 'take an undue
advantage, and commit manifest injustice.' It concludes with the point made that the
40 It is dated 10 September 1793. Both are taken from the Faculty Collection of Session Papers,
Advocates' Library, 1793 No 124
41II, 10, 59
42 II, 8, 6
43 See above.
44 viz. Halliburton; Forrat; Potter (as above)
45 By this time, the word 'deduce' could be used in the same manner as 'inferred' had been
used in the earlier period. See chapter 1.
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Lord Ordinary pronounced a decision, in respect of the half acre, in favour of the
charger, which was adhered to by the Court, which 'appears extremely favourable to
the plea which he at present humbly maintains'.
The Court heard parties again on 17 January 1794 and pronounced the following
interlocutor:
'Upon Report of Lord Monboddo, and having advised the mutual
informations for the parties, the Lords find the lands of Lochfurr, being
temporal lands, are not liable to be designated for a glebe to the minister,
when there are church-lands in the parish, and therefore sustain the
reasons of suspension of that designation, and in so far suspend the
letter and decern'.
Morison's Dictionary gives an account of the case.46 It records that 'The Court were
much divided in their sentiments.' Several of the Judges considering that where
church lands lay at an inconvenient distance, the glebe should be designated from
temporal lands, properly interpreting the statutes of 1649 and 1663. However, the
majority, whilst appreciating the hardship on the minister, opined that as 'in this
question the power of the Court arose entirely from statutes, they were bound to
adhere to their strict letter' and on a sound construction, church lands must first be
designated, 'especially as this was the opinion of Stair, whose authority must have
great weight in all cases like the present which turn upon the construction of our
older statutes, and where the point is not settled by a train of decisions.'47 Thus, 'by a
46 William Maxwell Morison, The Decisions of the Court ofSession from its first institution to the
present time, digested under proper heads, in the form ofa Dictionary, (Edinburgh, 1803), Vol. XI,
1794, No.22, p.5140.
47 On this as a development in the citation of authority, particularly in relation to older Scots
Law, see J. W. G. Blackie, 'Stair's Later Reputation as a Jurist' in (ed.) D. M. Walker, Stair
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narrow majority' the Court found that the lands allocated by the presbytery, being
temporal lands, were not liable to be designated, when there were church-lands in
the parish; and therefore sustained the reasons of suspension of that designation.
This, however, was not quite the end of the matter. The Reverend charger reclaimed
by Petition48 (of 26 pages) covering the same ground and concluding that
'The Petitioner has the greatest respect for the suspenders; but he cannot
help saying, that he has been very much surprised indeed at their
conduct in the present process, as he is not sensible of requesting
anything which it was improper in him to ask, or becoming in them to
refuse.'
The suspenders gave in answers49 (10 pages). On 10 June 1794, the Court, on advising
the reclaiming petition with answers, adhered.
Thus, the cause, from the first 'debate' before the Ordinary on 19th January 1791 to its
final determination on 10 June 1794 had taken three and a half years.
The pleadings demonstrate some of the points raised in chapter 1, that a cause
required to ripen and develop. That it took four years to reach a resolution was not
uncommon of the time. The pleadings themselves show the tactics each party chose
to adopt and the urging 'but a little at a time' of one's case until the position of the
opponent became more apparent. One is struck in reading the pleadings that, with
the removal of the rhetoric and the versions of previous procedural events, the
Centenary Studies, op. cit. pp. 207-27 at 219-20 and also John W. Cairns, Historical Introduction,
op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 170-171.
48 dated 29th January 1794. Session Papers, Advocates' Library, No. 125
49 dated 10th April 1794
x
presentation in writing is not greatly removed from what could be presented orally
in a modern debate. There is citation of previous decisions of the Court, Acts of
Parliament, and references to principles enunciated by institutional writers. The
submissions fall into general and particular categories and the law is ascertained and
tested against the facts as the argument is developed.
Postscript
There is a postscript to the case, disclosed later in Morison's Dictionary50 and what
was to happen sums up much of what was wrong with procedure, process and
pleading in the late eighteenth century. Following the Court's decision on 10 June
1794, the presbytery designed the glebe out of the church lands51 at Newton
belonging to a Mr. Balfour Hay. He now brought a suspension against the
designation, there being other church lands lying more contiguous to the manse.52
Lord Monboddo again was the Ordinary and again reported to the Lords. On 17 May
1798 the Lords advised on Informations and repelled the suspension which
interlocutor Hay reclaimed against. The Court ordered Answers for the other parties
concerned in the designation (the other heritors)53 and on 27 November 1798 the
Lords (two of whom were with the arguments for the suspender) adhered to the
interlocutor reclaimed against but reserving to Hay a claim against the other heritors.
On pronouncing this, 'great doubts were entertained of the propriety of the
judgment 10 June 1794',54 and Hay presented another reclaiming petition.55 Upon
50 Appendix, Part I, pp. 3-9
51 that is originally they were Church lands.
52 the closer lands were lands originally belonging to a bishopric and the College of St.
Andrews.
53 including the (by now) Henry Erskine still as assisted by Cathcart
54 i.e. the Court's decision in Erskine's earlier case. In 1796, Henry Erskine, old Dean and the
embodiment ofWhiggery, had been removed by machinations of his political adversaries.
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advising this petition, with answers, the Lords adhered to the interlocutor
complained of but found:
'that in the circumstances of this case, the minister has the right to have
his glebe designed out of lands lying near to his manse whether they be
kirk-lands or temporal lands; but found that the heritor whose lands
shall be so designed, is entitled to a proportional relief from the other
heritors in the parish, liable in payment of the £60. Scots hitherto
received by the minister in lieu of a glebe.'56
Thus, nearly a decade later, the minister had his glebe and the Court had altered its
position.57 William Forbes' praise of Scotland's Form of Process (detailed at the start
of chapter one) in the first years of the century was undeserved at the end of it. Such
eulogies would have rung hollow to litigants such as the minister of Kingsbarns,
forced through such machinations, and the case in its conclusion had been successful
for him. It would have been galling to those whose causes took a similar path and for
whom the outcome was different.58
55 arguing that he had been a minor at the time of the decision and it was not therefore
binding on him, and stating reasons for the alteration of the judgment.
56 my emphasis
57 There was at this time no concept of stare decisis See T. B. Smith, 'British Justice: The Scottish
Contribution ' Hamlyn Lectures, 1963, pp.75-77
58 See the case of Groat v. Sinclair 15th May 1819, Fac. Coll, initiated in 1780 to recover payment
of the price of certain lands together with interest and the near quarter of a century taken to
resolve the litigation.
Appendix 2
Illustrative Examples ofWritten Pleadings in the Faculty of
Advocates' Session Papers in the period 1843 - 1863
One can obtain an indication of the methods used in pleadings across the period
examined in Chapter Three from the Session Papers of Session Cases stored in the
Advocates' Library.1
This brief excursus into the pleading practices of the period should be read in
conjunction with Chapter Three.
First Period 1843
In the first sample one observes long and often rambling summonses met by
defences in short compass. Following revisal, re-revised or re-re-revised
condescendences and answers for the parties put the pleadings in a semblance of
order. Long passages from statutes are commonly cited. Pleas in law are appended
in separate Notes as per the statutory directions. There are general pleas in law in the
form 'There are no grounds either set forth in the summons, or existing in the
circumstances of the case, for setting aside the deeds sought to be reduced' (or other
remedies sought). The specific pleas often contain lengthy propositions of law and
cite authority - mirroring those citations in gremio of the Condescendence and
1 The exercise is illustrative only. I have taken four periods, all in the Winter Session, a
decade apart. The papers mainly consist of the process from hearings before the Inner House.
The review was conducted using the Faculty of Advocates' General Collection (ALSP Gen.
Coll.) The four periods and Session Papers are a] 1st November 1843 - 2nd December Vol. 391,
No.'s 5-27; b] 1853 2nd November - 7th December Vol. 477, No.'s 1 - 32; c] 1863 2nd November
- 9th December Vol. 567 No.'s 1-53; d] 1873 15lh October - 22nd November Vol. 643 12 - 45. For
further discussion on the Session Papers held in the Advocates' Library see the recent
valuable paper by Angus Stewart, Q.C., - 'The Session Papers in the Advocates Library' in
H.L. MacQueen (ed.), 'Miscellany Fonr' (Stair Soc., Edinburgh, 2002) 199 - 223.
Answers. 'Appendices' are attached to the pleadings and lodged in process
containing the 'deeds and writs produced in process' and sometimes Memorials or
Cases for the Opinion of Counsel as well as the Opinions of Counsel. Parties mark
that they 'agree to close the record' on the revised pleadings and further procedure is
appointed by the Court. At this stage the pleadings often comprise short statements
of facts, sometimes in three or four lines, answered with 'admitted' or 'admitted
under reference to' for example, a document produced by the other party or
'admitted under reference' to that party's own separate statement of fact, the latter
being widespread. 'Denied', 'Denied in toto', 'The whole of this article is denied', or
denials of particular averments appear. One often sees 'the rest of the article is
denied' or similar wording and at the end, as the situation required 'Quoad ultra
denied' or 'Quoad ultra admitted'. Sometimes less circumspect language is used: 'this
article is in general an entire misrepresentation, and the allegations contained in it
are denied.' There are various 'Statements of belief' of the veracity of the other's
averments - 'the defender believes the statement here to be true' or [a particular
statement] is 'denied and quoad ultra [the party] does not know and does not admit
the truth.' There are phrases such as '[the content of the averment] is true but under
explanation'. Some answers are to more than one condescendence. Evidence is often
pleaded and argumentative pleading is common. Averments going to the probability
of one's averments and the improbability of the averments of one's opponent can be
seen.
Second Period 1853
In the second period the approach seems to have been similar to the earlier period,
although summonses are in the new format, but not always. Revised
condescendences and answers are short and to the point. Pleas are still in general
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and specific form. The general plea to the relevancy is stated as 'The pleas are
irrelevant, (incompetent) and groundless' or 'The pursuer has not set forth
averments relevant or sufficient to entitle him to decree as concluded for'. There are
general pleas for pursuers stated as 'The pursuer is entitled to decree in terms of the
conclusion of the libel' or other such similar wording. 'Admitted', 'Admitted under
reference', 'Denied' and 'Quoad ultra admitted or denied' are still used. 'Believed to
be true' and 'not known and not admitted' appear. The pleas in law are now shorter
and authority is not so frequently cited therein. One often sees explanations for
previous procedure explaining that a party had wanted to close the Record on the
Summons and Defences - ' the pursuers, being desirous of closing the Record on the
Summons and Defences, but requiring before doing so to make certain additions to
the condescendence annexed to the summons in respect of certain statements of the
defenders.' Parties seek amendments - 'leave craved to allow to amend [the
condescendence or answers] by deleting and substituting therefor' or' substitute
instead thereof' Argumentative averments and averments of probability still appear
although seem less frequent.
Third Period 1863
The third period sees a continuation of the development of the language of admitted
and denied and 'quoad ultra and one sees 'denied as stated', 'denied insofar as they
do not coincide', 'No admission is made' and 'not admitted'. Deeds and documents
are 'referred to for their terms'. Documents or other previous pleading are often
'referred to' - 'reference is made to the pursuer's [or defender's] other 'statements'
or other parts of the pleading. There is no 'incorporation'. Condescendences and
Answers are longer. General pleas are common - 'the present action being
unnecessary and unfounded the defender ought to be assoilzied', 'The conclusions
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for [whatever remedy] being unfounded and untenable, the defender ought to be
assoilzied therefrom.', 'The pursuer has not set forth averments relevant or sufficient
to entitle him to decree as concluded for', 'the averments and pleas of the pursuers
are irrelevant and insufficient to support the conclusions of the summons.' General
pleas on the merits are also found - 'generally in the circumstances above set forth
the pursuers are entitled to decreet as concluded for', 'in all the circumstances before
condescended upon the pursuer is entitled to decree in terms of the conclusions of
the summons.'2 Where cases are ordered these are often long3 extrapolations of the
law and contain detailed argument. Commissions are frequent and adjournments or
prorogations numerous.
The Fourth Period 1873
The fourth period demonstrates pleadings in similar terms to the third. There is the
same use of 'admitted' with or without qualifications. So there is a simple 'admitted',
or in embellished form, admitting the whole article of condescendence: 'The facts set
forth in this article are admitted. Quoad ultra no admission is made.' The admissions
with qualifications are 'admitted under explanation' or 'admitted under reference to
[the document] itself' or 'Under the following explanation [ ] the article is admitted.'
'Quoad ultra denied' is frequent as is 'Quoad ultra not admitted.' 'Quoad ultra not
known and not admitted' or 'This fact is not within the knowledge of the defender
and therefore not admitted' is used or in longer form, 'Quoad ultra the statements
contained in answer to this article are not known and not admitted'. 'The statements
of the defender embodied in his defence to this article are denied' then particular
2 Even after Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis' decision in Young & Co. v. Graham 1860 23 D. 36 see
above.
3 Sometimes up to fifty pages.
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denials. Quoad ultra denied (or not admitted) so far as inconsistent with this answer.'
Documents are very often 'referred to for their terms.' The pleas are short and very
rarely contain citation. Specific pleas are well drafted. General pleas are common
'The pursuer is entitled to decree in terms of the conclusions of the libel' or 'the
pursuer is entitled in all the circumstances to decree in terms of the conclusions'.
Pleas to the relevancy appear as e.g. 'The averments of the pursuer are irrelevant and
insufficient in law to support the conclusions of the summons against the defender'
There are pleas to the facts: 'The averments upon which the pursuer's claim rested
being unfounded entitles the defender to be assoilzied',' The statements on which
the conclusions of this summons are based being unfounded in fact, the pursuer has
no good ground of action and the defender should be assoilzied' So also, 'The pleas
of the defenders being unfounded, ought to be repelled and decree pronounced
against him in terms of the conclusions of the summons' or 'the averments of the
pursuer being unfounded in fact and there being no grounds truly existing to
support the conclusions of the summons, the defenders ought to be assoilzied with
expenses.' Proof before answer allowed 'The Lord Ordinary while indicating that a
proof must be allowed has thought it better at present to repel none of the pleas of
the parties until the facts are ascertained'.
Observations
The regulation of pleading changed significantly across the period and one might
have expected to see greater changes in the pleadings from the Session Papers.
Pleading of argument, rhetoric and probability certainly decreases. The length of
articles of condescendence and answers increases. The number of articles of
condescendence are greatest in the middle period - sometimes as high as thirty. The
presentation of the averments in the condescendence and answers follows both
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styles prescribed by s.106 of A.S. 11 July 1828 although the 'double column' method
becomes increasingly infrequent. This is maybe because when printed in this way,
the text is very small and difficult to read. The Notice of 6 March 1839 by Lords
Ordinary does not appear to have been obtempered.
We do not see pleas to specification. There are pleas that the averments of the
pursuer are irrelevant and insufficient to support the conclusions of the summons,
but not that they are Tacking in specification.' This formulation seems to have
developed much later.4
4 See discussion in Chapter 3.
Appendix 3(a)
Sheriff Court Survey
Pro Forma Questionnaire sent to solicitors' firms
1. Firm Name:
2. Position:
3. Local Sheriff Court
4. Approximately, what proportion of the civil litigation workload
of your firm is:
ordinary non-consistorial (ordinary)?
ordinary consistorial (family)?
5. How many fee earners participate in civil litigation
within your firm?
6. Do you use agency
solicitors for appearances? yes / no
7. Do you act as agent for other solicitors? yes / no
Written Pleading
8. How would you evaluate the standard of written
pleading in the sheriff court? poor / moderate / good
9. Do you consider that the standard of written pleading
has fallen in the last ten years? yes / no
10. Has the introduction of OCR 1993 affected the standard
of written pleading? yes / no
11. Do you hold training programs e.g. seminars, workshops etc.
for trainees and young solicitors learning to draft written pleadings? yes / no
12. Should the current system of written pleadings remain part
of civil litigation? yes / no
13. Do you consider that 'abbreviated pleading' (as per Cullen proposals)
should be introduced into the sheriff court in:
a) family cases? yes / no
b) ordinary cases? yes / no
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14. If 'abbreviated pleading' was introduced, do you consider that
problems would arise with requirements of specification and relevancy? yes / no
OCR 1993 as amended
15. Did you consider that the previous rules required revision? yes / no
16. In your opinion, has OCR 1993 reduced delay in
a) family actions? yes / no
b) ordinary actions? yes / no
17. Do you consider that OCR 1993 has altered practitioner attitudes? yes / no
18. Is there inconsistency in shrieval approach as to the interpretation
of OCR 1993? yes / no
19. Do you think that the exercise of a sheriff's discretion is
sometimes dependant upon the reputation of the defaulter? yes / no
20. Have shrieval approaches to procedural errors generally become
more lenient since the introduction of OCR 1993? yes / no
21. How often do you lodge motions for summary decree? rarely / infrequently / often
22. Generally, do you move for decree by default (if competent)
for an opponent's default? yes / no
23. Have you had expenses awarded against you personally for default? yes / no
24. If you have experience of family litigation in the sheriff court, do
you consider OCR 1993 as suitable for family actions? yes / no
25. In your court, are options hearings held on more than one day? yes / no
26. Are family and ordinary options hearings held on different days? yes / no
27. Do you consider that individual options hearings should be
heard at e.g. 15min intervals? yes / no
28. Generally, in your opinion, what proportion of records are
not lodged for options hearings? [%]
29. Is this proportion increasing / static / decreasing?
30. If the record has not been lodged timeously, do the sheriff clerks
in your court accept the record as 'tendered'? yes / no
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31. In general, are sheriffs pro-active at options hearings? yes / no
32. Do sheriffs in your court adopt a strict approach at options hearings?
(as expounded in case law)
33. What is your perception of the proportion of cases that
are dismissed for failing to lodge a record? [%]
34. In your court, if the sheriff has not had the opportunity
of reading the record (i.e. default), generally does he / she
a) continue the options hearing?
b) hear parties and try to read the record on the bench?
c) adjourn the hearing until the end of the options roll?
d)discharge and re-assign the options hearing?
e) (if ContOH) continue the options hearing for a second time?
35. Have you appealed an options hearing 'decision' of a sheriff ?
36. In your experience, what proportion of options hearings
(in total) are continued?







37. Do you consider that the adjustment period should be time limited?
38. Do you find adjustment by opposing parties at, or near, the last
permitted day for adjustment to be problematic?
39. Do you consider that this is sometimes used tactically?
40. If this is done prior to an continued options hearing, in general
how do sheriffs proceed?
a) by amendment?
b) by further adjustment?






41. In comparison with the situation pre-1993, is the incidence
of diets of debates presently fixed:
42. If the incidence is lower, do you consider that this is
due to the requirement that 'OCR 22 Notes' must be lodged?
higher / the same / lower?
yes / no
43. At an options hearing, are you required by the sheriff to justify
any OCR 22 Notes?




45. What is your perception of the incidence of motions to sist
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made by parties in ordinary actions?
46. Have you ever encountered 'time limited1 periods of sist? yes / no
47. Is Additional Procedure commonly used? yes / no
Pro-activity, Case management and Adversarialism
48. Do you consider that a sheriff should hear an individual
case from its commencement to its conclusion:
a) In family cases? yes / no / undecided
b) In ordinary cases? yes / no / undecided
49. Do you consider that sheriffs should specialise in 'areas'
of law? (if logistically possible) yes / no / undecided
50. Should the sheriff court become the only court of first instance? yes / no / undecided
51. Should a sheriff have the power to call for evidence? yes / no / undecided
52. Should the sheriff have the power to call parties? yes / no / undecided
53. Should there be an additional 'options hearing' or 'procedural
hearing' prior to a diet of final disposal? yes / no / undecided
54. In your opinion, does increased judicial discretion lead to
decreased consistency in judicial approach? yes / no
55. Do you consider that the adversarial nature of civil litigation
hampers settlement? yes / no
56. Should solicitors be paid for taking avoidable procedural steps
in litigation yes / no
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study
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Introduction Thisresearchw scarriedoutt l citpractitioners'vi wsnt p rationfO d aryC eRul1993scertaih theprofessionviewedwrittl adingsa rtfsh riffcourvilp cedure.T eportedaft rtimplem ntat on rulessuggestedthatnewystemnd rtRwabeingimplem n edconflictingysath tdiff r nturt differentsheriffsw retak ngdi ferentapproachesndindh ldiv ge tvi wot rov sionsw rbnt et d. Theliteraturesugg st datolicitorsthems lv sl odifferent irpini nsh wprovis nsw esupp s dp ate andwhatasappropriateitheprep r tionofparties' le dingst tO tiH ringandthereafter.1T roject wasdesignedtoascertainhvi wsfpractitionersroSc tla dt eseme . Inthedebateleadingupocrea ioft1993R l s,ndf rsometimet er aft r,holwri tenpleadi gsicivil procedurewasbeingquestio ed.Conven nally,pl i gsrmecha ismf r quiringancouragingthp rti litigationostateclearlyndnciselyth irrespe tivepositionfactdl w,adx di ousl ,su hsb gfor h clearlythdisputablem tterbetw ent mforC ur 'sd termination.Asca vassedp r5,htradi io alv wt wastheparties2hodictat dcontentfpl dingsyh ,bytla1980nearly9f nacquiredf t controloverthprogressfrdinaryactioish riffc urt.Tp ovisionstRulw ede i nedre e , institutingdefinitivetimeperiodsforhprepa a ioofl adingsanquiringpartis eN ft e rleg losit o sbef r considerationouldbgiventpermittingadi tfebate.Thw it rishedasc rtainh hert ys mwripl adi gs hadbeenaffectedyth sndoth rprovisionsfth1993Rulesawhatpracti i nersthem elvtuallyt ughtabor tten pleadingsandth ircontinuedusi ivilprocedure.Aa tft rly90sdeb tmentionedab ve,hb ootthat writtenpleadingsshouldbscrappedcom letelyanr placwith'abbreviatedpleadings'tli fkinghb e adopted(inpart)byLordCullenshw sthi iReviewfB sin sOut rHousetC uS ssion.(Sc t i hrt Administration,Edi burgh1996).Theviewsoftpractitionersnda sociatedpiwsou t. 1SeediscussionnChapter5 2Throughout,referenceismadet'parties' r'litigants'.hip rtfwellknowneup mismat parties'l advi rsho actuallyct.Thesewordscanbr aden ompassingo hlitig ntatheiradvis rs.
Ashasbeenexploredinthemainxtofh is,r ceptionsch gei ivilprocedurev yoftturuh wchang






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40.Ifthisisdoneprioranco t uedop i ns













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Pro Forma Questionnaire sent to all full time sheriffs
This was the questionnaire sent to the Sheriffs in the six Sheriffdoms.
1. How long have you been a full time sheriff?
2. Before your appointment as a sheriff were you
an advocate or a solicitor? [Advocate / Solicitor]
3. Have you always been a sheriff in this
sheriffdom? [yes / no]
4. If not, in which sheriffdom(s) were you previously
resident?
5. What proportion of your workload is allocated to
ordinary non-consistorial actions?
Written Pleading
6. How would you evaluate the standard of written
pleading in the sheriff court? [poor / moderate / good]
[Comment]
7. Do you consider that the standard of written
pleading has fallen in the last ten years? [yes / no]
8. Has the introduction of OCR 1993 affected the
standard of written pleading? [yes / no]
9. If yes, in what way?
10. Do you consider that 'abbreviated pleadings'
should form part of ordinary procedure? [yes / no / undecided]
10. If so, would this remove pleas to
relevancy and specification? [yes / no / undecided]
OCR 1993 as amended
12. Did you consider that the previous ordinary
cause rules required revision? [yes / no]
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13. Have the OCR 1993 altered practitioner
attitudes?
14. In your opinion, have the OCR 1993 reduced
delay in the disposal of ordinary actions?
15. Were you given official guidance as to
the exercise of the pro-active powers prior to
the implementation of OCR 1993?
16. Has this been continuous?
17. If not, would you wish continuous
training/guidance?





Options Hearings, adjustment, amendment and debate
18. Have you observed another sheriff
conducting an options hearing?
19. Are you allocated time within the court
schedule to read records prior to options
hearings?
20. In your court, are options hearings held
on more than one day in the week?
21. Do you consider that individual options
hearings should be heard at e.g. 15min
intervals?
22. What proportion of records are not lodged
for an options hearing?
23. Is this proportion:
24. In your experience, what proportion of
options hearings are continued?
25. Do you read through the process if
the record has not been lodged timeously
for an options hearing?
26. If the record has not been lodged for an
options hearing, and the parties are in
attendance at the options hearing, in general,





[increasing / static / decreasing]
[yes / no]
[yes / no]
27. If there is no record for the options
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hearing and no-one appears, do you dismiss
the case? [yes / no]
28. Is the exercise of your discretion dependant
upon the reputation (for default) of the defaulter? [yes / no]
29. For actions dismissed, what proportion of
these dismissals are on the defender's motion?
30. If in general you do not dismiss actions, do you:
continue the options hearing? [yes / no]
try to read the record on the bench? [yes / no]
discharge and re-assign the options hearing? [yes / no]
continue the options hearing for a second time? [yes / no]
31. Would you award expenses against a pursuer for
the default of no record
ex proprio motu? [yes / no]
on defender's motion? [yes / no]
32. Have you awarded expenses against a solicitor
personally? [yes / no]
33. Do you consider that adjustment should be
time limited? [yes / no]
34. If one party makes significant adjustments on
or near the final day for adjustment prior to a
continued options hearing, would you permit the
other to answer? [yes / no]
If yes: [by adjustment (& Record)]
[by amendment & Hearing)]
35. Do you perceive the current use of amendment
in actions as: [increasing / static / decreasing]
36. In your interpretation of OCR 14.3.(2)(c), does
the sheriff have pro-active powers akin to an options
hearing? [yes / no]
37. In comparison the situation pre-1993, is the
incidence of diets of debates fixed: [higher / the same / lower]
38. If the incidence is lower, is this due to the
requirement that 'OCR 22 Notes' must be lodged? [yes / no]
39. At an options hearing, do you require solicitors
to justify any OCR 22 Notes? [yes / no]
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40. Does your court have a Miscellaneous
Procedure Roll or Procedure Roll?
41. Is OCR 1993 Ch. 10 Additional Procedure
commonly moved for?
42. Have you ever 'time limited' a period of sist?
Pro-activity, case management
43. Do you consider that a sheriff should hear an
individual case from its commencement to
its conclusion?
44. Do you consider sheriffs should specialise
in 'areas' of law?
45. Should the sheriff court become the only
court of first instance?
46. Should a sheriff have the power to call
for evidence?
47. Should the sheriff have the power to call
parties?
48. Should there be an additional 'options
hearing' prior to a diet of final disposal?
49. In your opinion, does increased judicial
discretion lead to decreased consistency in
judicial approach?
50. Do you consider that the adversarial nature
of civil litigation hampers settlement?
51. Should solicitors be paid for taking avoidable




[yes / no / undecided]
[yes / no / undecided]
[yes / no / undecided]
[yes / no / undecided]
[yes / no / undecided]






Sheriff Court Survey Results Collated for all Sheriffdoms
Introduction
This research was carried out to ascertain sheriffs' views on the operation of the
Ordinary Cause Rules 1993 and written pleadings as part of sheriff court civil
procedure. The cases reported after the implementation of the rules suggested that
the new system under the Rules was being implemented in conflicting ways and that
different courts and different sheriffs were taking different approaches and indeed
held divergent views on how the provisions were to be interpreted. The literature
suggested that solicitors themselves also differed in their opinions as to how the
provisions were supposed to operate and what was appropriate in the preparation of
parties' pleadings to the point of the Options Hearing and thereafter.1 This project
was designed to ascertain the views of sheriffs across Scotland on these themes.
In the debate leading up to the creation of the 1993 Rules, and for sometime
thereafter, the role of written pleadings in civil procedure was being questioned.
Conventionally, pleadings were a mechanism for requiring and encouraging the
parties to a litigation to state clearly and concisely their respective positions in fact
and law, and to do so expeditiously, such as to bring forth clearly the disputable
matter between them for the Court's determination. As canvassed in Chapter 5, the
traditional view was that it was the parties2 who dictated the content of the pleadings
and they had, by the late 1980s and early 1990s often acquired de facto control over
the progress of ordinary actions in the sheriff court. The provisions of the Rules were
designed to reverse this trend, instituting definitive time periods for the preparation
of pleadings and requiring parties to state Notes of their legal positions before
consideration could be given to permitting a diet of debate. The writer wished to
ascertain whether the system of written pleadings had been affected by these and
other provisions of the Rules and what practitioners themselves actually thought
about written pleadings and their continued use in civil procedure. As part of the
early 90s debate mentioned above, it had been mooted that written pleadings should
be scrapped completely and replaced with 'abbreviated pleadings' and this line of
thinking had been adopted by Lord Cullen (as he then was) in his Review of the
Business of the Outer House of the Court ofSession. (Scottish Courts Administration,
Edinburgh, 1996). The views of the practitioners on this and associated topics was
sought.
As has been explored in the main text of the thesis, receptions of changes in civil
procedure very often turn upon the how the change is viewed by practitioners,
whether it is followed in practice and how courts react to situations when deviations
from the prescribed course are requested by the parties. The first step, though, is to
ascertain the views of those who must in practice follow and abide by the changes.
Secondly, any change must be implemented by the courts, sometimes with, other
1 See discussion in Chapter 5
2 Throughout, reference is made to 'parties' or 'litigants'. This is part of the well known
euphemism that it is the parties' legal advisers who actually act. These words can be read as
encompassing both litigants and their advisers.
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times without the practitioner's concurrence. Finally, if there are deviations from a
prescribed course, one must ask whether they are 'one-offs', permitted in the
interests of justice, or whether there are the start of a deeper erosion. The 1993 Rules
prescribed the course to be followed in Ordinary Actions in the Sheriff Courts of
Scotland and following implementation, all of this was apparent from the case law.
The research here was designed to test this directly with the practitioners. The results
are interesting and go some way to affirming the hypothesis and confirming the case
law. The results, as appropriate are incorporated into the main body of the thesis text
together with analysis of them.
Methodology
The research was carried out in the period September 1997 - February 1998. The
methodology adopted was to send a questionnaire and a S.A.E.'s with a covering
letter to all the (then) full-time practising sheriffs in the six Sheriffdoms in Scotland.







1. How long have you been a full time sheriff? Average
14.8 years
68
2. Before your appointment as a sheriff were you an





3. Have you always been a sheriff in this sheriffdom? 68
yes 37
no 31
4. If not, in which sheriffdom(s) were you previously
resident?






6. How would you evaluate the standard of written











7. Do you consider that the standard of written pleading




8. Has the introduction of OCR 1993 affected the




9. If yes, in what way? See
Comments3
10. Do you consider that 'abbreviated pleadings' should





Don't understand the concept 2






Don't understand the concept 2
OCR 1993 as amended





yes, but not replacement 1
yes, in part 1
13. Have the OCR 1993 altered practitioner attitudes? 69
yes 47
3 The following were received as comments: 'dramatically - there is now a need to be specific
earlier and avoid waffle'; 'improved generally because of need to focus at an earlier stage';
'favourably'; 'very slightly improved'; slight improvement'; 'improved'; 'more slipshod and
hurried'; 'not significantly'; 'in several ways'; 'some of the emphasis for clear pleadings has
been removed by the rules'; 'a little better'; 'improved a bit'; 'concentration of minds'; 'agents
now think anything goes'; 'more precise/timeous';' more focussed'; 'practitioners think
about relevancy more closely'; 'discussion at options hearing frequently identified remediable
deficiencies'; 'agents think more carefully about what they put in their pleadings when they






yes + qualification 1
14. In your opinion, have the OCR 1993 reduced delay in




15. Were you given official guidance as to the exercise of






don't understand the question 3




don't understand the question 1




discussion would be useful 1
question misconceived 1
Options Hearings, adjustment, amendment and debate




19. Are you allocated time within the court schedule to 69




20. In your court, are options hearings held on more than





21. Do you consider that individual options hearings




















25. Do you read through the process if the record has not





if looks settled 1
depends on circumstances 2
26. If the record has not been lodged for an options
hearing, and the parties are in attendance at the options




depends on reason 3
hear parties first 1
yes, or award expenses 1
generally no/ depends on reasons
not necessarily 2
sometimes 1
no, if motion is made 1
dismiss 50% 1
27. If there is no record for the options hearing and no-





yes, but few 1
yes + qualification 3
no 9
not always 1
4 The following were received as responses to this question: 'small'; 'very small now'; they are
almost always lodged unless the case has settled'; 'I don't have any statistics'; 'very few in
this court'; 'very few'; Tow'; '50%'; '20%'; '15%'; '10%'; '10-15%'; 'about 5%'; '5%'; 'less than
5%'; 3%'; '2%'; '0.1%'; 'none'; 'impossible question';' a few dismissals have had a very
salutary effect'.
5 The following were received as responses to this question: 'proportion continued 50%'; '75%
(probably my fault)'; '25%'; 'approximately 40%'; '50%'; '50-60%'; '70%'; '75%'; '60%'; 'a third
to a half; '90%'.
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not necessarily 1
not without inquiry 1
not usually 1
probably not 1
no, peremptory diet 1
varies 1
never happened 1
28. Is the exercise of your discretion dependant upon the






saves appeal procedure 1
don't know 1
29. For actions dismissed, what proportion of these See
dismissals are on the defender's motion? comments6
30. If in general you do not dismiss actions, do you:




depends on circumstances 2
yes ex proprio motu 1
either continue or read 1
sometimes 1
MPR 1





depends on circumstances 2
either continue or read 1
MPR 1
discharge and re-assign the options hearing? 54
yes 4
no 45
yes, but depends on circumstances 1
depends on circumstances 2
sometimes 1
MPR 1
continue the options hearing for a second time? 58
6 The following were received as responses to this question: 'unable to say'; 'it has hardly ever
happened although I would not dismiss unless the defender moved for it'; 'most I would
think'; 'practically nil'; all but they are few'; '100%'; 'nil'; 'not known'; 'no idea'; 'don't know';
'50%'; 'very small proportion'; 'it is not a question of the defender's motion. The action must
be dismissed unless the pursuer has a (good) explanation. The defender's attitude may have a




depends on circumstances 1
MPR 1
31. Would you award expenses against a pursuer for the
default of no record







depends on reasons 2
depends on circumstances 2
never had to 1







depends on reasons 2
depends on circumstances 2
maybe 1
never had to 1






yes, but not for this 3





depends on circumstances 1
34. If one party makes significant adjustments on or near
the final day for adjustment prior to a continued options









by adjustment (& Record)
yes 16
yes, if permitted by the rules 1
no 1
depends on circumstances 4
depends on history 1





by amendment (& Hearing) 48
yes 31
no 2
depends on circumstances 4
depends on history 1













36 In your interpretation of OCR 14.3.(2)(c), does the





37. In comparison with the situation pre-1993, is the





38 If the incidence is lower, is this due to the requirement





39 At an options hearing, do you require solicitors to 66
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justify any OCR 22 Notes?
yes 28
yes, in outline 1
yes, on occasion 2
yes, sometimes 1
yes, if necessary 1
yes and no 1
no 25
depends on terms of note 3


















43. Do you consider that a sheriff should hear an 68





depends on circumstances 1
44. Do you consider sheriffs should specialise in 'areas' of 68
law?
yes 13
yes, but not strictly 1













no, except in children cases 1
in what circumstances? 1
undecided 3
47. Should the sheriff have the power to call parties? 68
yes 16
no 45
in what circumstances? 1
only exceptional - children 1
undecided 5
call them what? 1
48. Should there be an additional 'options hearing' prior





don't understand the question 3
not clear question 1
49. In your opinion, does increased judicial discretion








don't understand the question 3





no (except family cases) 1
not necessarily 2
how anything other advers. 1
not to the exclusion of 1
don't understand the question 1
51. Should solicitors be paid for taking avoidable 67
procedural steps in litigation?
yes 9
yes, grey area 1
no 51
depends on circumstances 3
depends on the reason 1




Questionnaire for Students Completing Diploma's Civil
Practice Section.
1. Did you graduate in law from this university? Yes / No
2. Do you have a traineeship? Yes / No
3. If so, will your traineeship encompass civil court experience? Yes / No / Don't know
4. Which area of law do you intend to specialise in?
or undecided
5. Have you observed actions in the sheriff
court or Court of Session? If so, which? Yes / No
If yes:-
- Sheriff Court
- Court of Session
6. Do you believe that the Diploma is the best
vehicle for learning the rudiments of civil procedure? Yes / No / Don't know
7. Which have you found to be more instructive
tutorials or lectures? Tutorials / Lectures / Neither /
Both
8. Have you participated in a mock debate? Yes / No
9. Have you participated in a mock proof? Yes / No
10. Have you examined in detail the 'rules' of written pleading
i.e. when to use different pleading formula e.g.
'believed to be true' or 'believed and averred'? Yes / No
11. Do you understand the concept of
Proof before Answer? Yes / No / Unsure
12. How would you characterise
your proficiency in drafting pleadings? Very good /good /fair /bad /very
bad
1
13. Do you fully understand the concept of relevancy? Yes / No / Unsure
14. When you have drafted mock pleadings,
have you made use of styles? Yes / No
If so, which of the following have you used? Bennett: Style Writs in the Sheriff
Court
Greens Litigation Styles
Dobie: Sheriff Court Styles
Diploma Handout
Other
15. Have you referred to any of the following books whilst
completing this part of the Diploma?
Maxwell: The Practice of the Court of Session Yes / No
Thomson & Middleton: Manual of Court of Session Procedure Yes / No
McBryde and Dowie: Petition Procedure in the Court of Session Yes / No
Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 17, Civil Procedure Yes / No
Greens Annotated Rules of the Court of Session Yes / No
Macphail: Sheriff Court Practice Yes / No
Lewis: Sheriff Court Procedure Yes / No
Kearney: An Introduction to Ordinary Civil Procedure in the Sheriff Court Yes
/ No
McCuIloch & Laing: New Ordinary Cause Rules Yes / No
White: Ordinary Cause Rules 1993 Yes
/ No
Lees: Pleading and Interlocutors Yes / No
McEwan: Pleading in Court Yes / No
Black: An Introduction to Written Pleading Yes
/ No
Jacob & Goldrein: Pleadings Principles and Practice Yes
/ No
16. Are you conversant with the rules of procedure
for the 'Commercial Court' in the Court of Session? Yes / No
17. How do you view abbreviated pleadings? For / Against / Don't know
Don't understand the
concept
18. Do you think a judge should:-
(i) only decide cases and let parties
dictate the progress of litigation?
know
(ii) act in an interventionist manner
and endeavour to speed up cases?
know
19. Do you think that the current system of pleading
-will stay unchanged? Yes / No / Don't know
-should stay unchanged? Yes / No / Don't
know
20. If not, why not?
Comment
Yes / No / Don't
Yes / No / Don't
lii
Thank for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.
liii
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(Edinburgh University Press, 1997). Parts of it have been used in Chapter 5 of this
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Regulation 3.9.11, published papers must be included in the thesis and the formal
permission of the publisher obtained. I am grateful to Edinburgh University Press for
granting permission to use the material.
Access to Justice: Lessons from the Sheriff Court?
In 1540, the Scottish Parliament of the time passed an Act ratifying the creation of the
College of Justice, the forerunner to the present Court of Session. It provided, inter
alia that the College 'remain perpetuallie, for the administratioun of justice' and
devolved:
'to the President, Vice-president, and Senatoures power to make sic acts,
statutes and ordinances, as they sail think expediente, for ordouring of
proces, and haistie expedition of Justice' (A.P.S. 1540, cap. 10.).
'Access to Justice' as a concept has been a powerful force in the regulation of civil
disputes in Scotland since the sixteenth century. It incorporates the idea that civil
justice 'should be available to all on the basis of equality, equity and fairness' (Jacob
1982: 277). Individuals are entitled to just and fair adjudication of their 'private'
disputes by the courts. To this end courts must provide a defined and simple
procedure which does not result in unnecessary delay and undue expense for the
litigant.
It is argued in some quarters that the present system of civil procedure in
Scotland does not meet these aims. Outmoded and 'a contemporary relic of a
vanished age'(Gill 1995:129), there are criticisms of the fundamental bases upon
which the system operates:- the adversarial nature of the system results in
unnecessary delay and resultant expense and nurtures a mentality which is not
conducive to the resolution of disputes (Jacob 1988: 16, Gill 1997: 129); the
emasculated role of the judge as passive arbiter or 'umpire' results in avoidable
delays in the expeditious progress of litigation; the formal requirement of
presentation of argument by written pleading adds to expense and as currently
practised produces 'the antithesis of the candid, concise and lucid document' the
system was designed to produce (Woolman 1997: 280). It is argued that for these and
other reasons, the costs incurred by litigants and the public in general (as indirect
funders of the system) have increased to such an unacceptable level that the system
must not only be reformed but radically overhauled (Mays 1997, Gill 1995).
In recent years those responsible for the administration and smooth operation
of the civil justice system have made a number of changes to the rules of civil
procedure (e.g. Commercial Court procedure, Optional procedure). More are
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contemplated (Cullen 1995). Central to these changes (implemented and proposed) is
the conceptual shift in the perception of the role of the judge. This article examines
the changes which were made to sheriff court ordinary cause procedure in 1993
which incorporated a similar shift, the problems the changes addressed and
attempts an assessment as to whether they have achieved their objectives. Similar
problems with civil procedure are perceived to exist in Court of Session Outer House
ordinary procedure and Lord Cullen has recommended the adoption of changes,
some of which are similar to those which have been implemented in sheriff court
ordinary procedure (Cullen). Change may be required, but it must not be change for
change's sake. The John Wheatley Centre has warned that wide-scale reform of our
system of civil justice is not to be undertaken lightly (Wheatley 1997: 3). Before any
radical reform is made, it may be prudent to take cognisance of the reception of the
1993 Rules changes which were implemented in the sheriff court.
Adversarialism and Defended Ordinary Cause Actions Pre-1993
Traditionally, 'ordinary' actions in the sheriff court were conducted in accordance
with the principles of an adversarial system. In an adversarial system, the court plays
a passive, non-interventionist role and the parties play a major, dominating,
independent role, seeking to persuade the court to adjudicate in their favour (Jacob
1987: 7).
The adversarial system is often contrasted with the inquisitorial system. With
an inquisitorial system of civil justice the roles of the court and parties are different.
The court takes a more active, interventionist and authoritative role; the underlying
principle being that the court is vested with the public duty and interest to ensure the
proper conduct, content and progress of the proceedings. The parties' role is minor
and supportive, assisting the court in ascertaining and determining the dispute
(Jacob 1987: 7).
Prior to 1993 the sheriff's function included ensuring that court rules were
observed and that progress of the proceedings was orderly and expeditious. His role
did not encompass however, taking control of litigation once it had been brought
into court (Macphail 1987: para 5-110). The pace and extent of litigation was largely
the prerogative of the parties. As one Sheriff Principal remarked, ' the sheriff can
exercise control but under the rules they are not explicitly required to do so. The
sheriff can act legitimately as a neutral referee under the rules' (Morris and Headrick
1995: 27). This traditional role of the sheriff was viewed by many as hindering the
expeditious progress of cases through the court which led to delay and expense.
Another contributory factor was the procedure itself.
Three aspects of the procedure in particular were perceived as contributing to
delay and unnecessary expense (Grant 1967; Hughes 1980; Morris and Headrick
1995:13-15. C.f. Gill 1995:129 and Cullen 1996 paras 3.6-3.20).
1. Adjustment: (c.f. Murray supra) Adjustment is the technical name given to
the process of each party altering their case. After the pursuer has stated his case in
law and fact, and the defender has answered this, the parties are afforded a period
for further alteration called adjustment. Adjustments by one party are often made in
light of issues raised by the other side. Under the old procedure, adjustments were
made by the parties on 'adjustment rolls' whereby cases called before the sheriff to
allow him to see the extent of progress being made by each side and to grant further
continuation where there were reasons for doing so. When both sides had completed
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their adjustment, the record (the document containing the parties respective final
cases for adjudication) was 'closed', which prevented further adjustment and the
case was sent for final determination. No time limit for the completion of adjustment
was provided. In theory, after one continuation, further continuations of the case on
the continued adjustment roll were only granted on 'cause shown' (which precluded
continuation by reason only that the parties had agreed to it) (Macphail 1987: para 8-
33). Although the adjustment and continued adjustment rolls were intended to
provide parties with the opportunity to make alterations to their pleadings to focus
and clearly define matters in dispute (Macphail 1987: para 8-27), in practice, the
continued adjustment roll became a significant cause of undue delay. Parties often
failed to focus the issues timeously, and on average cases were continued five or six
times (Dailly 1993: 180). New issues were often raised at the last minute requiring
further continuation to allow the 'intimatee' the opportunity to answer in the
interests of fairness.
It has been suggested that the last minute adjustment 'syndrome' (c.f.
Deutsch 1996: 8-9) prevalent at the time was due to poor preparation or as a result of
tactical decisions both of which resulted in delaying final determination of the case.
Joint motions for continuation were often granted without inquiry albeit that this did
not conventionally amount to 'cause shown'.
2. Procedure Roll: This was the roll to which cases were sent for miscellaneous
procedure e.g. for settlement and negotiation, minutes of amendment and answers
thereto, the lodging of joint minutes etc. In effect it became a procedural lay-by. In
the event that the sheriff refused further continuation for adjustment, some parties
would attempt to continue 'adjusting' their cases by lodging minutes of amendment
and answer on the procedure roll. Amendment is the procedure whereby parties
seek to alter their case after the record is closed. (In some cases, fundamental changes
to a parties' pleading prior to closing the record must also proceed by amendment.)
A party wishing to amend must get the approval of the court before the amendments
can be incorporated into the record. This would be sought ordinarily on the
procedure roll.
3. Fixing of Debates: A debate is a hearing where the parties argue their
preliminary pleas-in-law. Preliminary pleas are technical propositions of law which
do not go into the merits of the case. If a party insisted on his preliminary plea, under
the old procedure, the case was normally sent to debate. A significant number of
cases would have diets of debate assigned but thereafter discharged at or
immediately prior to the diet.
As a member of the Sheriff Court Rules Council explained:
'Another problem was that on average, eight out of ten debates fixed in
ordinary actions did not proceed. This was another unnecessary step in
procedure that was routinely used' (Dailly 1993:180).
Sheriff Principal Risk Q.C. has subsequently observed:
'As every experienced sheriff knows, the problem which existed under the
old rules was the fixing of scores if not hundreds of debates which were
never likely to proceed In many cases, when the record was closed, the
fixing of a diet of debate meant no more than a three-month delay '
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(Dinardo Partnership v. Thomas Tait & Sons 1995 S.C.L.R. (Sh. Ct) 941 @
945D)
Morris and Headrick found that sometimes it was the delay per se which was sought
and thus the debate was fixed with no considered intention of proceeding or as a
second preferred option when further continuation on the continued adjustment roll
was refused (Morris and Headrick 1995: para 4.25).
Reform of Sheriff Court Procedure and the 1993 Rules
The Sheriff Court Rules Council (hereafter 'The Rules Council') is a statutory body
whose function includes keeping under review the procedure and practice followed
in civil proceedings in the sheriff court (Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 s.34(2)).
The Rules Council carried out a study of a sample of ordinary cause actions
which had concluded in 1988 to investigate the extent of problems existing in sheriff
court ordinary procedure. They also received representations from interested parties
regarding undue delay, complexity and unnecessary attendance, and as a result the
Rules Council decided to instigate a review of civil court procedures and primarily
ordinary cause procedure. Their term of reference was: 'To examine the procedure
and practices in the sheriff's ordinary court and make proposals for reform with a
view to reducing delay, cost and complexity.' The Rules Council issued a
consultation paper outlining proposals for change together with propositions upon
which views were invited from interested parties (Consultation Paper 1990).
Following consideration of the responses to the consultation paper, the Rules Council
issued a report containing their conclusions (Report 1991) together with draft rules
which became, with minor modification, Act of Sederunt (Sheriff Court Ordinary
Cause Rules) 1993 S.I. 1993 No. 1956 (S.223) and which came into force on 1st January
1994. The rules implemented the Rules Council's five policy objectives for ordinary
cause procedure. These were: 'cases should call in court only when necessary; the
number of callings should be kept to a minimum; the rules should prescribe periods
for completion of the various stages of procedure; the control and management of
cases should be vested in the court rather than leaving the parties free to litigate at
their own pace; and the procedures of the Court of Session and the Sheriff Court
should be harmonised wherever possible' (McCulloch & Laing 1995: 24; Morris and
Headrick 1995: 6-7; Mays 1997: 94).
The 1993 Rules attempted to radically alter the way ordinary causes were
conducted in the sheriff court and in doing so the ethos which had existed under the
previous procedure. As Sheriff Principal Risk Q.C. observed: 'The 1993 Rules have
changed certain of the underlying assumptions upon which litigation is conducted,
one of their main principles being that the sheriff should take an active part in
ensuring the progress of the cause through the court' (Welsh). A 'blow-by-blow'
account of the rules is beyond the scope of this article, but for more detailed
examinations, see for example: McCulloch & Laing (1995); White (1994); Mays (1997).
The rule changes were welcomed in many quarters and were viewed as
innovative and 'demonstrating a line that could be followed with profit' (Morton
1995: 3). Lord Cullen in preparing his Review, visited sheriff courts to observe their
operation, principally the innovative options hearing procedure (Cullen 1995: para
2.5), and noted that the rules incorporated 'elements of a case management system'
(Cullen 1995:6.9). Lord Cullen subsequently incorporated the concept as one of the
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proposals in his Review. In the House of Lords, Lord Morton of Shuna, in a speech
relating to the provision of civil justice in Scotland, noted that:
'There has recently been a radical review of procedure in the sheriff court,
including a system under which the sheriff has much more control of the
way the case proceeds and the speed at which it proceeds. Unfortunately,
none of that applies in the Court of Session....' (Hansard No.1614:183)
Some of the concepts introduced by the rules were not original:
In 1967, the Grant Committee, (1967, p.175) recommended that in order to
avoid unnecessary appearances at court, 'there should not be repeated appearance
for the adjustment of pleadings' and unnecessary attendance could be prevented by
'the institution of a timetable indicating with reference to the date of the service of
the initial writ, the various procedural steps that the parties are required to take and
the time for taking them.'
In 1980, the Hughes Commission (Hughes Commission 1980), considering the
misuse of procedure as a source of delay concluded: 'It may be that a solution is
to be found in the court taking a more active role in controlling the conduct of a case
than has been traditional in our brand of adversary procedure.'
The 1993 Rules attempted to eliminate aspects of previous procedure which
were misused and resulted in delay.
To counter the appointment of 'wasted' debates, a party wishing to debate a
preliminary plea must prepare a 'note of basis of preliminary plea' and lodge it with
the court not later than three days before the options hearing or any continuation of
it. (OCR 22) The sheriff will only appoint the cause to debate if, after consideration
of the note in conjunction with submissions by the parties, he is satisfied that there is
a preliminary matter of law which justifies the debate (OCR 9.12.(3)). It was
envisaged that the sheriff would use this power to restrict cases seeking debate to
those cases where there was bona fide reasons for debate.
To counter the possibility of the adjustment period being misused,
adjustment is time-limited after which no further adjustment is permitted (except
with the leave of the sheriff). Rule 9.8 provides that the parties may adjust their
pleadings until fourteen days before the options hearing or any continuation of it.
The imposition of the time limit was intended to prevent the repeated continuations
which had existed under the old procedure which had been the cause of unnecessary
delay. The 1993 Rules do not provide for a 'Procedure Roll' or 'Miscellaneous
Procedure Roll'.
The most significant change implemented by the rules, however, was the
creation of the 'options hearing' which incorporated an element more commonly
found in inquisitorial systems of civil procedure. At the options hearing the court
exerts its control over a case by dictating future procedure including the mode of
final disposal. The sheriff is under a duty to 'secure the expeditious progress of the
cause by ascertaining from the parties the matters in dispute' (OCR 9.12(1)), as well
as any other matters relating to further procedure.
The discharge of the sheriff's duty is reliant on the parties fulfilling
corresponding duties imposed upon them. It is the duty of the pursuer to lodge a
certified copy of the record with the court which contains the pleadings (i.e. the
respective component final parts of each side's case) including authorised alterations,
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not later than two days before the options hearing or continued options hearing
(OCR 9.11) and it is the duty of both the parties to provide the sheriff with sufficient
information to enable him to conduct the hearing as provided for in the rule.
The sheriff reads the record prior to the options hearing and hears
submissions from the parties at the hearing. Thereafter, the rules provide that the
sheriff shall appoint the case to proof (or proof before answer if a Note has been
lodged). Both of these are final hearings which deal with the merits of the case and
lead to final disposal; or the sheriff sends the case to a debate if he is satisfied that
there is a preliminary matter of law justifying debate. Alternative courses of action
are available however. The sheriff may grant a continuation of the options hearing for
a period not exceeding 28days (or first suitable court day thereafter). There can be
only one continuation of the options hearing. This is designed to prevent the
recurrence of numerous continuations prevalent under the previous procedure. The
sheriff may order the case to proceed under Additional Procedure if he is satisfied as
to its difficulty or complexity. As its name suggests, this is a procedure which allows
the parties further procedure to clarify the issues in dispute and is designed to deal
with cases of such complexity that they cannot reasonably be completed within the
ordinary time frame. Finally, if a party is in default, the sheriff may grant decree as
craved, decree of absolvitor or dismiss the cause with expenses, as the case may be.
The ambit of situations in which a party is held to be in default is defined in Rules
16.2 (ordinary procedure) and 33.37 (family procedure). It includes the failure to
lodge, or failure to intimate the lodging of any production or part of process within
any time period provided for by the rules or by the sheriff. Also, failure to implement
an order of the sheriff or failure to appear or to be represented at any diet (i.e. court
date) will result in default. Therefore, if one or either of the parties fail to 'obey' the
rules they will be deemed to be in default. For example, if the pursuer does not lodge
the record timeously prior to the options hearing, the pursuer is in default. When a
party is in default the sheriff may grant decree against him. Of the decrees the sheriff
can grant, the first two decrees are final decrees. Respectively, neither the defender
nor the pursuer can come back to court. They have lost the action. This is a very
severe sanction. All they may do is appeal to a higher court. If the case is dismissed,
the aggrieved party may come back to the court and re-start the action from the
beginning. He has to re-incur previous expense to bring the action back to its point of
dismissal. If the sheriff dismisses the cause with expenses, the party must pay, in
whole or part, the expenses run up by his opponent from the start to the point of
dismissal as well as his own.
Late Records, Dispensing Power and the Expeditious Progress of the Cause
A party who fails to comply with the rules and is held to be in default can appeal to
the sheriff to be excused. He must have a bona fide reason or reasons for his failure.
He must explain to the sheriff the reason(s) and then move the sheriff to grant relief
from the consequences of his default by exercising the dispensing power under Rule
2.1. Whether relief is granted thereafter is a matter for the sheriff's discretion.
At the time the rules were introduced, it was envisaged that in most cases a
proof would be assigned following the options hearing (SCRC Report 1991; Civil
Judicial Statistics 1995) and in general, no continuation of the options hearing would
be permitted (Neilson 1993). Sheriffs were provided with guidance by members of
the Sheriff Court Rules Council prior to implementation of the rules as to the pro¬
active approach they were to take (Johnston 1995a: 5).
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As the rules were implemented, it became apparent, perhaps not
surprisingly, that parties, (or more correctly their advisors) were failing to meet the
time limits imposed by the rules. A particular problem was the failure by parties to
comply with OCR 9.11 (the lodging of the record before the options hearing) which
hindered the sheriff discharging his pro-active duty. Although in theory, every case
turns on its own merits, the courts, principally the appellate courts of the Sheriffs
Principal, sought to establish parameters and to give guidance and clarification as to
the practical approach to be adopted. This originally lead to a bifurcated approach as
to the sanctions which fell to be imposed for default. The following interpretation
came to be known as the 'strict or hard approach.'
The 'Strict' or 'Hard' Approach
The courts noted that the Ordinary Cause Rules 1993 provide that the
sheriff's function at the options hearing is to 'seek to secure the expeditious progress
of the cause' and it was therefore essential that the options hearing operated
efficiently to secure this objective (D.T.Z. Debenham Thorpe). The sheriff's role is a
pro-active one, and to discharge this, the sheriff must firstly prepare for the options
hearing by reading the record prior to the hearing. Therefore, it is 'crucial' or 'vital'
that the record is lodged with the court to permit the sheriff the necessary time to
prepare (Welsh; Group 4; D.T.Z. Debenham Thorpe; Morran). Default in not lodging
the record timeously affects not only the parties, but also the court and cannot be
disposed of by granting more time or by making a finding of expenses (D.T.Z.
Debenham Thorpe), nor can the sheriff merely continue the options hearing to
accommodate the late record as firstly he has no information before him to permit
such a course and secondly, this would be a corruption of the procedure (Group 4).
Continuations will only be granted if parties provide a persuasive reason for
requiring further continuation, which does not include a submission that the parties
are agreed as to further continuation (Mahoney; Welsh).
If the record has not been lodged then the party is in default and the sheriff
may grant decree of dismissal by default at the options hearing. Granting decree of
dismissal however does not cause substantial injustice as a party may return to court
and re-raise the action (Mahoney). Decree of Absolvitor is normally a sanction
wholly disproportionate to the default (Group 4).
However, the sheriff always has a discretion as to whether he grants decree
(D.T.Z. Debenham Thorpe). The sheriff may excuse the default by exercising the
'dispensing power' in provided in Rule 2.1. If his decision is appealed, the question
for an appellate court in reviewing the exercise of that discretion is whether the
sheriff has misdirected himself in law, or has failed to take into account a material
and relevant factor or has reached a wholly unreasonable result (D.T.Z. Debenham
Thorpe).
The 1993 Rules differ from the previous ordinary cause rules in that a party
must show that a failure to comply with the rules was due to 'mistake, oversight or
other excusable cause.' Whether the explanation given is 'excusable' must be
interpreted within the framework and philosophy of the 1993 rules (Morran). An
unfamiliarity with the rules does not amount to a satisfactory excuse for a failure to
lodge a record (De Melo), but may be sufficient to excuse failures to meet other time
limits.
In considering whether to relieve the party from the consequences of default,
the sheriff must also consider the consequences of dismissal. If it is not in the
interests of justice to dismiss the action (e.g. because the action becomes timebarred)
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or the action is not a simple or is an unusual one (D.A. Baird) the sheriff may grant
relief. A balance must be struck between the gravity of the default and the
consequences of granting decree of dismissal (Price).
A strict approach to the interpretation of the 1993 Rules is necessary as
excuses can easily be found for failure to comply and if they are accepted in one case,
in equity they must be accepted in other cases. Hard decisions are sometimes
necessary if the rules are to operate properly. Failure to lodge a record is not a trivial
matter, nor is it lightly excused, nor excused as a matter of course (Group 4).
This 'strict or hard approach' embraced a Procrustean attitude adopted by the
appellate courts in their interpretation of the provisions of the 1993 Rules may have
been informed by a fear that the new rules would be interpreted in practice in such a
way as to incorporate many of the bad practices which had existed under the
previous rules. The rules were formulated, as has been seen, to prevent the use (or
misuse) of procedure to hinder the expedition of cases through the court. The over¬
riding concern has been the retention of control of the pace of litigation by the court.
As Mays (1997) has noted, the dismissal of actions for procedural defaults appears
prima facie incongruous with the declared intention of the rules to expeditiously
progress cases and to eliminate delay and it is questionable whether overall
expedition and substantive justice is served by the enforcement and rigorous
application of the procedure. Further, the dismissal of cases normally results in the
penalisation of the parties themselves as opposed to their legal advisors. Such
considerations informed an alternative interpretation of the 1993 Rules relating to the
default of failing to lodge a record for an options hearing.
The 'Soft' or 'Lenient' approach
In the initial flurry of decisions following implementation, a 'softer' or more
'lenient' approach was expounded by the Sheriff Principal of South Strathclyde,
Dumfries and Galloway (Burtonport; Strathclyde Business Park) incorporating a
'bird's eye view' of the expeditious progress of a cause. The Sheriff Principal
considered that the unjustified dismissal of cases did not expedite them and incurred
expense as well as delay in the resolution of a dispute by bringing the pursuer back
to the start (Strathclyde Business Park). He considered that a dismissal would have to
be justified in accordance with conventional principles. In Burtonport, the Sheriff
Principal held that dismissal of the action for a failure to lodge a record was
unreasonable as again the pursuer would have to start again resulting in further
delay in the resolution of the dispute which was not the object of the 'new' rules. He
considered that the court should have adjourned the hearing for the record to be
lodged.
This soft or lenient approach was subsequently criticised by other sheriffs principal
on three grounds: firstly, it is founded conceptually in the position which existed
before the 1993 Rules and does not take account of the change of emphasis in the
1993 Rules (D.A. Baird); secondly, an adjournment would be a continuation within
the meaning of OCR 9.12 and would preclude further continuation for a 'legitimate
purpose' (Group 4); and thirdly, it fails to impose an effective sanction for failure to
obtemper OCR 9.11 (Group 4). However, as seen below, although this approach has
been discredited theoretically, there are suggestions it is more readily adopted at a
practical level.
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The 1993 Rules in Practice and Associated Problems
Practitioner Attitudes and the Culture of Reception
Reflecting on Lord Woolf's proposed changes to English civil procedure,
Scott has observed:
'The impact that they will have on the way civil cases develop cannot
accurately be predicted. Further, the ways in which parties, and more
particularly litigation lawyers will adjust to this remains to be seen. Their
resourcefulness and their capacity for good reasons and bad, to undermine
the best laid plans should not be underestimated.' (I.R. Scott in Zuckermann
& Cranston (1995): 29)
Remarking on the 1993 Rules, the pro-active role imposed on the sheriff, and
attitudes to the rules Mays has said:
'It is debatable to what extent the options hearing has truly transformed civil
litigation in sheriff court ordinary actions. Anecdotal evidence would
suggest that the options hearing has not revolutionised practitioner attitudes
to the process of litigation but rather that many old attitudes and approaches
are now accommodated within the confines of the new procedure.' (Mays
1997: 97)
The absence of published research makes it difficult to assess to what extent
the 1993 Rules have achieved in practice the objectives which underpinned their
creation. Their success was always likely to be dependent on the attitudes of the
bench and profession. Observations by sheriffs principal, sheriffs and solicitors in the
literature and reported cases, however, would seem to suggest that the Rules have
not been as successful as the Rules Council might have envisaged. This might partly
be explained by the fact that radical reforms usually produce unexpected,
unwelcome results (Zander 1995), but it is of greater importance that the changes to
the Ordinary Cause Rules were not initially universally welcomed by the profession.
As Mays has commented: 'at the time of implementation, and for a period thereafter,
the new ordinary cause procedure proved substantially unpopular'(Mays 1997: 96).
The reasons for this unpopularity are probably varied. It may have resulted from the
novel proposition that it was no longer possible for parties to dictate the pace of
litigation. Another plausible explanation for the 1993 Rules being unpopular may be
that a perception existed that there had been little wrong with the old procedure. The
Edinburgh Bar Association, after the 1993 Rules had been in force for one year,
canvassed the views of its civil litigation members as to the changes and noted:
'While many representatives appeared to take a relatively neutral view as to
whether the new rules represented a change for the better, significantly not
one single respondent expressed a view that the system was operating more
smoothly than was previously the case and several senior practitioners
wholeheartedly condemned the rules as being a backward and retrograde
step' ( Recommendations of Edinburgh Bar Association 1995:1).
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The imposition of time limits for the completion of parts of procedure also caused
concern (c.f. views expressed by practitioners prior to implementation. Headrick and
Morris 1995: 13-14). The view amongst some practitioners was that the rules had
become a 'procedural minefield' (Mays 1997: 97); making the lives of sole
practitioners a misery (Vocational Training Unit Seminar: Discussion) and in general,
failing to take account of the practicalities of the day-to-day running of solicitors'
offices operating within a commercial environment. The requirement to lodge a
record two days before the options hearing under pain of possible dismissal was
criticised in particular on the basis that it put solicitors and their staff under
'intolerable strain' (Recommendations of Edinburgh Bar Association 1995: 3).
It had been thought that the 1993 Rules would encourage parties in the early
preparation of their case. Last minute preparation had been not unusual under the
previous procedure. As the Hughes Commission noted 'There is a human tendency
for even the most responsible professionals, if they are busy men, to put off work
which can wait' (Hughes Commission 1980: 205). 'The natural human tendency to
leave everything to the last minute' (Deutsch 1996: 10), however, has probably
continued to have an effect on the 1993 Rules in practice and it is open to question
whether the aim of early preparation has been achieved.
Shrieval Interpretation, Substantive Justice and Procedural Compliance
Any approach taken by a sheriff will be according to his vision of the ethos
and underlying principles of the 1993 Rules. The rules enjoin the sheriff to 'secure the
expeditious progress of the cause'(OCR 9.12). Further, he has fairly broad powers
under Chapter 2 to relieve parties from the consequences of failures and defaults. In
both these respects the sheriff will act according to his personal perception of how
the rule should be applied. Necessarily his approach will be tempered by any
approach taken by his sheriff principal as well as by similar decisions of the Court of
Session which he is bound to follow. He may acknowledge the persuasiveness of
approaches adopted by other sheriffs principal (which are not binding on him). In
practice, however, the sheriff will have a wide latitude, perceived or otherwise, to act
according to the principles underlying the rules as he thinks best in all the
circumstances. As Sheriff Kelbie has noted, as the operation of (options hearings)
depends on the approach of the sheriff, 'it is not surprising that there appear to be
differences, even among sheriffs principal, in the decisions' (Kelbie 1995: 7). Implicit
in the introduction of the 1993 Rules was the idea that a new approach would
harmonise the conduct of litigation in the sheriff court throughout Scotland (Dailly
1993: 180), and that the 'pro-activity' imposed on the sheriff, whilst allowing a
beneficial degree of flexibility, would be used to ensure the efficient and expeditious
progress of cases through the ordinary court. In practice, there would appear to be
some variation of practice among sheriffs principal, sheriff courts and sheriffs.
Predictably perhaps, this has reached it's zenith (or nadir) at the point in the
procedure where the sheriff has greatest discretion, i.e., at the options hearing.
Whilst 'idiosyncrasies are part and parcel of the sheriff court' (Johnston 1995: 5), if
the approaches of sheriffs lack consistency, collectively they will also lack
predictability and a justifiable complaint among practitioners has been that it is now
important to 'know your sheriff' (Johnston 1995: 5). Sheriffs take differing
approaches at options hearings in the situation where the pursuer has failed to lodge
the record timeously and this has frustrated the objects of the rule. The 'strict
approach' would require the sheriff to dismiss the case unless the party moves him
to exercise the dispensing power, and the sheriff, in all the circumstances, considers
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it justifiable to do so. A study conducted by the writer (illustrative rather than
representative), found that whilst the incidence of failures to lodge records following
the implementation of the 1993 Rules has remained relatively consistent, the
incidence of dismissal has remained relatively low, sheriffs preferring if possible to
accommodate the late record and impose a sanction other than dismissal. This was of
course part of the (discredited) 'soft' approach.
Administrative Discrepancies
Discrepancies have arisen administratively as to whether the record can be
received after the period for lodging has elapsed. The Rules provide that the record
must be lodged two days before the options hearing and a shrieval decision (Maersk)
confirmed that this meant two 'clear' days after which the party is deemed to be in
default. It is understood that some sheriff courts have therefore refused to accept the
record if the time limit has expired. Other sheriff courts however have taken a more
lenient approach and have received the record, placing it with the papers for the
sheriff but marking it as 'tendered' as opposed to 'lodged'(i.e. marking that there has
been a failure to obey the rule as to timeous lodging but the record is still placed with
the rest of the papers). The sheriff is therefore alerted to the fact that there has been a
default in terms of the rules as the record is marked by the sheriff clerk as 'tendered'.
This approach permits him the opportunity of preparing for the options hearing by
reading the late record and thereafter addressing the default at the options hearing.
It is understood that some sheriff courts have considered that the record can
competently be lodged on the second day prior to the options hearing. The issue was
muddied when it arose before the Inner House in D.T.Z Debenham Thorpe. The
approach in Maersk was followed but the Inner House considered that a degree of
latitude is permissible when the rule operates in practice.
Aberration and Innovation
It has been argued that there has also been reluctance on the part of sheriffs to
act according to the principles of the strict approach which has led at best to straining
the interpretation of the provisions of the 1993 Rules and at worst innovation in their
application. Although Sheriff Principal Risk considered that the continuation of the
options hearing for the accommodation of a late record was a clear aberration of
procedure (Group 4), in seeking to act expeditiously, anecdotal evidence would
suggest that some sheriffs have on occasion adopted such a course. Further, at the
continued options hearing, in some cases the hearing has been continued again to a
'third options hearing' (e.g. Letter to the Editor, Greens Civil Practice Bulletin Issue
10: 11) or the court has engaged in the fiction of 'discharging and re-assigning' the
options hearing (e.g. Johnston 1996c: 5). The writer's research suggests that this is not
a common practice. However, the inherent danger in such courses being adopted is
that they are an implicit condonation of aberrations in procedure. Such
considerations were responsible for the frequent continuations of cases under pre-
1993 procedure (e.g. continuations not on 'cause shown' but on joint motion). It may
be that in some circumstances, the interests of justice require aberration or
innovation but these instances should be exceptional. Difficulties will always arise
for a sheriff in marrying substantive justice and procedural compliance.
The Return of the Procedure Roll
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An unfortunate addition to the 1993 Rules in some sheriff courts has been a
re-creation of the 'old' Procedure Roll. This was the Roll under the old procedure
which had been a contributory factor to delay endemic at the time. As has been
noted, the 1993 Rules do not provide for one. Commenting on an interlocutor which
continued a cause to the 'Additional Procedure Roll', Sheriff Principal Maguire Q.C.
said:
'This is not a creature with which I am familiar While I accept that not all
cases can proceed as smoothly as is envisaged in the Ordinary Cause Rules
1993 and there is on occasion necessary continuation to hearings to consider
Minutes of Amendments and the like, I would discourage the setting up of
Additional Procedure Rolls or Miscellaneous Procedure Rolls. If the Court
provides a haven, cases will inevitably seek shelter there. This will generally
be of benefit to the incompetent, inefficient or the merely idle. The courts
would then gradually revert to the pre 1993 attitudes. This should not be
allowed to happen. It is for Sheriffs to take charge of the cases so far as they
can, and ensure that the case proceeds as expeditiously as possible.' (Smart v.
Tullis Russell Ltd. Unreported 18th June 1996)
A very different view, however, was promulgated by the Edinburgh Bar Association:
'it has been noted that Glasgow Sheriff Court has instituted a Miscellaneous
Procedure Roll which appears to be quite inconsistent with anything in the
new rules, and it is understood that Dundee Sheriff Court now has a
Procedure Roll. That may be inconsistent with the content of the new rules
but it is utterly consistent with logic and pragmatism.' (Edinburgh Bar
Association 1995:10)
The writer is not aware of the number of 'procedure rolls' which have been
re-created in all the sheriff courts. It would follow, however, that if they are in
existence, there is some force in Sheriff Principal Maguire's argument, especially if
the adjustment period is not utilised effectively.
Adjustment and Amendment and Delay Displacement
The 1993 Rules provide that for a minimum of six weeks adjustment takes
place between the parties and must conclude fourteen days before the options
hearing. Further adjustment is permitted between the options hearing and any
continuation of it but again must be completed fourteen days before the continued
options hearing (in essence permitting a continued period of adjustment of two
weeks).
It would appear that in some courts, parties are increasingly intimating
adjustments on, or near the last day permitted for adjustment (Deutsch 1996: 8;
Johnston 1996: 6-7). This might be due to genuine last minute developments
requiring last minute incorporation or as a result of last minute preparation or
tactical decisions taken by one party seeking further continuation (Deutsch 1996: 8-9).
Whatever the motive, if the adjustments made by one party are significant and are
made on the last day permitted prior to a continued options hearing, the sheriff is
faced with the difficulty of either refusing a party the opportunity of answering
matters raised by an opponent (by legitimate means) and progressing the action to its
next natural step or seeking to accommodate within the time frame the opportunity
to answer the adjustments by amendment after the record is closed at the continued
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options hearing and fixing a diet of final procedure. The first approach is difficult to
reconcile with the interests of justice and with the second approach, the decision as to
final procedure may ultimately be frustrated by the dynamics of parties altering their
respective cases. After minutes of amendment and answer, parties are sometimes
permitted further 'adjustment' in light of them. OCR 18.3 provides that where the
sheriff allows adjustment to the minutes he shall fix a date for hearing the parties on
the minutes and adjustments. Both must be lodged with the court prior to the
hearing (Bryson) It is open to question whether the sheriff has the same pro-active
powers at such a hearing The sheriff held that he retained similar powers in the
decision of Bryson on the basis that the whole procedure under the 1993 Rules could
be called into question by parties lodging minutes of amendment.
An analogy with the practice under the previous procedure is apposite. With
the pre-1993 rules, delay was caused by lengthy adjustment and by the fixing of
debates which were then discharged and re-assigned or discharged and the
pleadings amended. Under the 1993 Rules, the period for adjustment is limited, but a
party may still attempt to amend. It would appear that the practice of amending after
the options hearing is becoming more widespread - at least in some sheriff courts.
One sheriff has commented:
'A guess - educated perhaps - suggests that no case ever comes to proof now
without at least one minute of amendment. Indeed it is not unusual to be met
at proof with a pile of papers which includes the third amended closed
record. One of the consequences of the new rules has been a greater reliance
on amendment and amendment procedure' (Johnston 1997: 4-5).
Morris and Headrick (1995:14) found that sheriffs would sometimes permit repeated
adjustment on the continued adjustment roll under the old procedure because they
appreciated that to close the record when parties had not completed adjustment to
their satisfaction only resulted in the problem of further alteration being taken to the
amendment stage, which resulted in considerable additional expense.
It may be that the imposition of time-limited adjustment by the 1993 Rules
has resulted in the increasing use of amendment which ultimately usurps the court's
interventionist management function at the options hearing and authoritative
guidance is still required as to whether the sheriff retains similar powers in relation
to a rule 18.3 hearing on minutes of amendment and answers. It could be argued that
the limiting of adjustment has resulted in problem displacement - delays now build
up after the options hearing before the case reaches final adjudication.
Sanctions for Default
A significant problem for sheriffs has been selecting an appropriate sanction,
if any, to apply to parties who have defaulted. This has been particularly so where
the pursuer has failed to lodge a record for the options hearing. It is a matter for the
sheriff's discretion. The 'hard' interpretation would suggest that the sheriff should
dismiss the action unless persuasive reasons or the 'interests of justice' dictate that he
exercises his dispensing power. However, the counter argument is that if the rules
were partly designed to reduce delay and expense for litigants, adopting such a
course does not necessarily achieve that objective. Such considerations informed the
'lenient' interpretation of the rules. If the action is dismissed the pursuer has
expenses awarded against him. Further, an award of expenses as a sanction will
often be ultimately relayed to the party unless the solicitor is found personally liable
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in the expense occasioned by the default, or he undertakes to pay the expenses
awarded against his client.
Prior to the 1993 Rules, in considering an adverse award of expenses for
procedural default, the court would often give consideration to the question of
whether the conduct resulting in the default was that of the party or the solicitor. In
considering decree of dismissal by default, it was usually considered inappropriate if
there had been no default on the part of the litigant himself (Macphail 1987: paras 5-
112; 14-08,14-09). Although the cases following the 1993 Rules have considered that
prejudice to the court is a consideration it is suggested that some sheriffs are
reluctant to indirectly penalise the party nor directly penalise the agent. No
distinction has been drawn in the case law between the actings of a pursuer and the
actings (or lack of them) of his agent although this distinction has been drawn
regarding the converse situation with defenders (Ellis).
Conclusion
Due to the unavailability of published research into the operation of the 1993 Rules,
the conclusions articulated in this paper are necessarily premissed on the
observations of practitioners published in the literature, the writer's research and
observations and anecdotal evidence. One may induce, however that the 1993 Rules
have been only partially successful in obtaining the five policy objectives of the
Sheriff Court Rules Council. Mays (1997) has suggested that old attitudes and
approaches are accommodated in the new rules. It is submitted that he is correct. The
1993 Rules attempted to revolutionise the conduct of litigation in the sheriff's
ordinary court. However, revolutions tend to return to an old order if they do not
have the support of the majority. As Main and Wadia have argued, changes to
systems of civil justice are dependent on the reaction of the culture they seek to alter.
Cultures alter gradually and it was perhaps optimistic to expect that among
practitioners, a Damascene attitudinal conversion would follow the implementation
of rules. Those responsible for enforcing the Rules, however, initially took a firm line.
Just as revolutions can be sustained by force, by and large, sheriffs and Sheriffs
Principal considered that they had a responsibility to make the 1993 Rules work in
practice. The strict approach elucidated through case law during the year following
the introduction of the 1993 Rules was a radical departure from the pre-1993
position. As Foulis has noted, prior to implementation, practitioners probably did
not anticipate the consequences of their failure to comply with the time limits
imposed by the rules. However, the sanctions for non-compliance imposed by the
courts in terms of the strict approach were not designed to punish or stimulate
solicitors to improve their performance by a system of reward and punishment.
Although sheriffs had been enjoined to take a firm approach to sanctioning non¬
compliance prior to the rules coming into force, the 'hard approach' (e.g. by
dismissing cases) was said to be part of the duty of the court to do justice between
the parties, (Sheriff Principal Risk Q.C.: 1996 S.C.L.R. 'Quotations' 1173B). In
accordance with previous theory, the courts did not exist and had never existed for
the sake of discipline (Macphail 1987 15-114). The courts have continued to maintain
that the strict approach should not employed to cut the Gordian knot.
Although the 'strict' approach came to be acknowledged as the proper
approach to be employed, it is uncertain to what extent it was and is universally
applied in practice. If the strict approach is being eroded in practice by aberrations in
procedure and 'mischievous' interpretations of the 1993 Rules, this should be having
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an effect on 'access to justice'. Assuming the 1993 Rules expedite cases on route to
adjudication or settlement and delay and expense is reduced, then superficially there
has been increased access to justice. However, if sheriffs view their expeditious
powers 'mischievously' as opposed to 'literally', whilst the instant interests of
substantive justice may be served, does arising inconsistency in approach lead to a
lack of predictability and Sheriff Johnston's 'know your sheriff' argument? Any
system of justice must be clear and predictable, procedural justice included.
Balancing these considerations will always be problematic. The scope for
inconsistency has increased in line with increased discretion. There are multifarious
interpretations of the 'expedition of the cause'.
If inconsistency in approach is an unwelcome element in sheriff court civil
practice, a solution may be lie with sheriffs receiving additional training as to the
exercise of the pro-active power. There are two problems with this however. Firstly,
it might be perceived as curbing traditional judicial independence and secondly,
more fundamentally, it is extremely difficult to give guidance as to the exercise of
discretion and pro-activity. They are inherently substantive. Although sheriffs
received training prior to the implementation of the 1993 Rules, the training was
restricted to guidance as to acting expeditiously. It is understood that training has
not been continuous following the induction course. It may be a solution can be
found by the new Judicial Studies Committee.
There is also uncertainty as to the current attitude of practitioners to the 1993
Rules. Although there was an initial scepticism and perception that the procedure
had not required alteration, it is difficult to assess whether the rules are now
accepted and complied with as envisaged by the Rules Council. The number of cases
appealed has dropped drastically which might indicate that this is so. However,
observations by the writer and articles by the profession in the literature seem to
indicate that practitioners have devised methods of avoiding, for whatever reason,
the most draconian interventionist aspects of the rules. There would appear to be
increased use of minutes of amendment on route to final determination. Adjustments
are intimated immediately prior to or on the last day permitted for adjustment.
Motions are made for innovative steps in procedure. Whilst these approaches may
not be calculated to delay final resolution, very often that is their effect. In addition,
before the introduction of the 1993 Rules, solicitors were urged to use the procedures
to compel their opponents to meet their case (Neilson 1993: 426). This would not
appear to have happened. As Sheriff Johnston has remarked, solicitors are 'extremely
forbearing with their colleagues' and are reluctant to do so. If the writer's
propositions are correct, the initial hostility found within some elements of the
profession would be expected to abate if methods are now used to wrest from the
court some control over the progress of litigation.
The 1993 Rules have been in existence now for nearly four years and have
been subsequently amended twice. The amendments have been primarily
clarificatory (dealing with anomalies raised in case law) and corrective (spelling
mistakes etc.) (although changes were made to motion procedure). The thrust of the
1993 Rules has remained unaltered and by inference the Sheriff Court Rules Council
would appear satisfied that they are working in practice. The perception amongst
Sheriffs Principal, sheriffs and court staff would appear to be that the rules have been
a success 'on the whole' and in any event a considerable improvement on their
predecessors.
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Surrendering the progress of litigation to the control of the court may be seen
as a potential solution to the interminable problems of delay which have traditionally
been found in Scottish civil procedure. However, as sheriff court procedure has
shown, there are inherent difficulties with the exercise of judicial inquisitorial
powers. Lord Cullen's proposals for reform of the Court of Session incorporate
powers of judicial interventionism which go beyond that which has been tried in the
sheriff court. The Faculty of Advocates has expressed reservations preferring the
retention of the traditional judicial role. If Lord Cullen's proposals are to operate as
envisaged, the Court of Session may look to lessons that are being learned in the
sheriff court. Current proposals for reform of civil procedure in the Court of Session
will be dependent for their success on a number of factors. Firstly, if the culture of
reception is wholly or in part hostile to the proposed reform, then the likelihood of
successful implementation is diminished. If those practising under new rules are not
fully agreeable to them, mechanisms will be devised and tried in an attempt to
undermine the effectiveness of reforms and to return to the old order. The history of
civil procedure is littered with similar examples. Secondly, (a point acknowledged by
Lord Cullen), the judiciary must be fully supportive of any proposals that are
implemented. If aberration or innovation is condoned, the interests of natural justice
entail universal application in all similar cases. This will invariably result in a
decrease in efficacy. Thirdly, pro-active powers, increased judicial discretion and
interventionism may be useful in the expedition of cases through the courts and a
reduction in expense and delay, but if these powers are exercised inconsistently, the
end result may be decreased predictability and a diminution in the coherence of the
civil justice system as a whole. Fourthly, the traditional safety net of appeal is
compromised by the very nature of the exercise of discretion. The appellate courts
have traditionally been reluctant to intervene with the exercise of judicial discretion.
Fifthly, it is difficult to give guidance to the judiciary as to the exercise of powers
designed to progress actions through the courts. The exercise of these powers will
always be dependent on substantive considerations and may ultimately be seen as a
threat to judicial independence.
The argument that the introduction of case management and increased
judicial discretion is the solution to the problems of delay and expense would appear
to have gained credence in recent years. Any civil justice system will involve some
delay and will involve some complexity. This does not mean that better systems of
civil justice cannot be devised. However, altering the roles of parties and judges and
incorporating elements of foreign procedure in the face of indigenous scepticism is
not necessarily the panacean solution. If the propositions expounded in this article
are correct, the sheriff court has shown that there are problems with such an
approach. The Court of Session should look to and learn from lessons currently being
learned following the introduction of 1993 Rules in the sheriff court.
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